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ABSTRACT
Since the end of Cold War, processes of regionalisation have developed in a world 
experiencing globalisation. The Tumen River Area Development Project (TRADP) is an 
UNDP-initiated multilateral sub-regional scheme for economic cooperation that emerged 
in 1992 and was institutionalised by the establishment of the Tumen Secretariat in 1995. 
It is based on ‘North-South’ cooperation as well as a socialist-capitalist division of labour 
among six neighbouring countries (China, Russia, DPRK, ROK, Mongolia, and Japan), 
involving certain adjacent areas in the Tumen River region -  which serves as a natural 
border for China, Russia, and North Korea. Arguing that the project has a significance 
that is more political than economic, the thesis will explore the significance of 
regionalism as an element of China’s security and foreign policy. China was the project’s 
most active supporter, from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. This thesis will argue that 
China developed the Tumen project not only as part of its own pursuit of domestic 
development, but also in order to take the initiative in regional economic development 
and to alter the distribution of power in Northeast Asia, in particular, the Korean 
Peninsula.
The thesis will also attempt to explain why China has found it so difficult to bring the 
project to fruition. The Chinese government did not provide proper infrastructure and 
give the project high priority in its national development policy. As a result, the project 
could not be attractive to the private sector, which was to be the major source of 
international investment. Further, the participating countries were concerned about 
Chinese motives and the economic and political-security implications of the project for 
the region. Thus, the project came to be regarded as a political ploy and was treated 
accordingly. This research hopes to make a contribution in two major ways. One is to 
understand the characteristics and trends of regionalism in East Asia; and the other is to 
delineate the scope and limits of China’s seemingly more interdependent, cooperative, 
and multilateral foreign behaviour since the late 1980s.
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Chapter One. Introduction
Introduction
The Tumen River region, which opens out to the East Sea (or the Sea of Japan), straddles 
the borderlands of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation, and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Arguably, the conflicts of this much 
troubled region have been occasioned by the confluence of broader international trends 
affecting the great powers with and local and regional developments. These at the time of 
the 19th and 20th centuries involved the competition between China, Russia, Japan, and 
the United States for control of Northeast Asia. Several wars have been fought over the 
region including those between China and Japan (1894-5), Japan and Russia (1905), 
China and Japan (1931) and first war of the Cold War, China/North Korea against the 
US/South Korea (1950-53). Indeed tension inherent over the last years has yet to be 
resolved. Moreover, past tense relations between the former Soviet Union and China have 
contributed to the area’s insecurity. To this must be added continued suspicion by 
Chinese and Koreans towards Japan and the persistent failure of Russia and Japan to 
settle their differences. This has resulted in a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
in the area, with cross-border relationships defined primarily by the conflicting political 
and strategic factors.
The end of the Cold War, not surprisingly, was instrumental in bringing about further 
change. It brought about new patterns of regionalisation and globalisation and pushed the 
countries in Northeast Asia to ease regional tensions and consider regional cooperation. 
Political polarity and economic interdependence led the regional countries to open their 
closed borders, regardless of differences in the political systems and ideologies. The key 
institutional expression of this was the Tumen River Area Development Project 
(TRADP) promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It aimed 
to bring together the six neighbouring countries (China, Russia, DPRK, ROK, Mongolia, 
and Japan) which hold territory and interests in the Tumen River region. The aim of the
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project was to enable this area to develop into a centre for transit trade or bonded 
processing area in the Northeast Asian sub-region. Promoters of the project such as Cho 
and Valencia claimed that opportunities would be created for the neighbouring countries 
to build new relationships with each other in the fields of trade, investment and 
technology transfer by taking advantage of the division of labour between them. 
Substantial gains were envisioned for all concerned. Such economic activity would lead 
to regional development and improvement in the standard of living of the relevant 
populations. It was hoped that in the long run, cooperation would lead to better mutual 
understanding, as a result of the working of institutional arrangements, involving linkages 
between divergent legal and political systems (Cho & Valencia, 1992: 14).
At the beginning of 1990s, the TRADP was seen as a great opportunity for promoting the 
regional economic development of the neighboring countries. In October 1992, the UNDP 
inaugurated the TRADP, with a view to establishing the Tumen River area as a regional 
centre for international trade and industrialisation. The Northeast Asian regional 
countries embarked on the Tumen project with optimistic ambition, but they ultimately 
failed to create the common joint development scheme. The nature of the multilateral 
project, originally based on the assumed feasibility of an international division of labour, 
changed to one that tried to come to terms with the fact that the relevant parties 
approached the project in a competitive way that arose from divergences in their 
respective national interests. The objective then became one of trying to find ways of 
coordinating the various unilateral, bilateral and multilateral relationships. Overall, the 
response from the private sector, which was ultimately responsible for the bulk of 
investment, was cool, and the future of the project no longer looks as bright as it did in 
the early 1990s. Enthusiasm for the TRADP has waned considerably.
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Bringing in the two themes o f the thesis
At present the TRADP is generally regarded as a ‘failure’. It has not lived up to original 
expectations and there appears to be a belief that the project no longer has a realistic 
prospect of becoming an example of successful multinational economic cooperation. If 
this is the case, then what need is there to study the TRADP at all? A major argument of 
this thesis is that there is always something we can learn, even from ‘failure’, and that 
there are many interesting aspects of the presumed failure that have yet to be examined. 
Beyond analysing the dimensions of its failure, there are two additional aspects of the 
TRADP that will be considered.
The first theme focuses on the experiences of the TRADP, as an example of regionalism. 
In the period since the end of the Cold War the process of regionalisation has 
accompanied the intensification of globalisation. Some scholars have been concerned 
with the wider political aspects of globalisation, and consider in particular how the nation 
state is the focal point for globalisation (Hirst & Thompson, 1996). Regionalisation in 
this context is regarded as more than a pattern of increased interactions, especially of the 
economic kind, within states and across state boundaries. Most of the analysis in this 
thesis is concerned with how regional cooperation may apply in the Asia-Pacific region 
in general and East Asia in particular. There has been an increasing interest in East Asian 
political and economic development in this period of globalisation in which complex of 
globalising and localising tendencies interact with each other. What are the characteristics 
and pattern of the development of regionalism in East Asia? Can the Western type of 
institutionalised regionalism apply to East Asia? How significant are the roles of the 
market and the state in creating regionalism in East Asia? And how easily does 
cooperation occur in the region? This study explores the potential of one of the most 
economically dynamic regions in the world which its development will arguably have a 
major impact on the future direction and substance of regionalisation. This research will 
further contribute to the current regionalist debate on ‘the difficulty of making firm 
generalisation about the relationship between regionalism and international order’ 
(Fawectt & Hurrell, 1995: 324).
20
The second aspect centres on China’s foreign policy in which regional issues have 
acquired a growing significance. Extending beyond the economic aspects of cooperation 
between adjacent countries, regionalism offers additional dimensions for the study of 
foreign policy (Weatherbee, 1995). Regionalism contains major political and security 
implications beyond transnational economic interaction. This thesis involves studying the 
international security order of the post-Cold War period, focusing on regionalism, the 
political and security dilemmas of and within states, and the states’ foreign policy. In case 
of China, the issue is not just whether Chinese regionalism is an attempt to take 
advantage of general trends in the global economy, but whether it serves particular 
political and foreign policy interests. The Chinese government has deliberately promoted 
regionalism since 1979 when Deng Xiaoping first selected a policy of economic 
development that placed priority on the coastal regions. That programme further 
encouraged the border areas of the country to cultivate economic relations with adjacent 
neighbouring countries. How has China managed border relations through sub-regional 
economic cooperation? As China develops economically, has its foreign policy become 
more interdependent? What strategic foreign policy objectives has China aimed for? And 
has economic development brought real changes to foreign policy? Answers to the 
questions about regionalism as an instrument of China’s foreign policy therefore helps 
understanding the scope and limits of China’s seemingly more interdependent, 
cooperative, and multilateral foreign behaviour since the late 1980s.
Thus the TRADP will be a useful case study in examining two related issues: First, the 
nature of regionalism in the Asian context: as the only multinational economic 
cooperation project in Northeast Asia, the analysis of the TRADP can provide a model 
for examining the characteristics, potential and limits of regionalism in East Asia. 
Second, the significance of regionalism as a component of China’s security and foreign 
policy: the study will argue that this particular regional project emanated from Chinese 
preoccupation with regional development within China and as linked with adjoining parts 
of neighbouring countries. Studying regionalism is also useful to understand the nature of 
the Chinese foreign policy of interdependence. It reveals the complexity of the political 
relations between China and its neighbouring countries. It illustrates the fragility of
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economic interdependence in the context of the cautious and suspicious inter-state 
relationships in Northeast Asia, where political, economic and military rivalry and 
historical hostility are still dominant. This thesis places the study of regionalism within 
the disciplines of both IR and China area studies. It aims to combine the insights of China 
area studies which emphasise the alleged uniqueness of China’s characteristics and 
experiences with IR scholarship that focuses on the more general view of China as a 
member of the international community that has not been excluded from external 
influence. It therefore hopes to contribute to the academic exchange between IR on the 
one hand, and the area studies of Northeast Asia and China, on the other.
To examine the TRADP in the context of the themes, this introductory chapter examines 
the theory of ‘relative gains versus absolute gains’. This theoretical setting of the concern 
of states in contemplating cooperation can explain the success or failure of regionalisms 
in various parts of the world, and then highlight the implications of relative gains for 
China and illustrates the applications to the study of China’s foreign policy. Finally, it 
will outline the research design, and summarise the contents of this thesis.
I. Regionalism in international relations
1. The concern for regionalism in cooperation between states: Theoretical setting
The major focus of this thesis is to analyse why China has shown a more cooperative 
attitude since the open door policy in 1978 and, more concretely, how the country has 
manipulated such a cooperative policy of regional cooperation for its purpose. Of course, 
this thesis does not attempt to test international relations (IR) theories. However, in 
examining the obstacles facing China’s regionalism policy of interdependence with 
neighbouring countries, this thesis joins in some of the debates, that scholars in 
international relations have long tried to understand; why and when can cooperation 
develop? Why does regional cooperation fail to emerge in most cases? And what 
accounts for its success in the other cases? (Oye, 1986; Ugur, 1997; Jervis, 1999). This
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section reviews the broader theoretical point regarding the nature and role of states in 
cooperation with one another, before explaining why most regional activities have been 
unsuccessful. Within the context this thesis goes to clarify the nature of China’s 
cooperation foreign policy by underlining the general scope and possibilities of states’ 
foreign policies.
1.1 Relative versus absolute gains
Theoretical analysis of regionalism in international political economy generally begins 
with the state as a key level of explanation (Gamble & Payne, 1996). Differences about 
the bases of cooperation stem from the question as to whether states are concerned 
primarily about relative or absolute gains. The basic point can be found in the following 
passage from Waltz:
When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that 
feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to 
ask not ‘Will both of us gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more?’(Waltz, 1979: 105; 
also quoted in Baldwin, 1993: 5-6)
This important factor of perceived gains is interpreted differently according to the 
theoretical problem; with neoliberals stressing absolute and neorealists relative gains 
(Baldwin, 1993: 5). From the neoliberal camp, Snidal does not accept that the issue of 
relative gains is always an inhibiting factor to cooperation. States are always able to make 
up for any relative disadvantage by other means. Through further cooperation and 
agreement, with compensation or structural reforms, states may arrive at a balance that is 
acceptable to the initially disadvantaged partner (APSR, 1993: 730-1).
From the neorealist camp, Grieco challenges Snidal’s absolute gains assumptions. He 
reminds us that in a game where present friends can become enemies, concern about 
relative gains will always be in the background. Unequal gains in such cooperation will 
always be a fact (Grieco, 1988, p. 499, in Matthews, 1996: 119). And Gilpin suggests that 
some partners in international cooperation have gained far more than others. The 
significance of relative gains may be greater than that of absolute gains (Gilpin, 1992:
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52). This is especially the case in security rather than economic matters, since economic 
rivalry does not present a direct threat to national sovereignty. Of course, a country with a 
strong economy may turn such economic strengths into military capabilities (Matthews, 
1996: 115).
Explaining cooperation requires a more careful approach than is allowed for by the pure 
argument about relative gains versus absolute gains. Matthews distinguishes scenarios 
when relative or absolute gains are more or less significant in the players’ objectives. 
Under some conditions, gains, however small, will accumulate and earlier rounds will 
influence the later rounds significantly to establish market or security dominance. In 
these cases relative outcomes are of great importance. In circumstances, where gains will 
not accumulate, then clearly absolute gains will have more prominence. Both neorealists 
and neoliberals have come to agree that it is important to identify when conditions will 
lead to relative gains as they may hinder successful outcomes of cooperation (Matthews, 
1996: 112, 116-7)
1.2 Why cooperation does not arise in most cases
In practice cooperation between states is not easy. Cooperation at governmental level 
occurs only when players adapt ‘their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences 
of others, through a process of policy coordination’ (Keohane, 1984: 51). There are at 
least two additional sources of a state’s concerns about cooperation: uncertainties about 
the other partners, and fears with regard to relative gains. In Grieco’s view, the prime 
motivation of states is a deep-seated fear of being dominated by other states and the need 
for security. Milner refers to Grieco as arguing that this leads states to aim to be as self- 
reliant as possible. It also means that in changes in international power relations states 
will be concerned to maintain their relative power positions, and that any cooperative 
relationships that negatively affect these positions will be viewed unfavourably (Milner, 
1992: 482-3).
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Such defensive state positioning1 is considered by realists to be an unfortunate reflection 
of the uncertainty in international relations. States are naturally concerned about one 
another’s future intentions and how cooperation might influence the future balance of 
power and capabilities (Grieco, 1993a: 128). One could foresee cooperation leading to 
increase influence, thus forcing disadvantaged partners ‘to accept progressively less 
favourable terms’ not only in the original cooperation agreement but ‘in arrangements in 
other domains as well’. This can restrict the independent action of the disadvantaged 
partners (Grieco, 1993b: 315). In cases where this threat is perceived as more likely, there 
is of course more sensitivity to relative gains, tending towards the adoption of this 
defensive positioning (Matthews, 1996: 119).
Participating countries may decide to act as individuals rather than collectively or 
cooperatively when they are wary of their partner making even relative gains, or when 
the future is uncertain and thus involves risk. In seeking to reduce the gains available to 
others, there are various alternatives to cooperation: withdrawal, unilateral behaviour, and 
inactivity. Unilateral action may be taken, and simple inactivity is an alternative to 
cooperation. These may not aim to affect others’ gains, but still will be uncooperative if 
they do not bring down the negative impact of the acting party’s policies (Milner, 1992: 
468). If a state has concerns that a partner has real prospects of making relative gains and 
if this is seen as a threat, that state may well withdraw its cooperation or rein in its 
cooperative actions, even though it may have stood to make large absolute gains (Grieco, 
1993a: 128).
1 Snidal briefly clarifies Grieco’s definition as ‘[T]he possibility o f some states’ seeking relative gains leads 
all states to forego co-operative opportunities out o f fear that others will take advantage of them’ (Snidal, 
1993: 201).
1.3 When cooperation is possible in specific cases
International cooperation is possible, although it is hard to achieve. Bearing in mind the 
central motivation of states will clarify the range of possibility of cooperation. My 
argument is that cooperation is unlikely in cases where countries are seeking to minimise 
partner countries’ relative gains, or where future outcomes are too uncertain. In such a 
case they will prefer to act unilaterally or may be inactive. However, cooperative action 
may be won even in such a case, if long-term strategic considerations are taken into 
account. Reluctant cooperation can arise when states fear that being left behind will 
weaken them, even though rivals may gain as a result.
Relative gains will allow one state to have the upper hand over another under certain 
conditions. Even though the actual gain may be small, a relative gain may be very 
important. This is especially so where ‘winning or losing ground’ may influence who 
wins the next round of negotiations or positioning, and thus in the long term determine 
which country is able to establish the superior position in market or security domains 
(Matthews, 1996: 128). Relative gains can be in the area of economics, security or 
politics, and not all states may be so concerned about them. If the government of a state is 
focuses on its economic interests, the relative gains of the state lie in economic terms. 
Cooperation in that case would not present so many problems. If regime stability is what 
governments value above all, then the relative gains will be couched in political terms. 
Under such conditions, a state might refuse cooperation despite potential economic gains. 
If there are no threats to political stability, then even if there were no economic gains to 
be had, a state may cooperate in a project, albeit reluctantly.
Even if the government of a state judges that there are no possible political, economic, or 
security gains in cooperation, it may not withdraw from the cooperation opportunity so 
long as there is some degree of uncertainty about the future. Provided that cooperation 
does not entail large sacrifices of a sensitive or threatening nature, the state might not 
withdraw from cooperation, calculating that it would be a way to keep a foot in the door 
and to keep its options open, or possibly to counterbalance other players whose relative 
power was seen to be growing.
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1.4 The number of actors
How important is the number of actors in achieving successful regional cooperation? The 
range of different views on the influence of the number of actors indicates the difficulties 
in understanding the issue. ‘Relative gains considerations are shown to matter only for  
issues involving small numbers o f states. The impact o f relative gains drops o ff quickly 
with more than two states and is virtually irrelevant for issues involving a large number 
o f actors. In addition, the transition to cooperation is not appreciably more difficult 
under relative gains than under absolute gains’ (original emphasis) (Snidal, 1991: 388). 
In total contrast, Oye explains why cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of 
actors increases. As the number and heterogeneity of players increases, ‘transactions and 
information costs rise’. ‘[T]he likelihood of autonomous defection’ increases while 
simultaneously becoming harder to detect and to control. As the gains and costs become 
obscured, ‘prospects for mutual cooperation may decline’ (Oye, 1986: 18-9).
For Walter (1995: 83), however, the number of actors is not a factor which necessarily 
determines the effectiveness of regional institutions. Neorealist and neoliberal arguments 
are used at both global and regional levels. It is true that the size of a body in terms of 
numbers of participants can make institution building complicated. Nevertheless, against 
this, these processes are supported by the move towards multilateral thinking, working in 
coalition, and by the fact that in very large multilateral bodies it is often only a small 
group of major players (such as the US, the European Community (EC)/European Union 
(EU) and Japan within the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT)) who call the 
shots. Milner claims ‘the relationship between the number of actors and [effective] 
cooperation may be quite complex’ (Milner, 1992: 474). Still, it seems axiomatic that the 
greater the number of the actors, the more complex the form of cooperation and the lower 
the chances of success. However, there is no optimal number of players. Actors may 
cooperate for the reasons discussed previously, the most important being the political will 
of the governments.
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1.5 The importance of political decision
What makes states decide whether or not to cooperate in a regional project? As discussed, 
relative gains influence a state’s decision. However, as Milner argues, international 
anarchy does not necessarily make the dichotomous question of ‘relative or absolute 
gains dominate the motivations of states’ (Milner, 1992: 496). Domestic politics, a factor 
in goal setting ‘a state’s position, the nature of its political system, bureaucracy, the 
influence of special interests, and public opinion’, may be of great influence in 
determining strategic positioning of states at international level (Ibid.: 493). As Oye 
notes, some domestic interest groups may benefit from regional agreements, and this will 
be a further spur towards liberalisation as a regional or multilateral level (Oye, 1992, in 
Walter, 1995: 82). More particular factors may add influence from the personal 
orientation of leaders or privileged elites, the pressure of powerful lobbies, to the hard-to- 
define influence of national character (Jervis, 1988: 324-29). In the realm of foreign 
trade, Grieco points out the strong factor of domestic political institutions (Grieco, 1990, 
p. 24, in Milner, 1992: 490).
Self-interested strategic motives must be read into any cooperative as well as individual 
actions of states. As this self interest differs according to differing domestic 
characteristics, states’ international goals will also differ (Milner, 1991: 81). States will 
also have an eye on the benefits of cooperation taken by other states, and will use this as 
a measure of the strategic benefit to themselves. Therefore, within an international 
system, cooperation may or may not be attainable because of domestic conditions.
2. The political economy of regionalism: Empirical setting
Theorising about the economic, political and security significance of regionalism has 
largely been based on particular sets of institutions including the European Union (EU) 
within Europe, and the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) within the Asia Pacific. With the end of the Cold War such regional 
arrangements can be seen as leading to increased regional economic and political
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integration. While they may all be framed within a common globalist perspective, each 
regionalism has ‘distinctive features’ (Aarts, 1999: 911) in terms of the degree of 
institutionalisation and speed of progress. If considered in the framework of relative 
gains, such differences may be explained by the changes ‘taking place in the relative 
strengths and capabilities of partners in the different regions’, and how those changes 
affect the attitude of nations towards regionalism (Grieco, 1997: 176).
For regionalism to be successful, its distinctive features should be considered from two 
perspectives: i) whether a leading country (or countries) within a region is willing to 
provide a common good, and/or less powerful states are willing to accept the leader(s); 
and ii) whether rivalry between major powers can be accommodated in the region. This 
section will show that the EU succeeded because rivalry between major powers such as 
Germany and France was accommodated, while NAFTA could succeed because the less 
powerful countries such as Mexico and Canada accepted the US as the unquestionable 
leader. However, most regionalisms in other parts of the world have not been successful. 
Central American states sought unilateral actions to maximise their national interests, 
thus sowing distrust. Political and historical rivalry were crucial in the cases of South 
Asia and Middle East. Meanwhile, despite economic dynamics, along with many 
political, economic and historical reasons, the rivalry between Japan and China is the 
fundamental obstruction to the success of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific in general and 
East Asia in particular.
2.1 Successful cases of regionalism
Europe
Regionalism is generally considered to be more firmly established in Western Europe, the 
EC being the focal point for extensive economic cooperation. The European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) was set up in 1951 between France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. This became, in 1957, the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Integration has been expedited by a series of legislations, such as the 
implementation of the Single European Act in 1986, and the Maastricht Treaty 1991
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which created the EU. Other countries joined successively: Britain, Denmark, and Ireland 
joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden in 1995. There are plans to extend its scope to the countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe. The European countries have sought not only economic integration, but 
also cooperation on social issues, defence and foreign policy (Ibid.: 168).
There are various reasons for the success of European regionalism. The first is its relative 
homogeneity, both historical and cultural. Another was the commonly perceived threat of 
the Soviet Union and the member nations’ interest in centring US leadership in the 
security sphere. Yet another powerful reason was the congruence of the interests of the 
major European powers. A single regional hegemon did not exist in Europe, rather the 
regional leadership has been ‘divided relatively evenly between Germany, France, and 
Britain’ (Gamble & Payne, 1996: 257). Initially France opposed the creation of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, but later chose the path of integration as a way of checking 
the growing power of Germany within the structure of a higher authority. The ECSC 
were devised not only to secure France’s economic interests, such as equal distribution of 
the supplies of coal and steel with Germany, but also to prevent the possible recurrence of 
war between France and Germany (George, 1996: 22). Western Germany in turn believed 
the ECSC could help breakdown the suspicions of other European countries towards the 
new state, as well as encouraging economic development. Britain later joined the EEC 
partly to counter the growing French leadership, which aimed to develop the EEC into a 
third global power alongside the US and the Soviet Union (Ibid.: 24).
North America
In Europe regionalism thrived on a balance of power between the equals France and 
Germany, and on the recognition that the US was dominant at global level. North 
American regionalism, by contrast, was much less balanced. The US is the undisputed 
hegemon, as demonstrated in the negotiation of NAFTA. The partner countries were in a 
dependent relationship (Haggard, 1997: 21). Over 70% of Mexico’s trade was with the 
US before the establishment of NAFTA. Economic factors were paramount, with Mexico 
suffering an economic crisis. Liberalisation of regional trade on whatever terms imposed
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by the US was considered by Mexico to be beneficial, especially as a way to encourage 
foreign investment (Grugel, 1996: 142-3, 147). Canada also had little option but to join, 
with 22% of US trade (US$79 billion) directed there in 1989 (Payne, 1996: 102). It did 
not want to risk losing out to Mexico (Gamble & Payne, 1996: 255).
2.2 Unsuccessful cases
Central and South Americas
Unlike the successful implementation of the EU and NAFTA, regional efforts in other 
parts of the world have been unsuccessful. Regionalism in Central America is one such 
failure. Regional initiatives were first stimulated by the US’s Enterprise for American 
Initiative (EAI) in 1990 and the subsequent NAFTA agreement between the US, Mexico, 
and Canada (Grugel, 1996: 132). The Mercosur (The South American Common Market) 
was created by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991. It was an attempt to 
upgrade the economic cooperation between Argentina and Brazil into a common market 
union. Despite a great deal of institutionalisation, South American regionalism has not 
achieved much substantially (Bull, 1999). Other attempts at regionalism took place in 
Central America. In 1993 the Central American Integration System (SICA) was 
established between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. However, with a 
history of regional instability, national interests have dominated the outcomes. More 
often the member countries have operated bilaterally with third parties, for example, in 
the Costa Rica-Mexico treaty of 1995 followed by independent negotiations with Mexico 
by El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala (Ibid.: 961). This has naturally undermined 
regional efforts.
South Asia
The failure of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been 
well described in a recent issue of The Economist (2002). Despite more than five years of 
cooperation between the SAARC’s seven members (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives) in a preferential trading arrangement, in 
2001/01 exports from India to the SAARC stood at only 4% of its total export, and the
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figure for Pakistan was 3%. A more ambitious proposal for a trade agreement based on a 
common market for the region is unlikely to take off. Part of the reason is because the 
member countries are in favour of bilateral trade rather than remaining within a regional 
grouping but, more crucially, the stand-off between Pakistan and India has created a 
security crisis which has affected wider regional trade, and member countries.
Middle East and North Africa
Although there has been talk of regional integration in the Middle East and North Africa, 
this has been more of symbolic value then having wide tangible benefits. The Arab 
Maghreb Union (UMA) consisting of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, 
created in 1989, had potential to harness complementarities for growth. However, 60- 
75% of trade of the UMA remains extra-mural with Europe rather than intra-mural. On a 
political level there is little cooperation between widely differing ideologies. In 1989 
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and North Yeman formed the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), but 
it turned out to be a strategic ploy between the members. The ACC broke down after the 
Gulf crisis of 1990, and cooperation across the Middle East has remained plagued by 
violence and political instability (Aarts, 1999: 912-3)
2.3 Asia-Pacific: Test case at trial
In contrast to the large extent of institutionalisation in Europe and Americas, the process 
of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific is insignificant, notwithstanding the economic growth 
and development achieved with the region. There have been various levels of 
regionalism. At an Asia-Pacific level there is APEC and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 
Lower down come ASEAN, ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the East Asia 
Economic Group (EAEG)/East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC). Finally there are several 
sub-regional economic zones (SREZs).
ASEAN has had some success, introducing preferential trading amongst members. 
However, these possibilities have not been fully realised. In 1992 AFTA was set up with 
a 15-year plan for trade liberalisation, but again real progress has been limited (Grieco, 
1997: 167). The 23 countries of the ARF, set up in 1994, work together on political and
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security matters, but with the minimum of institutional formality. Malaysia led the way in 
putting forward the more institutionalised EAEG/EAEC, but received little initial support 
across the region (Ibid.: 170). Since 1989, APEC has brought together representatives 
from the US, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, China, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and the ASEAN countries. In 1994 the target was agreed of liberalising trade 
and investment by 2010 between those countries that were economically developed, and 
by 2020 for less developed countries (Ibid.: 168), and following year it was agreed that 
the target was not binding. However, it would be safe to comment that the APEC is 
‘largely engaged for the most part solely in the gathering and exchange of information’ 
(Ibid.: 169). The value of APEC was more in the forum itself, which provides a process 
for confidence building, although it has a considerable amount of institutionalisation. All 
of these organisations offer little more than opportunities for dialogues.
Apart from APEC, ASEAN, and AFTA cooperation at macro-level, it is notable that a 
new cooperation model has emerged in East Asia. This is the Sub-regional Economic 
Zones (SREZ), involving links between segments of neighbouring states. There are nine 
SREZs in East Asia (Chia, 1993: 4-9). In Southeast Asia, the Singapore-Johore-Riau 
(SIJORI) connects Singapore and the provinces of Malaysia and Indonesia. The Baht 
Economic Zone includes Thailand and the contiguous border areas of southwest China 
(Yunnan province), Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The Northern Growth 
Triangle (NGT) proposed by Malaysia, comprises the neighbouring areas of 11 provinces 
in Western Indonesia, northern Malaysia, and southern Thailand. The Eastern Growth 
Triangle (EGT) straddles four ASEAN countries, namely Brunei, Sulawesi in eastern 
Indonesia, Mindanao in southern Philippines, and Sabah and Sarawak in eastern 
Malaysia. The Greater Mekong Sub-regional Development Project embraces Myanmar, 
China, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand. In Northeast Asia, the Greater South 
China Economic Zone (GSCEZ) combines China’s Guangdong province, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong. The Sea of Japan (East Sea) Economic Zone includes the Russian Far East, 
the three northeast provinces of China, the Korean Peninsula, and Japan’s sixteen coastal 
prefectures on the East Sea. The Yellow Sea Economic Zone links China, Japan and 
South Korea. The TRADP involves the Russian Far East, China, South and North
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Koreas, Mongolia, and Japan. SREZs were seen as a great opportunity to promote mutual 
regional economic development. However, most of the above projects have failed to 
deliver, and only two SREZs - SIJORI and GSCEZ - can be considered successful in the 
region. Even those two appear to have developed independently of the end of the Cold 
War and the continuing trend towards globalisation.
Thus it is apparent that there has been a failure to establish strong regional institutions in 
the Asia-Pacific. This can be attributed to three factors (See also Chapter Two). First, 
whereas Western Europe felt threatened by the Soviet Union, Asia did not suffer in the 
same way from a single sustained external threat. Security was not guaranteed through 
pooled arrangements but largely through bilateral agreements with the US. Second, the 
concept of Asia includes not only a huge diversity of cultures, histories and interests, but 
also a wide disparities of economic development and a range of models from market 
economies such as Japan and the four Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) and 
ASEAN countries, through market socialism such as China and Vietnam, to the central 
command economy of North Korea. The area has experienced some rapid growth in 
investment and trade quite apart from developments in regionalism, and most countries 
are individually strongly dependent on US markets (Haggard, 1997: 45-6). These features 
both militate against the development of coordinated regional policy making. Third, as a 
result of historical rivalry and conflicting political ideologies, the countries in the region 
have been suspicious of each other. Franco-Germany rivalry was brought into 
accommodating framework, but Sino-Japanese relations, for example, cannot be said to 
have fully thawed. With no single regional hegemon, major players are still trying to 
extract economic and political advantages (Ibid.: 46-7; Bergsten, 2000).
3. A contribution to the study of international relations
Against this background, what does the case study of TRADP add to IR? It has four key 
findings to contribute to the comparative study on the world’s regionalisms. First of all, 
analysis of the TRADP as a SREZ within the framework of IR theory will shed further 
light on the characteristics and pattern of development of regionalism in East Asia. Such
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an analysis can benefit from looking at similar emerging structures in other world regions 
(See also Katzenstein & Shiraishi, 1997; Katzenstein, 1996). Keeping in mind that while 
various regionalist processes may be comparable, they are also very different. Before 
1990 the EU presented a working model of formal economic integration, among a 
geographically proximate group of states which were already in a stable and clear 
security framework (Wallace, 1995: 226). It differed markedly from the mode of 
cooperation in East Asia. European regionalism, formal and exclusive, stands in contrast 
to the informal and open structures of Asian regionalism. Asian regionalism possesses 
two qualities that are significantly different from the EU model: First, it is not rule- 
making nor highly institutionalised; and second, multilateral cooperation in Asia aims at 
cooperation based on and implemented through an informal consensus. In this respect, 
the TRADP can provide an interesting example. The Tumen project is nowhere like the 
formal economic integration of the EU and NAFTA. Nor is it similar to the ASEAN’s 
Free Trade Area plan (3fii, Zhu, 1996: 97). Instead, it resembles to what Robert Scalapino 
has called the ‘Natural Economic Territories’ (NETs).2 This involves links between 
segments of neighbouring states. Such SREZs emerged on the basis of geographical, 
historical and cultural proximity between regions within neighbouring countries, offering 
comparative advantages, and thus gains from trade, to each other. In contrast to Western 
institutionalism, SREZs are ‘pragmatic’ rather than principled forms of cooperation. They 
do not necessitate binding inter-state agreements, and can operate across very different 
economic and political conditions (Zhao, Suisheng, 1998: 111). For political reasons, 
formal institutions are avoided, and the whole state is not necessarily involved. The 
striking differences between the two modes of cooperation mean a comparative analysis 
can help us identify elements of Asian and non-Asian distinctiveness. In this sense, 
looking at an example outside the EU-type formal integration will enrich conventional 
integration theories.
2 ‘ A. .. trend in the economic area, but one with strong political and strategic connotations, is the emergence 
of what I have termed ‘natural economic territories’ (NETs). These NETs are sometimes the product of 
governmental policies, in some cases, the results o f private initiatives; in many cases, a combination of 
these factors. Whatever their stimuli, they cut across political lines, raising a host o f intriguing new 
issues....’ (Scalapino, 1991: 4). The use of the concept ‘NETs’ here is limited to cross-border cooperation. 
The emphasis on the role of market force is dropped to allow for government intervention.
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In comparison to Europe, Asian regionalism does not have strong institutional traditions. 
It seems that the preferred approach of East Asian governments has been ‘non-binding 
policy instruments’ and ‘intensive consultation process’ (Yoshimatsu, 2000: 16). The 
value of APEC is more in the forum itself, which provides a process for confidence 
building, although it has a considerable amount of institutionalisation. Other Asia-Pacific 
organisations also offer little more than opportunities for dialogues. Many other sub­
regional cooperation projects have also taken a similar approach, but only two regional 
projects have been transformed into institutionalised regionalism through inter­
governmental agreements. One of these institutionalised regionalisms is the Singapore- 
Johore-Riau Growth Triangle (SUORI). Although it has been successful in developing 
regional cooperation, it was in fact institutionalised more strongly only in 1994, after 
more than a decade of cooperation. In contrast to the non-institutional character of 
regionalism in East Asia and to the institutionalisation of SUORI, the TRADP from the 
outset sought to promote its regionalism on a formal institutional basis. The Tumen River 
Area Development Coordinating Council was set up by China, Russia, and North Korea 
in 1995. At the same time these countries plus Mongolia and South Korea established the 
Tumen River Area Development Consulting Council. They also issued formal guidelines 
to manage environmental issues. The two UNDP-led bodies set up to assist the 
governments in the project have brought about the formal framework (Zhao, Suisheng, 
1998: 111-2). The inclusion of North Korea means that ‘the TRADP is the only 
development programme through which almost all countries in Northeast Asia have made 
a commitment to effect cooperation at the governmental level’ (Rim, 1998: 181). Thus 
there is a certain amount of structure to the TRADP. The second contribution will 
measure the likelihood of success of institutionalised regionalism in East Asia.
The third considers the feasibility of ‘North-South’ cooperation. Due to the Cold War 
polarity, regional economic cooperation that included one or the other of the two 
superpowers was seen as an alignment with that power (Morrison, 1998: 6). That 
necessarily limited the scope for such cooperation and entailed domestic pressure against 
this in many Asian countries. Towards the end of the Cold War, however, many more 
possibilities emerged for the development of multilateral economic relations between
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developed and developing countries, and for more openness to association with countries 
from a different political spectrum. There are nine SREZs in East Asia, including SUORI 
and the GSCEZ, which were formed in the early 1980s. There are five SREZs in 
Southeast Asia and four in Northeast Asia. While most participants in Southeast Asia are 
minor players, those in Northeast Asia include the major regional powers. In the case of 
TRADP, China and Russia are carrying out reforms to establish a freer market economy 
aimed at economic development that is at the same time linked to the world economy. 
South Korea and Japan have long benefited from capitalism and its attendant, the free 
market. North Korea remains ideologically committed to the command economy and 
self-reliance (Takao, 1995: 50). This research attempts to investigate the complex issue of 
regional cooperation across divergent political and security as well as economic levels.
Last but not the least, comes the assessment of the relative significance of the market and 
the state in creating regionalism. It has been suggested that with globalisation blurring 
national borders, the nation-state faces a challenge to find a new place in relationships 
within its immediate and wider region (Christoffersen, 2001: 2). Most regional 
cooperative projects, except SIJORI and GSCEZ, have been less than successful. This is 
because most projects have not provided economic incentives to the private sector, whose 
role is essential to the ultimate success of such zones. In addition, the relevant 
governments failed to provide significant political commitment. The findings in the cases 
of SIJORI and GSCEZ demonstrate the significance of political commitment as a 
facilitating factor (Tongzon, 1998; Thambipillai, 1991). Extreme demonstrations of self- 
interest, as where states seek to dominate a region may damage cooperative regional 
bodies. The relative benefits achieved through regionalism remain important and states 
will use their political and economic muscle to secure gains from cooperative ventures. 
States thus play a central role in the success of regionalism. The TRADP is no exception 
to this ‘rule’. This suggests that political commitment is an imperative for regionalism to 
succeed, and that would seem to be driven by the interests of states. The main actors in 
Northeast Asia are still nation-states, which act out of self-interest.
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II. Regionalism in China’s foreign policy
1. Recent research on the TRADP
Regionalism cannot be simply seen as a pure economic activity, and a cautious approach 
should move into the realm of political and security. This study aims to contribute not 
only to the literature on East Asian regionalism, but also to that on the role of regionalism 
in the China’s foreign policy. The significant role of regionalism in China’s foreign 
policy in the period of more interdependent globalisation demands scholarly attention. 
Before going on to provide the brief description of objectives and obstacles of China’s 
TRADP policy, this section first supplements the literature on the TRADP.
1.1 Chinese scholarship
Many analyses by Chinese scholars in the 1980s favoured the promotion of economic 
development on a regional basis. As Christoffersen has noted, the ‘formula of economic 
complementarity was repeated in every conference paper at every meeting on Northeast 
Asian economic cooperation since 1985’ (Christoffersen, 1996b, p. 271; also quoted in 
Blanchard, 2000: 272).3 In general, the main argument was that the TRADP would let 
China could access Russian, North Korean and Mongolian natural resources and 
infrastructure and attract Japanese and South Korean capital and technology.
3 Many other articles concerning regional cooperation were published in the journals o f the region. See 
(Chen, Qida, 1991; Wang, Yuexiang, 1992; Torn, 1992; Yakubovsky, 1992).
Chinese scholars have explained the TRADP largely in terms of economics and 
geography. Ding Shicheng (1994) provides insights into technical and industrial 
development ideas for the Tumen project. Chui Longhe (1994) claims that the project 
exemplifies the need for regionalisation as a corollary of globalisation. Many scholars in 
Li Shaogeng’s edition (1992) pay attention to the Yanbian Prefecture where the TRADP 
locates, and the economic development strategy with regard to Northeast Asian trade 
cooperation. Most articles in the local journals have focused on industrial development 
and the investment environment of Northeast China.4
However, we can also add some non-economic dimensions to previous economics- 
centred explanations of why Beijing has supported the TRADP. One of the main 
assumptions of this research is that all government-sponsored economic activities are 
pursued, at least partly if not entirely, for political reasons. As Stuart Harris has 
contested, ‘Economics can enter the security discourse from various directions.... In 
maintaining security in this sense, economic factors are always involved but economic 
factors seldom exist or exert their influence in isolation’ (Harris, 1995: 34).
The motives of the Chinese government too are political. Clearly, a purely economic 
account of Beijing’s involvement can explain only part of the project. The TRADP 
‘offered relatively small economic gains’, in relation to ‘the Chinese economy as a whole 
or to larger economic initiatives such as the Pudong or Three Gorges developments’ 
(Clayton, 1996, quoted in Blanchard, 2000: 272). The total amount of foreign investment 
brought into the TRADP was minor. From 1990 to 1995, it only added up to US$230 
million, barely 0.5% of the total foreign investment that China took in 1999 (Ibid.). 
Therefore, we must recognise the meaningful role of political considerations in China’s 
involvement in the project.
Nonetheless, Chinese scholars have rarely referred explicitly to the political dimension of 
the project. Cao Liqun (1995) expanded upon the domestic and international political
4Joumals such as Dongbei Shida Xuebao (Journal of Northeast Normal University), Dongbeiya Yanjiu 
(Northeast Asia Studies), and Dongbeiya Luntan (Northeast Asia Forum), all edited by Northeast Normal 
University (Changchun), which has spent most effort studying the project.
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dimensions, but the explanation remained superficial. Chen and Yuan (1996) openly 
discussed the sensitive issue of navigation to the East Sea (Chapter II in particular), but 
avoided discussion of any possible military use of the channel or any account of security 
related issues. Most Chinese discussions were still confined to studying the issues and 
problems of economic cooperation in the region.
In sum, Chinese scholarship has engaged with the socio-economic views of the 
development in the Tumen River area. Many still remain at the level of official 
declaratory principles, but a few have put forward views regarding the political and 
security effects of the project. Clearly there are problems and challenges of various kinds 
that arise from the Chinese obsession with secrecy regarding security and foreign affairs 
and from the lack of straightforwardness in the way they present their views.
1.2 Non-Chinese scholarship
Western experts studying the TRADP as an element of China’s security and foreign 
policy have encountered major difficulties because of limited access to the reliable 
sources, i.e., interim documents of administrative departments. Despite the paucity of 
reliable sources, some articles have provided interesting analyses relevant to the TRADP 
at various levels in a timely manner.
In the early years, non-Chinese scholars also began to assess the economic value of the 
project and to suggest its future course. On the project itself, Kim Icksoo (1995) reviews 
the key features of TRADP and the differing positions of concerned countries. Marton, 
McGee and Paterson (1995) provide an understanding of the Tumen project in the 
context of Northeast Asian economic cooperation. Furthermore, some literature deals 
with the provincial and national levels of the project. Cotton (1996) investigates the 
current status and development strategy of Jilin Province, on the Chinese side of the 
TRADP. Christoffersen (1996a; 1996b) analyses the role of regional cooperation in inter- 
provincial relations (Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces) and in China’s national strategy. 
Another scholar has outlined the politically complicated dimension of the project. 
Rozman (1997; 1998a; 1998b) assesses why Northeast Asian regionalism has failed, by
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explaining different national and local considerations of the countries involved in the 
regional cooperation.
However, this scholarship has not addressed the question why Beijing has been so 
supportive of the TRADP. Up to now, Blanchard (2000) has provided a more 
comprehensive analysis of China’s international political interest in the TRADP. He 
argues that the project cannot be explained without grasping three political 
considerations. First, the project could be a multi-functioned means to balance against the 
economic and political threat of Japan; second, it could serve to counter the political 
threat generated by Western protectionism and bloc formation; and finally it could help to 
ensure peace and stability on the strategic Korean Peninsula. Yet, his work did not pay a 
great deal of attention to the interests and policies of the other participating countries.5 In 
addition, he gave little consideration to the importance of Beijing’s domestic 
consideration of trying to achieve a more balanced pattern of development between the 
regions.
5 Blanchard also recognises that ‘It is important to note that my work also ignores the interests and policies 
of Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan. This is defensible from a methodological standpoint 
because it allows for an intensive study of one country’s involvement in the TRADP that would not be 
possible if  one attempted to study the interests of all or multiple TRADP countries’ (16fii, Blanchard, 2000: 
274).
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Despite the high quality of the works, the above mentioned articles have tended to focus 
only on single aspect of the TRADP issue. Each of these papers has analysed aspects of 
either political, economic, diplomatic, or security issues of the project itself, at one of the 
domestic, inter-state, or international levels alone. Although this thesis does not attempt 
to provide a wide-ranging account of all the issues and problems concerning the project, 
it will attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the TRADP, which includes as 
many aspects as possible at various levels, both empirical and theoretical. This thesis will 
focus more on Beijing’s interests, because at present, national interest rather than local 
interest remains at the core of China’s approach to the TRADP. The project may not 
necessarily be the highest political priority for Beijing and it may not always be viewed 
as a useful way to satisfy its political goals but, as Blanchard notes, focusing on the local 
level inevitably means that insufficient attention is given to the interests of the central 
government in Beijing (Blanchard, 2000: 274).
2. Defining China’s TRADP strategic objectives
Economics-centred analysis alone cannot explain the extent of Beijing’s involvement. 
First, attention should be drawn to the domestic political aspect. The interest in the 
economic development of regions was heavily influence by political considerations. 
Following the adoption of the open-door policy, China has experienced growing 
disparities between the coast and the interior and it has faced widespread complaints and 
discontent from the interior regions (Yang, Dali, 1997). Thus, the Chinese government 
was forced to seek a more balanced pattern of regional development and, as part of that 
process, it created the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Tumen River area in Jilin 
Province. The Tumen project could be seen as a product of the Beijing government’s 
attempts to readjust a prevailing coast-interior gap and to dissolve the discontent from the 
region. Furthermore, China was concerned about the Korean minority in the region and 
had to mitigate the latter’s obvious resentment and dissatisfaction by whatever means it 
could. This explains why the central leadership declared the development in Hunchun as 
the key project for the region.
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Second, access to the East Sea would not only restore Chinese historical and legal claims 
but it would also establish maritime and military interests in the Sea, as recognised in the 
Chinese official or unofficial writings (Chen & Yuan, 1996; Chiao, 1994). The vision for 
the TRADP is of an international trade and transport mega-complex for export-processing in 
the Tumen River area. This plan put forward by the UNDP calls for a ‘cross-border free 
trade zone near the mouth of the river’ {Financial Times, 27 May 1992). To exit from or 
gain entry to China from the East Sea one may go through the Tumen River. The navigation 
to the Sea through the Tumen River has been China’s long-cherished desire since losing the 
maritime territory in 1860, and the opportunity given by the TRADP would make it possible 
to reclaim China’s ambition to access the East Sea. Once China gains the right it may also 
freely use the Sea in various ways. China does not want to lose this opportunity, which has 
resulted from the rapid changes in the Northeast Asian political atmosphere since the late 
1980s.
Third, the TRADP has played an important role in China’s policy towards the Korean 
Peninsula. China is well aware that the unification of Korea is inevitable in the long run. At 
issue is the form and context in which China might accept the unification of the Peninsula. 
In the shorter term, it is in China’s interest to prolong the division of Korea, so as to defer a 
possible crisis arising from too rapid a unification that could follow from the collapse of the 
North. In order to avoid that, China has provided North Korea with political and economic 
support and has encouraged it to adopt economic reform. In this strategic context, the 
Tumen project would be one way of stabilising the dire economic situation in North Korea 
by introducing some market elements into the North Korean system (Cotton, 1995: 206-7). 
Maintaining stability in the Korean Peninsula served the interests of China, in the midst of 
its own economic modernisation. China wants to teach North Korea ‘how to fish’ rather 
than ‘to eat fish’ as the Korean proverb goes. In addition to the contribution the Tumen 
development could make to its economic interests through cooperation with North Korea, 
by establishing economic relationships with North Korea, China might be able to preserve 
an economic buffer should Korea become reunited. That is despite losing its political buffer 
on the Korean Peninsula after the reunification of the Koreas. The centrality of the Korean 
Peninsula is connected to any scheme of regional cooperation (Ibid.).
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Finally, the initial impetus to the growing regional focus of China’s foreign policy may be 
regarded as a product of the marginalisation of China in world politics (Yahuda, 1992: 32). 
Beijing certainly has aspirations to be a decisive power, even though it claims not to be a 
hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific region. What China needs is to build a power base in 
Asia for its future global power status.6 More importantly, in the early 1990s it was thought 
this could help to advance China’s efforts to avoid international isolation and to maintain 
diplomatic leverage imposed after the Tiananmen crisis (Hu, Weixing, 1996: 45; also cited 
in Blanchard, 2000: 284). China clearly recognised that its capabilities were too limited to 
compete successfully with Japan, let alone with the US. That is why it adopted the 
‘Segmental Omni-dimensional Cooperative Strategy’, which attempted to break the region 
into manageable sub-regions (See Chapter Six). Accordingly, the TRADP could provide 
Beijing with a potential means to counter Japanese centred proposals for economic 
cooperation in Northeast Asia. Not only did the project deny Japan a leading or central 
political and economic role, but it elevated China to a leading role in Northeast Asian 
economic cooperation that did not include the US, which China saw as its rival in 
establishing regional leadership.
3. Assessing obstacles to China’s TRADP policy
China’s initial aims in pursuing the TRADP policy have encountered multiple challenges. 
The reasons for the current difficulties facing China can be examined from several 
perspectives. Firstly, the project is constrained by many economic problems in and/or 
around the project itself. These weaknesses were originally ignored, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, by participating countries. Economically speaking, questions still remain: 
how much of the project is actually viable? And how attractive is it for the private sector, 
which ultimately must provide heavy investment? The probable answers to these questions 
are quite pessimistic. Basically, the geological and natural environment of the project is 
harsh (Li, Kiseok et al., 1994: 56), and the infrastructure of the region is too poor to provide
6 In 1987, Huan Xiang, Premier Zhao Ziyang’s leading foreign policy advisor, argued that Beijing must 
have ‘the mentality o f being a world power’ and ‘should not be satisfied with being a second-class power 
or regional power’, quoted in (Hu, Weixing, 1995b: 63).
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support for the project. The legacy of socialism remains strong in Mongolia and in China’s 
two riparian neighbouring countries (North Korea and Russia). Northeast China lags behind 
the rest of the country, despite its considerable economic reform (Kim, Icksoo, 1995a: 93). 
Except for South Korea and Japan, the other members of the TRADP do not effectively 
understand trade mechanisms and incentive structures, as well as other important economic 
mechanisms. Due to the large number of participants, distributional issues among countries 
have become an obstacle (Marton et al., 1995: 13). Who the real players in the project are is 
still unclear: the representatives of China and Russia are local governments; while the two 
Koreas and Mongolia participate in the name of central government. Accordingly, mutual 
coordination is not an easy task. The three legs within the triangle (China, Russia, DPRK) 
are not uniformly developed, and achievements that have been made up to now are the result 
of bilateral rather than multilateral negotiations (Ding, Dou, 1996). The UNDP has also 
been blamed for its lack of co-ordination skills and its incapacity to raise sufficient funds to 
continue the project as a mediator (Davies, 2000: 44-5). Not surprisingly, the private sector, 
which is the only possible investor that can provide the huge financial support necessary to 
continue the project, remains pessimistic about the project.
Second, the upgrading of the Hunchun project, as the Chinese leg of the TRADP, to one of 
ten national development projects was made by the central government without making 
rational economic calculations. In fact, its decision was largely influenced by non-economic 
considerations. Beijing permitted Jilin Province to undertake the Hunchun project, in an 
attempt to address the constant resentment of the aforementioned Korean minority. At this 
stage, the Chinese part of the TRADP was limited to the TREZ (Tumen River Economic 
Zone), the smaller triangle. However, the Jilin-centred Tumen formulation encountered 
jealousy and adverse reactions from the Heilongjiang and Liaoning provinces. The latter 
provinces used every opportunity to bargain with the central government to pursue their own 
provincial interests. They were able to transform the geographical scope of the TREZ (the 
smaller triangle) toward the Northeast Asia Economic Development Area (NEARDA), the 
larger triangle, which they preferred, rather than having benefits concentrated in one small 
area (Christoffersen, 1996b). The TRADP does not in terms of economic efficiency rank 
high in the order of Beijing’s plans for national development, even though it is listed as one
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of the ten national-level development projects. The Tumen formulation could be said to 
mirror the process of political change in China, which produced important changes in the 
nature of both centre-province and inter-provincial relations after 1978 (Rozman, 1998a: 10- 
11 & 1998b: 12-4). The project served as a double compromise between the aims of the 
centre and the provinces, and between the provinces themselves. It was based on domestic 
political consideration, and not on economic rationality.
Third, there is a big difference in the extent of the current commitment by member countries 
to the TRADP. As the project has low priority even in China, the strongest backer, the 
interest of other countries is also not high. North Korea is interested in the economic gains 
of the project but is hesitant about a full-scale ‘opening’ to the outside, because it is afraid of 
a possible threat to the regime. Russia was reluctant to join and at present lacks the political 
commitment and the financial resources to participate actively. It also has problems in 
coordinating policies between central and regional governments, but simply wants to take 
advantage of whatever aspects of the project should meet its own interests. South Korea 
believes the project enables the expansion of its markets and inter-Korean dialogue but it 
thinks that the project will not be able to fully meet its potential without cooperation with 
Japan because of the limited economic capacity of South Korea. So its policy is to ‘wait and 
see’. Mongolia is enthusiastic about the project, but it is the weakest member of the TRADP 
group and its leverage is minimal. Japan is currently just a TRADP observer and also 
maintains a ‘wait and see’ attitude towards the project. Its hesitation is related to a lack of 
assurances that it would be a prime beneficiary of the project. In sum, all countries 
concerned are very sensitive to possible relative gains and an uncertain future, so they 
choose unilateral actions, inactivity, or reluctant cooperation. Their approaches are 
identified, in colloquial terms, as ‘one foot is inside, while the other is outside’.
Finally, as politics is always at the heart of all multi-country economic projects, the TRADP 
should not be seen only as a pure multilateral economic project, but rather should also be 
seen as reflecting the major players’ (China, Russia, Japan, and the US) different approaches 
to the regional distribution of power. The strategy of China has been to divide the wider 
region into units that could be more easily influenced by China that is still not strong
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enough to be considered the dominant regional power (Christoffersen, 1996a: 1081). This 
has led China to take the initiative in encouraging Northeast Asian economic cooperation in 
the region. Meanwhile, due to its weakened position, Russian thinking is concerned with 
balancing the regional effects of the project. Hence, Russia has co-operated with each aspect 
on a case-by-case basis. Japan sees the rise of China as potentially threatening its national 
interests, and the Sino-Russian strategic partnership remains a main concern. Japan has 
tightened its security ties with the US and plays a significant role in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) that acts as a certain constraint on Chinese behaviour. China and the two 
Koreas suspect that Japan aims to build a new Greater East Asia Co-prosperity scheme in 
the longer term. The US’s main concern about the region is to maintain the current balance 
of power. Currently, it attempts to check China's political and economic ambition and ease 
Chinese pressure in the region. Therefore the mutual competition and checks have acted as a 
brake to restrain the future development of the project.
4. A contribution to the study of Chinese foreign policy
The study of TRADP has four findings to contribute to the field of Chinese foreign 
policy. The first finding shows how China has used international organizations to its own 
end in its foreign policy. Starting from the 1980s, China has taken steps to be included in 
the international community. Rather than passively accept the benefits granted by 
international institutions, it has taken a more participative role in multilateral 
international organisations. The TRADP should be regarded primarily as a Chinese rather 
than a UNDP initiative. China could be characterised as the most active supporter of all 
the national participating governments (Blanchard, 2000: 271). Indeed, the TRADP is a 
Chinese designated project that was reinvented to become a UNDP sponsored 
international project.7 China proposed and designed the concept of the TRADP as early 
as 1985, a long time before the UNDP adopted the TRADP as one of its top agendas in 
Northeast Asia in 1992. While other Tumen member countries have been hesitant in
7 At the beginning of the 1980s, Chinese scholars considered issues surrounding regional cooperation in 
Northeast Asia and the development in the Tumen River area. They looked at ways to reopen navigation to 
the East Sea through the Tumen River and explored a strategic concept of development in Tumen River 
(Chen & Yuan, 1996: Preface, p. 4).
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offering to participate in the project, China has actively taken the initiative. Beijing 
energetically supported efforts to develop infrastructure in the Chinese part of the Tumen 
development area. In addition, it pushed North Korea and Russia to implement policies 
that would advance the cause of the TRADP. Furthermore, it hosted a number of 
international conferences and investment fairs oriented around the TRADP. The research 
undertaken for this thesis can make a contribution towards understanding China’s 
policies towards multinational economic cooperation projects and international 
organisations.
Second, this research enables us to gain insight into the characteristics of and differences 
between the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China, and the role of the zones in the 
context of Chinese foreign policy. Since China started with the concept of SEZs in 1978, 
there have been variations in policy towards various SEZs. External Chinese 
communities who had already achieved advanced economic levels of development and 
who were also closely integrated in the international economy were seen as key in the 
development of the SEZs in various parts of China. The TRADP, however, is more of an 
international project involving cooperation at the state level. Southern and Eastern China 
has strong links with Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan, which has facilitated capital 
inflow. The northeastern provinces, nevertheless, ‘have far fewer connections with those 
Chinese living abroad’, and consequently lower capital inflows. However, the Northeast 
is closer geographically to Japan and Korea than any other regions of China. Also, there 
are Korean residents within Northeast with ethnic ties to South and North Korea. Koreans 
in these places are not as economically active as the overseas Chinese, but they do 
provide added support (ECFA, 1993: 9-10). In this regard, the research hopes to provide 
an understanding of Chinese foreign policy with reference to the ethnic-based SEZ.
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Third, the research then considers the relationship between central and local governments 
and the balance between political and economic factors.8 In many studies the provinces 
are seen as the real driving force rather than Beijing.9 Relatedly, arguments have been 
propounded by Breslin that research should focus on local government initiatives as the 
key factor of China’s integration into the global economy as well as Northeast Asian 
regionalisms; and by Bum that Northeast Asian regional projects such as the TRADP 
would not have possible without sub-national political units’ initiatives (Breslin, 2000 & 
Bums, 1994, both cited in Christoffersen, 2001: 3). However, it will be argued here, on 
the basis of the Jilin Provincial case study, that foreign policy is generated in Beijing 
rather than in the provinces. Jilin Province had worked on the project alongside Beijing, 
but the main player would seem to be the central government which pursues broader 
interests. Whereas the province has been motivated mainly by economic interests 
accruing from multilateral economic development, the project has been incorporated 
within Beijing’s political considerations at domestic and international levels. On the 
surface Chinese leaders have accepted the principles of multilateralism, but Chinese 
actions have not matched the rhetoric of multilateralism. With a change of circumstances, 
it is not difficult to imagine China turning its back on such new ideas, since China is 
primarily committed to preserving national sovereignty and party legitimacy (Wang, 
Hongying, 2000: 484-5). This research hopes to shed more light on the decisive role of 
central government in the regional dimensions of China’s foreign policy.
8 Such issues are well observed by Christoffersen. See her work (2001: 2-4); Another scholar observed the 
relationship between the centre and provinces in the post-Mao period through the analysis o f the financial 
and political dimensions, see (Ferdiand, 1987).
9 Cheung’s edition (1998) is well researched and has noticed the critical role o f provincial leadership in 
economic development strategies in the post-Mao period.
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Finally, the TRADP experience sheds more light on China’s outwardly cooperative 
foreign policy. Compared with the foreign policy pursued during the Mao period (1949- 
1976), Deng and post-Deng foreign policy has become ‘more complex, more involved, 
more multilateral, more functional, more institutionalised..., more interest-oriented, more 
self-serving, and more adaptive’ (Kim, Samuel, 1989: 25-6). Scholars and experts in the 
fields of international relations and Chinese foreign and security policies have much 
debated the aims and practice of China’s security and foreign policy (See Denny, 1998; 
Goodman & Segal, 1997; Robinson & Shambaugh, 1994; Samuel S. Kim, 1984; 1989; 
1991; 1994; 1998). As China develops economically, has its foreign policy become more 
cooperative and interdependent?10 Has economic development brought real changes to 
foreign policy? This has become a salient question in the post-Cold War era and reflects 
the significantly increased status of China in the international political economy. There 
has not been much discussion of this issue in the literature on China’s foreign policy (See 
Segal, 1994). The function of projects such as the TRADP in China’s national strategy 
has been little studied, despite the significance of the issue to the ER scholarship. In this 
regard, this research into the TRADP issue hopes to provide a case to study of the role 
and limits of regionalism in China’s concrete security and foreign policy in the era of 
globalisation. Once it is recognised that the TRADP can be seen as a crystallisation of 
efforts to respond to the rapid changes in and out of China, there are few better examples 
than the case study of the TRADP in order to comprehend the motivations, aims and 
strategic diplomacy of Chinese foreign policy.
5. Methodology
This research is based on source materials dating mainly from the 1990s when the project 
was actively discussed and it is based on various materials, which have provided 
important and revealing information. The main materials include books, edited volumes, 
monographs, periodicals, newspapers, newsmagazines, and internet websites written in 
English, Chinese, and Korean.
10 Similar questions were asked by (Wang, Hongying, 2000).
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In regard to the TRADP itself, primary materials provide invaluable information in terms 
of scope and depth. Examples are the periodicals, documents, monographs, and other 
printed materials, published by Jilin Province, Yanbian government, and Hunchun 
government as well as by Northeast Normal University, Jilin University, and Yanbian 
University. The authors of articles in these publications are usually officials and scholars 
who took a part in the project directly or indirectly, so that the articles provide an 
insightful peek into aspects of their work.
Apart from documentary materials, interviews were conducted in the field with numerous 
officials, researchers, and scholars mainly in China. The methodology used in conducting 
the various interviews was qualitative (rather quantative) and the approach on each 
occasion was similar. But the particularities of the questions varied in accordance with 
the interests and the responsibilities of the interviewee. They largely focused on the 
origin and development process of the TRADP, the Chinese policies at various 
administrative levels, and academic research activities. I made a trip to Hunchun, Tumen, 
Yanbian (the prefectural capital of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture), 
Changchun (the provincial capital of Jilin Province), and Beijing in August 1997. 
Interviews were conducted with officials from bureaus spanning Hunchun, Yanbian, and 
Jilin administrations, as well as with members of universities and independent researchers 
in the semi-governmental research institutes. These have been important, because the 
interviews enabled me to clarify information contained in documentary materials.
On the whole the officials I contacted, mostly at the middle level of the hierarchy in a 
government department, were very helpful. Nevertheless, it was difficult to get 
information on subjects such as central-provincial bargaining, and the link between China 
and the UNDP. Thus ‘Chapter Five: The Perspective of Jilin Province’ is descriptive 
rather than analytical. It was also difficult to get information and views on the sensitive 
topic of China’s navigation through the Tumen River, due to its security implications for 
China and other neighbouring countries, notably North Korea, Japan, and Russia.
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To fill the gaps, I paid for two trips to Korea and Japan for interviews with those directly 
or indirectly who knew of the issue in the UNDP, academic and semi-governmental 
institutes; tried to find relevant materials in Chinese documents, and speculated on certain 
aspects of the issue from the main documents written in Korea and Japan. Many original 
documents and conference proceedings papers were provided by numerous institutes at 
various stages: the UNDP Tumen Secretariat in Beijing, and the UNDP Seoul Office; 
National Unification Ministry of Republic of Korea (ROK), Sejong Institute, and Korea 
Export-Import Bank (all in Seoul); Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) and 
Sasakawa Peace Foundation (both in Tokyo), Economic Research Institute for Northeast 
Asia (ERINA), Niigata, Japan; and East-West Centre, Hawaii, USA.
6. Structure of the thesis
Since the thesis is concerned with regionalism in Northeast Asia, it was thought that it 
was important first to set the analysis within the framework of regional studies within IR 
as a whole and more particularly within East Asia. Accordingly, after this introductory 
chapter there is a review of the IR literature on regionalism which followed in Chapter 
Two with an account of regionalism in East Asia. This will show that it does not follow 
the general pattern laid out in the more theoretical literature on the salient which on 
whole takes the European experience in the norm. Chapter Three then provides an 
account at the institutional character of the TRADP as this has been little studied in the 
literature and it is important that its chief characteristics should be understood before a 
more critical analysis of its evaluation and the role of China can be developed.
Since the initiative for promoting the TRADP came largely from China, the next three 
chapters explain how it came to figure in Chinese policies. Chapter Four will examine 
Chinese thinking about regionalism. The chapter will provide some explanations about 
the concept of Sub-regional Economic Zones (SREZs) and the factors that have promoted 
sub-regionalism as a principal factor in China’s strategy of development. It will then 
explain China’s use of regional cooperation as a major diplomatic means to cultivate 
good relations with neighbouring countries and to promote economic interdependence
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between its border regions and adjacent countries. Since the Chinese approach 
incorporated both the concerns of the local province and the national centre, Chapter Five 
will investigate the perspective of Jilin province, which gave the project top priority. In 
particular, this chapter will analyse the role and status of the Hunchun project as the 
province’s core development strategy. It will also provide an empirical description and 
analysis of the role of various administrative levels in the origin of the TRADP. The 
central government’s strategy towards the TRADP will be analysed in Chapter Six. This 
chapter will argue that political purposes are almost always involved in economic 
activities. China's TRADP policies are intended to contribute to the achievement of its 
political objectives in Northeast Asia as well as to its own pursuit of domestic 
development.
Chapters Seven and Eight will explain why the TRADP has not been successful and will 
analyse some of the obstacles presently blocking further progress. Chapter Seven will 
compare the differing positions of the countries concerned and analyse economic 
constraints to the project. Chapter Eight will evaluate the very real challenges facing 
China in the areas of politics and security at the international level.
Finally, Chapter Nine, the concluding chapter, will assess the value of the TRADP, 
looking from the dual aspect of this thesis: i) Explaining what went wrong from a 
Chinese perspective; and ii) Explaining the TRADP and its problems in Asian context of 
regionalism. It will then argue that the TRADP cannot be successful without political 
commitment by the relevant governments and free market incentives. China is at the core 
of the TRADP, and hence has a pivotal role in determining the outcome of the TRADP.
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Chapter Two. Regionalism: Theoretical Dimension
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, regionalisation processes have arisen in a world 
experiencing globalisation. In East Asia, the Sub-regional Economic Zones (SREZs), 
involving links between segments of neighbouring states, were seen as a great 
opportunity for promoting mutual and regional economic development. However, most 
projects have failed to perform, and only two SREZs - the Singapore-Johore-Riau 
Growth Triangle (SIJORI) and Greater South China Economic Zone (GSCEZ) - can be 
considered successful in the region; even these two SREZs developed without close 
relations to the end of the Cold War and the continuing trend towards globalisation. The 
objective of Chapter Two seeks to find the reasons why such seemingly plausible projects 
have not been successful. What kinds of regionalism succeed or fail? And what are the 
key factors that could make sub-regionalism in East Asia work? This chapter argues that 
the political commitment of governments is more crucial as a facilitating factor for 
regionalism, although the importance of the private sector cannot be denied.
Following this introduction, Part I will seek to understand the nature, significance and 
limits of regionalism in the context of international relations (IR) theory. Part II will 
identify the emerging trends of SREZs in East Asia since the late 1980s. To do so will 
help us to understand the political economic status of the TRADP on three levels: the 
domestic, the regional, and the international.
I. Regionalism in theory
The starting point in this analysis is the argument that East Asia has its own model of 
regionalism which is different from Western European and North American regionalism.
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The case of the EU and NAFTA are not relevant to the situation in the Asia-Pacific 
region and hence should not be applied as appropriate models. This part thus begins with 
a review of different concepts, modalities, categories, and objectives of sub-regionalism, 
the experience of which will be influenced strongly by historical, cultural and political 
factors.
1. Concepts of regionalism
The term regionalism is ambiguous and its definitions have so far been inconclusive,1 but 
Hurrell effectively breaks the notion of ‘regionalism’ down into three different 
categories:2
Regionalisation
Regionalisation refers to the growth of societal integration within a region 
and to the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction. This 
is... described as informal integration... [or] as ‘soft regionalism’. The term 
lays particular weight on autonomous economic processes which lead to 
higher levels of economic interdependence within a given geographical area 
than between that area and the rest of the world. Although seldom unaffected 
by state policies, the most important driving force for economic 
regionalisation come from markets, from private trade and investment flows, 
and from the policies and decisions of companies. The growth of intra-firm 
trade, the increasing numbers of international mergers and acquisitions, and 
the emergence of an increasingly dense network of strategic alliances 
between firms are of particular importance.... ‘[T]hese flows are creating 
inexorable momentum towards the further integration of economies within 
and across regions’. Such regionalisation processes have become a
1 Nye defines regions in international politics as ‘a limited number o f states linked by a geographical 
relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence, differentiated according to the level and scope of 
exchange, formal organisations, and political interdependence’ (Nye, 1968, p. vii, in Butler, 1997: 410). 
Alagappa (1995: 362) describes it as ‘cooperation among governments or non-government organisations in 
three or more geographically proximity and interdependent countries fo r  the pursuit o f  mutual gain in one 
or more issue-areas' (Original emphasis). For Hurrell (1995b: 333), it is necessary to impose notions of 
geography, particularly contiguity and proximity, on the concept of regionalism in order to define it as 
distinct from other forms o f ‘less than global’ cooperation and to avoid the term becoming so wide to be 
meaningless.
2 Initially, Hurrell broke up the notion into five categories: 1) regionalisation, 2) regional interstate 
cooperation, 3) regional awareness and identity, 4) state-promoted regional integration, 5) regional 
cohesion. However, I have reduced them to three. This is because, his fourth category - state-promoted 
regional integration - is quite similar to the second (regional inter-state cooperation) due to the same 
emphasis on government initiative. The fifth category -regional cohesion - is also excluded, because it can 
be seen as the result of matured regionalism.
particularly important feature of Asia-Pacific regionalism, driven by complex, 
market-based imperatives of international specialisation and organised around 
transnational... firms and regional business networks.
Regional interstate cooperation
A great deal of regionalist activity involves the negotiation and construction 
of interstate or intergovernmental agreements or regimes. Such cooperation 
can be formal or informal and high levels of institutionalisation are no 
guarantee of either effectiveness or political importance.... Such co-operative 
arrangements can serve a wide variety of purposes. On the one hand, they can 
serve as a means of responding to external challenges and of co-ordinating 
regional positions in international institutions or negotiating forums. On the 
other, they can be developed to secure welfare gains, to promote common 
values, or to solve common problems, especially problems arising from 
increased levels of regional interdependence. In the security field, for 
example, such cooperation can range from the stabilisation of a regional 
balance of power, to the institutionalisation of confidence-building measures, 
to the negotiation of a region-wide security regime. Unlike some brands of 
regional integration, such co-operative arrangements are very clearly statist, 
designed to protect and enhance the role of the state and the power of ... 
government....
Regional awareness and identity
...All regions... can be understood in terms of... ‘cognitive regions’.... 
Regional awareness, the shared perception of belonging to a particular 
community can rest on internal factors, often defined in terms of common 
culture, history, or religious traditions. It may also be understood in terms of a 
security threat (Europe’s self-image defined as against the Soviet Union...); 
or an external cultural challenge (...‘Europe’ was defined in opposition to the 
non-European and, especially, Islamic world...)... [It is] framed by 
historically deep-rooted arguments about the definition of the region and the 
values and purposes that it represents.... (Hurrell, 1995: 39-42).
Hurrell’s first category, regionalisation, is non-official and non-political ‘soft 
regionalism’, while political intentions are involved in the second category. A key 
difference here is whether or not the region is formed through negotiations or agreements 
of official institutions. The third category, a psychological or a constructivist approach, 
focuses on the formation of identity. Identity can be produced by political or economic 
integration, or it can enforce them. To understand the nature of regionalism all three of 
these categories should be considered. These three elements of regionalism may be 
combined in various ways to define several types of regionalism.
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2. Theoretical approaches to regionalism
In response to the EU’s closer integration and to globalising processes, regionalism is 
now a major issue in IR scholarship (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995; Gamaut & Drysdale, 
1994; The special issue of Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 5, 1999). New theories 
have been developed to explain its rise. The four main approaches are: Neorealism, 
Neoliberal institutionalism, Neofunctionalism, and Constructivism.
2.1 Approaches of the four theories
The key arguments of the four major theories are well observed in HurrelTs articles. 
According to him, the neorealist believes that recent developments in regionalism and 
economic cooperation are guided by the wider international political structures and 
within that the major states. Cooperation also takes the form of alliances which are driven 
by two or more states’ global objectives and strategies, and regional economic 
cooperation can be seen to be similarly motivated. This school of thought sees the 
geopolitical conditions in Europe as being central to moves to economic cooperation 
(Hurrell, 1995: 47). They argue that while regional cooperation and integration is indeed 
possible, it is more often the response to the existence of a regional hegemon, or results 
from a longer period of converging interests. And whether or not it is economic or 
political, it is a strategic response to ongoing threats or challenges (Ibid.: 53). In the 
neorealist view there is also the important factor of states wishing to extend their 
international trade, a neo-mercantilist approach. Mercantile power is a form of strategic 
weapon in the economic order. In the 1980s the US economic position was weakening 
relative to Europe and Japan, and this brought about an interest in mercantile strategy as 
an issue (Ibid.: 22). Not only the major players, but smaller states in Europe saw 
cooperation as a means to increase their bargaining power and to restrict entry into a 
controlled market (Ibid.: 49).
Liberal IR theory has found a lot of scope within moves to regionalism since 1945 to 
develop its ideas further. For neoliberal institutionalists regionalism is seen as a new level
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of entity above and also below the previously accepted notion of the state, with new 
players and social constructs (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995b: 324). Regionalism is considered 
to be a new process that may help us to interpret ‘nation’ and ‘national interest’ in 
different ways. The setting up of institutions is part of a response to solve real problems 
collectively. And acting collectively, willingly submitting to higher authority, has great 
potential mutual benefits in reducing tensions (Keohane, 1984: 84). Economic integration 
is also seen as mutually beneficial. It heightens the stakes nations have in each other and 
therefore works to diffuse conflicts, and also creates a framework where conflicts may be 
resolved, where new ways of viewing each other and oneself can arise and new 
institutions can be developed. Neoliberal institutionalists agree that a shared geography, 
history and culture are important factors (Hurrell & Fawcett, 1995b: 313).
Neo-functionalist approaches have also been keenly applied to analyses of European 
regionalism. These see the starting point as the need to solve common problems of a non- 
contentious nature such as technical matters or matters of limited scope. The ECSC is a 
response to a particular defined problem. The institutions which are set in motion gather 
momentum, grow, and become self-sustaining and spill over into other forms of 
cooperation, culminating in political integration (Ibid.: 59).
Finally, a constructivist looks at regionalism from a social psychological perspective, 
dealing with the matters of identity and belonging. The key factor which will sustain 
regionalism is a sense of community. The trust necessary to build this arises from shared 
cognitive elements, shared knowledge, culture, values and social norms. Material 
economic benefits are not the only catalyst. It is therefore important to examine the 
subjective aspect of identity to understand regional developments (Ibid: 65).
2.2 Critiques of these four theories
Clearly it is possible to criticise each theory. Hurrell provides a balancing perspective on 
each. The weakness of the neorealist view is that it does not see the differences between 
regionalism and strategic alliances (Hurrell, 1995: 53). The autonomy and sustained 
impact of various international institutions is not accorded enough weight, whether it be
58
in the changes European institutions have brought about in the political climate (Ibid.: 73), 
or simply the fact that ASEAN continues to exist after the end of the Cold War.
Neoliberal institutionalists have too much confidence in the institutions themselves. 
These can only operate effectively where intra-regional tensions between states are 
controlled or calmed to the extent that they do not destroy regional confidence. 
Institutions thus have a job to do, but more in sustaining rather than creating intra- 
regional cooperation (Hurrell & Fawcett, 1995b: 317).
While Neo-functionalism has influenced ‘both the theory and the practice of European 
regionalism’, it focuses on institutions and does not address ‘the factors behind the 
emergence of regionalist schemes’. It therefore also has difficulties dealing with the kinds 
of regionalism that involve low level institutional contact (Hurrell, 1995: 61).
Finally, Constructivists neglect the realities that history, geography, and shared culture 
and relationships have not prevented civil wars. Identities are in fact rather fluid and may 
change rapidly. Not only that, but the understanding of the whole by social groups within 
it may differ radically from others within the same region (Ibid.: 66).
3. East Asian regionalism
Nevertheless, the different theoretical approaches can offer complementary views of 
regionalism. Each one gives another insight into the nature of change in the global 
economy through the different workings of globalisation and regionalisation. All of the 
approaches tend to take as working models highly institutionalised forms of 
regionalisation, such as has been seen in the EU in particular and, to a lesser extent, 
NAFTA. The European case is the most advanced example of regionalism and of 
extensive integration over the last 40 years and it has also been a stimulus for regional 
efforts elsewhere (Axline, 1988: 3; Yamazawa, 1998: 163). European integration has 
raised questions of erosion of existing, and the rise of new sovereignties. The move 
towards political integration is sometimes regarded almost as ‘a higher state of political
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organisation to which humankind is carried on the ultimately irresistible tide of historical 
progress’ (Milward, 2000: 12). But in fact this issue does not arise outside the European 
context. Hettne for example argues ‘Europe represents the most advanced regional 
arrangement the world has seen, and it will consequently serve as our paradigm for the 
new regionalism’ (Hettne & Inotai, 1994, p. 12, in 28fii, Marchand et al., 1999: 903). 
Both neorealists and neoliberals also agree that the success or otherwise of the EU is an 
important test case (Baldwin, 1993: 5).
3.1 Why EU-type regionalism does not exist in East Asia
The EU has a strong institutional foundation integral to economic cooperation; East Asia 
has nothing comparable. Many scholars have provided explanations of why it is difficult 
to provide such regionalisms in the region. They tend to refer to the diversity of East Asia 
as the prime reason (Si, Chu, 1991). There are at least three incompatible political 
systems evident among the member states of APEC: A communist, an authoritarian 
capitalist and a democratic capitalist system. In addition, East Asia has a wide spectrum 
of different levels of economic development. Japan has a GDP per capita thirty times 
greater than China’s. In addition there is extensive cultural, religious and social-ethnical 
heterogeneity (Peng, 2000: 178-9).
Second, the wider the diversity in a region in political, economic and other terms, the 
higher the transaction costs of building formal regional institutions, and the resulting 
institutions may not be the best means of overcoming the informal trade barriers that exist 
across a region. For this informal cooperation is a better vehicle (Ibid.). The combination 
of Japan and the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) was successful in penetrating 
western markets and this has spurred an interest in multilateral trading systems (Foot, 
1995: 234-5).
Third, some scholars seek the answer from the external security circumstances. While 
East Asia has seen within itself ideological polarities (the two Koreas, the two Vietnams, 
and China/Taiwan), it has never had a single comprehensive security threat such as was 
perceived in Western Europe and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) from the
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Soviet Union. East Asia has implemented security mechanisms that are based on bilateral 
rather than multilateral treaties (Ibid.: 238-40; See also Mansfield & Milner, 1999: 618; 
Katzenstein, 1996: 141-2).
Finally, the Asia-Pacific region had few multilateral institutions during the early post-war 
period. Effective economic regionalism was absent, particularly during the Cold War era. 
Even now it may be contended that Asia-Pacific organisations offer little more than 
opportunities for dialogues, although some institution-building efforts have been made in 
the region.3 For example, the geographically extensive APEC is wider than a regional 
body, and should be termed ‘toms-regional’. It is closer to the model of the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) and the TransAtlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) than the EU or 
NAFTA, even though it is more institutionalised than the former. The value of APEC is 
more in the forum itself, which provides a process for confidence-building, than in the 
potential results (Ravenhill, 2000: 329, 331). The same is true of other examples of 
regional organisations. ASEAN has not undergone the same kind of economic 
integration, nor encouraged the growth of an internal market as has been seen in the EU. 
Neither of those activities have been a goal of ASEAN, which has developed rather a 
political and economic subgroup that does not discriminate against outsider nations 
(Butler, 1997: 416).4 The EAEC (East Asia Economic Caucus) has also not made much 
progress.5 In this, as Katzenstein contends, the regional efforts to create stronger ties -  in 
particular APEC, AFTA, and EAEC/East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) -  have shaky 
futures (Katzenstein, 1997: 22).
3 ‘Unofficial regional institutions were formed before such as, the business related Pacific Basin Economic 
Council (PBEC) in 1967; the academic Pacific Trade and Development Conference (P AFT AD) founded in 
1969; and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC, now Council) in 1980’ (28fii, 
Yoshimatsu, 2000: 16). In 1989 APEC was set up in an Australian initiative. APEC has been the main 
forum for economic dialogue among the member countries, holding ministerial meetings, high-level 
official meetings, and working groups. Its object is to liberalise trade and investment (Ibid.: 17)
4 Unlike the EU, ASEAN has not achieved ‘substantial integration o f economic activity and growth of 
intra-regional trade and investment.... Intra-ASEAN trade only grew from 3.2% of total trade in 1980 to 
4% in 1990, with much o f this trade not governed by preferential trade rules’ (Panagariya, 1994, pp. 16-7, 
cited in Butler, 1997: 416).
5 The EAEC has also faced significant opposition from North America and Australia, which are excluded 
from the membership. Moreover, some member countries such as Japan have taken a cautious attitude 
towards the idea (Urata, 1998: 34).
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3.2 East Asian regionalism
The method of institutionalisation chosen and its depth is a function of different kinds of 
regional groupings. The way to look at it is that there are deep-seated differences in 
patterns of regional governance and the extent of institutionalisation is a manifestation, 
and not an explanation, of these differences. There is no common understanding of the 
form or types, which are defined as a process through which regional patterns of relations 
are established and institutionalised (Bajo, 1999: 927-8). Thus the wider political and 
economic questions and contexts will have different regional dynamics and these in turn 
will produce totally different concepts of regionalism (Beeson & Jayasuriya, 1998: 312).
Compared to Europe, Asian regionalism does not have strong institutions. Attempts to 
establish formal rule-making and rule-binding regional institutions in Asia have generally 
failed, but one should not use European ‘success’ as a yardstick to measure Asian 
‘failure’. This focus on the institutions reflects a view of regionalism that is heavily 
influenced by the EU model, which is often implicitly seen as the height of regional 
institutional integration. The European model is not the only form of regionalism, 
although some scholars, such as Hettne, have argued that the EU model is superior to 
these developed outside Europe. In the EU model, integration occurs on more than an 
economic level. As Milward argues, the emergence and development of the EU was 
made possible due to the particular historical circumstances in post-war western Europe 
(Milward, 2000: 10). It was not only the positive factors of shared history and culture that 
brought European integration forward, but also the shared suffering of the war, the threat 
posed by Soviet military power and concern about American hegemony (Wallace, 1995: 
201).
It is difficult to use theories of regionalism based on Western and particular European 
experience to understand the situation of Asian regionalism. A broader view should take 
account of regional efforts in various parts of the world, regardless of form. It is better to 
acknowledge that regional integration can be very different in nature, depth and scope, in 
different world regions. ‘East Asia’s development will necessarily reflect current political 
and economic structures’ (Ibid.). The emphasis in Asian regionalism has been on
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informal consultation rather than institutional structure and formally agreed and adopted 
rules. In the Asian model of cooperation, according to Yoshimatsu, basic principles are 
agreed upon in the guiding rules and the details required for practice arrived at through 
informal and incremental consultation. It works by consensus, thus Asian states have a 
veto power over collective actions. One benefit of this informality is that there is more 
room for manoeuvre for each participating country. The flexibility allows for changes of 
policy and bargaining positions taken by each player (Yoshimatsu, 2000: 23). For East 
Asia some forms of functional cooperation may be the ultimate evolution of regionalism, 
and it can be better described as ‘cooperation’, rather than ‘integration’.
What then is the difference between integration and cooperation? First of all, two 
scholars raised the need for defining integration. Wallace distinguishes integration 
between the formal and the informal. The former is identified by ‘deliberate actions by 
authoritative policy-makers to create and adjust mles, to establish common institutions 
and to work with and through those institutions’. The latter is characterised by ‘intense 
patterns of interaction that follow the dynamics of makers, technology, communications 
networks and social exchange without the intervention of public authorities’ (Wallace, 
1990, p. 54, in Laffan, 1992: 3-4). Peng notes the importance, for formal integration, of 
‘regional integrative organisations’ and ‘comprehensive legal agreements*. They are 
comprehensive in that a large part of the international exchange between agreeing states, 
such as free trade areas and custom unions are covered. For informal integration, no such 
agreements are required. Although economic factors and the private sector play a leading 
role, this is not to say that background government support is not important (Peng, 2000: 
177-8).
In addition to this, other scholars such as Laffan also claim that regional cooperation 
should be differentiated from integration, by saying that while similarities exist, as both 
involve some kind of collective action by states, the intensity of relations between the 
participating state and the level of organisation is higher in the case of regionalism as 
integration (Laffan, 1992: 3). Hass contends that integration creates political communities 
(Hass, 1971, p. 6, in Ibid.). In the integration process, the nation-state, which stands to
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lose some aspects of sovereignty, must be the main actor. On the other hand, cooperation 
works within clearly defined limits and leaves the powers of member states unaffected. 
National sovereignty is not brought into question and no independent centre of power and 
authority is created (Ibid.).6
In this regard, what Scalapino identifies ‘Natural Economic Territories’ (NETs) are other 
examples of such a kind of Asian cooperation model. NETs are ‘entities that cross 
political boundaries, often encompassing only portions of the state, but with their raison 
d ’etre resting upon the combination of natural resources, manpower, technology, and 
capital that can be pooled to maximum advantage’ (Scalapino, 1992: 22, also quoted in 
Lew, Seok-Jin, 1995: 18). This concept can be developed to postulate a soft regionalism. 
Thus regionalism can remain a wide notion embracing both that of the EU with its 
political superstructures, and its operation at state level, and also the soft regionalism that 
is based simply around the economic flow across political boundaries (Scalapino, 1992: 
8, in Ibid.: 19).
II. Regionalism in East Asia
Part II attempts to identify the emerging trends of SREZs since the late 1980s in East 
Asia. It outlines the concepts, modalities, categories, and objectives of sub-regional 
economic zones (SREZs) as a new East Asian model and raises the question as to why 
only the Singapore-Johore-Riau Growth Triangle (SUORI) and the Greater South China 
Economic Zone (GSCEZ) have been successful The discussion also analyses - 
comparatively - the key success factors in the SIJORI and GSCEZ projects. Finally, the 
concluding section discusses the lessons that may be applied to the Tumen River Area 
Development Project (TRADP).
6 According to Lew, regional cooperation will be loosely defined as ‘informal and uninstitutionalised 
arrangements among particular regions of the concerned countries, not confined to the central government, 
but extended to local government and private capital, concerning making the transaction o f capital, goods 
and technology across the national boundaries easier and freer’ (Lew, Seok-Jin, 1995: 20-1).
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1. Defining Sub-regional Economic Zones (SREZs)
1.1 Concepts
Towards the end of the 1980s, different versions of a new type of regional economic 
cooperation started to appear rapidly in various parts of East Asia. SREZs have been 
given various names: transnational economic zones, growth triangles, transnational 
export processing zones, natural economic territories, and extended metropolitan regions 
(Chia, 1993: l).7 Two Asian academics have provided the definitions of SREZs:
[SREZ] is a special case of the more general concept of economic 
cooperation... [It] involves economic cooperation based on encouraging 
specific and limited linkages of complementary economic activities across 
borders. It is a pragmatic response to the practical problems of formal 
economic integration among nations that require fundamental changes in 
national institutional and administrative arrangements as with NAFTA, the 
EC or AFTA... [It] needs not involve entire countries, but simply adjacent 
areas within countries that have complementary capabilities and resources 
(Abonyi, 1996: 4-5).
...These sub-regional economic integration processes cut across political 
boundaries and political and economic systems, and occur with or without 
government initiative, and with or without formal institutions and structures...
The driving force is the private sector. [But] the facilitators are governments, 
who remove the political barriers to the movement of goods, services and 
factors of production, provide the physical infrastructure, and offer various 
investment incentives. As such, the SREZ is more than the border trade that is 
commonly found along the borders of nation states (Chia, 1993: 1-3).
1.2 Modalities
Chia visualised the strengths of the SREZ concept by comparing it with a national export 
processing zone (EPZ) and a regional free trade area (FTA). An EPZ ‘is a specially 
designated area in a country to promote export manufacturing and foreign investment. It 
receives special treatment in the form of fiscal incentives and infrastructural support.... 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan have established successful EPZs’ (Ibid.: 3). A FTA 
[composes] more formal institutionalised arrangements, and ‘focuses on sharing the
7 The term ‘growth triangles’ gradually emerged as a popularly acceptable term, but not all ‘triangles’ are 
triangular, but rectangular, or hexagon, etc. Therefore, SREZs are used as a unifying concept.
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enlarged regional market and discriminates against non-members’. NAFTA and AFTA 
are examples. By contrast, the SREZ is fra/w-national export processing zone, with 
distinct advantages over the national-bound EPZs. Compared to FTA, the SREZ can 
avoid political and economic risks as ‘it localises the effects of trade and investment 
opening to the outside world’ (Ibid.). In this context, the SREZ is consistent with the 
scope of ‘open regionalism’ defined by Gamaut: such a type of regionalism does not 
discriminate against outsiders, and is different from ‘discriminatory regionalism’ 
(Gamaut, 1996).8 Overall, SREZs not only provide ‘a way of addressing their national 
priorities and concerns in the context of intense global competition’ (Tongzon, 1998: 88), 
but also increase bargaining power for relations with the major global players (Mistry, 
1999: 125-6; Walter, 1995: 95).
1.3 SREZs in East Asia
There are nine SREZs in East Asia, two (SUORI and GSCEZ) currently operational and 
seven others under discussion (China, 1993: 4-9). Apart from the TRADP, they are:
Singapore-Johore-Riau (SIJORI)
The name SUORI is taken from the initial two letters of the names of the three 
participants: Singapore, the southern Malaysian state of Johore, and the Riau Islands of 
Indonesia (initially involving only Batam Island, but then extended to the whole Riau 
archipelago). The SIJORI was inaugurated in 1990. After a period of recession in 1985, 
the Singapore government encouraged manufacturing to relocate to Johore and in 
December 1989 the Deputy Prime Minster Goh Chok Tong formally opened the so-called 
‘Growth Triangle’. The resulting combination of skilled labour, developed 
communications and financial infrastructure from Singapore, and lower property and 
labour costs in Johore and Riau have been mutually beneficial (Bridges, 1997: 63-4).
8 Walter’s ‘Benign Regionalism’ sounds similar to ‘Open Regionalism’. He defines it ‘as regional 
arrangements which, in the process of the voluntary swapping o f mutual preferences between the group’s 
members, do not at the same time increase barriers to economic exchange with the outside world. The basic 
point is that the intent is not consciously to reduce the welfare o f outsiders (or indeed insiders)’ (Walter, 
1995: 78).
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Greater South China Economic Zone (GSCEZ)
This Greater South China Economic Zone (GSCEZ) reaches across Guangdong and 
Fujian into Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and has been successful in increasing cross 
border trade. The volume of trade and investment of Hong Kong and Taiwan with China 
is now greater than that of the rest of their trading partners. The GSCEZ was set in 
motion in 1979. It began with four SEZs to encourage foreign investment in China, 
established in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou (Guangdong province), and Xiamen 
(Fujian). The concept spread through the 1980s to other parts of the Pearl River Delta 
(Ibid.: 58-60; Chia, 1993: 6).
Northern Growth Triangle (NGT)
The Northern Growth Triangle (NGT) covers 11 provinces in Western Indonesia 
(Northern Sumatra and Aceh), northern Malaysia (Penang, Kedah, Perlis and Perak), and 
southern Thailand (Songkhla, Satun, Yala, Narthiwat and Pattani). The NGT was 
initiated by Malaysia and seeks to find synergy between an industralised Northern 
Peninsula Malaysia with a strong service sector, and the more agricultural-based southern 
Thailand and Northern Sumatra (Chia, 1993: 4-5). Thailand and Indonesia have 
population pressures in Bangkok and Java, and need to find development solutions. The 
NGT seeks help from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to draw up a programme and 
explore possibilities (Salleh, 1993: 63).
East Growth Triangle (EGT)
The East Growth Triangle (EGT) was established to address the less developed areas of 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, namely Brunei, Sulawesi in eastern Indonesia, 
Mindanao in southern Philippines, and Sabah and Sarawak in eastern Malaysia. Brunei is 
also included in the EGT and as a rich country is a potential source of capital. There are 
potentials for development in the areas of marine resources, energy, transportation and 
tourism (Chia, 1993: 5).
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Baht Economic Zone
The name Baht Economic Zone reflects the wide use of the Thai baht as a transaction 
currency.9 The Thai baht is relatively strong in the border areas encompassing Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Yunnan Province of China. The Thai private sector has 
been encouraged to forge economic links across the region to develop industries in 
minerals, forestry and fishery. The Thai government is promoting commerce and capital 
flows between this area and the outside world, something particularly important to land­
locked Laos (Ibid.).
Mekong River Basin Project
The history of cooperation in this region goes back to 1957 when Thailand, Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos started to address together the development of the lower Mekong 
Basin by attracting outside capital and funding. Myanmar and Yunnan Province of China 
joined later. All these areas were underdeveloped with poor infrastructure, lack of capital, 
and poor productivity. The Mekong Basin is a natural economic territory, and possible 
areas of collaboration, with coordination led by the ADB, are hydroelectric power, 
irrigation, flood control, drainage, improving navigation improvement and environmental 
management (Ibid.: 5-6).
Yellow Sea and Sea o f Japan Rims
Japanese sub-regional economic cooperation on the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan Rims is 
rather different in that there is a strong market and corporate drive. As China opened its 
coastal regions, Japanese and South Korean investments moved in. There are some 
cultural and historical links between the Rims encompassing Northwest China (Bohai, 
Shandong and Liaoning), Southwest Japan and the Koreas, and the Russian Far East. 
These ties give support to the exploration of industrial complementarities (Ibid.: 9).
9 Since the financial crisis o f 1997 the Chinese yuan has replaced the Baht in the border areas immediately 
adjacent to China.
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Figure 2-1: Sub-regional Economic Zones (SREZs) in East Asia
Source: (Tongzon, 1998: 85)
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Table 2-1. Economic cooperation groupings in East Asia
Name of economic 
grouping
Date formed Basis Number of 
countries
Component
countries/areas
Greater South 
China Economic 
Zone (GSCEZ)
private sector 
activity
3 Coastal South 
China, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan
Yellow Sea Rim 
Economic Zone
- 11 3 Northern China, 
Japan, ROK
Sea of Japan Rim 
Economic Zone
If 5 Japan, East Russia, 
Northeast China, 
DPRK, ROK
Tumen River Delta 
Area
concept phase 5 East Russia, 
Northeast China, 
Mongolia, DPRK, 
ROK
Singapore-Johore 
-Riau Growth 
Triangle (SIJORI)
1989 private sector 
activity
3 Singapore, Johore 
(Malaysia), Riau 
(Indonesia)
Northern Growth 
Triangle (NGT)
concept phase 3 West Indonesia, 
North Malaysia, 
South Thailand
Baht Economic 
Zone
private sector 
activity
5 Yunnan (China), 
Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, 
Northeast Thailand
East Growth 
Triangle (EGT)
concept phase 4 Brunei, Philippine, 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia
Mekong River 
Project
1957 6 Yunnan (China), 
Thailand, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar
Source: based on (Chia, 1993: 2)
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Table 2-2: Basic indications for the GSCEZ and SIJORI
GSCEZ SIJORI
Hong
Kong
Taiwan Guang­
dong
Fujian Total Singap­
ore
Johore Batam Total
Area 
(sq. km)
1,075 36,000 18,000 12,000 67,075 639 18,914 N.A. 19,553
Popula­
tion
5.7 20.4 62.8 30.0 118.9 2.8 2.2 0.1 5.1
Per
capita
GNP
13,200 3,070 535 350 N.A. 12,890 3,594 500 N.A.
Total
GDP
(US$
billion)
59.7 180.3 33.6 10.5 284.1 34.6 4.3 US$
0.045
38.9
GDP
growth
rate
(1991)
3.9 7.3 17.3 15.4 N.A. 6.7 9.0 N.A. N.A.
Unskil­
led
labour
Cost
(US$
p/m)
708 N.A. 103 N.A. N.A. 350 150 90 N.A.
Land 
cost 
(US$/ 
sq m/ 
month)
24.7 N.A. 1.9 N.A. N.A. 4.25 4.08 2.3 N.A.
Source: (Thant, 1996: 249)
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1.4 Categories
Chia distinguishes SREZs conceptually into the following categories, which in practice 
may overlap (Ibid.: 3-4):
A metropolitan spillover into the hinterland
...The core enjoys better infrastructure, and economies of scale and 
agglomeration. However, economic success leads to growing land and labour 
constraints, so that development spills over into the periphery.... This 
category of SREZs corresponds to the concepts of Extended Metropolitan 
Region and National Economic Territories. Examples are the Singapore 
development spillover into Johore and Riau and the Hong Kong and Taiwan 
development spillover into South China.
Geographically proximate areas with common interests 
Historically, geographical proximity, ethnic and cultural affinity, and 
geographical interests have led to active economic exchange between border 
areas of neighbouring countries... [However, the] end of the Cold War and 
the transition of socialist command economies towards open market 
economies have led to a revival of border exchanges.... This type of SREZ is 
typified by Baht economic zone, Yellow Sea Rim and Japan Sea Rim 
economic zones.
Joint development o f natural resources and infrastructure 
Low income countries need to develop their infrastructure as a precondition 
for... the attraction of private capital, but face severe financial constraints. 
Sub-regional cooperation can reduce the financial burden by joint approaches 
to external funding agencies and improve the efficiency of projects by 
exploiting the economies of scale and agglomeration.... This type of SREZ is 
typified by the Mekong River project in Southeast Asia and the Tumen River 
project in Northeast Asia. (Neither of which have been successful so far.)
1.5 Classification by initiatives
Although the forms of the zone may vary, these economic zones can be classified 
according to whether they are government-led, private sector-led, or UNDP-led, and local 
government-led. Unlike SUORI, where the economic integration process was 
government-led, the economic integration of the GSCEZ has been private sector-led 
development. The third category describes the Tumen River project in Northeast Asia. 
Furthermore, it can be redefined as ‘international organisation-led’ if the Greater Mekong
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concept develops with the ADB taking a leading role (Yeung, 1995, in Bridges, 1997: 57- 
8).
2. Objectives of the SREZ
Regional (or sub-regional) competitive advantage within the global economy is seen to 
foster national competitive advantage (Abonyi, 1996: 4-5). However, it would be wrong 
to see SREZs as driven only by economics. What were the objectives that led to the 
emergence of this kind of sub-regionalism? We need to provide a wide ranging critique 
of the sometimes simplistic notions of regionalism to take account of new and concrete 
developments that are occurring. Regionalism may appear economic in its stated goals, 
but underlying factors and motivations may reveal political and security concerns, and 
these need to be taken into account when assessing the dynamics of the economic 
interactions.
2.1 Performance legitimacy
The introduction of SREZs may help a regime under pressure to increase its legitimacy 
and thus secure some measure of domestic stability and order (Acharya, 1996: 31). The 
Economist magazine (25 September 1993: 3, cited in Ibid.) noted that there are good 
political reasons for governments to support SREZs because it ‘sounds like [Southeast 
Asian governments] are doing something for development in politically troubled 
regions’. In theory at least, welfare and development of standards of living are inherent in 
SREZs, as is providing national security through regional cooperation. This would 
contribute to what has been called ‘performance legitimacy’. Domestic political 
legitimacy will be enhanced where the state is seen as concerned for its people’s well­
being and wider security, both of which remain important in Southeast Asia (Ibid.).
2.2 Bargaining power
Most of these countries need regional engagement and mutual assistance to improve 
economic survival prospects. Increasing global competition is forcing states to seek more 
bilateral and sub-regional cooperation. Such regional groupings also provide increased
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bargaining power for relations with the major global players (Mistry, 1999: 125-6; 
Walter, 1995: 95).
2.3 Reducing the likelihood of conflict
Regional economic cooperation can help lay foundations for improved order and stability 
within a region (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995b: 310). Such interdependence does not, of 
course, do away with conflicts completely, but the economic costs of entering into 
conflict are increased and thus the ‘likelihood of conflict’ is reduced (Bridges, 1997: 70- 
1).10 Economic development requires outside investment from multinationals. Given the 
difficulties in attracting such investment, states are less likely to risk capital flight 
through moves that undermine stability.
2.4 Harmony with the higher regional level
The ASEAN SREZs are also part of the wider ASEAN vision to bring about better 
pooling of resources and market sharing. The 1992 ‘Singapore Declaration’ of the Third 
ASEAN Summit set out intentions to realise economic and political cooperation at 
increasing levels ‘to move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation’ 
(Weatherbee, 1995: 427). Tongzon contends that SREZs can work to help cooperation 
across the ASEAN region and to complement the higher level cooperation processes in 
the following ways:
[SREZs] can be perceived as building blocs for economic cooperation in the 
region. They are complementary, rather than alternatives for the regionwide 
economic cooperation. [They] can serve the role of ‘reality tests’ for selected 
dimensions or assumptions of AFTA. They can be instrumental in moving 
them from national comparative advantage to regional competitive 
advantage.... [They] could also be a means by which the region’s economic 
dynamism could be spread to the lagging parts of the region.... [B]y playing 
down political and security issues, [SREZs] can provide a venue through 
which the member states can focus on similarities such as mutual economic 
gains (Tongzon, 1998: 91-2).
10 Bridges also argues that the key to reducing the likelihood of conflict is the increased cost to the parties 
involved. Singapore’s security has been improved by ‘functional interdependence’ with its neighbours. In 
Taiwan, there is a particular advantage in a case where formal diplomatic relations are fraught with 
difficulty. The SREZ allows an informal involvement which promotes stability (Bridges, 1997: 70-1).
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It thus can be concluded that SREZs have shown positive effects, which have acted as an 
incentive to greater political commitment to regional cooperation.
3. Problems and issues
Notwithstanding these positive evaluations, the SREZs have nevertheless experienced 
great difficulties. The various parts of the SREZ are at different stages of economic 
development and have varying natural and human resources. The SREZ as a transnational 
phenomenon gives rise to political and security problems at various levels, in addition to 
being constrained itself by its own economic problems. Seven of the nine SREZs have 
not yet gone beyond the discussion stage, and even the two projects in operation (SUORI 
and GSCEZ) have experienced and continue to face many setbacks.
3.1 Financial constraint
Country-specific projects have been the traditional destination for investment. 
Mechanisms need to be developed for the financing of trans-border projects, and these 
mechanisms need to be workable for a range of international financial institutions 
(Abonyi, 1996: 11). The present international system will need a more developed 
approach to deal with SREZs, especially the problems of high credit cost and large 
collateral and reserve requirements (Thant, 1996: 253-4).
3.2 Lack of coordination
Lack of coordination can be another problem. For example, as Chia explains, some local 
governments in southern coastal China have been successful in securing infrastructure 
funding. However, this has been achieved on their own and may have been at the expense 
of efficient allocation of resources with resulting excess capacity in some areas (Chia, 
1993: 26).
3.3 Distributional issues
There are widening gaps in income and economic development between the areas that 
have specially designed economic zones and those that do not. This can create serious
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domestic problems. Note, though, that these are problems generated by a host state, rather 
than by regionalism per se. However, because SREZs directly benefit only a defined and 
limited area, they may become a ‘politically sensitive’ issue (Acharya, 1996: 33).11 The 
growing wealth and level of development and standard of living in the provinces of 
Guangdong and Fujian compared to the relatively poor northern and inland provinces is a 
case in point (Chia, 1993: 26). The economic growth in the SUORI area also raises 
distributional issues. There has been pressure for the inclusion of other islands in Riau, 
while Batam used to be considered as a minor irritant to Indonesia’s economy. Local 
people both inside and outside the region are concerned that they are not seeing the 
benefits generated from such initiatives (Ahmmed, 1993: 111).
3.4 Inter-provincial rivalry
As central investment in a SREZ means diverting funds from other provinces or projects, 
this means there is great potential for inter-provincial jealousies (Chia, 1993: 25-6). In 
Indonesia, where there is a perception that the economic benefits to the Riau Islands have 
not spread to the mainland part of the same province or to the rest of Indonesia, inter- 
provincial rivalry is high. The main problem seems to lie in excessive competition 
between individual islands in the Riau province (particularly between Batam as the 
industrially focused island and Bintan as a tourist resort island). Clearly other parts of 
Indonesia are also concerned that the lion’s share of the central development budget is 
being spent on one island (Bridges, 1997: 65-6).12
3.5 Central-provincial tensions
A SREZ, involving as it does, parts of rather than the whole of these countries, affects the 
way central government and provincial government relate (Thambipillai, 1998: 263). The 
same tensions can arise where there are two or more SREZs in a state, and where some
11 Adding to this concern, SREZs need to be carefully handled from the point o f view o f domestic social 
stability. Significant migration of parts of the labour force with economic expansion leads to housing 
shortages, pressure on social services, and increasing wage differentials. In these lie the seeds of political 
unrest. In Indonesia reference has been made by the military to threats to the social order arising out of 
Batam, part o f SIJORI (Straits Times, June 20,1991, cited in Acharya, 1996: 34).
12 Whetherbee (1995: 429) says that the Indonesian proposal to develop an industrial centre on ‘Madura to 
rival Batam’, while perhaps not a challenge to the geographic edge o f Batam can be seen as a response to 
complaints o f unbalanced regional industrial growth in the country.
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are perceived to have preferential status. The risk of political resentment and bad feeling 
against central government is high (Bridges, 1997: 72). The SREZ can become a channel 
for drawing the periphery area away from the national core towards a foreign support. 
Ultimately this could undermine central authority and national cohesion, with the 
province demanding greater provincial autonomy in policy formulation and 
implementation and in the collection and use of tax revenues (Chia, 1993: 25).
3.6 Allotment among countries
Then there are allocation issues between countries -  for example between Indonesia and 
Singapore in the SUORI. Singapore covers only 3% of SUORI geographically, 50% in 
terms of population, but takes 90% of its income. President Suharto of Indonesia declared 
at the start of the project that it would need to be seen to be of benefit to all participating 
countries or it would fall down politically (New Straits Times, September 27, 1990, in 
Acharya, 1996: 35). In Malaysia, Semangat ‘46, the political opposition, explicitly raised 
the issue that the SREZ could turn Johore into the ‘backyard’ of Singapore (Straits Times, 
October 20, 1990, in Ibid.: 34). Cooperative relationship can still be fraught with tension, 
as demonstrated by the angry Malaysian response to Lee Kuan Yew’s comments that 
Johore was ‘crime-ridden’ (The Economist, 1997).
3.7 Differential sovereignty levels: unclear major players
Again SUORI illustrates further complications. While Singapore is a sovereign state, 
Johore is only a province. Johore is strongly interested in the relationship and decision 
making processes with Singapore, but since the SREZ has been formalised at national 
level, its powers are subject to the federal government in Kuala Lumpur. Riau is not an 
exception, and is ruled by the central government in Jakarta (Bridges, 1997: 65). And the 
Northern Growth Triangle (NGT) is significantly more complicated, involving three 
central governments, four states in Northern Peninsula Malaysia, 14 Provinces in 
Southern Thailand and two Provinces in Northern Sumatra, not to mention the private 
sector (Salleh, 1993: 66).
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3.8 Different development preference of each country
The various participants will thus be differently committed to a SREZ project. The result 
is potentially disruptive. It is commonly perceived, for example, that Singapore is the 
strongest supporter of SIJORI, which is only natural as it is also believed that Singapore 
will be the major beneficiary (Thant, 1996: 250). Other cases of SREZs are not very 
different. Malaysia supports the NGT concept in preference to SUORI. In Thailand the 
GMS seems to rank higher than the NGT in importance (Liwgasemsan, 1993: 73). 
Indonesia has more commitment to SUORI than the NGT, which is seen as an initiative 
by the Philippines government (Bridges, 1997: 67, 72).
3.9 Incomplete triangle
SUORI has indeed been successful. However, it is an unbalanced triangular relationship 
which may impede maximum effectiveness. The bilateral partnerships in the triangle are 
not equally strong and there are two main legs: Singapore-Johore and Singapore-Riau 
(Straits Times, October 3, 1991, in Acharya, 1996: 35). Even these have different bases, 
the Singapore-Johore leg is a more market led development, whereas the state has much 
more involvement in Singapore-Riau leg. And Riau-Johore ties are practically non­
existent. These two areas both lack their own capital, so they suffer the same predicament 
and share few complementarities (Thant, 1996: 250; Ganesan, 1993: 6-7; Vatikiotis, 
1993a).
3.10 Political sensitivity
Since the concept of NGT was proposed in 1993, Malaysia has been its strong backer, 
however, Thailand and Indonesia have not been enthusiastic. There have been security 
concerns in Thailand about its southern provinces, threatened by the rise of Muslim 
separatists there. It is concerned that one effect of the NGT would be an increased 
identification by southern Thai provinces with Muslim Malaysia. Indonesia has doubts 
too. It feels that a better approach might be to join Sumatra to an expanded SUORI. 
Penang, which has a relatively high average income and also an important Chinese 
element, has the potential to become a destabilising factor if ethnic tension increases 
(Bridges, 1997: 67-8). Countries participating in the Greater Mekong project are also
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cautious. The northern areas of Burma could experience racial tensions if Chinese 
commercial interests were to become too strong; Laos is economically weak and fears the 
influence of foreign, especially Thai and Chinese, businesses (Ibid.: 68).
3.11 Discouragement of economic cooperation at a regional level 
Every ASEAN country is in some way involved in one or more SREZs (Abonyi, 1996: 
22). The danger is that rather than promoting regionalism the commercial success of 
SREZs could actually discourage closer regional economic cooperation. If SREZs are 
seen as framing easily achievable targets, this may encourage parties to divert energies 
into these rather than, for example, into the more ambitious but slow-moving AFTA 
programme (Bridges, 1997: 72). SREZs and their like may also detract from the wider 
regionalism of the ASEAN type by alienating neighbours which are not involved in the 
smaller group. The growing links between Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have the 
potential to disaffect other ASEAN members, and indeed the agendas of the two 
cooperative bodies may to some extent be at odds (Acharya, 1996: 35-6).
4. Why are SUORI and GSCEZ successful when others have failed?
As discussed above, most SREZs have suffered difficulties due to various political, 
economic, and security issues at domestic and international levels. Seven of nine SREZs 
are still in the planning stage. Clearly then, not all attempts at regional cooperation have 
been successful. Only two, SIJORI and the GSCEZ, can be said to have taken off. 
Despite grappling with constraints, they can be considered significant and dynamic 
economic centres in East Asia. Why did they succeed when others failed?
4.1 A comparison of SUORI and the GSCEZ
SUORI involves the sub-regions of three rather than two countries as is the case for the 
GSCEZ (Lee, Tsao Yuan, 1993: 20). Hong Kong, as a leg of the GSCEZ, has become 
part of a single national actor, China, and Taiwan can in economic terms be included with 
China. The GSCEZ thus becomes an example of ‘trans-state interdependencies’ 
(Weatherbee, 1995: 422). It is therefore of limited use as a model for exploring broader
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policy implications of sub-regionalism for national actors (Abonyi, 1996: 19-20). 
SUORI, by contrast, being truly multinational, multiethnic and multicultural, qualifies as 
a true SREZ (Weatherbee, 1995: 423).
Both SUORI and GSCEZ have central government involvement. Singapore and 
Indonesia have high level commitments to SUORI, with ‘approvals by heads of state, 
bilateral treaties, a coordinating committee at ministerial level, and involvement of 
Singapore state-enterprises’ (Ibid.). In direct contrast, the GSCEZ developed without any 
such major formal treaty. The open door was created by unilateral Chinese political 
commitment, which lead to investments flowing in from Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 
light of a reduction of political uncertainties and risk (Thant, 1996: 248-250).
4.2 Political commitment—the key success factor of SREZs
Valuable lessens for other emerging SREZs in the region can obviously be drawn from 
SUORI and GSCEZ. The ongoing success of these SREZs depends on overcoming the 
kinds of obstacles and limitations discussed in relation to SUORI and the GSCEZ in 
order to reach economic complementarities, a suitable infrastructure base, state capacity, 
political commitment, including a leading player to drive the process, as well as private 
sector support (Tongzon, 1998: 95). Of these targets, the really crucial factors are a 
positive political will which will work to win over any domestic doubts and the creation 
of a conducive climate for cooperation based on non-hostile relations (Thambipillai, 
1991: 310), as exemplified by the GSCEZ.
Even though the initiative of the private sector is increasingly important, the government
11still plays a key role in creating the framework for investment. Only governments can 
devise and implement institutional frameworks required to anchor and sustain sub­
regional cooperation. This includes ‘specific legal, regulatory and policy frameworks,
13 Toh Mun Heng and Linda Low have argued in their discussion of SREZs within the ASEAN that ‘The 
government factor is... important for political will and commitment to make the economics o f any growth 
triangle work... [T]he government enters any [SREZ] is as the prime mover or the catalyst. It can cut 
through the economic, social and political issues and layers most effectively and play this prime mover role 
better than the private sector. However, governments need to be guided by the private sector and market 
forces rather than pure bureaucratic considerations which may be parochial and self-serving for the 
government in office’ (Heng & Low, 1993: 230).
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and transborder agreements relating to areas such as customs, immigration, repatriation 
of capital, foreign exchange transactions, fiscal incentives, investment guarantees and so 
on’ (Abonyi, 1996: 6-7). Strong political commitment at the highest level and the 
willingness to adjust national policies so as to effectively participate in the SREZs 
constitute the key factor to success. Only government policies can encourage the essential 
participation of the private sector, which is the ultimate target of economic linkages.14 It 
is up to the government to create a climate of political confidence for potential investors 
in the region (Tongzon, 1998: 94). The government is the only body that can provide 
such a framework and will do so only if there is consistency with its other political and 
security objectives (Acharya, 1996: 28-9). The SREZs could not have been possible 
without such political commitment.
S. The number of actors
Some scholars claim that effective cooperation is easier if there are fewer players. Thus 
in East Asia, the fewer the participating governments, the higher the probability that these 
projects will succeed. The potential for conflicts of interest and disagreements over 
policies will be increased with a greater number of participants, and this will tend to 
block development (Weatherbee, 1995: 425; Thambipillai, 1991: 311). Conflicts of 
interest exist within the hexagon of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, and 
China in the GMS. If one compares them to the number of players in SUORI one might 
be led to think that an optimum number of partners should be fewer rather than greater 
(Ibid.: 426). The Chief Minister of Johore once described SUORI as a ‘mini-ASEAN’ 
that was ‘more manageable’ (Ibid.: 427).
However, this would be an oversimplification. For example, the NGT involves only three 
states, while still hovering at discussion level. Not surprisingly, there are problems of co­
ordination and in identifying major areas of cooperation (Tongzon, 1998: 93). Instead, 
this thesis takes a position that the projects can succeed if the governments have strong
14 In GSCEZ, the key was Beijing’s commitment to economic reform. But the private sector took the lead 
from the start.
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political will to guarantee international cooperation, even where the number of actors is 
large. Although ASEAN is the exact example, it has been regarded as the most successful 
one within the ten membership countries. And here the individual leaders play a 
important role: if the leaders of the country feel that the project is no longer useful, the 
country’s stance will be uncooperative. The most important thing is whether or not the 
governments concerned have the political will to guarantee economic cooperation.
6. Implications for the TRADP
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a basis in theory for understanding the 
significance of the TRADP, as one of the regional projects in East Asia and as one of 
many regional projects in the world. Since the late 1980s, regionalism has become one of 
the most important subjects in the debates about the nature of the post-Cold War 
international order. The multidimensional significance of regionalism largely resulted 
from developments in the EC/EU and NAFTA. To some extent countries in East Asia 
have had to catch up with the mainstream of the international political economy. The sub­
regional economic zones (SREZs), which do not necessarily involve whole states, 
emerged as a new model in East Asia. This was due to the political, economic, security 
and historical features of East Asia. Even if the outward form of regionalism is economic 
in nature, the factors that underpin economic regionalism are often far from solely 
economic, and SREZs as transnational phenomena in East Asia give rise to political and 
security problems.
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Obviously, this appears to be the case with the TRADP, the most complex of the 
proposed SREZs. Unlike the EU and NAFTA, most East Asian regional projects have 
failed to perform. The TRADP, in this regard, is no exception. Only two projects (SUORI 
and the GSCEZ) have succeeded so far. The reason why the TRADP has followed in the 
footsteps of other failed East Asian projects, rather than these two, can be found in a 
sharp difference in the level of involvement of government will in involvement, although 
the importance of the private sector cannot be denied. It is hereby argued that the political 
will of the governments is a fundamental prerequisite to realising the SREZs. The 
enhancement of interstate cooperation requires such will. Without political commitment, 
any kind of economic project, however promising, will fail to perform adequately. This 
argument, which runs throughout this chapter, is a significant lesson to the TRADP in 
particular.
Although the TRADP, to some extent, has become a well-known example of regional 
cooperation in Northeast Asia, the future of the project is not as bright as formerly 
expected. Initially academic and business circles in the region were very excited, but now 
their appraisal is cool. Their disappointment is understandable, given that the TRADP 
was seen as somehow different, not likely to follow the path of other East Asian regional 
projects. The failure to consider similar problems between the TRADP and the many 
other unsuccessful regional projects was a big mistake made by the proponents of the 
TRADP.
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Chapter Three. The TRADP
Introduction
What is the Tumen River Area Development Project (TRADP) and whom does it involve? 
What kinds of visions and goals does it have and how has it evolved? Before analysing the 
various aspects of China’s TRADP policy in the following chapters, it is first necessary to 
provide a background description of the TRADP. This chapter will cover the elements of the 
Tumen project, including the scope, economic potential and goals as outlined in the 
publications of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other materials.
1. A profile of the TRADP1
1.1 Geography of the Tumen River
The Tumen River is centrally located in Northeast Asia flowing into the East Sea (Sea of 
Japan) and forms the natural boundary of three riparian countries: China, North Korea 
and Russia. The 516 km long Tumen originates at the eastern side of the Changbai 
Mountains on the border between China and North Korea, flows east along the Sino- 
Korean border, passes along the Korean-Russian border near its mouth, and ends its 
journey in the East Sea. The Chinese border does not reach the Sea and it is located 15 
km upstream. The total drainage area of the Tumen River amounts to 33,168 km2; 22,861 
km2 or 69.3% lies on the Chinese side, and 10,307 km2 or 30.3% on the North Korean. 
The Russian side has only 100 km2 or 0.3% (Ding, Shicheng, 1997: 1-2 & 1994: 72-87).
1 Because the TRADP is an ongoing project, this section describes the profile o f the project, in the present
tense, although many of objectives stated have not lived up to expectations and became part o f history.
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1.2 Regional scope of the TRADP
The TRADP comprises of three sub-projects. The Tumen River Economic Zone (TREZ) is 
the smallest of those, comprising 1,000 sq. km within a small delta area including the Rajin- 
Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone of North Korea, the Hunchun Border Economic 
Zone of China, and Posyet (and Zarubino) of Russia. The Tumen River Economic 
Development Area (TREDA) is medium sized: about 10,000 sq. km, taking in Chongjin in 
North Korea, Yanji (and Longjing, Tumen) in China’s Jilin Province, and Vladivostok (and 
Nakhodka and Vostochny2) in Russia. The Northeast Asia Regional Development Area 
(NEARDA) is the largest of the three: 370,000 sq. km of river valley and inland. It covers 
the whole of the Korean Peninsula, Mongolia, the three Northeast provinces of China 
(Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning) and the nine provinces of Russia’s Far Eastern part 
(Primorsky Krai, Khabarovskiy Krai, Aurskaya Oblast, Sakha Republic, Kamchatskaya 
Oblast, Yevreiskaya, Koryakskiy Autonomous Okrug, Magadanskaya Oblast and 
Sakhalinskaya Oblast) (See Figure 3-2).
2 The Russian side of the TREDA was extended to Nakhodka and Vostochny after the fourth Programme 
Management Committee (PMC) meeting in 1994.
Figure 3-1. Northeast Asia
Source: (http://ace.acadiau.ca/history/nearcwor/nearcmap.htm)
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Figure 3-2. Tumen River and Tumen River Delta Area with Large/Small Development 
Zones.
Source: {The TRADP Third Working Paper, 1993: 31)
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1.3 Vision and goals
The vision of the TRADP is for a multi-billion dollar trade and transport complex with 
infrastructure designated for export processing in the Tumen River area. Central to this is a 
new port city with 1 million residents. Proposed by the UNDP, this plan calls for a ‘cross- 
border free trade zone near the mouth of the river’ {Financial Times, 27 May 1992). The 
initial financial commitment is estimated to be about US$30 billion,3 to be spread over the 
next two decades (Ibid., 8 July 1992; Chosun Hbo, 9 June 1994).4 The Tumen River area is 
marketed by project backers as a new trade artery: a kind of sub-Siberian Hong Kong, or 
sometimes similar to the St. Lawrence Seaway on the US-Canadian border, to the Danube in 
Central Europe, or even Rotterdam. The TRADP would ‘open up to the world economy a 
relatively new area and create new trade entrepots, while demonstrating a new model of 
development for a post-Cold War period’.5
According to the forecasts in Table 3-1, the TRADP would help the GNP of all countries 
in this region to reach 2.7-3.2 times the 1990 levels by 2010, and 4.5-6.4 times by 2020. 
The increase per head of GNP ranges from at least 1.33 times the 1992 value for the case 
of Mongolia to 8.73 times for China {Chosun Ilbo, 9 June 1994). The real average annual 
GDP per capita of the population in this region is expected to rise by a factor of more 
than 5.0, from approximately US$1,200 in 1990 to some US$6,500 in 2020, in constant 
1990 dollars {TRADP Infrastructure Plan, 1995: i). In addition, trade between the 
TRADP countries should achieve a growth of 2.2-2.4 times (US$316 billion) by 2000 
and 5.7-6.9 times by 2010 (US$891.8 billion) at the 1990 price {Chosun Ilbo, 9 June 
1994; Kim, Icksoo, 1994a: 238).
3 The estimate was expected to include an allocation for the construction o f a new city o f US$13 billion, for 
the improvement of infrastructure, US$11 billion, and for education and development o f human resources, 
US$6 billion (EFANS, 1993: 4). For example, according to the Transportation Sector of the ‘Master Plan’, 
prepared during the Programme Management Committee (PMC) II meeting in Beijing in October, 1992, 
US$11 billion for the improvement of infrastructure would be spread over three stages: Stage I until 2000 - 
US$3.3 billion; Stage II until 2010 - US$7.2 billion; Stage HI until 2020 - US$10.8 billion. For more detail, 
see ‘The Transportation Sector’ of (The Third Working Group Meeting Paper, 1993: 23-133).
4 On the other hand, one o f the originators of this scheme, Ding Shisui, former chairman of the Jilin 
provincial science and technology commission, predicted it would need US$35 billion over the next three 
to five decades; Ding Shicheng, deputy secretary-general of Jilin Province and a long-time advocate of the 
project, estimated that US$100 billion would be called for over the next 30 years, ‘The Tumen River 
Programme promises economic growth’ (Asahi News Service, 23 February 1996).
5 William Clark, Jr., assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs (1992-93), in address to 
the Mid-America Committee, December 1992, quoted in (Kouriatchev, 1993: 1).
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Table 3-1. Per head of GNP (Moderate/Low Growth Projections) (US$, 1990’s price)
1990 2000 2010 2020 2010/1990 2020/1990
N. Korea 1033 1158 1859 2715 1.80 2.63
S. Korea 5990 9857 16464 25011 2.75 4.17
N.E. China 370 705 1326 2315 3.58 6.26
Heilongjiang 396 596 887 1188 2.24 3.00
Jilin 338 489 721 957 2.13 2.80
Liaoning 512 990 1729 2776 3.38 5.42
I. Mongolia 276 401 585 776 2.12 2.80
Mongolia 781 549 791 1036 1.01 1.33
Russia F.E. 2000 1596 2692 5475 1.35 2.73
Japan 25453 37648 55153 65212 2.17 2.56
Source: The Evaluation o f  Sectors for participating in TRADP, KEEP, 1994.
According to The TRADP Third Working Group Paper (1993: 187), the TREZ shall provide 
facilities for intensive co-operative development of infrastructure and industry by the three 
neighbouring countries, China, DPRK, and Russia. The TREDA would function as a co­
operative trade and market area, with joint use of infrastructure, transportation and 
communication. The NEARDA would provide raw materials, traffic services and labour. 
This last area would be regulated by the national governments.
The project is expected ‘to improve the concentration of industry, level of employment and 
standard of living for people in this region and to create additional business activity in other 
regions beyond the borders of the defined zone’ (Infrastructure Sector Plan o f TRADP: 
1995: i). According to the TRADP Strategy and Concept Paper (1992: 5), which is proposed 
at the Beijing Working Group meeting in April 1992:
The primary goal of the TRADP is for the Tumen River area to become a 
leading world class transit/transport hub and processing/manufacturing centre 
over the coming decades, with tourism, shipping and finance capabilities, so as 
to realise the area’s potential. Decisions on how to fulfil this long-term goal will 
be taken by governments on the basis of the pre-feasibility study to be 
conducted taking into account: (1) the evolving economic, social and legal 
systems of the participating countries; (2) the principles of sustainable 
development, environmental soundness and sensitivity to the needs of the 
people, and (3) efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The secondary goal of the 
TRADP for the short-term goal is to assist in assessing the needs and 
opportunities for co-operative measures on a less comprehensive scale to
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encourage trade and investment in the region, e.g., the simplification and 
harmonisation of local customs regulations.
1.4 Economic complementarities
They are positive dimensions that make the TRADP seem attractive. The TRADP promises 
to bring together a synergetic and logical combination of advantages - Japanese and South 
Korean capital and industrial technology together with Chinese, North Korean, Russian and 
Mongolian labour, land and raw materials.6
Natural resources
The TRADP possesses a variety of economic resources, including minerals, energy, water, 
farmland, and forests. The Sakha Republic of Russia and Sakhalin Islands have oil reserves 
estimated at 1,200 million tons each, and the Sakhalin continental shelf is thought to hold 
five billion tons of oil. The deposit of natural gas of the two areas is 340 million m3 
(Asakura, 1996; See also Paik, K., 1997). Northeast China is an important oil producer: over 
half of the total oil deposits of China are thought to be located in the area, and oil shale 
amounts to 21.14 billion tons. Coal is concentrated in Russia, China, Mongolia and North 
Korea. In the Russian Far East, hard coal deposits in the prospected areas are 20 billion tons. 
Northeast China has coal deposits of 66.91 billion tons. Mongolia has 16.5 billion tons, and 
North Korea has 9 billion, of which 70% is anthracite. The lower reaches of Tumen River 
are famed for their brown coal. Hunchun’s deposit is 1.3 billion tons and 3 billion tons are 
found on the North Korean side. There are various metal and non-metal deposits in 
Northeast Asia, and finally there are forests, prairies, land and fresh water resources (Yuan, 
Shuren, et al., 1995: 186; See also Dorian et al., 1993). There is a shortage of resources in 
South Korea and Japan, but this is where the strength of the complementary resources of 
China, Mongolia and North Korea come into play.
Population and labour force
There is an imbalance in the distribution of the labour force. Although Northeast Asia has a 
large population, some areas are extremely densely populated, whereas others have a sparse
6 For a general understanding on human and natural resources, see {Study o f  the Commercial and 
Investment Banking Needs in the TREDA, 1997: 20-28).
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population: 462.6 persons/km2 for South Korea and 325.6 for Japan, against 1.25 in the 
Russian Far East and 1.34 in Mongolia. In addition, the skills and experience of the labour 
force also differ widely. South Korea and Japan have very skilled human capital with higher 
levels of technology and productivity, but both countries have high labour costs, and even 
experienced labour shortages. In Russia’s coastal border, there are 1.1 million workers, but 
at least, 600,000 more may be needed by the end of the century. In contrast, Northeast China 
and North Korea have a surplus of good quality labour, up to an estimated 30% (11.7 
million) in Northeast China (Yuan, Shuren, et al., 1995: 187-8).
Capital and technology
Of the countries in the scheme, Japan and South Korea have the largest capital resources 
of those within the project. Even though economic changes and restructuring, South 
Korea is still a major investor, and Japan is still one of the world’s foremost foreign 
investors. The Northeast Asian countries including China and Russia have made big 
strides forward in the area of science and technology. Combined with Japanese capital 
and technology, there are avenues for fruitful cooperation (Trade and Investment 
Complementarities in Northeast Asia, 1996: 98).
Geographical location
Yuan and others argue that together with mutually beneficial complementarities 
mentioned above, geographical closeness and direct connection between transportation 
systems would result in relatively lower transportation costs (Yuan, Shuren, et al., 1995: 
190). The region straddles part of the shortest routes between Western Europe and Asia- 
Pacific. The Suez Canal, Indian and Pacific Ocean route is three times as long and four 
times as expensive. The Trans-Siberian (TSR) and Baikal-Amur Railways crossing 
Europe-Asia end in the Far East. There is plenty of scope for expansion of international 
land and sea or sea and air routes. This makes the area viable as a processing zone for 
export (Anosova, 1992; Wu, Naitao, 1990). The region is also highly accessible to its 
partners. China, Russia, and North Korea share a common border in the Tumen region. 
South Korea and Japan are not far off, and Mongolia is included in the Tumen area, 
because through it Mongolia can access the East Sea. The Tumen river area, emerging in
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the heart of the East Sea, connects all the countries and regions involved and defines 
Northeast Asia.
In this regard, the Tumen River is both at the centre of Northeast Asian economic activity, 
and at the edge of the economies of China, North Korea and Russia. It would be very 
difficult for the Tumen region of each country to separately attract the outside investment 
needed to overcome economic underdevelopment. As a pool of complementarity 
resources with potential benefits to Japan and South Korea and other countries further 
afield, the area has much better prospects for development (Chen, Cai, 1995: 269).
The development of the Tumen River would be beneficial to the whole region as well as 
improving GNP across borders. With improved sea trading routes, China and Russia 
would have new access to Japan and South Korea. If North Korea can be gently helped to 
develop its economy, this may result in some more openness to the global market place. 
Land-locked Mongolia would have improved export opportunities. In short, the Tumen is 
a pivot for vertical and horizontal division of economic activities in Northeast Asia (Ibid.: 
266).
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Table 3-2. Mutually complementary conditions of Northeast Asian countries.
Country/ Region Strengths Weaknesses
Japan Capital, advanced technology, 
sophisticated machinery and 
equipment; advanced industrial 
products and management 
experience
Insufficient energy and industrial 
resources; shortages of livestock 
feed grains and some farm 
products; insufficient labour force
South Korea Capital, advanced technology, 
machinery and equipment, and 
advanced industrial products
Insufficient energy and industrial 
resources; insufficient livestock 
feed, insufficient labour
North Korea Mineral resources, metal ores, 
simple processed products, marine 
produce, some industrial products; 
abundant labour force
Shortages o f capital, insufficient 
farm products and secondary light 
industrial products; outdated 
machinery and equipment and 
technology; poor management; a 
socialist economy
Northeast China Advantageous agricultural 
conditions, farm products; some 
textile industry products, oil, coal, 
building materials, and Chinese 
herbal medicine; surplus labour 
force
Shortages of capital, advanced 
machinery and equipment, 
technology, and management 
experience; too many SOEs; 
insufficiencies in some mineral 
resources and infrastructure
Russian Far East Forests, non-ferrous metal ores, 
oil, gas, coal, some heavy 
machinery and chemical industrial 
products
Shortages o f farm products and 
light industrial products, 
insufficient labour and capital; fear 
of Chinese migration; outdated 
industrial machinery and 
equipment and management 
technology
Mongolia Abundant livestock products, 
minerals and ores, in particular 
fluorite
No convenient, direct transport to 
other Northeast Asian countries; 
shortages o f capital, technology, 
machinery and equipment, farm 
products, and light industrial 
products
Source: Chen Cai, Yuan Shuren, Wang Li, Ding Sibao, ‘Regional Cooperation in Development of Northeast 
Asia and Tumen River Delta Area’ (in Chinese), material distributed at 2nd Northeast Asia Economic and 
Technical Development Conference, Changchun, 1991, cited in (Imai, K., 1993).
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2. The view of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
The UNDP initiated discussions in 1991, which led the five Northeast countries to cooperate 
in the TRADP. Regional economic cooperation, it was argued, would create a positive 
climate for trade and investment and enable a more efficient joint-development and use of 
human, capital and natural resources. More importantly, for the UNDP, this would 
contribute to peace and development in the region by providing an opportunity for dialogue 
and cooperation between the participating countries. After an initial US$3.5 million 
injection to the project budget, the UNDP committed another US$3.2 million over the 1997- 
99 period.7
In the absence of other pre-existing regional cooperation institutions, the UNDP was 
perhaps the only international institution to have the authority to assist neighbouring 
countries in joint development efforts. As set out by the UNDP itself, the goal of assistance 
was:
...(a) to investigate the feasibility on economic, financial, technical and 
institutional grounds for increased inter-country cooperation in the Tumen River 
area in terms of trade, transit, and transportation arrangements, and other areas 
of economic benefit to all parties both for the short and longer term; (b) to 
present study findings and proposals to an appropriate forum constituted by the 
governments; (c) to assist governments to identify appropriate institutional and 
other mechanisms which could be implemented through longer-term 
cooperation; and (d) to suggest to governments immediate actions for 
cooperation in the area of trade, transit, and joint use or operation of 
infrastructure facilities... {The First Working Group Paper, 1992: 9).
The UNDP took the view that as a result of poor credit ratings and their inefficient economic 
systems, any independent plans by the three riparian countries to set up their own economic 
zones was unlikely to be successful. It considered the establishment of a united sole 
decision-making institution, able to make quick decisions, as the only solution. The UNDP 
idea drew much from on the experience of the co-operative development models of SUORI
7 In addition to funds from South Korea and the Tumen member countries, financing came from Scandinavian 
countries and UN agencies. Funding of US$4.96 million had been provided by the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) to develop a Strategic Action Programme (SAP) (Husband, 1998).
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and the bilateral regime between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, based on leased lands. Unlike 
these models, however, which developed over time, the UNDP believed that a well focused 
strategy could promote the TRADP in a shorter time frame (Kim, Haksoo, 1993: 15-6).
In 1995, ‘The agreement on the Establishment of the Tumen River Economic Development 
Zone and the Northeast Asia Development Consultative Commission’ was the ‘outcome of 
three years of quiet diplomacy’ by the UNDP. The UNDP facilitated the negotiations, which 
enabled five countries to work in close consultation in the economic, social, political, and 
international spheres (Beijing Review, 1995). Agreement was reached in principle on the 
following matters:
- Existence of complementarity
- Desirability of cooperation based on common interests
- Need for appropriate institutional arrangements, defined by international 
agreements
- Integration of local initiatives
- Continuation of UNDP involvement
- Geographical extent of Programme includes the Tumen River Economic 
Development Area and Northeast Asia
- Progressive harmonisation amongst zones
- Need for infrastructural improvements
- Maximisation of opportunities for investment
- Emphasis on environmentally sound and sustainable projects
- Focus on priority sectors (TRADP Profile, 1995).
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Figure 3-3. The recom mend approach
Source: (Gateway to Northeast Asia -  A New Investment and Trade Frontier, 1995: 4).
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3. TRADP membership and organisations8
As is now clear, the TRADP was co-ordinated and supported by the UNDP for the five 
countries that were signatories to the October 1992 TRADP agreement: South Korea, North 
Korea, China, Russia and Mongolia. In addition, Japan, Finland, Australia, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) have observer status.
On 6 December 1995, the five TRADP member countries signed an agreement to establish 
an institutional framework consisting of two intergovernmental bodies (Tumen Consultative 
Commission and Tumen Coordination Committee), national teams from the five member 
countries, and the Tumen Secretariat. The chart below shows the structure of the TRADP.
Tumen Consultative Commission
The project is directed by the ‘Consultative Commission for the Development of the Tumen 
River Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia’. The Commission is made up of 
representatives at vice ministerial level from all five member countries. The Commission 
meets once a year to assess progress and provide future direction activities. The 
chairmanship of the Commission rotates on an annual basis among the member countries.
Tumen Coordination Committee
China, North Korea, and Russia are the three riparian countries that have a vice ministerial 
level seat on the ‘Tumen River Area Development Coordination Committee’. This body 
seeks to coordinate a number of aspects, including trade and investment initiatives, cross- 
border transport infrastructure and environmental aspects. There is an annually rotating 
chair.
8 This description is based on ‘The TRADP Institutional Framework’, the UNDP, is available at 
http://www.tradp.org/textonly/framework/ifrwrk.htm.
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National Teams
National Teams have been set up in each of the five member countries. These teams, 
which also have working groups, include representatives from both national and local 
governments, and have a liaising role between governments, local administration, the 
Tumen Secretariat and the UNDP.
Tumen Secretariat
Management of the TRADP from the intergovernmental point of view is vested in the 
Tumen Secretariat, which supports the national teams and the formulation and 
implementation of the project.
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Figure 3-4. Tumen 
Organisation
Tumen Tumen Secretariat Tumen Coordinative Committee
Consultative Commission PRC, DPRK, R ussia
PRC, DPRK, Russia, ROK, Mongolia
PRC DPRK Russia ROK Mongolia
MOFTEC, SPEC , MOST, MOF, CPEEC MOT, MOE, MOFA, MOF, MOFE, MONU, MOFAT, MOF, MOtD, MOER, MONE,
MOFA, JPG , SETC, MOSR, MOR, (MOFT, MOPT, MOLT, RSCPC) MOR, MOTR, MOPCST, SCC, (MOCT, MOCTO, MOST, DPG, FTFIA, MCT1, IIS, MNTC,
MOC, MOCO, CGA, SEPA, SAFEA SCEP, FBG S.PTG KDI.KIEP) TAM, (LCERM)
PRC
National Team
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC)
State Planning and Development Commission (SPC)
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)
Ministry of Finance (MOF)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Jilin Provincial Government (JPG)
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC)
Ministry of Spatial Resources (MOSR)
Ministry of Railways (MOR)
Ministry of Communications (MOC)
Ministry of Construction (MOCO)
Customs General Administration (CGA)
State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA)
State Administration of Foreign Expert Affairs (SAFEA)
DPRK
National Team
The Korea Committee for Promotion of External Economic Cooperation (CPEEC), under 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
In close cooperation with 
Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT)
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MOPT)
Ministry of Land-Sea Transport (MOLT)
The Rajin-Sonbong City People’s Committee (RSCPC)
Mongolia
National Team 
Ministry of Finance (MOF)
Ministry of Infrastructure Development (MOID)
Ministry of Justice (MOJ)
Ministry of Agriculture and Industry (MOAI)
Ministry of External Relations (MOER)
Ministry of Nature and Environment 
Domod Provincial Government (DPG)
Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment Agency (FTFLA)
Mongolian Chamber of Trade and Industry (MCTI)
Institute of International Studies (IIS)
Mongolian National Tourism Centre (MNTC)
Tourism Association of Mongolia (TAM)
In close cooperation with
The Local Commission of the Eastern Region of Mongolia (LCERM)
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Representatives from Mongolia’s three eastern provinces, including the Governor of Domod 
Province, Vice Governors and Directors of die Planning Divisions of the three eastern 
provinces
ROK
National Team
Ministry of Finance and Economics (MOFE)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MONU)
Ministry of National Unification (MOFAT)
In close cooperation with
Ministry of Construction and Transport (MOCT)
Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MOCTO)
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)
The Korea Development Institute (KDI)
The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Russian Federation
National Team 
Ministry of Trade (MOT)
Ministry of Economy (MOE)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Ministry of Finance (MOF)
Ministry of Railways (MOR)
Ministry of Transport (MOTR)
Ministry of Physical Culture, Sport and Tourism (MOPCST)
State Customs Committee (SCC)
State Committee on Environmental Protection (SCEP)
Federal Border Guard Service (FBGS)
Primorsky Territory Government (PTG)
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Figure 3-5: TUMEN RIVER AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL
FRAMEWORK, 1996-2000
(Based on the Tumen Intergovernmental Agreements of December 6,1995, U.N. New York)
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December 1999 Source: (Davies, 2000: Annex IV)
Conclusion
The TRADP is a multinational economic project led by the UNDP, which is aimed at 
improving the living standard of the countries in the region. Its stated objective is to bring 
together a synergetic and logical combination of regional division of labour -  Japanese 
and South Korean capital and industrial technology with Chinese, Russian, Mongolian 
and North Korean labour, land and raw materials. The project has been upgraded to vice- 
ministerial level, and has its own organisation (Secretariat sponsored by the participating 
countries and led by the UNDP). Nevertheless, the development of the project has been 
limited because of the diverging national interests of the member states and inconsistent 
guideline of the UNDP’s plans. The economic, institutional, political and security 
analysis of the project will by explored in Chapters Seven and Eight respectively. The 
TRADP still remains at an early development stage, even though some progress has been 
achieved.
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Chapter Four. Regionalism: The Chinese Dimension
Introduction
Regionalisation, together with globalisation, has become an important factor in the post- 
Cold War international order. As seen in Chapter Two, regionalisation has also become 
an important phenomenon in Asia among states that border each other. As a major 
political and economic player, China has participated in a number of regional cooperation 
projects in various parts of its territory. How does China conduct its national and local 
economic relations with neighbouring countries? How should its active participation in 
sub-regional economic cooperation be understood? Has economic interdependence 
brought real changes to its foreign policy? This chapter will seek to advance our 
understanding of the role of regionalism in the context of Chinese policy practice.
Part I will examine the trend of China’s economic relations with foreign countries, which 
has lead to an emphasis on the economic importance of the Asia-Pacific region in China’s 
foreign economic strategy. This part will review recent developments in foreign trade and 
investment, and their impact on the country and its provincial areas. This part will also 
describe how the economic strategy of choosing foreign countries to be economic 
partners has brought about development in the provinces.
Part II will argue that China’s steps towards economic interdependence should be seen as 
strategic behaviour to achieve its long-term goals. In order to probe the surface of the 
Chinese interdependence, this part will begin with a theoretical review to understand the 
characteristics and limits of China’s seemingly interdependent and cooperative 
diplomacy. It then goes on to discuss how regionalism has developed as a pivot of 
China’s good neighbourly diplomacy. Finally, this part will highlight the significance of 
the TRADP as a SREZ in China’s foreign policy, comparing similarities and differences 
with two other sub-regional economic projects, the Greater South China Economic Zone 
(GSCEZ) and the Greater Mekong Sub-regional Economic Zone (GMS).
I. Regionalism in China’s foreign economic relations
This part looks at China’s foreign economic relations from the late 1970s to the mid- 
1990s, to explain how the need for the TRADP arose, it will be argued that these 
economic circumstances highlighted the importance of the Asia-Pacific region in China’s 
economic policy, and spurred the choice of neighbouring countries as immediate partners 
for provinces.
1. China’s intra-regional economic relations
Since China opened itself to more global trade in 1978 its GDP growth has been much 
above the global average. GDP per person has grown by almost 8% per year since 1980 
and exports by more than 12% per year. GDP in the mid-1990s grew at nearly 14% 
although inflation also grew (Zhou, Yuan, 1995: 274). From 1978 to 1990 the share of 
exports in China’s GNP exports went up from 4.8% to 20.8%. Total trade as a share of 
GNP grew steadily from 12.8% in 1980 to 35.96% in 1993. The total value of China’s 
imports and exports reached US$ 195.71 billion in 1993; trade with the Asia-Pacific 
region, at US$ 110.2 billion, represented 66.52% of that (Ding, Jingping, 1995: 58). In 
1997 China’s foreign trade volume reached a total of US$325.06 billion, increasing its 
world export ranking from 27th to 10th, highlighting the importance of the global 
economy to China (Almanac o f China’s 1998/99: 11).
Foreign investment has been crucial to the process of opening up China to the world. 
US$68.1 billion of foreign capital was invested in China from 1979 to 1990, of which 
35% was direct investment by private companies. This investment was much needed to 
fill China’s investment-savings gap and provided a spur for the modernisation of 
management resources and technology. Even after the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, foreign 
investments have maintained their momentum, reaching US$11.6 billion in 1991 
(Kuribayashi, 1993: 50). In 1992, US$58 billion of foreign investment was committed, 
although the actual investment amount was US$11 billion. More than 80% of foreign
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investment came from the Asia-Pacific region, specifically from Hong Kong and Taiwan 
(Wong, 1995: 625).
The growing integration of the Chinese economy, with its huge population and vast 
resource base, into the Asia-Pacific region will no doubt serve to further enhance the 
region’s overall growth potential. It is in the context of the Asia-Pacific region that the 
full significance of China’s recent economic upsurge can be properly gauged (Ibid.: 618). 
As a result, the Asia-Pacific region has been the most important area for China’s 
economic strategy (Xue, Mouhong, 1991; Beijing Review, 1994a & 1994b; Gao, 
Shangguan, 1995; Nye, 1997-98). By making use of its comparative advantages, China 
hopes to build competitive pillar industries and large enterprise groups for actively 
conducting economic and technological exchanges with various countries and regions 
throughout the world, particularly those in the Asia-Pacific region (Mao, 1990). Several 
economies in the region have therefore been chosen as economic partners for China (See 
also Zhou & Ma: 1992).
1.1 Hong Kong
Since the beginning of China’s open-door policy, Hong Kong has been its major trading 
partner and investor. In 1997 the total import and export trade volume between China and 
Hong Kong reached US$50.77 billion, an increase of 24.6% over 1996, accounting for 
15.61% of the total import and export volume of China in 1997 {Almanac o f China's 
1998/99: 415). Hong Kong is the chief source of foreign investment in China: contractual 
Hong Kong investment value was US$18.22 billion and accounted for 35.7% of the total 
foreign investment in China in the same year. Actual direct investment from Hong Kong 
reached US$20.63 billion (45.6% of total actual foreign investments in China in the same 
period); actual Hong Kong investment amounted to US$119 billion (53.5% of actual 
foreign investment in the mainland in the same period) (Ibid.: 416). On the other hand, 
Hong Kong is now also a destination for capital flight from China, as China increasingly 
invests there (Wong, 1995: 630).
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1.2 Taiwan
Despite political distance and an absence of direct trading links, trade and manufacturing 
links across the Taiwan Straits have grown since 1986. Hong Kong was the conduit for 
the bulk of this traffic, which increased at the high annual rate of 50% from US$1.5 
billion in 1987 to US$8.7 billion in 1993 (Ibid.), and the total trade between the two was 
calculated at US$ 24.45 billion in 1997 (Almanac o f China’s 1998/99: 405, 408, 410). 
Taiwan, like Hong Kong, has invested significant amounts -  US$14.5 billion by 1993 - 
and has similarly moved labour-intensive manufacturing to the mainland, making 
Taiwan, in 1993, the second largest investor (Ibid.; Simon, 1995: 39).
1.3 Japan
The Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship is the most important relationship in terms of 
finance and trade. Up to 1997, Japan had been China’s largest trading partner for 5 
successive years. Sino-Japanese trade in 1997 amounted to US$60.81 billion, up 1.2% 
over 1996. Of this, China’s export to Japan was US$31.82 billion and its import from 
Japan was US$28.99 billion. China enjoyed a trade surplus of US$2.82 billion from its 
trade with Japan. Trade volume between China and Japan accounted for 18.7% of the 
total foreign trade of China. By the end of 1997, China approved the contractual amount 
of US$29.79 billion and the actual amount of US$18.51 billion, accounting for 5.38% 
and 5.73% of foreign direct investment in China respectively (Almanac o f China’s 
1998/99: 418-9).
1.4 South Korea
China’s diplomatic relationship with South Korea was formalised in August 1992, and is 
a significant addition to its growing linkages with the East Asian regional economy. By 
1993 trade with South Korea had reached US$13 billion (Wong, 1995: 630-1). South 
Korea became China’s sixth largest trading partner and China Korea’s third largest 
trading partner after Japan and the US (not including Hong Kong). Total Korean foreign 
investment in China reached US$1.96 billion by February 1995 (Simon, 1995: 36).
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1.5 ASEAN
The bilateral trade between China and the then seven ASEAN countries, namely Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, reached 
US$24.36 billion, up 19.4% over 1996. Of this, China’s exports came to US$12.03 
billion and its imports to US$12.33 billion. Their trade volume in 1997 occupied 7.5% of 
China’s total foreign trade volume and ranked fifth after Japan, Hong Kong, the US and 
the EU. Among the seven ASEAN countries, the trade volume between China and 
Singapore ranked the highest with a value of US$8.78 billion, followed by Indonesia 
(US$4.51 billion), Malaysia (US$4.42 billion), Thailand (US$3.52 billion), the 
Philippines (US$1.67 billion), Vietnam (US$1.44 billion) and Brunei (US$30 billion). By 
the end of 1997, China had approved a contractual investment amount of US$39.8 billion 
and the actual amount of US$12.8 billion from the seven ASEAN countries. China also 
invested US$870 million in the seven ASEAN countries {Almanac o f China’s 1998/99: 
419-20).
1.6 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
The trade volume between China and countries in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) in 1997 was US$7.49 billion. Among all the countries in the CIS, Russia was 
the biggest trade partner of China, and ranked eighth among China’s trade partners, while 
China was the fifth biggest trade partner of Russia. In 1997, the bilateral trade volume 
between China and Russia was US$6.11 billion, accounting for 1.9% of China’s total 
foreign trade volume. Russia was followed by Kazakhstan (US$527 million), Ukraine 
(US$435 million), Uzbekistan (US$203 million) and Kirghizstan (US$ 107 million) 
(Ibid.: 428).
2. Foreign economic relations of China’s provinces
China’s economy has become integrated with the East Asian economy, but countries in 
the region play varying and complementary roles in China’s economic development 
(Ding, Jingping, 1995: 59). It is also important to recognise that China’s economic 
integration is driven by the various regions within China. The correct choice of partners
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for external economic cooperation by China’s provinces will allow the comparative 
advantages of both sides to be used to the fullest. Hence Hong Kong is closely linked 
with Guangdong Province. Taiwan regards Fujian as an attractive region for investment. 
Similarly, Russia has done so in Inner Mongolia and Heilongjiang. Liaoning looks to 
Japan for trade ties, and South Korea has made some direct investments in Shandong and 
Jilin.
2.1 Guangdong Province
In 1997, the total import and export value of Guangdong Province reached US$119.82 
billion, up 19.55% over US$100.22 billion in 1996. The total value of imports reached 
US$47.16 billion, with a growth rate of 14.39% over US$41.23 billion in 1996. Foreign 
investment came from 44 countries, including Hong Kong (US$3.93 billion), Singapore 
(US$247.40 million), Taiwan (US$236.33 million), the US (US$199.29 million), 
Thailand (US$138.40 million), Japan (US$136.91 million), the UK (US$136.62 million), 
and Macao (US$92.06 million) (Ibid.: 331-4).
Table 4-1. Guangdong Province’s major export and import markets
Ma jor Export Markets Ma jor Import Markets
Country/Region Export Values 
(US$ million)
% o f Total 
Export
Country/Region Import Values 
(US$ million)
% o f Total 
Import
Hong Kong 61,612.41 84.80 Hong Kong 39,715.97 84.21
USA 3,298.67 4.54 Japan 1,566.11 3.32
Japan 1,905.57 2.62 USA 1,382.43 2.93
EU 1,802.34 2.48 Taiwan 950.78 2.02
Singapore 547.26 0.75 EU 902.10 1.91
Taiwan 448.10 0.62 ROK 541.08 1.15
Macao 413.32 0.57 Singapore 397.96 0.84
ROK 388.63 0.54 Iran 344.92 0.73
Total 70,416.30 96.92 Total 45,801.35 97.11
Source: (Almanac o f  China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1998/99: 332-3).
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2.2 Fujian Province
In 1997, the total trade volume of Fujian Province reached US$19.46 billion, up 16.23% 
over US$16.74 billion in 1996. The total value of exports was US$11.58 billion 
accounting for 32.02% of the province’s GDP and 6.34% of the country’s total export 
value. The total value of imports was US$7.87 billion. Foreign investment came from 43 
countries including Hong Kong with a contracted foreign capital amount of US$2.53 
billion, Taiwan (US$598 million), the US (US$182 million), the Philippines (US$81.13 
million), Malaysia (US$49.82 million), Macao (US$23.29 million), the ROK (US$10.59 
million) (Ibid.: 288-9).
2.3 Shandong Province
In 1997, the total trade volume of Shandong Province reached US$19.74 billion, up 
10.7% over US$17.84 billion in 1996. The total value of exports was US$13.08 billion 
accounting for 16.3% of US$80.2 billion of the province. The total value of imports 
reached US$6.65 billion. Foreign investment came from 64 countries including Hong 
Kong (US$1.07 billion), France (US$470 million), the ROK (US$320 million), and the 
US (US$200 million) (Ibid.: 303-5).
Table 4-2. Shandong Province’s major export markets
Country/Region Export Values (US$ million) % of Total Export
ROK 3,438.37 26.3
Japan 3,426.30 26.2
USA 1,647.08 12.6
Hong Kong 1,533.42 11.7
Germany 307.87 2.4
Singapore 218.30 1.7
Taiwan 217.09 1.7
Russia 162.27 1.2
Malaysia 135.57 1.0
UK 127.27 1.0
Total 11,212.54 85.8
Source: (Almanac o f  China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1998/99: 304).
I l l
2.4 Liaoning Province
In 1997, the total trade volume of Liaoning Province reached US$12.96 billion, up 15.2% 
over US$11.25 billion in 1996. The total value of exports was US$8.89 billion and 
accounted for 21% of the province’s GDP. The total value of imports reached US$4,067 
billion. The actual invested amount of foreign capital of the province was US$2.23 
billion in the same period (Ibid.: 230-1,234).
Table 4-3. Liaoning Province’s major export and import markets
Major Export Markets Major Import Markets
Country/Region Export Values 
(US$ million)
% of Total 
Export
Country/Region Import Values 
(US$ million)
% of Total 
Import
Japan 3,636.63 40.89 Japan 1,348.64 33.16
ROK 969.37 10.90 ROK 408.64 10.05
USA 920.48 10.35 Indonesia 386.75 9.51
Hong Kong 4.4.51 4.55 Hong Kong 268.73 6.61
Singapore 381.26 4.28 USA 222.73 5.48
Germany 291.42 3.28 Singapore 166.05 4.08
DPRK 279.89 3.15 Australia 129.59 3.19
Norway 235.89 2.65 Russia 52.96 1.30
Malaysia 147.92 1.66 Germany 51.37 1.26
Netherlands 142.88 1.61 Norway 44.38 1.09
Total 7,267.37 81.71 Total 3,079.84 75.73
Source: (Almanac o f  China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1998/99: 231-2).
2.5 Jilin Province
In 1997, the total trade volume of Jilin Province reached US$2.52 billion, down 11% 
from US$2.84 billion in 1996. The total value of exports was US$1.60 billion and 
accounted for 9.20% of RMB 145.04 billion yuan of the province’s GDP. The total value 
of imports reached US$921 million. Foreign investment came from 23 countries 
including Hong Kong (US$208.86 million), accounting for 42.8% of the total amount of 
foreign capital investment in Jilin Province (Ibid.: 242-4).
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Table 4-4. Jilin Province’s major export and import markets
Ma ior Export Markets Major Import Markets
Country/Region Export Values 
(US$ million)
% o f Total 
Export
Country/Region Import Values 
(US$ million)
% o f Total 
Import
Japan 416.57 26 Germany 318.80 34.6
ROK 170.36 10.6 Japan 130.80 14.2
Hong Kong 144.87 9.0 Italy 80.39 8.72
USA 116.21 7.2 USA 57.48 6.23
Netherlands 83.83 5.2 ROK 56.55 6.14
Russia 83.52 5.2 DPRK 38.86 4.21
DPRK 81.80 5.1 Brazil 35.00 3.80
Germany 81.17 5.0 Russia 31.78 3.45
Thailand 28.71 1.79 Australia 28.72 3.12
UK 25.10 1.56 Taiwan 21.08 2.29
Total 1,232.14 76.7 Total 799.46 86.76
Source: {Almanac o f  China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1998/99: 242-3).
2.6 Heilongjiang Province
In 1997, the trade volume with Russia accounted for 39.65% of the total trade volume of 
the province. The total import and export value of Heilongjiang Province reached 
US$3.58 billion, up 1.85% over US$3.51 billion in 1996. The total value of exports was 
US$2 billion, accounting for 6.12% of the province’s GDP. The total value of imports 
was US$1.58 billion. Foreign investment came from 26 countries including Hong Kong 
(US$227.10 million), ROK (US$150.82 million), the US (US$91.40 million), Taiwan 
(US$38.55), Canada (US$35.54 million), and Japan (US$15.36 million) (Ibid.: 248-250).
Table 4-5. Heilongjiang Province’s major export markets
Country/Region Export Values (US$ million) % of Total Export
Russia 718.39 35.88
Hong Kong 306.64 15.32
Japan 281.45 14.05
ROK 213.04 10.64
Taiwan 35.24 1.76
Pakistan 30.29 1.51
Germany 24.14 1.20
DPRK 21.87 1.09
Singapore 19.22 0.96
Source: {Almanac o f  China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1998/99: 249).
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2.7 Yunnan Province
In 1997, the total trade volume of Yunnan Province reached US$2.01 billion, down 2.3% 
from US$2.05 billion in 1996. The total value of exports was US$1.21 billion, accounting 
for 6.2% of the province’s GDP and 0.66% of the total value of exports of the whole 
country. Foreign investment came from 21 countries including Hong Kong (US$80.15 
million), Canada (US$31.86 million), the US (US$28.07 million), Japan (US$16.65 
million), Malaysia (US$15.87 million), Macao (US$8.86 million), and Taiwan (US$4.24 
million) (Ibid.: 379-381).
Table 4-6. Yunnan Province’s major export and import markets
Ma or Export Markets Major Import Markets
Country/Region Export Values 
(US$ million)
% of Total 
Export
Country/Region Import Values 
(US$ million)
% o f Total 
Import
Hong Kong 305.80 25.2 Hong Kong 255.84 32.1
Myanmar 276.37 22.8 USA 127.79 16.0
Japan 131.59 10.8 Italy 81.78 10.3
USA 54.26 4.5 Germany 67.41 8.5
Vietnam 51.40 4.2 UK 36.57 4.6
Indonesia 44.91 3.7 Myanmar 28.40 3.6
Malaysia 44.81 3.7 Australia 26.17 3.4
Netherlands 37.90 3.1 Switzerland 19.63 2.5
Source: (.Almanac o f  China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1998/99: 380).
2.8 Inner Mongolia
In 1997, the total trade volume of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was US$1.31 
billion, up 4.84% from US$1.24 billion in 1996. The total value of exports was 
US$735.18 million, and the total value of imports was US$575.08 million. Foreign 
capital came from 31 countries including Hong Kong (US$47.83 million), Malaysia 
(US$8.95 million), the ROK (US$8.20 million), and the US (US$7.44 million) (Ibid.: 
227-229).
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Table 4-7. Inner Mongolia’s Major export and import markets
Ma ior Export Markets Major Import Markets
Country/Region Export Values 
(US$ million)
% of Total 
Export
Country/Region Import Values 
(US$ million)
% of Total 
Import
Russia 202.35 27.52 Russia 228.50 39.73
Japan 114.87 15.63 Mongolia 107.75 18.74
Hong Kong 88.57 12.05 Australia 40.52 7.05
EU 70.3 9.57 Japan 34.29 5.96
Mongolia 32.95 4.48 Italy 22.40 3.90
USA 31.29 4.34 UK 22.05 3.83
ASEAN 30.29 4.12 Sweden 18.10 3.15
USA 16.21 2.82
Total 571.27 77.71 489.82 85.07
Source: (Almanac o f  China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1998/99: 228).
2.9 Tibet
In 1997, the total import and export value of the Tibet Autonomous Region reached 
US$113.83 million, up 25.58% over US$94.23 million in 1996. The total value of exports 
was US$50.10 million, accounting for 5.61% of the region’s GDP of RMB7.4 billion 
yuan. The total value of imports reached US$68.23 million (Ibid.: 382-3).
2.10 Xinjiang
In 1997, the total import and export value of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 
reached US$1.44 billion, up 3.06% over US$1.40 billion in 1996. The total value of 
exports was US$666.11 million, accounting for 5.26% of the region’s GDP of US$12.66 
billion and 0.36% of the value of the country’s total exports. The total value of imports 
reached US$781.20 million (Ibid.: 399-402).
Table 4-8. Xinjiang’s major export and import markets
Major Export Markets Major Import Markets
Country/Region Export Values 
(US$ million)
% o f Total 
Export
Country/Region Import Values 
(US$ million)
% o f Total 
Import
Hong Kong 213.64 32.07 Kazakhstan 433.48 55.49
Kazakhstan 116.62 17.51 Hong Kong 54.70 7.00
Kirghizstan 71.27 10.70 Uzbekistan 49.71 6.36
Japan 43.55 6.54 Russia 46.31 5.93
USA 35.66 5.35 Kirghizstan 41.14 5.27
Uzbekistan 22.54 3.38 USA 38.54 4.93
Germany 17.21 2.58 Germany 18.34 2.35
UK 13.39 2.01 Japan 17.11 2.19
Total 533.88 80.14 Total 699.33 89.52
Source: (Almanac o f  China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1998/99: 400-1).
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3. Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
3.1 The development history of SEZs
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have been a means by which China has implemented its 
reform policy of opening itself up (Huang, Taihe, 1991: 16; Jiang, Mingqing 1993).1 In 
1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China took on the task of developing an open-door policy. In July 1980, the State Council 
approved ‘Provisional Regulations on Promoting Economic Cooperation’, which began 
to address the concept of economic zones. This document stressed the importance of 
strengthening local administrative guidance in economic matters (Nakajima, 1987: 2-3). 
In August 1980 China established the SEZs in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen.
In early 1984, fourteen coastal cities (Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, 
Lianyuangang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, 
Beihai) were given the status of coastal open cities for foreign investment (Bucknall, 
1989: 143-167). The report to the June 1983 session of the Sixth National People’s 
Congress (NPC) argued for the establishment of economic zones and economic networks 
through increased economic cooperation among various departments. This marked the 
beginning of various activities to harness the potential of cities as centres of emerging 
economic zones. In October 1984, the Party endorsed the Central Committee’s ‘Decision 
on Reform of the Economic Structure’ and supported the idea of economic zones based 
around large or medium-sized cities. Seven major cities - Chongqing, Guangzhou, 
Harbin, Xian, Wuhan, Shenyang, and Dalian - were granted provincial-level economic 
management powers. 16 medium-sized cities were chosen to pilot a programme for 
organisational reform and to develop urban capabilities. In the Seventh Five Year plan, 
the whole of China was subdivided again into three wider economic blocs designated the
1 Since 1979, there have been a variety of special zones, including the Economic and Technical 
Development Zones (ETDZs), the National Industrial Development Zones for New and Advanced 
Technology (NIDZNATs), and the Border-region Economic Cooperation Zones (BECZs) - these have not 
enjoyed Shenzhen’s spectacular growth. The zones have played an important role in accelerating coastal 
development, introducing a number of managerial, financial and technological reforms, and acting as a 
bridge between the advanced, capitalist countries and the Chinese economy. The SEZs have thus become 
the most prominent symbol o f China’s opening policy (Reardon, 1996: 281-2).
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Eastern, Central and Western regions. This was to promote better planning of local 
economic zones (Nakajima, 1987: 2-3).
In February 1985 the Lower Yangtze Delta, the Pearl River Delta and the Xiamen- 
Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle were designated as coastal economic development zones. 
In early 1988 Hainan Island became a separate province as well as China’s largest SEZ. 
Shanghai was authorised in 1990 to launch the development of Pudong New Area and 
has been treated as a SEZ and given a host of special policies. Other such projects with 
cities in the Yangtze basin and cities bordering zones in the country’s northeast came into 
being in 1992. Economic development was encouraged in the poorer border regions with 
large ethnic minorities. 14 Border-region Economic Cooperation Zones (BECZs) were 
given the blessing of the State Council in 1992, which were designed to develop cross- 
border economic development in Northeast (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, 
Liaoning) and Southwest (Guangxi, Yunnan) (Reardon, 1996: 300).
3.2 The purpose and functions of SEZs
Many Chinese scholars describe China’s sub-regional economic cooperation as an 
‘economic circle’ (jingjiquan), meaning ‘a loose form of multilateral economic 
transnationalism based on a natural division of labour and trade ties’ (Liang, 1993, Chap. 
1, in Hu, Weixing, 1996: 47). The purpose of building SEZs was not only to promote 
Chinese indigenous industries and social values and sovereignty, but it was also to fully 
exploit their geographic advantages of being close to international markets such as Hong 
Kong, Macao, and other neighbouring countries (Shi, Min, 1991: 89). They are special, 
externally oriented, comprehensive economic regions focusing chiefly on industry, 
developing both industry and trade, and integrating industry, trade and technology (Liu, 
Guoguang, 1992: 9). They enjoy special preferential treatments and convenience in the 
use of land, taxes and approval procedures (Shi, Min, 1991: 89).
The flow of goods, people, and capital into a sub-region does not happen automatically 
but usually requires government incentives. SEZs are such incentives, as the Greater 
South China Economic Zone (GSCEZ) and Singapore-Johore-Riau Growth Triangle
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(SUORI) demonstrate by their effectiveness in attracting foreign investment. On one 
level, the favourable financial and fiscal conditions are an obvious attraction. On another 
level investment is encouraged by the political commitment to an area demonstrated by 
the setting up of SEZs with enhanced prospects of stability.
The focus of SEZs in China follows the pattern of export commodity processing zones 
and free trade zones for other countries, but they retain so called ‘Chinese 
characteristics’: i) The development of the SEZs in China has tried to harness foreign 
capital in ways similar to those of export commodity processing zones. At the same time 
Chinese businesses from other parts of the country are also encouraged to invest; ii) As in 
free trade zones, SEZs are regulated by the markets, especially the international trade 
market. However, the construction and the development of the Chinese SEZs are also 
guided by state macro-economic management and control; iii) Most of the goods 
produced in SEZs will be sold internationally, so external markets determine production. 
However, the SEZs can sell a limited amount of goods on the domestic market, as 
defined by regulations; and iv) Preferential tax treatment is granted to all foreign 
businesses investing in the zones (Li, Wen, 1990: 126-7).
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Figure 4-1. Location of the fourteen open cities and the four Special Economic Zones
(Linge & Forbes, 1990: 17).
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II. China’s foreign policy of interdependence
Why has China pursued a policy of economic interdependence with neighbours in the 
region, despite negative Chinese experiences of interdependence since the Opium War? 
What are the major obstacles to its foreign policy? How can we place the TRADP in the 
context of Chinese foreign policy? This part reviews the significance attached to 
interdependence in Western and Chinese literature before assessing China’s diplomacy of 
interdependence and its basic goals and limits.
1. Levels of analysing Chinese foreign policy
Can we explain China’s foreign policy using the structures of the international system? Is 
its foreign policy shaped mainly by its own domestic situation? Or are external and 
internal dynamics interactive?2 We are dealing with a ‘level of analysis problem’. This 
‘problem’ comes about when we start looking for explanations as to why states to act in 
certain ways. These explanations may be found at two ‘levels’: in the analysis of IR 
theorists and specialists of China.3
1.1 The IR theorists’ approach
At least three theories may be distinguished in the IR literature: (Neo)realism, 
(Neo)liberalism, and (Neo)Marxism. Each of these competing theoretical perspectives 
starts from different sets of premises, and provides a distinctive framework for 
interpreting China’s foreign relations. Each of these theories helps to explain some 
aspects of Chinese foreign policy.
The Realist perspective
Realism stresses the primacy of the state and of security. There is seen to be a continuous 
competition between states for power, with occasional moments of peaceful cooperation 
(Gilpin, 1987: 42-3). Human nature is believed to lie at the root of political conflict. The
2 These questions are also asked by (Rosenau, 1994).
3 The theoretical analytical framework is based on Chapter 10 of (Roy, 1998: 227-245).
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international system is anarchical, and the result is a focus on autonomy and 
independence. Traditional realists had the likelihood of conflict or war in mind. However, 
neo-realists acknowledge that national interest can be concerned with economic as well 
as with physical security. Under anarchic conditions states naturally develop military and 
economic strategies that bolster their autonomy and enhance security options to be able to 
counter adverse conditions (Johnston, 1998: 59). The major powers, having achieved a 
sense of security, may become involved in international arrangements addressing specific 
issues which will work to maintain the balance and status quo achieved. For less 
powerful countries such multilateral arrangements benefit them by providing a way to 
confront the powerful.
Following the analysis of Roy, it is all to clear from a neorealist perspective that China 
must fear the influence of international treaties on its sense of sovereignty. Any 
international regime is a concrete inroad into the Chinese regime. In this view China’s 
openness to global trade is seen as a reluctant choice, the only way that China could 
increase its power in the international arena through economic development, and any idea 
that China is seeking cooperation and integration in itself is viewed with scepticism. The 
motivation that drives policy-makers in Beijing is fear of the outside world. As a result 
openness is carefully limited, and even economically beneficial cooperation will be 
circumscribed. Economic benefits are considered not as absolute goods, but are seen in 
relative terms with a careful eye on what others will stand to gain. The extent of China’s 
foreign policy actions will depend on how strong it is in the international order (Roy, 
1998: 229-230).
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The Liberal perspective
Liberalism rejects most of Neo-realism’s basic assumptions. Liberalism acknowledges 
that states are not impermeable and that other levels of activity -  subnational or 
supranational -  are possible (Ibid.: 231-2). There are several processes at work, processes 
of learning and defining, and these processes are influenced by new international bodies 
and regimes. The state is not the absolute it was once considered to be, with other units 
coming maybe even to take its place in certain respects. Liberalism sees trade and 
economic flows as positive not only in economic terms but as means by which the 
community of nations is developed. Economic development is also considered as a goal 
in its own right, and benefits in absolute rather than relative terms, not as a means to an 
end of enhanced security options. Indeed, the military and security motivation within the 
neo-realist approach is considered over-exaggerated.
Roy also provides a liberal perspective on China’s foreign policy. In this view China is 
being attracted by and as a result socialised into the international community through soft 
tactics. Its own populace has tasted alternative ways of living, and the international 
standards and norms are now too well established to be ignored by China. Any 
involvement in or concession to the international scene will have a knock-on effect on 
Chinese policy-making which will ultimately benefit both China and the global 
community (Roy, 1998: 231-2). Thus the liberal hope is an irresistible movement towards 
openness despite the protestations of the Chinese leadership.
The Marxist perspective
Despite having very different basis in their views of the state and of human nature, there 
are affinities between the Marxist and the realist. They both see uneven power relations 
between states as the prime catalyst for conflict and policy. Marxism sees salvation in the 
struggle of re-educated human nature against the negatives of capitalism, which include 
the state, dominated by elites, and its resulting domestic and foreign policies. War, 
imperialism and the liberal state are regarded as evils to be removed by the communist 
revolution (Gilpin, 1987: 42-3). While this goal is now held by fewer Marxists, their 
analysis of global change which factors in both economics and technological advances is
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insightful. Lenin emphasised unbalanced development as a factor in global conflict (Ibid: 
51). What Western Marxists call ‘World System Theory’ posits an integrated capitalist 
world economy based on unequal exchange relations between the developed core and 
less-developed periphery nations, reflecting in the political sphere the capitalist modes of 
production. States work to bolster the capitalist division and control of labour on a world 
scale (Ng-Quinn, 1984: 89).
The idea of a developed core and periphery gives some insights into China’s external 
relations. China would in this view be a semi-peripheral state. China itself is a producer 
for export both to developed and less-developed countries. It has low labour costs that are 
attractive to investors. But it is also dependent for advanced technology on the core 
countries. World System Theory can be used to shed light on the way that different 
regions in China have developed differently (Roy, 1998: 234).
1.2 A Critique of three perspectives
Realism, liberalism, and Marxism thus come to different conclusions regarding the nature 
and consequences of Chinese foreign policy, according to their different assumptions. 
Each viewpoint has its weaknesses as well as its insights.
Critique o f Realism
States still have the control of some domains, and (Neo)realists can argue that states may 
rationally use force to protect their interest in those domains. Governments are becoming 
less strong and alternatives such as social movements, transnational organisations and 
corporations are becoming more important. However, the sphere of influence of states is 
being ever made smaller by global changes and realists have not fully taken this into 
account (Rosenau, 1994: 536-7). The fact is that China has already become integrated 
into the world economy and its moves have never more been dependent on the 
calculation of economic gains or losses. China’s foreign policy actions are already 
influenced by the economic interdependence it finds itself in.
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Critique o f Liberalism
Resenau criticises the liberal perspective for not giving enough importance to the 
existence of structures. These will certainly have an impact on defining issues and on the 
processes at work. This will be so even where such structures are themselves not set in 
stone (Rosenau, 1994: 538). Keohone and Nye, supporting theories of interdependence, 
remind us that when push comes to shove states will indeed act to survive and even resort 
to force if necessary (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 27). The liberals may be right in terms of 
global trends, but the Chinese leadership may not yet concur. Tiananmen was a sober 
reminder that China of the 1980s was not on an irreversible path to political 
liberalisation. There is still a gap between the values of multilateralism, human rights, the 
rule of law in international trade, and peaceful conflict resolution espoused by liberalism, 
and elements in current Chinese leadership (Roy, 1998: 232).
Critique o f Marxism
There are weaknesses in a purely Marxist analysis. Political and strategic relations before 
states may carry as much influence as economic relations in certain scenarios (Gilpin, 
1987: 51). Political conflicts may not have economic grounds, and political relations may 
exist even without relations in economic exchange. States competed with each other even 
before anything that could be called ‘capitalism’ had evolved (Ng-Quinn, 1984: 90). 
Traditional class struggles may be significant in themselves, but not so significant as to 
be determinant of foreign policy (Roy, 1998: 234). Rosenau criticises the ‘World System 
Theory’ as not being true to the facts. If developing countries are being kept in place by 
the elite nations, it is difficult to explain the rise and new found power of the NIEs. 
Further, in moving from an industrial to an information age, traditional class lines and 
power relations have shifted (Rosenau, 1994: 537-8). In this aspect, Post-Mao China has 
embraced the post-industrial system to speed economic development, and even to give 
China a place among the core nations (Roy, 1998: 235). China has been able to choose 
between participation and withdrawal, and this means the world economy is not the final 
arbiter of international action.
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1.3 The approach of specialists on China
Most specialists on Chinese affairs try to understand Chinese politics within the Chinese 
state itself, and focus less on the external pressures from other states (Ibid.: 236). In this 
regard the three factors of Chinese history, ideology, and internal politics are the keys to 
understanding what shapes Chinese foreign policy and the minds of those that decide it.
Historical factor
No one can deny the role of history in understanding contemporary events. In China, with 
its strong tradition of statecraft, this may carry special weight. China has moved through 
many periods, from the Han and Tang dynasties with their cosmopolitan flavour, the mid- 
Qing, with its arrogance, to the anti-imperialist revolution (Mancall, 1967). Chinese elites 
have often seen themselves as being at the centre of civilisation. Regionally, satellite 
states owing loyalty to the centre developed. The corollary was a sense of cultural 
superiority, and a lack of concepts of equality of standing in the international arena (Ojha, 
1969: 5-6). Chinese society is hierarchical, and the self-expression that is foreign policy 
may be considered to reflect this background.4 Another historical determinant may be the 
‘century of shame’, from the Opium War in 1842 until the communist triumph in 1949 
(Roy, 1998: 237-8). This historical failure has tended to motivate China’s desire to gain 
respect and recognition among nations and created the need for the ability to act with 
independence in foreign affairs. Leaders have been driven to seek a dominant position in 
world affairs rather than accept the mainstream international system (Ng-Quinn, 1983: 
207). These two historical factors would seem to be at odds with China’s status as a 
socialist nation, but ingrained attitudes live on (Fairbank, 1968: 4; Schwartz, 1968: 277, 
284).
4 Faribank (1968: 2) divides the Chinese view of world into the three zones. First, the Sinic Zone consisting 
of the most nearby and culturally similar tributaries, Korea and Vietnam, parts o f which had anciently been 
ruled within the Chinese empire, and also the Liu-Ch’iu (Ryukyu) Islands and, at brief times, Japan. 
Second, the Inner Asian Zone, consisting o f tributary tribes and states o f the nomadic or seminomadic 
peoples of Inner Asia, who were not only ethnically and culturally non-Chinese but were also outside or on 
the fringe o f the Chinese culture area, even though sometimes pressing upon the Great Wall frontier. Third, 
the Outer Zone, consisting o f the ‘outer barbarians’ (wai-i) generally, at a further distance over land or sea, 
including eventually Japan and other states of Southeast and South Asia and Europe that were supposed to 
send tribute when trading.
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Domestic political factor
Another important approach of Sinologists is the emphasis on domestic political 
characteristics of China. As an authoritarian political system, public opinion has very 
little influence on the Chinese foreign policy (Roy, 1998: 236). Important foreign policy 
decisions have been made by the few leaders, so that much has depended on the 
individuals who have their own approaches to the management of foreign relations. Thus 
leadership style is important, and is normally dependent on personality.5 The natural 
question then, is whether we can attribute significant behavioural tendencies to the 
different types of actors. One interpretation of Chinese leadership takes a psychocultural 
perspective and identifies three styles: the ‘hierarchical’ style, the ‘normalcy’ style, and 
the ‘rebellious’ style (Shih, 1990: 63). A hierarchical leader seeks psychological self- 
assurance; a normal leader recognises other states’ national interests; and a revolutionary 
leader tends to operate best where everything representing the status quo authority needs 
to be overthrown (Ibid: 94). Revolutionaries such as Mao Zedong, implemented 
aggressive foreign policies. Thus the person of Mao had a major impact on foreign policy 
decision-making as well as its outcome (Hunt, 1996: 231). More ‘normal’ leaders, like 
Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping, proved more sympathetic towards a China- 
among-equals world view. The result is that in China, where power is concentrated in 
persons rather than institutional procedures, it is more difficult to identify the roots of 
foreign policy decisions as these may be found in the individual leaders (Pye, 1990: 72).
Ideological factor
In the Chinese political system, in contrast to most countries, ideology is still important. 
It can be harnessed as a ‘unifying and energising force of moral values’ and justifies 
control policies to support single party rule (Harmin, 1984, in Wang, Jisi, 1994: 504). It 
works to legitimise the regime, and provides the leaders with a framework within which 
to operate and make policy judgements, including international affairs. Dangdai 
Zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Foreign Relations], an official history of 
Chinese foreign relations covering the period 1949-1986, sees Marxism, Leninism, and 
Maoist-thought as the guide to interpret world affairs (Kim, Samuel, 1994: 5-6). If there
5 For an understanding o f Chinese political behaviour and thinking, see (Pye and Leites, 1982).
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is a conflict in action between national interest and ideology, the latter will overrule (Zhi, 
1982: 286).
1.4 A Critique of the three factors
Although each of perspectives provides useful insights, they cannot be proved through 
logical argument. The strengths of these theories should also be evaluated alongside their 
weaknesses. A critique of the perspectives will be explored below.
Critique o f the historical factor
The traditional historical and cultural approach has several problems. First, 
‘Sinocentrism’ is more a description than a theory, and it has many faces (Kim, Samuel, 
1982: 64). Official Chinese dynastic histories, on which historians rely, may be slanted to 
support tradition, and thus biased (Ng-Quinn, 1983: 207). It also contains the danger 
inherent in all-encompassing explanations (Kim, Samuel, 1989: 16). Second,
Sinocentrism is subject to ongoing change. There are not only similarities between 
dynasties and regimes but also dissimilarities and discontinuities. Today’s Chinese world 
view does not resemble the traditional tribute system. The main historical influence on 
Chinese Communist leaders’ foreign policy thinking is modem history (Kim, Samuel, 
1994: 12). Thus China may be better viewed as in transition to becoming a fully modem 
society (Pye, 1968: xv). Industrial societies are different from agrarian ones. Even deep- 
rooted Confucianism may be less influential than modernisation, urbanisation and 
indoctrination (Ojha, 1969: 25).6 Third, China has not been isolated, but has been active 
on the international stage and to an extent has had to buy into that system. Historically, 
China handled other states by seeking a resolution based on the balance of power, similar 
to today’s international relations. Examples are China’s relations with the Xiong-nu in 
the Han Dynasty, and with the Turks and Tibetans in the Tang Dynasty (Ng-Quinn, 1983: 
207). Chinese history is as huge as its geography and to identify which period is 
influential in terms of current foreign policy is not straightforward (Kim, Samuel, 1994: 
13).
6 For the current discussion on the relationship and role of Chinese culture to the modernisation o f China, 
see (Zi, Zhongyun, 1987).
127
Critique o f the domestic political factor
As in most countries, but especially so in China, with its ‘geographical, social, 
generational, social, educational, occupational, philosophical and other diversities’, there 
are any number of sets of cultural viewpoints and thus the leadership of the nation also 
cannot be said to be culturally ‘homogeneous’ or even ‘Sinocentric’ (Ng-Quinn, 1983: 
207). During the Mao period it became evident that the revolutionary elite and wider 
circle of subordinates, which were necessary to support and serve their leaders, needed to 
be drawn together by a clear and shared system of belief to counterbalance the diversities 
among them (Hunt, 1996: 231).
Critique o f the ideological factor
In China the world has been seen through Marxist-Leninist spectacles, and this has 
guided interpretation and policy-making. Even so, there have been inconsistent foreign 
policy outcomes. Hunt notes that self-protection has been as important a motivation as 
national development. The various military and near military conflicts crises (in Korea in 
1950, along the Taiwan straits in 1958, along the Indian border in 1962, in Vietnam in 
1965, and along the Soviet border in 1969) have shown a major motivation of China to be 
the maintenance of historical borders (Hunt, 1984: 39-40). Ideology has later been used 
to justify China’s actions rather than to guide them and has been used as a weapon to 
criticise Western ideologies (Ojha, 1969: 14-5).
1.5 Towards synthesis: Realism with ‘Chinese Characteristics’
There are so many aspects to Chinese foreign policy that it is difficult to point to a single 
unifying perspective. The realist position may, perhaps, be the theory which best explains 
the reality (Kapstein, 1995). This is due to its focus on maintaining territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and security within an anarchic international playing-field (Ng-Quinn, 1984: 
95). However, as Samuel Kim argues, it does not provide a perfect or comprehensive 
understanding. Bringing it together with a cultural approach that focuses on specific 
Chinese characteristics may yield a more fruitful framework for analysis. This 
combination will avoid acultural and ahistorical biases of mainstream realism, and will 
seek to identify real and historical fields in the ways in which the outside world has been
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seen by the Chinese elite (Kim, Samuel, 1994: 14). Thus the understanding of Chinese 
foreign policy will not be the exclusive preserve of either IR theorists or of Sinologists. 
Rather, a cross-disciplinary approach is needed in order to develop a framework that 
draws on both streams of knowledge, and to develop a deeper theory (Shambaugh, 1994: 
8-9; Rosenau, 1994: 532). Johnston has captured an important part of Chinese thinking 
and behaviour, by stressing the entrenched realism that has been embedded its strategic 
culture that has evolved through its long history (Johnston: 1995). This will lead to a 
better understanding of the complexity that is Chinese foreign policy.
Chinese policy makers have no hesitation in ascribing the basis of their actions to 
Chinese wisdom. For example the Beijing Review states: ‘The policy-makers are 
followers of ancient Chinese strategist and philosopher Sun Zi whose maxim is “a good 
go [Chinese chess]-player seeks the trend, while a bad one seeks pieces’” (Shi Nangen, 
1998: 7). They have drawn variously on Chinese classical writings such as Sunzi Bingfa 
(Sun Tzu’s The Act of War), Sanguo Yanyi (The Romance of the Three Kingdoms), 
Shuihu Zhuan (Water Margin), and Changuo Ts ’e (Chronicle of Warring States).7 These 
writings present notions such as, ‘subduing the enemy without fighting’, ‘defensiveness’ 
and ‘limited war’. The Warring States period (403-221 B.C.) is an oft-consulted model of 
Chinese strategic culture. This tradition highlights an amoral interstate system where 
states are constantly competing ruthlessly and playing each other off. In fact Confucian 
writers later renounced such ‘opportunism and deceitful stratagems’ but the Chinese have 
retained a sense of pride in this era in which they ‘knew how to manipulate the situation 
to their own advantage and inspire complete awe by their prestige’ (Hunt, 1984: 8). Thus 
the Chinese view is that states remain the significant units of action in world affairs, and 
that force is a suitable, possible, and effective policy instrument. ‘In their eyes, world 
politics continues to involve a zero-sum game, and in the inevitable hierarchy, the more 
powerful nations dominate the weak’ (Strasser, 1995, p. 30, quoted in Roy, 1998: 43). 
The basic nature of politics is one of the survival of the fittest, a struggle for wealth and 
power in a ruleless system. Thus, Wang Jisi refers to Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic thinking as 
arguing that Chinese foreign policy may choose to draw on traditional philosophy where
7 This point has also been made in (Roy, 1998).
129
it suits and apply it to its advantage in formulating policies (Wang, Jisi, 1994: 503). This 
is important in the understanding of Chinese strategic thinking.
2. Interdependence as China’s foreign policy choice
How should we understand China’s choice of interdependence as foreign policy? Why 
did China choose to pursue a policy of interdependence, despite its negative view of 
interdependence resulting from its experiences since the Opium War?
2.1 Interdependence in the Western literature
Interdependence is well established in international relations as a means to establish 
peaceful security relations through recognising the link between economic and security 
matters and through promoting diplomatic cooperation (Robinson, 1994a: 187, 190). 
Interdependence has been defined by Morse as ‘the outcomes of specified actions of two 
or more parties (individuals, governments, corporation, etc.) when the outcomes of these 
actions are mutually contingent’ (Morse, 1976: 663); and by Keohane and Nye as 
‘...mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations 
characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different 
countries’ (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 9, also quoted in Xu, 1993: 22). To distinguish it from 
mere international interconnectedness, Samuel Kim (1989: 14) expands as follows: 
‘[International interdependence refers to a balanced and equitable dependence in which 
actors share the benefits, cost, and consequences of their transactions in goods, services, 
capital, knowledge, and rule making. Interdependence exists where actors of more or less 
equal ‘power’ are engaged in the joint management of their mutual dependence’. There 
are thus benefits to all parties engaged in economic interdependence, and this encourages 
better political relations. Peace is sought by those local groups who have benefited from 
such economic relations. Channels of communication are opened up and information is 
exchanged, which goes to break down the misconceptions of other parties (Harris & 
Mack, 1997: 18-9). The likelihood of force being used between partners is reduced 
because of the threat to wealth generating opportunities and the opposition by interested 
groups in their respective societies.
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However, other views are possible. Interdependence may in fact mask an imbalanced 
relationship where one partner is advantaged. If there is a dominant partner, economic 
development may well have negative knock-on effects in the military and cultural spheres. 
More interdependence may in fact create less rather than more stability. The role of 
economic development is clearly increasingly important, but not uncontroversial 
(Scalapino, 1997: 140). The problem is that interdependence is complex. There is no way 
to measure it, and the benefits may also include some downsides. Thus it is a multi­
faceted situation, and assessment is problematic.
Keohane and Nye have attempted to solve the problem of assessment by distinguishing 
two kinds of interdependence: sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability
interdependence. ‘Sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside 
before policies are altered to try to change the situation. Vulnerability can be defined as 
an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have 
altered’ (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 13, also quoted in Xu, 1993: 24). International 
interdependence was originally a description of what was happening between the 
developed countries through progress in communication and transport infrastructure 
rather than between developed and developing countries. The latter interdependence is 
likely to involve vulnerable positions for the developing countries, whereas 
interdependence between developed countries is likely to be sensitivity interdependence 
(Wu, 1981, p. 448, in Ibid.: 25). Holsti reminds us that although interdependence may 
create an area of new international relations, one should not get too excited nor forget the 
vulnerability of the weaker players. It is not a sure route to winners all round, for there 
are cost implications. Unbalanced integration can lead to disintegration, to autarky, to 
isolation as a reaction to dominance by one party (Holsti, 1978: 530). The weaker parties 
may lose independence in domestic policymaking. These dangers mean that vulnerable 
states may be hesitant to buy into interdependent structures especially where other factors 
make the environment insecure or political relationships less than benign (Harris & 
Mack, 1997: 19). Thus interdependence has the risk of creating dependence. This in turn
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leads to tensions, insecurity and even conflict. The higher the inequality between 
partners, the less one can speak of real interdependence (Waltz, 1970: 207).
2.2 The Chinese view of interdependence
There is some truth in the claim that China’s modem foreign relations have been 
influenced by its history in foreign relations. In the dynastic period foreigners were 
regarded as inferior, and the result was a system of tributes by which foreigners 
expressed deference. Gradually, and under the influence of Western expansionism in the 
nineteen century, China was forced to become an equal player by law on the international 
scene, and in practice a player of the second rank. Dependence on the West meant an 
increased influence of foreign ideas and a loss of self-respect (Robinson, 1994a: 189).
The communist leaders were not happy with the notion that states may be mutually 
interdependent. It undermined their sense of independence and self-reliance.8 Mao 
considered that there was too much dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1950s 
(Yahuda, 1997: 8). So-called neo-colonialism was vigorously opposed by Maoists, and a 
sense of self-reliance was fostered. Links were forged with the third world against the 
powerful countries. After some moves to openness to the global economy from 1978 
there was a reactionary response against what was seen as ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ and 
‘spiritual pollution’ of the communist spirit (Robinson, 1994a: 189-190).
Indeed after the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, the efforts of the West to integrate China and 
to introduce the concept of interdependence were considered to be a strategy to 
undermine communist rule (Yahuda, 1997: 6). Thus the Chinese leadership has had to 
tread a thin line when working with other countries. Its views of independence and 
sovereignty is inclined to the absolutist extreme, and this tends to constrain its foreign 
policy actions, since effort is put into defending sovereignty at the expense of other 
foreign relations possibilities. Combined with a relatively weak position in recent times,
8 In usage, independence {duli or more fully, duli zizhu) has the meaning o f ‘maintain independence and 
keep the initiative in one’s own hands’. Sovereignty (zhuquan) has the connotation o f the exercise of 
exclusive power. Self-reliance (zili gengsheng) means ‘strive for regeneration through one’s own efforts 
(Yahuda, 1997: 8).
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this has made it hard for China to normalise relations with the rest of the world. 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that China has rejected interdependence. Indeed 
interdependence is now at the forefront of Chinese policy, and one may ask why this is 
so, in the light of its previous suspicions.
2.3 Goals of China’s Interdependence
Each state has a number of sometimes conflicting objectives. Some may need to be 
sacrificed for the sake of others, and a number of factors will come into the process of 
prioritisation (Legg & Morrison, 1991: 61). Factors will include the international and 
domestic outcomes, the amount of risk the state is willing to take, time frames, and the 
weighing up of costs and benefits. This goes into making up a rational decision-making 
process (Lambom, 1997: 212). In the sphere of foreign policy rationality is ‘the process 
of organising clear and reliable means’ towards achieving objectives. States have 
‘different organisational capacities’ and operate within situations of ‘internal and external 
change’. States thus develop strategies to cope with these changes, and these strategies 
determine international manoeuvring (Ikenberry, 1991: 157).
In Chinese thinking, strategy (zhanlue) ‘applies to the method of manoeuvring the enemy, 
actual or potential, into a position from which it would be difficult to counter the Chinese 
foreign policy offensive’ (Simmonds, 1970: 136). It is a way to defend against the 
shifting array of international hostile forces. It is also a way of evaluating the strengths 
and weaknesses of others in comparison to itself. Strategy is long-term, whereas tactics 
are short term. Strategy leads to tactics, which are concerned with the actual actions 
against the hostile force, having manoeuvred that hostile force into as weak a position as 
possible (Ibid.: 136).
China has sought to achieve several goals by pursuing a diplomacy of interdependence. It 
regards great power status and regime stability as long-term goals. A major source of 
foreign policy motivation is the standing and status of the state in the eyes of world. 
Many analysts have given less weight to the importance of global social sanctions and 
‘peer pressure’ in accounting for the behaviour of states. But it is clear that even where
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there are no concrete benefits or sanctions, states sometimes act according to 
international public opinion. To gain powerful status is a main goal of Chinese foreign 
policy (Johnston, 1998: 76-78). This is linked to the historical Chinese view of itself as 
morally and culturally superior. China can be seen to be seeking affirmation of its 
superiority (Sutter, 1978: 3-4), particularly as a revived China would be able to erase its 
past shadows of foreign domination.
Another major foreign policy source is the political state of a nation and the political 
needs of its government (Legg & Morrison, 1991: 62). The communist elite has always 
been concerned with external threats, as well as with the threat of discontent from the 
vast geographical area under their rule (neiluan, waihuan). Regional fragmentation has 
been a perennial concern. The 14th century historical novel Romance o f the Three 
Kingdoms written by Lo Kuanchung starts with the words, ‘Long united, the kingdom 
must divide; long divided, it must unite. It has always been thus’ (also quoted in Roy, 
1998: 54). In fact internal and external threats are treated more on par in China than in 
most other countries (Ibid.: 43; Fairbank, 1968: 3). Chinese analysts have distinguished 
the pre- and post-Cold War periods. In the former the threat was mainly external and 
military, in the latter it is internal and political, attacking the rule of the Communist Party 
(Yahuda, 1997: 18). The Tiananmen crisis was a direct attack on regime legitimacy, 
which had its roots in the wider worldwide collapse of communism. Legitimacy is a 
crucial goal to be maintained by the leadership in an age where economic success is more 
and more becoming the test of such legitimacy. Leaders need continuous economic 
success in order to maintain legitimacy, and this may be another spur to economic 
interaction with the outside (Ibid.: 7).
To achieve its long-term goals China has focused on creating a peaceful environment to 
facilitate domestic development (Cable & Ferdinand, 1994: 259). These goals are to be 
best achieved through economic interdependence, and the current focus on 
interdependence should be analysed in terms of ‘comprehensive national strength’, a term 
that includes not only military defence but also internal conditions such as economic 
prosperity, political stability, and cultural or ideological purity.
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2.4 China’s good neighbourliness
It has been said as late as the 1980s that China did not have a real regional policy 
(Yahuda, 1996: 186). From that time both domestic and international changes operated to 
propel China into an entirely new international direction, which including regionalisation 
(Goodman, 1992: 2-3). Several factors pushed the government to take on a Chinese 
model of regional cooperation.
First, the end of tripolarity during the Cold War era meant that China itself had become 
regionalised (Yahuda, 1996: 212) now that the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle 
had gone. Its place was a set of arrangements among five power centres (North America, 
Europe, Russia, China, and Japan) that were much looser (Robinson, 1994b: 593). This 
weakened China’s relative strength and it had to find new ways to pursue its interests 
(Gurtov & Hwang, 1998: 66-7). At the same time the collapse of the Soviet Union also 
ended once and for all any prospect of an invasion from the north. This gave China a 
degree of strategic latitude it had never enjoyed before.
Second, there was a gradual shift in the Chinese perception of security from military 
security matters to economic concerns as the main focus in East Asia (Robinson, 1994b: 
595-6). Both economic and military action is recognised as necessary to safeguard 
national security (Hu, Weixing, 1995a: 133).9 The collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe in 1989 followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused 
China’s leaders to concentrate even more on economic development as a condition for 
ensuring continued communist rule.
9 Obviously, for Beijing ‘security’ is a dynamic concept in a broad sense rather than a static one in a narrow 
sense. It refers not only to ‘safety’ in the military and diplomatic sciences, but also to economic and 
technological security. Also, political security requires the unity of leadership at different levels. The 
leading group should cope with social contradictions, thus avoiding serious political and social turbulence 
(Wang, Yizhou, 1999: 7).
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Third, the late 1980s saw regionalism become an important part of the global political 
structure discourse largely as a result of developments in the EU and NAFTA. The 
development of these trading blocs coincided with attempts by East Asian NIEs (Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea) to restructure their economies because of 
high factor costs. China’s new export-oriented outlook and lower labour costs met their 
needs for cost-saving processing and production. Thus East Asia grew in China’s 
economic relations as a direct source of investment and then as an export market. China 
was catching up with the realities of the international political economy. This not only 
increased intra-regional trade, but also furthered China’s integration into the economic 
and, to an extent, the political order of East Asia.
The Chinese revised their military strategy to focus primarily on the preparation for 
localised high-tech small wars because they no longer followed Mao’s belief in the 
inevitability of another world war. Hence they focused on the prospect of wars near their 
borders. But because of their need for a peaceful international environment the new 
military strategy highlighted the need to maintain friendly relations with neighbouring 
countries and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation (Beijing Review, 1994b & 1998). 
Ideology in China was taking more and more of a back seat allowing room to deal with 
countries with differing values, social structures, and economic systems. Further, 
developing relationships with as many different countries as possible would help in 
China’s integration process with the rest of the world (Harding, 1994: 399-400). 
Diplomatic relations was established with Singapore (1990), Brunei (1991), South Korea 
(1992), and the four Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan; 1992-93); relations were normalised with 
Mongolia and Laos (1990), Vietnam (1991), and Indonesia (1990); there was a boundary 
agreement with Laos and Vietnam (1992) (Gurtov & Hwang, 1998: 67).
These interactions on China’s borders were guided by Beijing’s foreign policy 
(Christoffersen, 1996b: 294). It was realised that foreign policy should hasten to create a 
peaceful political external environment, enabling China to concentrate on domestic
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economic development. Sub-regionalism was seen as the most flexible method to achieve 
this aim.
2.5 Constraints to China’s interdependence due to neighbouring countries’ concern for 
relative gains
To adapt to the rapidly changing domestic and international environment, China has 
adapted interdependence to meet its own strategic requirements. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that China’s foreign policy objectives face a major constraint, which is 
the concern regarding relative gains of neighbouring countries.
A main tenet of liberal thinking is that states work together with the target of achieving 
absolute gains. It is said that states act on rational economic grounds to increase their own 
net benefits (Milner, 1992: 470), and in doing so they must be prepared to take into 
account the choices of other states. Nonetheless, the issue here is the tension between 
absolute and relative gains. Where joint gains are made from cooperation, the next 
question is how they should be distributed. This may result in disagreement between 
partners, which hinders cooperation (Powell, 1994: 314-5). Even where absolute gains 
may be had all round, competitive or jealous states do not like to realise fewer gains than 
their partners, and thus the issue of relative gains in economic and political terms can 
present a problem for cooperation. This comes from the anarchic system states find 
themselves in. Survival is dependent only upon a state’s own power and cohesion. 
Relative shifts in gains are thus a central concern, and unfavourable cooperative 
situations will not be tolerated lightly (Milner, 1992: 483). ‘No nation will concede 
political advantages to another nation without the expectation of receiving proportionate 
advantages in return’ (Grieco, 1990, p. 47, in Ibid.: 471).
Cooperation is thus made more difficult the more a participant state feels that the group 
objectives diverge from its own. It will not be willing to take risks on behalf of the group 
goals (Lambom, 1997: 195). The fact is that the main goal of states in such situations 
may not be to achieve advances for itself, but may be to prevent other states from moving 
ahead in a relative sense (Grieco, 1990, p. 39, in Milner, 1992: 484-5). States may even
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act to reduce the gains of other partners, or they may decide to take unilateral action or be 
inactive in the partnership (Ibid.: 468).
With this in mind, China has ruled to manipulate interdependence to serve its own 
strategic advantage, but it may have been less successful than it had hoped. In playing the 
international game, it cannot avoid the rules and problems given by the game, and this 
has had an impact on its regionalist approaches. Beijing has tried to follow a ‘maxi/mini 
principle’ in the conduct of multilateral diplomacy - maximising China’s rights and 
interests and minimising China’s responsibilities and normative costs (Kim, Samuel, 
1991, pp. 25-7, in Yahuda, 1997: 15). In fact China has retained a mindset that is rather 
focused on a narrow definition of self interest. This viewpoint takes the realist approach, 
and many of the international norms of cooperation have not been taken on board (Ibid.).
Both weaker neighbours and stronger powers are suspicious of China’s moves to 
interdependence. The former are vulnerable, the latter sensitive, to growing 
interdependence. Weaker neighbours such as the ASEAN are, as a group, an important 
trading partner of China. The bilateral trade volume between China and ASEAN 
countries, reached US$24.36 billion in 1997. However, they are rivals in producing 
natural resources, labour-intensive and agricultural products, and manufactured goods. 
The economic structure of China and the ASEAN countries have converged. They share 
the same market focus on countries and regions as America, Europe, and Japan. Indeed, 
there is much concern and uncertainty about the emergence of China. The biggest 
problem for the countries in the region is China as a military power. The realisation of 
modernisation would enable China to command the maritime heart of Southeast Asia, 
with hegemonic implications for its resident states as well as for all states concerned 
(Leifer, 1997: 157). The conflict over Mischief Reef in the South China Sea of 1995 has 
led to a belief that China is not constrained by concerns that it might damage its 
economic interdependence.
In case of stronger neighbours, such as China’s relations with Russia, economic relations 
have developed at both national and local levels. In 1993 China was Russia’s second
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most important trading partner and Russia China’s seventh, with the value of bilateral 
trade reaching US$7.68 billion. However, their economic relationship was downscaled, 
because of Russia’s concern for the vulnerable situation of its Far Eastern provinces 
(Yahuda, 1997: 19). China wanted to improve economic and trade relationships with 
Russia, but could not manage to attract a positive a response. Low quality products and 
the fear of potential Chinese migration made the Russian Far East hostile and reluctant to 
cooperate with China (Christoffersen, 1996b: 267, 277-80). Although their relationship 
was good in terms of military and diplomatic cooperation, their relationship can be better 
described as one that was based on the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ rather 
than the practice of interdependence (Yahuda, 1997: 19).
In Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Japanese investment rapidly increased in the 1990s, 
reaching US$3.2 billion in 1998. By the late 1990s China ranked second only to the US 
in the Japanese investment volume. Japan has become China’s greatest trading partner 
and China, Japan’s second biggest. Politically, Japan was the first of the Western allies to 
lift economic sanctions against China after the Tiananmen crisis in 1989. However, their 
complementary economic relations have not transcended the traditional security issues. 
Their relationship remains, in the realist approach, deeply influenced by several unsolved 
issues such as the historical legacy of Japanese invasion of China, the Taiwan question 
and the territorial disputes in Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands (Yahuda, 2001).
The same goes for relations with the US. Sino-American bilateral trade volume reached 
US$48.99 billion in 1997. By the end of the same year, the US was committed to 
investing US$40.06 billion with an actual investment of US$17.5 billion (Almanac o f 
China’s 1998/99: 431-2). Despite the US’s great commitment in trade and investment, 
there is a notion among the Chinese leadership that the US is trying to resist the 
development toward multipolar arrangements in order to retain its dominant position. The 
intent of the US is to thwart the emergence of China as a great power, since the US sees 
China as its main competitor in Asia. Beijing sees shifts towards integrating it in the 
international community as moves to subject it to US dominance (Godwin, 1998: 177-8). 
Meanwhile the US holds China to blame for many issues, including not making an effort
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to reduce the US’s trade deficit, its human rights record, threatening to invade Taiwan, 
and infringement of minorities such as Xinjiang and Tibet. Even China’s military power 
is seen as an indication of its ambition to be a hegemon of the region. Tensions still 
remain and there has been no real change in the substance of their interdependence.
3. Sub-regionalism in China’s regional policy
As examined in Chapter Two, SREZs are a form of soft regionalism, based more upon 
the flow of economic interaction across ideological and political boundaries. This means 
that within a cooperative situation the properties of regionalism are manifest, but there is 
little or no institutional structure and such structures or effects that may be there do not 
cover whole states. The growing significance of such soft regionalism results from the 
realisation that at different points in the peripheral provinces there are indeed SREZs that 
link regions of China with adjacent neighbouring territory (Yahuda, 1994: 264). The vast 
mass of China sits in the middle section of the western shores of the Pacific and bridges 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. It possesses rich natural resources, a relatively complete 
industrial system, a large capacity in its multilevel technological structure, and great 
technological strength. These must be used in bilateral, multilateral and ‘sub-regional’ 
cooperation. The fruits of the open-door policy, originally confined to the east coast, are 
evident, and emphasis is now placed along the land borders of China with its neighbours 
and along the major rivers, focusing on areas with natural access to the outside world.
Of the sub-regionalisms around the Chinese territory, there are two projects that involve 
more than two countries. China is involved in both the GMS10 and the TRADP at 
opposite ends of its vast territory. Yunnan Province and the Yanbian Korean 
Autonomous Prefecture are similar in that they are underdeveloped provinces near 
coastal areas. Both projects commenced in 1992 with objectives of economic 
development. That would be sustainable in the long term, with resulting improved living 
standards for local people. Major international aid organisations have been involved in 
facilitating inter-country cooperation in the targeted region (Husband, 1998: 68-70). The
10 For the general principles of the project, see (ADB, 1993).
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two projects have focused on non-Chinese investment (ECFA, 1993: 9-10; Zou & Ma, 
1992: 71). Despite their potential, however, both projects have not been successful, and 
have also faced similar difficulties. The comparison with the GMS could be a good 
starting point from which to analyse the TRADP. Why did the GMS fail? What are the 
political and security implications of the Mekong project? This section will begin with 
the description of the Mekong project and then highlight the significance of the TRADP.
3.1 The GMS in Chinese foreign policy
The GMS comprises Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yunnan 
Province of China, the six countries through which the Mekong flows or borders. The 
area covers 2.3 million sq. km with a population of almost 237 million in 1996. Thus 
there are both human and natural resources, which include timber, agricultural land, some 
oil and gas, and rivers suitable for hydropower development. The labour force is large 
and the GMS could generate a vigorous and sustained growth (Green, 1998: 1-2-4; See 
also ADB 1993).
The GMS was launched in 1992 by the ADB. It relies heavily on grants and subsidies, 
since there is little private capital inflow, largely because the project remains in its early 
stages (except for in Thailand) and levels of socio-economic development are low.11 The 
initial strategy by the ADB was to promote basic infrastructure, namely transportation 
and energy, thus to date development has mainly been of dams and roads (Brimble & 
Oldfield, 2000: 25).12
The six countries have established some kind of institutional framework. There are also 
working groups and forums covering both the ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ aspects of 
implementation. A body at ministerial level coordinates cooperation and provides overall
11 The terrain is mountainous and difficult jungle, requiring massive inputs to build transportation with low 
economic returns in the immediate future.
12 So far, the ADB has provided US$366 million in loans for priority sub-regional projects in the transport 
and energy sectors. It has also extended US$20 million in technical assistance grants to support sub­
regional activities. Approximately US$300 million is in the pipeline for GMS projects (Green, 1998:1-2-5). 
A recent ADB publication notes that ten sub-regional infrastructure projects have been completed or are 
nearing completion. Out o f the US$ 1 billion in financing for the ten projects, the ADB has financed six for 
US$465 million and mobilised US$234 million o f co-financing (ADB) (Brimble & Oldfield, 2000: 25).
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policy guidance and support. This is supported by a National Coordinating Committee in 
each country (Green, 1998:1-2-5).
Starting with the open-door policy in 1978, Yunnan gradually began renewing ties with 
its neighbours. The focus was on cross-border trade with Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos 
and on establishing links with Thailand. In 1984, the Southwestern Cooperation Zone 
was established, consisting of the provincial-level administrations of Yunnan, Sichuan, 
Guangxi, and Guizhou as well as Tibet. Its task was to open up the Southeast Asian 
market. For example, the eastern Dehong Prefecture attempted to establish, via Myanmar, 
trading links with Bangladesh, India and Pakistan; and the southern Xishuangbanna 
Prefecture developed links with Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore (d’Hooghe, 1994: 
286,295, 302).
The significance of the GMS lies in its role in China’s foreign policy. As far as China’s 
foreign policy is concerned, Southeast Asian countries are a key source of further 
development. Along with economic cross-border developments, China restored ties with 
Vietnam in 1989, and with Indonesia and Singapore in 1990. Improved regional relations 
are evidenced by increasing numbers of visits by various heads of governments from 
Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. China provides isolated Myanmar with political, 
economic, infrastructure, and military support. Myanmar provides China with strategic 
links with Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. China and Laos restored diplomatic 
relations in 1987 and have recently settled their border disputes (Ibid.: 305, 310, 315).
Nevertheless, not all is rosy. In fact the GMS has not been of huge economic access and 
interest and the project has not been the main priority for the central government. 
Economic affairs in Yunnan (apart from its drug problems) are not the biggest worry of 
the Chinese government to directly impinge on foreign policy. Bilateral political relations 
with Yunnan’s neighbours are still not very developed and are delicately balanced, which 
does not encourage a confident push for sustained growth (Ibid.: 315-6). And indeed the 
amount of trade between China and Southeast Asia, despite increases, remains small 
relative to China’s total. China does not really need what they have to offer, so
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complementarities are difficult. Plentiful cheap labour and natural resources but a lack of 
technology, capital, skilled labour, and managerial experience are common to all the 
participating countries (Ding, Jingping, 1995: 61).
More importantly, from the point of view of Southeast Asian countries, China’s flexing 
of its economic muscles is seen as a comprehensive threat. Most of them have trade 
deficits with China, and are concerned that further cooperation in markets will add to 
these deficits (Handley, 1993a & 1993b). Despite improving relations between China and 
neighbouring countries since the late 1980s, tensions still remain. The Tonkin Gulf region 
has provided territorial sea disputes, with several ASEAN countries claiming the Parcels 
and the Spratly archipelago along with China. As China believes that in the long run the 
Mekong offers a way a way to resist Japanese political and economic dominance of the 
region, Japan also tries to check and balance the Chinese movement in the region. As a 
result, the Mekong has become a stage for the two countries’ political game of aiming to 
influence Indochina (Handley, 1993a; The Economist, 1996).13
3.2 The significance of the TRADP in China’s foreign policy
The significance of sub-regional economic cooperation lies in its role in China’s security 
and foreign policy. One example is the Greater South China Economic Zone (GSCEZ). It 
utilised ethnic and blood ties with Chinese abroad to create strong capital inflows. In 
addition to accelerating national and regional development and acting as ‘experimental 
hot houses’ and generators of foreign exchange, since 1978 China has manipulated the 
GSCEZ in its foreign policy. It also has the function of integrating China with Hong 
Kong and Macao, and maintaining links with Taiwan (Reardon, 1996: 299). The growing 
trade with Taiwan via Hong Kong is naturally considered to be a favourable precondition 
for a possible political rapprochement. Thus the SREZ has implications in the political 
sphere that are potentially much more significant than economic development. China’s 
handling of the SREZ may shed light on how it might approach an eventual reunification 
process (Segal, 1994b: 328; Linge & Forbes, 1990: 15).
13 With its traditional thirst for new markets and raw materials, Japan has launched two initiatives and 
financed some o f the ADB studies {The Economist, 1996).
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China worked out its policy with regard to the TRADP and the GMS. Sub-regional 
economic cooperation may create some groundwork on which to begin building a new 
peace-oriented foreign policy. The new economic relations may pave the way for a new 
political alignment where states are not forced to choose between free market and 
command economy systems, but may rely on China as a kind of peacemaker with an 
interest to guarantee stability in the region for the sake of economic development of 
Northeast and Southeast China (Christoffersen, 1988: 1246).
The two projects have had similar roles in China’s foreign policy. At the same time, there 
are differences between the two. Firstly, the prime agent in the GMS are national 
governments. Only Yunnan Province is proceeding as an autonomous prefecture, while 
the TRADP is concerned as a cooperation between local and national governments, and 
covers peripheral areas of the countries taking part. The Tumen region is a sparsely 
populated hinterland of 5 million inhabitants, whereas the GMS has approximately 237 
million people. The GMS was a response to a growing trade situation resulting from the 
synergies of moving from subsistence farming to more diversified market-based, 
outward-oriented economic systems. A main aim of the TRADP is to build on a relatively 
small base to kick-start a new point of economic growth and develop a gateway for trade 
(Ibid.). Nevertheless, beyond superficial comparisons, we can assume the political and 
security significance may give more weight to the TRADP than the GMS, if we compare 
the two. The TRADP has developed in a more complex way than might be suggested by 
the concept of the SREZ. The TRADP will be more interesting if we examine the very 
rare case of multinational cooperation between the different economic systems: the 
capitalist economies (Japan, South Korea, with perhaps the US behind the two countries) 
and the socialist economies (North Korea, and to some extent Russia, China and 
Mongolia). On the other hand, the GMS member countries are all socialist economies 
except Thailand.
More importantly, the major difference between GMS and the TRADP is that China’s 
partners in the latter are large powers that are competing with China for influence. Laos,
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Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam are no match for China, but Russia and Japan are 
formidable rivals. China’s northeast is of obvious security significance since it faces both 
Russia and Japan. China has sought to develop a trade network in this region between the 
Soviet/Russian Far East, South Korea and Japan, and possibly North Korea. This would 
help to ease political tensions in the region by shifting focus away from an aligned 
position (Christoffersen, 1988: 1246). Finally, in terms of security, China’s analysts still 
warn of the possible dangers posed by Russia’s remaining forces in the region (Yahuda, 
1994: 254). North Korea’s unpredictability means that Chinese forces in the region must 
remain alert. Thus the TRADP has great strategic significance and Beijing wants to 
maintain control of the politics of the economic relations.
Conclusion
The need for economic development has required growing interdependence with foreign 
countries. Since 1979 China has received more foreign direct investment than any other 
developing country. As a result of its economic reforms, different regions have been 
integrated more closely with their foreign neighbours. However, Segal and Goodman ask 
a pertinent question: ‘How much was China’s rise shaped by its own agenda and how 
much was it constrained by interdependence with the outside world?’ (Segal & Goodman, 
1997: 1). When confronted with a different set of external challenges, states manoeuvre 
and adjust their policies to varying internal needs and aspirations. It is apparent that 
China has become interactive in regional and global affairs, and along several dimensions 
it has promulgated a policy of cooperation. China is preoccupied with its great tasks of 
political consolidation and economic construction, and it has adopted and manipulated a 
policy of interdependence in order to meet rapidly changing circumstances. However, it 
is important to emphasise that there exists a major constraint in achieving China’s foreign 
policy objectives - the relative gains concern. In fact China has retained a mindset that 
has focused on a narrow definition of self-interest. It maintains territorial disputes and 
conflicts over sovereignty and identity, which go back many decades. Both weaker 
neighbours and stronger powers are suspicious of China’s moves to interdependence.
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Trans-border cooperation with China, such as the Mekong region, raises fears relating to 
economic, political and security matters. These fears are likely to inhibit border 
countries’ cooperation.
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Chapter Five. The Perspective of Jilin Province
Introduction1
While Mongolia and the two Koreas engage bureaucratically in the TRADP at central 
government level, China, like Russia, operates at two different levels with local and central 
governments. The main player would seem to be Jilin Province with its Hunchun Zone that, 
together with the central administration in Beijing, constitutes the Chinese side of the 
TRADP. While the next chapter will investigate the perspective of the Beijing government, 
Chapter Five will explore the provincial level perspective. This chapter will consider the 
ways in which Jilin Province is motivated mainly by its own local economic interests.
Divided into three parts, Part I will provide an overview of the evolution of the Chinese 
regional development policy. This helps understand the general background of the birth of the 
project and its status in Beijing’s regional development policy. Part II will review the 
economic position of the three Northeast Chinese provinces that make up the Northeast Asia 
Regional Development Area (NEARDA), the largest development triangle of the TRADP. It 
will then examine the development strategies of the three provinces, which have targeted the 
TRADP as a means to access the East Sea. Part III will examine the rationale at various 
administrative levels for Hunchun development: Jilin Province, Yanbian Korean Autonomous 
Prefecture, and Hunchun City level. It will investigate the role played by these various 
administrative levels in the initial development of the TRADP. Finally, it will look at their 
institutional arrangements for operating the project.
1 Economic data for this chapter will be taken from the early 1990s as these were the relevant statistics at the 
times when the project was being developed.
I. Evolution of regional development policy: An overview
Part I will provide an overview of the changing patterns in Chinese regional economic 
development, presenting a time-series policy review of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC)’s spatial strategies. This part thus helps us understand the place of the TRADP in 
China’s current national development policy.
1. Regional development in the Pre-Tiananmen Period (1953-1989)
Mao’s 1953-78 development strategy, despite the fact that there were several differing phases 
during this period, was basically an interior-focused strategy. The regional development 
policy was influenced by notions of regional balance as well as military strategy. The Third 
Front strategy (sanxian zhanlue) developed to meet the projected threats of war by the US
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and the Soviet Umon that prevailed through the 1960s until the mid-seventies. Concentration 
of industry along the coastal region was avoided, because the coast was strategically exposed 
to foreign military attack (Yang, Dali, 1997: 16-7). The remote areas of the Northeast, North 
and Northwest were considered to be beyond the reach of the US in the event of a military 
strike. Later industry moved even further westward in light of the threat from either the US or 
the Soviet Union (Li & Fan, 1996: 56), and new projects were generally established in such 
third-front or remote areas. These included the provinces and regions of Sichuan, Guizhou, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qingai, Ningxia, Guangdong, Hubei, Hunan and Shanxi. There was 
progressively more investment in the field of construction in third front areas: 20.6% in the 
First Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1953-57); 36.9% in the Second FYP; and 52.7% in the Third 
(1966-70) (Yang, Dali, 1997: 19). The third-front construction continued in the early 1970s.4
2 The Third Front was well developed by B. Naughton. See his work (1988).
3 This strategy was formulated on the basis o f  the experiences o f the Japanese invasion in the Second World 
War and the civil war against the Nationalist regime. These places named ’Sheri' (remote and concealed areas), 
‘Shan’ (mountains) and ‘Dong' (caves and tunnels). There were two third fronts. ‘One was called the “Big Third 
Front” which covered national, strategic, interior safe areas in the country as a whole, comprising ten interior 
and remote provinces. The other was the “Small Third Front” which included strategic and interior safe areas at 
the provincial level’ (Zhao & Gu, 1995: 389). For the strategic factors for the Third-front policy, see (Cannon, 
1990: 36-9).
4 Even though the interior continued to be out-produced by the coastal region, the third front was continued 
because the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes made third front construction a top priority in the domestic 
decision-making. In addition, it was both politically and economically difficult for the leadership to leave 
projects half-finished. The decentralisation in economic decision-making made it difficult for Beijing to control 
investment scale as various localities used technology funds under their control to build small third front 
projects in each locality (Yang, Dali, 1997: 20; Naughton, 1988: 362-4).
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There was a reversal, however, in Mao’s regional development policy towards the late 1970s, 
especially at the party’s Thirty Plenum of the Eleventh Congress 1978. Younger leaders 
argued for some reforms and liberalisation, and against the huge coast-interior imbalance in 
development, which was seen as detrimental to strategic interests.5 Regional specialisation 
and trade replaced the ideology of self-reliance,6 and a ‘Coastal Development Strategy’ 
(CDS)7 was adopted.
The change in thinking was motivated by a objective view of industrial and economic 
potential. The coastal regions had more developed infrastructures than the interior, and a 
more skilled workforce. The interior-based industrial projects were also in fact not as 
successful as had been expected, and they had not had the revitalising impact on the local 
economies as hoped (Yang, Dali, 1997: 23). Politically, the Cultural Revolution had come to 
an end. The government was facing criticism on all sides and needed some fresh ideas. 
Internationally, although China perceived a heightened threat from Soviet-led encirclement 
(Vietnam, Middle East, Afghanistan etc), by the end of the 1970s the environment was more 
less threatening than it had been until then and by 1982 the Chinese were able to assert a 
policy of interdependence between the two superpowers.8 This eased the way for the 
leadership to make changes to catch up with economic development in the rest of the world 
that was racing far ahead in Japan, the NIEs and Taiwan.
The CDS, coming out of the Beneficial International Cycle (BIC),9 aimed to maximise 
regional advantages, and also sought to attract foreign investment to revitalise the Chinese
5 One aspect was the difficulty o f efficiently exploiting the resources in inland areas. The coast was being 
seriously disadvantaged by being cut off from distant raw materials processing and energy supply. Cost o f  
transport had to be added to any production and the transport infrastructure was put under pressure. See State 
Statistical Bureau, Guanghui de sanshiwu nian: 1949-1984 (Thirty-five glorious years: 1949-1984), Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1984, cited in (Yang, Dali, 1997: 16).
6 K. C. Yeh also observed some distinctive features of the new economic development approach during the first 
years of reform era, see his work (1984); For regional disparities on industrial sectors, see (Kueh, 1989: 424- 
430).
7 The CDS was clearly favoured under the leadership o f Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Zhao further 
commented that ‘the disparity [between the coastal region and the interior] was unavoidable and conformed to 
the law o f  economic development’, according to Xinhua report on January 1988, quoted in (Yang, Dali, 1997: 
87).
8 Technically, relations with the US were normalised on 1 January 1979.
9 According to Tzeng (1991: 272-3), the CDS concept originated from the notion o f ‘Beneficial International 
Cycle’ (BIC), a framework formulated by Wang Jian, Research Fellow at the Institute o f Planning Economics in 
the State Planning Commission (SPC). Wang Jian’s BIC formulation, reflecting the policy position o f the SPC, 
was published in June 1987. It was integrated into Zhao’s notion o f China’s CDS Strategy. The essence o f BIC 
consists o f  four major ideas: ‘i) coastal areas should concentrate on developing export-oriented and labour- 
intensive industrialisation; ii) industries should seek both their raw materials and markets for their products
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economy (Yang, Dali, 1997: 15). The Sixth FYP (1981-85) and Seventh FYP (1986-1990) 
were in marked contrast to the previous FYPs. In effect, the interior was abandoned as 
lacking in capital, in management, and in resources, and would have to survive by trickle 
down effects. The coastal regions were favoured, since these met the new conditions for 
development. The wording in the Seventh FYP is telling: the most effective way was ‘to 
speed up the development of the coastal region, to put the emphasis on energy and raw 
materials construction in the central region, and to actively make preparations for the further 
development of the western region’10 (Ibid.: 29).
Increasing economic growth became a key preoccupation for the Chinese government in the 
1980s, and indeed the CDS worked, with GDP per capita growing at 8% per year, overall 
GDP by 14% and exports by over 12%. However, there was a widening gap between the 
coast and the interior, though a geographical version of the trickle-down effect (waiyin 
neilian zhanlue: the strategy of bringing in from the outside and spreading into the interior) 
still held sway dominant in the Chinese leadership.
The disparity grew so wide, however, that tensions between east and west were created, and 
resulted in the interior adopting its own closed market to protect itself.11 In 1987 60% of 
gross national industrial output was based in the coastal region with 14% of the land area and 
41.3% of the population (Yang, Dali, 1991a: 42). 80% of FDI went to coastal areas (Qiou et 
al., 1994: 61-5).
In late 1989 widespread complaints and discontent from the interior regions, as well as social 
concerns for equality forced Li Peng’s government to think about achieving a more balanced 
regional development strategy. His government report and the State Planning Commission’s 
guidelines for drafting the ‘Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) and Ten-Year Planning for
abroad and be more actively involved in earning foreign exchange and global competition; iii) industries should 
use their foreign exchange earnings to attract more foreign capital and technology for the development o f  heavy 
industry; and iv) once development o f domestic heavy industrialisation is complete, the state could employ the 
funds to facilitate agricultural development’.
10 For proposals for specialisation and differential development o f the three regions, see Table: Macroregions of  
the Seventh Five-Year Plan (Cannon, 1990: 42).
11 Competition among the regions over the processing industries that had yielded immediate and huge profits led 
to irrational duplications and resulted in the convergence o f a sectoral structure among the regions and the 
wastage o f productivity. The regions battled heatedly over raw materials in order that their processing potential 
would not become redundant. For the causes and evolution o f ‘economic warlordism’, see (Li & Fan, 1996: 64); 
For the other pessimistic view o f Chinese excessive regionalism and cases o f conflicts among regions, see 
(Segal, 1994a).
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the 1990s’ were reworked and presented to the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
Conference in 1990. It sought to gain interior support by highlighting once again the 
importance of interior development (Yang, Dali, 1991b: 68), and accepted slower economic 
progress, which was necessary to accommodate the remnants of the command economy.
2. New regional development policy in the Post-Tiananmen Period (1990- )
In May 1992 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted a new ‘omni-directional, all- 
dimensional opening’ approach (quart fangwei duo chengci kaifang), and in October 1992 the 
14th NPC formally endorsed the full-scale open-door policy.12 The omni-directional opening 
policy sought a more balanced regional development strategy supported by the ‘4-Yan 
Development strategy’. This aimed to broaden the reach of the open door policy from the 
existing coastal area (Yanhai) to the inland areas, including border areas (Yanbian) and inland 
cities/towns/counties along the Yangtze River (Yanjiang) and railway (Yanxian) (Kim, 
Icksoo, 1995b: 251-3). The primary rationale of the ‘4-Yan development strategy’ was to 
‘revitalise the backward inland regions through the attraction of foreign capital and 
technology and also through the expansion of cross-border trade with neighbouring countries, 
and to accelerate the linking-up of the regional economies to the international economy. It 
also contains important measures for promoting co-ordinated regional economic 
development’ (Li & Fan, 1996: 67).
In the Yanbian areas, in June 1991, as a way of co-operating with Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) countries, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe, four northeastern 
cities and towns of Heihe, Shuifenhe (Heilongjiang), Hunchun (Jilin), and Manzhouli (Inner
12 The same year Deng Xiaoping launched his 'nanxun* (southern tour) and encouraged the coastal development 
strategy, but the CCP officially adopted the omni-directional opening policy. The feasibility o f omni-directional 
opening had been under careful study since the Tiananmen Crisis o f June 1989. In April 1991, the Fourth 
Plenum o f  the 7th NPC decided to include the ‘3-Yan' regional development strategy in the Ten Year Plan and 
the Ninth FYP Socio-Economic Plan. The key points are as follows: Effort should be made to speed up the 
opening up to the world. China should actively join international economic development and promote its 
competitiveness, taking advantage o f rich raw materials and the market (13th section, p. 15). However, it should 
consider the regional balance and reduce the gap between regions. From the Ninth FYP, China should give more 
help to the interior region and give some preferential policies as well. This is the best way to maintain social 
stability (15th section, pp. 15-6). As a concrete action, the united Yin-Di Zhi-Yi (the right plan in the right place) 
policy should be developed with the characters o f division o f labour, co-operative development, and taking its 
own advantages. The coast should reinforce export-oriented economy with foreign investment, raw material and 
market, while the interior should develop its own competitive power, using the support from the centre and the 
coast. The central government must support the minority and poor areas and take a lead its development (22nd 
section, pp. 23-25). See (The 9.5 Plan and Long-term Sketchy Objectives up to 2010 Concerning National 
Economy and Social Development: 1996).
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Mongolia) were designated as border open cities, and in March 1992 were given economic 
management authority comparable to special economic zones. In August 1992 Dandong 
(Liaoning), Yining, Urumqui, Bole, and Tacheng (Xinjiang) and in June of the same year, 
seven southwestern towns bordering Vietnam, India, and Pakistan, including Nanning, 
Fengxiang, Dongxing (Guangxi), Kunming, Wanding, Luirui, and Hekou (Yunnan) were 
granted the same status aimed at cooperation with South and Southeast Asia (Kim, Icksoo, 
1995b: 252).
A development plan around Pudong, the Yanjiang development, was introduced in September 
1990. Beginning with the Three Gorges (Sanxia) Dam construction, this included proposals 
to open up the Yangtze all the way from the ‘dragon head’ city of Shanghai to Chongqing as 
a way of improving east-west and north-south communications, and the flow of economic 
development. Again, open cities were designated, at the Yangtze Delta Zone Conference in 
June 1992 - a total of 28 cities and 8 districts, and this was built on in August 1992 by giving 
the five cities of Chongqing, Yueyang, Wuhan, Jiujiang and Wuhu, the same status as the 14 
open coastal cities (Ibid.).
A further 11 inland province capitals that were located along railroads (Yanxian) were also 
granted favourable tax status from August 1992 to March 1993. The Trans-China Railway 
(TCR) linking Lianyuangang to Lanzhou to Urumqi was also targeted with a number of open 
cities being declared. In 1991 the number of open cities/towns/counties stood at 339, 
covering 545,000 km2 and 230 million people (Ibid.: 252-3).
Since the establishment of the PRC, China has re-established its regional economic 
development policies and major economic regions for more balanced regional development 
and industrial efficiency. In the Eighth FYP period, the State Planning Committee (SPC) 
defined the four larger economic regions: Coastal, Inland, Minority and Poor (Wu, Jungha, 
1994: 748-51).
Table 5-1. Four larger economic regions
Coastal Inland Minority Poor
Developing high-tech 
industries Restructuring 
old industries
Abundant resources & 
energy, Speeding up 
agricultural/ husbandry 
industry
Improving backward 
status, combining 
economic and resources 
development
Helping the region out 
o f a poor situation, first
Source: (Wu, Jungha, 1994: 750)
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In February 1992, the SPC once more divided the whole country into 10 major economic 
zones: Northeast, Bohai, Yangtze Delta, South China, Yellow River Mid-stream, Yangtze
1 7Midstream, Yellow River Upstream, Yangtze Upstream, Xinjiang and Tibet. This replaced 
the ‘Third Front’ approach of dividing China into the east, central and west: Each of the 10 
economic zones is centred upon the identification of sectors that have comparative 
advantages in each region. However, the 10 major zones were revised in the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan (1996-2000) and the Ten Year Plan (1991-2000) finally produced seven: Northeast, 
Bohai-Rim, Yangtze Delta, South China, Southwest China, Central China, and Northwest.14
3. Concluding remarks
Since the open-door policy, China has experienced rapid economic growth, but the 
continuing east-west gap pushed the Chinese leadership to revise the existing regional 
development policies and brought in a special concern for the non-coastal regions. The 
Chinese government chose the ‘omni-directional opening policy’ as a new regional 
development model to balance the regional gap. In order to maximise economic efficiency of 
each region, the Chinese territory has been divided into the Seven Major Economic Zones. 
Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Jilin became part of the Northeast Economic Zone.
13 For similar content but giving different names to the ten major economic zones, see (Yang & Liang, 1992).
14 For the evaluation o f the seven economic regions, see (Hu, Zhaoliang, 1997).
Table 5-2. Major Economic Zones in China and Industries of Comparative Advantage
Economic Zones Provinces included in Each Zone Priority Industries
Northeast Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
East o f Inner Mongolia
Heavy industries (esp. steel, 
machinery, petrochemical ind.), 
agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry, food processing.
Bohai-Rim Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, 
Liaoning, Shandong
High-tech ind., export-oriented 
light ind., marine products.
Yangtze Delta Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang High-tech ind. (esp. electronics, 
semi-conductor), finance, real 
estate, telecom., information.
South China Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan Export-oriented light ind., finance 
& insurance, real estate
Southwest China West o f Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan
Energy development, heavy ind., 
space & aeronautics, timber 
processing, agriculture, forestry
Central China Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, 
Henan
River transportation, light ind., 
food processing.
Northwest Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, 
Shaanxi, Xinjiang, Tibet
Agriculture, forestry, Hydraulic 
power, energy, foodstuff, raw 
materials, heavy ind., Petroleum 
& petro-chemical agriculture
* Ind. (Industry)
Source: {Guojia Jiwei, 1996: 54-9; Jilin Ribao, 20 March, 1996; The Ninth Five-Year Socio-Economic Plan 
(1996-2000) & the Ten-Year Plan (1991-2000).
II. The three Northeast provinces
This part notes the geographical location, trade and investment figures, and the economic 
situation of the three Northeast Chinese provinces. It then looks at the development strategy 
of the Northeast Economic Zone (NEEZ), under which the three provinces are allocated in 
China’s regional development policy.
1. Background
1.1 Geography
With about 800,000 sq. km (8.2%) of the total Chinese territory (9,600,000 sq km) and a 
population of about 102.4 million in 1994, the NEEZ, one of China’s major seven economic 
zones, is located in the Northeastern part of China and comprises the three provinces of 
Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin (UNIDO, 1995a: 2). The relatively advantageous 
geographical position includes a maritime coastline in Liaoning province15 that extends to
15 Of the three Northeast provinces, Liaoning Province belongs to the east coastal district and Jilin and 
Heilongjiang provinces to the interior.
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2,180 km, with 4 ports for external contact; and a land and riverine border of over 7,000 km 
with more than 20 ports for foreign trade (Li, Bing, 1992: 90).
Table 5-3. Basic information of Northeast China, 1991
Population
1991
Area
1991
GNP
1991
Industrial 
Product 1990
Agricultural 
Product 1990
10m % lm  
sq. km
% lOOmr % lOOmr % lOOmr %
Nation
-al
1,200.
00
9.60 19,875 6,610 5,000
HLJ 35.75 3.1 0.45 4.7 732 3.7 315 4.8 160 3.2
Jilin 25.09 2.2 0.18 1.9 424 2.1 164 2.5 125 2.5
LN 39.90 3.4 0.14 1.5 1,073 5.4 468 7.1 167 3.3
Total 100.74 7.7 0.78 8.2 2,229 11.2 947 14.3 452 9.0
*m (million); mr (million RMB); HLJ Heilongjiang); LN Liaoning^
Source: (Wu, Jungha, 1994: 822).
Table 5-4. Economic growth of the three Northeast Chinese provinces (%)
National average Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning
1952-78 6.0 6.3 5.5 7.3
1979-89 9.0 6.2 8.5 8.8
1989 4.4 5.0 4.1 2.3
1990 4.1 4.5 3.5 0.3
1991 7.7 3.9 4.9 5.5
Source: (Wu, Jungha, 1994: 823).
1.2 Trade
In 1993 total trade for the whole of China was US$ 104 billion in imports as shown in Table. 
5-5. Of this total, 30% of exports and 33% of imports were with countries of Northeast Asia. 
Trade with Japan dominated, accounting for 70% of regional trade. The three Northeastern 
provinces show a higher percentage of China’s regional trade: 61% in exports and 65% in 
imports, suggesting a stronger sub-regional dependency. Major trade partners are Japan (31% 
of exports and 25% of imports), and Russia (16% of exports and 28% of imports) (ERINA, 
1996: 36-7).
1.3 Investment
Total investment in fixed assets in the three Northeastern provinces was RMB129 billion 
yuan, representing 10.4% of national investment in 1993, as against 12.4% in 1985. This is 
lower than the share in national GDP, which is 11.3%. The investment GDP ratio was 40% in 
Liaoning, 38% in Jilin, and 30% in Heilongjiang. On a national basis, the share of investment 
from the government budget decreased from 16% in 1985 to 3.7% in 1993, while foreign
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sourcing and domestic loan sourcing increased (ERINA, 1995: 9, 37). The 1993 share of the 
three Northeastern provinces was approximately 6.4% compared to the 11% share in GDP. 
Of the three provinces, Liaoning received the lion’s share of investment (4.7%) while 
contributing 5.7% in GDP. Most investment in 1994 (53.7%) came from other parts of China, 
although Japan contributed 5.1% and the US, 4.3%. The major area of investment was 
industry (49.7%) (ERINA, 1996: 31). The share of foreign capital in total investment in fixed 
assets was 9.3% in Liaoning (Coastal Bohai), exceeding the national average of 7.3%, but in 
Heilongjiang and Jilin it was 4.3% and 5.2% respectively (ERINA, 1995: 9, 37).
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Figure 5-1. The three Northeast provinces
Source: (UNIDO, 1995a)
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Table 5-5. Trade Matrix, 1993
Exporting
countries
Importing
countries
and
provinces
China S.
Korea
Japan Russia N.
Korea
Mongolia Others World
Total 3
prov.
Others Total Far
East
Others
China - - - 3,929 20,565 *2,692 582 2,110 643
(!)
82 63,852 *91,763
3 Prov. - - - *704 *3,040 *1,591 n.a. n.a. 612 n.a. 3,765 *9,712
Others - - - 3,225 17,525 1,101 n.a. n.a. 31 n.a. 60,170 82,051
South
Korea
*5,151 226 4,925 - 11,678 *601 69 532 8 *4 64,807 *82,250
North
Korea
359 (2) 359 0 178 252 54 2 52 - n.a. 357 *1,200
Russia 4,988 1,317 3,671 975 2,769 - - - 188 157 35,220 *44,297
Far East 607 n.a. n.a. 97 869 - - - *10 *6 234 *1,823
Others 4,381 n.a. n.a. 878 1,900 - - - 178 151 34,986 42,474
Japan 23,283 1,179 22,104 20,016 - *1,501 223 1,278 220 *19 315,873 *360.911
Mongolia 69 n.a. n.a. 4 27 81 0.1 81 n.a. - 201 *383
Others 70,100 1,685 68,484 58,879 205,378 21,878 342 21,537 571 117 - *3,192,896
World 3,773,700
Imports
103,950 4,766 99,184 83,980 240,670 26,807 1,217 25,591 1,630 379 3,275,634 3,733,050
Inports
Note: Either data from exporting country or importing country is used whenever the value is larger than the other to cover broader range o f trade. 
* Data from exporting countries
The exports-imports o f North Korea, and the three northeast provinces o f China. Others include Mongolia.
The exports-imports o f Mongolia, and the three northeast provinces o f China.
Source: (ERINA, 1996: 26)
Table 5-6. China’s Share of Total Exports with Particular Countries, 1993
Exporting
countries
Importing
countries
and
provinces
China S.
Korea
Japan Russia N.
Korea
Mongolia Others World
Total 3
prov.
Others Total Far
East
Others
China - - - 4.28 22.41 2.93 0.63 2.30 0.70 0.09 69.58 100.00
3 prov. - - - 7.25 31.30 16.38 n.a. n.a. 6.30 n.a. 38.77 100.00
Others - - - 3.93 21.36 1.34 n.a. n.a. 0.04 n.a. 73.33 100.00
S. Korea 6.26 0.27 5.99 - 14.20 0.73 0.08 0.65 0.01 0.00 78.79 100.00
Japan 6.45 0.33 6.12 5.55 - 0.42 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.01 87.52 100.00
Russia 11.26 2.97 8.29 2.20 6.25 - - - 0.42 0.35 79.51 100.00
Far East 33.30 n.a. n.a. 5.33 47.67 - - - 0.55 0.33 12.83 100.00
Others 10.31 n.a. n.a. 2.07 4.47 - - - 0.42 0.36 82.37 100.00
N. Korea 29.92 29.92 0 14.85 21.03 4.50 0.18 4.32 - n.a. 29.70 100.00
Mongolia 18.03 n.a. n.a. 1.04 7.18 21.17 0.03 21.14 n.a. - 52.58 100.00
Others 2.20 0.05 n.a. 1.84 6.43 0.69 0.01 0.67 0.02 0.00 88.82 100.00
World 2.78 0.13 n.a. 2.25 6.45 0.72 0.03 0.69 0.04 0.01 87.75 100.00
Note: Percentages have been calculated from the above.
Source: (ERINA, 1996: 27)
Table 5-7. China’s Share of Total Imports with Particular Countries, 1993
Exporting
countries
Importing
countries
and
provinces
China S.
Korea
Japan Russia N.
Korea
Mongolia Others World
Total 3
prov.
Others Total Far
East
Others
China - - - 4.68 8.54 10.04 47.80 8.25 39.45 21.64 1.95 2.43
3 prov. - - - 0.84 1.26 5.94 n.a. n.a. 37.55 n.a. 0.11 0.26
Others - - - 3.84 7.28 4.11 n.a. n.a. 1.90 n.a. 1.82 2.17
S. Korea 4.96 4.74 4.97 - 4.85 2.24 5.65 2.08 0.52 1.06 1.98 2.18
Japan 22.40 24.74 22.29 23.83 - 5.60 18.30 4.99 13.48 5.01 9.64 9.56
Russia 4.80 27.63 3.70 1.16 1.15 - - - 11.51 41.42 1.08 1.17
Far East 0.58 n.a. n.a. 0.12 0.36 - - - 0.61 1.58 0.01 0.05
Others 4.21 n.a. n.a. 1.05 0.79 - - - 10.90 39.84 1.07 1.13
N. Korea 0.35 7.53 0.0 0.21 0.10 0.20 0.18 0.20 - n.a. 0.01 0.03
Mongolia 0.07 n.a. n.a. 0.0 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.32 n.a. - 0.01 0.01
Others 67.44 35.35 69.04 70.11 85.34 81.61 28.07 84.16 35.05 30.87 85.34 84.61
World 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: Percentages have been calculated from the above.
Source: (ERINA, 1996: 28)
Table 5-8. China’s share of export and import partners
Exports Imports
Country 
or area
1985 1989 1993 1985 1989 1993
S. Korea 1.75 3.25 4.28 0.09 0.74 4.96
Japan 2370 21.21 22.41 35.58 17.81 22.40
Russia 3.64 3.52 2.93 3.32 3.63 4.80
Russian FE n.a. n.a. 0.63 n.a. n.a. 0.58
N. Korea 0.85 0.72 0.70 0.61 0.31 0.35
Mongolia 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.07
Others 70.04 71.26 69.58 61.38 77.49 67.44
Source: Analytical Overview and country Studies, (ERINA, 1996: 29).
Table 5-9. Foreign direct investment in the three Northeast Provinces 
(accumulated up to 1997)_____________________  i_
Number o f  
invested 
projects
% Actual amount 
(US$ lm)
% Amount per 
capita (US$)
China: Total 304,821 100.00 2,218 100.00 179
3 provinces: 
Total
26,771 8.78 139 6.27 132
Helongjiang 5,375 1.76 25 1.11 67
Jilin 4,879 1.60 19 0.84 72
Liaoning 16,517 5.42 95 4.30 230
Source: Chinese Ministry o f Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ‘Statistics o f Foreign Investment’, 
1998, (Wang, Zhile, 1999: HI-2-5).
Table 5-10. Direct investment in China
Direct investment 1993 Total trade amount
Investing
country
Number o f registered 
contracts
Registered investment 
value
1993
Number Share (%) Millions of 
US dollars
Share (%) Millions o f  
US dollars
Share (%)
Japan 3,488 4.2 2,960 2.7 43,848 22.4
South Korea 1,748 2.1 1,557 1.4 9,080 4.6
Russia 397 0.5 160 0.1 1,189 3.9
North Korea 73 0.1 52 0.0 1,002 0.5
+Mongolia 16 0.0 4 0.0 151 0.1
Others 77,175 93.1 106,703 95.8 140,443 68.5
Total 83,437 100.0 111,436 100.0 195,713 100.0
Investment actual amount in 1994 US$ 550 million
Source: Statistical Yearbook o f  Foreign Economy and Trade in China, 1994-95, (ERINA, 1996: 34).
Table 5-11. Direct investment in China - Northeast provinces
Direct investment to two provinces -  Liaoning and Jilin 1993 Trade amount o f three 
provinces
Investing
country
Number o f  registered 
contracts
Registered
va!
investment
ue
1993
Number Share (%) Millions of 
US dollars
Share (%) Millions o f  
US dollars
Share (%)
Japan 652.0 11.9 336.0 7.4 4,219 29.1
South Korea 680.0 12.4 287.0 6.3 930 6.4
Russia 33.0 0.6 12.0 0.3 n.a. n.a.
North Korea 21.0 0.4 11.0 0.2 971 6.7
Others 4,102.0 74.7 3,916.0 85.8 8,358 57.7
Total 5,488.0 100.0 4,562.0 100.0 14,478 100.0
Source: Statistical Yearbook o f  Foreign Economy and Trade in China, 1994-95, (ERINA, 1996: 34).
161
1.4 The development of Northeast China
Prior to the adoption of the policy of economic reform and openness in December 1978, the 
Northeastern part of China was relatively well known for its heavy industries and agriculture. 
Economically speaking, in certain areas of production it was strong as a percentage of 
national production: more than half percent of grain, 36% of timber, 20% of its steel, 17% of 
its coal and 15% of its grain in 1992. It was quite inward looking (Zhou, Yuan, 1995: 276-7).
During the Mao period the industrial Northeast was regarded on as one of the country’s main 
industrial bases, with many important industries from heavy industry to chemical production 
located there and run from Beijing. In the 1950s most projects sponsored by the Soviet Union 
were centred in the three Northeast provinces. In terms of national GNP share and industrial 
product the rankings of these three provinces were respectively: Liaoning, 2nd (12%) and 2nd 
(14.9%); Heilongjiang, 4th (5.9%) and 3rd (6.6%); and Jilin, 17th (3.0%) and 13th (3.5%). From 
the Table 5-4, we can see that the economic growth in 1952-78 of Heilongjiang and Liaoning 
was higher than the national average, but that of Jilin’s was below. However, from the 1960s, 
when state investment shifted toward the southwest and was reduced in the NEEZ, all three 
provinces experienced economic stagnation. In 1991, Liaoning was fifth in terms of national 
GNP share (5.4%) and industrial production (4.2%). Heilongjiang was the 12th (3.7%) and 
11th (2.3%), and Jilin 21st (2.1%) and 16th (1.5%) respectively (Wu, Jungha, 1994: 823).
In 1990 the GNP of the three provinces together reached RMB 199.6 billion yuan in GNP. 
Industrial and agricultural output stood at around RMB373 billion yuan. Most of this was 
industrial output (RMB302.2 billion yuan). Industrial fixed assets were valued at RMB255.3 
billion yuan (net value RMB 174 billion yuan) (Li, Bing, 1992: 87). While secondary 
industries decreased during the Seventh FYP (1985-90), dropping from 60.4% in 1985 to 
53.6% in 1990 as a proportion of GNP, primary industry grew 19.8% to 22.6% of GNP in the 
same period and tertiary from 19.8% to 23.8%. This was as a result of increased focus on the 
latter (Touma, 1992: 292-6).
1.5 Northeast phenomenon
Economic reforms in the three Northeastern provinces have not been as fast as in the 
Southern regions of China. Since 1978 Chinese economic growth has been led by small-scale 
collectives and private enterprises. Heilongjiang and Jilin have continually fallen behind 
economic growth rates in the southern coastal provinces of Jiangsu and Guangdong (Yahuda,
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1994: 257). In 1997 the national earnings average was US$179 per capita, in the three 
Northeast provinces this figure was US$132. It was even lower in Heilongjiang Province 
(US$67) and Jilin Province only managed US$72 (Wang, Zhile, 1999: III-2-5). The figures 
for foreign trade and investment are given in Table 5-11. Guangdong and Liaoning both have 
double-digit percentages of total national exports. But Guangdong is far ahead of Liaoning, 
while Heilongjiang and Jilin make up only 2-3%. The same trend can be seen in terms of 
imports. Apart from Guangdong, all the provinces score badly. Guangdong has also a huge 
lead (41.9%) in attracting direct investment (Kuribayashi, 1993: 51). This is because 
Guangdong has been the most open to the outside world.
The south has a definite economic advantage, which shows itself in growth figures. The 
southern coastal provinces have used light industry as a vehicle for development, with capital 
injections from foreign or private companies. Thus the private sector and small scale 
collectives have played a strong role. In the three Northeast provinces there are still many 
state-owned heavy and chemical industries. These generally have low productivity, out of 
date facilities and excess human resources. As a result the Northeast’s share of the national 
economy has declined (ERINA, 1996: 35-6). In addition there are disadvantages to the 
Northeast which arise from the type of industry located there and national price mechanisms. 
The Northeast supplies much energy and raw materials to the light industry in the south. Not 
only does heavy industry require more capital expenditure, but also the products, especially 
energy, have been highly subsidised to support the growing South. The management 
structures of the Northeast and the South are also radically different, the South being open to 
much more foreign investment, and thus more efficiency, which will perpetuate the 
imbalance in growth (Kuribayashi, 1993: 51).
In the National People’s Congress in March 1993, governor Yue Qifeng of Liaoning 
identified the Northeast situation as arising from too long an influence of the planned 
economy. The Northeast was not only technically behind, but was also behind in ideological 
terms (Yahuda, 1994: 257). Thus terminology such as the ‘Northeast Phenomenon’ was 
popularly used to describe economic stagnation in the three Northeast provinces. In short the 
following can be identified to help explain the phenomenon: i) no industrial balance between 
heavy and light industries; ii) out-dated facilities; iii) lack of financial support; iv) a dualistic 
structure between industry and agriculture; v) delayed starting of open-door policy; vi) 
economic inefficiency; vii) poor infrastructure; viii) insufficient leadership; and ix) the legacy
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of Soviet style focus on heavy industry and large State-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Wu, 
Jungha, 1994: 823-4; Yuan & Huang, 1995: 10-18; Li & Li: 1996).
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Table 5-12. Principal Economic Indicators for Provinces
Growth 
Rate: %
National
Income
0 0
Y Share Per
Capita
Y
Accumulative
Rate
Manufacturing
Y
Ratio of 
Heavy 
Industry
Ratio of 
State 
Enterprise
1984-
89
1990 1990:
100
Million
yuan
1990: % 1990:
yuan
1989: % 1989:% 1990: % 1991: %
Heilongjiang 6.4 4.2 574,9 4 1,659.00 33.6 59.8 66.4 80.9
Jilin 7.8 4.2 336.9 2.3 1,383.00 30.8 53.2 58.1 71.8
Liaoning 8.5 2.9 783.8 5.4 1,990.00 33.7 62.4 67.4 60.2
Beijing 7.8 6.4 367 2.5 3,577.00 53.6 60.8 56 59.1
Tianjin 7.1 3.4 244.1 1.7 2,842.00 41.8 64.3 49 55.9
Shandong 10.4 8.8 1,144.20 7.9 1,350.00 42.3 50.4 49.2 4
Jiangsu 10.8 6.2 1,138.30 7.9 1,695.00 40.5 54.3 45.3 33.1
Shanghai 7.5 5.2 617/2 4.3 4,822.00 50.9 71.6 48.1 64.9
Zhejiang 12.7 9.9 726.5 5 1,717.00 39.4 50 34.8 58.2
Fujian 12.1 11.2 388.8 2.7 1,313.00 30.6 41.2 38 40.7
Guangdong 13.4 14.3 1,132.20 7.8 1,842.00 35.6 42.3 32.5 38.2
Nationwide 9.2 5.9 14.429.00 100 1,267.00 34.3 47.4 50.6 52.8
Source: Compiled from ,Statistical Yearbook o f  China, various issues, cited in (Kuribayashi, 1993: 52).
Table 5-13. Principal Indicators of External Economic Relations for 1990
Export
$100
million
Export Imports
$100
million
Import Degree o f  
Dependence 
upon 
Foreign 
Trade
National
Income
Foreign
Capital
Utilised
$10,000
Foreign
Capital
Utilised
Direct
Investment
$10,000
Direct
Inves­
tment
Heilongjiang 10.9 1.8 4.1 0.8 12.3 4 4,695 0.5 2,449 0.7
Jilin 7.5 1.2 2 0.4 13.4 2.3 3,085 0.3 1,760 0.5
Liaoning 56 9 7 1.3 37.9 5.4 72,739 7.1 24,373 7
Inner
Mongolia
3.2 0.5 1.6 0.3 9.8 1.6 1,064 0.1 1,064 0.3
Guangdong 105.6 17 57.5 10.8 20.8 7.8 201,541 19.6 146,000 41.9
Nationwide 620.1 100 533.5 100 38.5 100 1,028,939 100 348,711 100
Source: Complied from Prefecture Statistical Yearbook 1991, cited in (Kuribayashi, 1993: 52).
2. Development strategies of the three Northeast provinces
The Northeast Economic Zone (NEEZ) has an advantageous geographical position, ample 
resources, technology and openness to the outside world. Many commentators and local 
functionaries feel that in order to make the most of these advantages, the future development 
of the economy should focus on the careful and thorough processing of resources. To 
establish the area as an economic trade zone, planners recognised the need for higher-level 
industries and the use of new and advanced technology (Li, Bing, 1992: 90-1).
Local leaders now say that sub-regional economic cooperation is the best way out of 
economic stagnation. They would like to see the NEEZ maximise its own geographical 
advantages, open to the North and cooperate more with Russia, Mongolia and other Far East 
Asian countries. They support involvement with Bohai Sea economic cooperation and see the 
Pacific Ocean as a means to access the rest of the world. Thus they favour committed and 
active international cooperation and economic integration to cultivate internationalised 
economic ‘hot spots’ (Zhou, Yuan, 1995: 298).
In recent years, the three Northeast provinces have established a more progressive foreign 
investment introduction strategy to promote the economic development of this region (Wang, 
Zhile, 1999: III-2-6; See also Jian, Chuan, 1995: 18-21; Lu, Jianren, 1995: 56-70; Lu, 
Yanhua, 1996).
Liaoning Province16 has undertaken the reform of large and medium size state-owned 
enterprises using foreign investments to improve existing manufacturing bases and promote 
the industrial structural adjustments of the entire province. This has been achieved through 
various means such as direct investments from foreign enterprises, transfer of shares and 
management rights, overseas loans, and Chinese-foreign joint ventures.
In Heilongjiang Province there has been comprehensive development of agriculture and 
agricultural processing, technological reform of the large and medium size state-owned 
enterprises, improvements in infrastructure, and development in high-tech industries and
16 This view is limited to the coastal Liaoning. In terms o f economic development Liaoning can be divided into 
an advanced coastal belt and a more stagnant interior.
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township and village enterprises. The five major industries, namely, automotive, 
petrochemicals, foods, medicines, and electronics have been cultivated.
In Jilin Province agricultural construction has been enhanced and industrialisation of 
agriculture promoted. Two major industries - automotives and petrochemicals - have been 
encouraged, and three major industries - foods, medicines, and electronics -  have been 
developed.
The regional layout for economic development in the NEEZ can be depicted as a ‘three strips 
and one zone’ model differentiated by their different functions, that roughly corresponds to 
the 4-Yan policy. Below is a summary of Zhou’s description of the 4-Yan policy (Zhou, 
Yuan, 1995: 300-302).
Coastal Economic Strip Centred at Dalian (Yanhai)
The Coastal Economic Strip stretches from Dandong in the east to Shanghaiguan Pass in the 
west. This includes the six cities of Dalian, Dandong, Yingkou, Panjin, Jingzhou, and Jinxi 
and 12 counties under their jurisdiction. It puts Dalian harbour as the centre and Dandong, 
Yingkou and Jingzhou as its wings. The strip, the southern front for the vast Northeast inland, 
serves as its ‘window’ to the outside world. It can play the role of ‘pace-setter’ in attracting 
foreign advanced technologies. Speeding up the development of the Strip is of great 
significance in promoting the overall economic development of the region and the prosperity 
of the Bohai-rim area.
Border Economic Development and the Opening Strip (Yanbian and Yanjiang)
All the provinces in the NEEZ border neighbouring countries and have long inland borders. 
The Border Economic Development and Opening Strip has 36 cities and counties, with 8 
million people, making up 7.1% of the total population of the region. Having abundant 
resources of land, forestry, hydraulic power, coal, non- ferrous metals and tourism resources, 
the strip boasts some large and medium sized industrial and mining cities like Dandong, 
Hunjiang, Jixi etc. and relatively efficient communications backed up by the hinterland cities. 
Manzhouli, Heihe, Suifenhe and Hunchun were approved at state level as open port border 
cities.
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Economic strip with Harbin-Dalian Railroad as the Axis (Yanxian)
With a population of 50 million, the Economic Strip with Harbin-Dalian Railroad as the Axis 
starts from Dalian in the south and ends at the Harbin-Dalian railroad and road. In 1991 its 
GNP reached RMB 130 million yuan, 54% of the region’s GNP. Gross Industrial Product 
(GIP) was RMB240 billion yuan, or two thirds of that of the whole region. The GNP and GIP 
per capita in the strip are 22% and 49% higher than that of the whole region respectively. It is 
the heartland of the Northeast. Iron and steel, oil and chemistry, automobile manufacturing, 
heavy-duty machinery and equipment are all located in the strip. Speeding up the 
development of this area is the key to reinvigorating the old industrial base.
Western Resources Development Zone
The Western Resources Development Zone includes the cities of eastern Inner Mongolia, 
Chaoyang city of Liaoning Province, Baicheng Prefecture of Jilin Province and Daxinganling 
area of Heilongjiang Province. The population of the zone is 1.7 million, 14.8% of the 
region’s total. Most of the area is very weak in terms of its economic foundations. There are 
vast land resources but a small population living off agriculture and husbandry. But with 
abundant natural resources, it can be built into a base within the NEEZ for energy, forestry, 
husbandry and non-ferrous metal mining and refining.
Meanwhile, the NEEZ’s basic disadvantage is its lack of direct access to the East Sea. Most 
international goods have to come through Dalian in Liaoning Province. That is the main port, 
although there are others such as Yingkou, Jinzhou, Dandong. The main transport artery of 
Northeast China is the Harbin-Changchun-Shenyang-Dalian route, and this is very much 
determined by geography. Land transport is mainly by railway and capacity is over-stretched 
(Lee, Chanwoo, 1999: 170-l).17The end of the Cold War brought new possibilities to the 
land-locked provinces such as Jilin and Heilongjiang. It became relatively easy to develop 
some border trade with Russia. But the key to real regional cooperation for these two 
provinces is a permanent link to the East Sea. Since October 1995, Jilin Province has had 
some access through Raj in, as well as a limited weekly link to Pusan, South Korea. Now road 
and train links to Zarubino Port in Russia have been established which provides another route 
to the outside world for Jilin Province (Ye, Shunzan, 1997: 33-4).
17 Dalian was the largest sea port until 1995, mostly exporting grains and oil, but since 1996, with the dramatic 
decrease in the export o f those products, the freight volume it handles is behind Shanghai, Tianjin, and Yangpu, 
which mostly handle general goods (Lee, Chanwoo, 1999: 171).
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3. Concluding remarks
The three provinces of the NEEZ had been outrun economically by other coastal provinces 
since they were privileged with special economic status in 1978. The condition and status of 
the region within the Chinese economy was termed the ‘Northeast Phenomenon’. To 
overcome with their economic difficulties, the provinces had tried to secure economic 
support from the central government, claiming as advantages their geographical position, 
ample resources, technology and openness to the outside world. Within the NEEZ, the 
provinces have also individually made their own economic policies and set up economic 
zones.
III. TRADP and Jilin Province
Part III examines the rationale of the development strategies of the various administrative 
levels for Hunchun development. Hunchun development is the Chinese component of 
TRADP involving Jilin Province, Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, and Hunchun 
City. This part explores the role of the Hunchun project in Jilin Province’s development 
strategy. Two other development strategies at local administrative levels (Yanbian Prefecture 
and Hunchun City) will be discussed later in this chapter.
1. Jilin Province
1.1 Background
With an area of 187,400 sq. km (1.95% of national territory and 23.80% of the NEEZ), Jilin, 
which contains the state development project in Hunchun area on the Chinese side of 
TRADP, borders Russia on the Northeast, Inner Mongolia on the west, Liaoning on the south, 
Heilongjiang on the north, while the Southeast overlooks the DPRK across the Yalu and 
Tumen rivers. There are 8 administrative divisions (Changchun, Jilin, Siping, Tonghua, 
Liaoyuan, Baishan, Songyuan, Baicheng) and one autonomous prefecture (Yanbian Korean 
Minority Autonomous Prefecture) in Jilin Province. The population of Jilin Province is 25
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million (2.1% of national population) (1994) while for the NEEZ it is 102.4 million (UNIDO, 
1995a: 2).
1.2 Economy
Jilin is a major agricultural province in terms of grain production, animal husbandry, 
agricultural and by-products, processing industry, and has a rural economy. However, Jilin’s 
industrial base is weak. In the earliest days, the industrial development of Jilin’s strength was 
limited to energy supply for industry in neighbouring Liaoning (Cotton, 1996: 1087-88; 
Wang, Shijun et al., 1996: 32-5). In 1978 Jilin accounted for around 2.6% of China's 
economy (calculated on the basis of the Gross Output Value of Industry and Agriculture), but 
this declined to 2.3% in 1990 and 2.0% in 1993 as the Jilin economy grew less rapidly than 
the country as a whole. Its economic size was 2.5 times less than that of Liaoning and 1.7 
times less than that of Heilongjiang and remained at almost the same level as that of 
underdeveloped Yunnan and Shaanxi (Gilimseung Pyunlam, 1994: 71-5).
Jilin Province had difficulties in matching the pace of reform elsewhere since it did not attract 
the same kind of foreign investment; was slower to re-orientate towards export markets; and 
was behind in encouraging private or collective enterprises. It was still behind in 1993, when 
there was still a 65% state sector as opposed to private sector output, compared with a 
national state sector output of 43.1% (Cotton, 1996: 1092). Its percentage of total trade in 
entire China was just 0.2% in 1978 and peaked at 1.0% in 1991. Reliance on agricultural 
production was very high, occupying 55% in total of exports and imports. The total amount 
of FDI for Jilin was around US$650 million from 847 contracts (only contractual terms) from 
1984 until 1992 (Gilimseoung Pyunlam, 1994: 83-9).
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Table 5-14. Comparison of GDP in Jilin and other Cities/Provinces (RMB 100
million,%)
GDP
City/Province 1990 1991 Growth Rate
Beijing 500.72 558.58 11.6
Shanghai 744.67 857.71 15.2
Tianjin 310.95 337.35 8.5
Liaoning 964.89 1,073.16 11.2
Heilongjiang 656.84 731.86 11.4
Jilin 393.90 424.95 7.7
Jiangsu 1,315.82 1,452.57 10.4
Zhejiang 836.89 983.54 17.5
Fujian 465.84 557.82 19.7
Shandong 1,331.94 1568.38 17.8
Guangdong 1,471.84 1780.56 21.0
Yunnan 395.99 432.86 9.3
Shaanxi 374.85 430.85 14.9
Source: (Gilimseoung Pyulam, 1994: 72).
Table 5-15. Total trade of Jilin within China
Year Country Jilin (%)
Total trade US$100m Total trade US$100m
1978 206.4 0.3 0.2
1979 293.3 0.67 0.2
1980 381.4 1.18 0.3
1981 440.3 1.71 0.4
1982 416.1 1.77 0.4
1983 436.2 2.18 0.5
1984 535.3 3.40 0.6
1985 696.0 5.50 0.8
1986 738.5 7.17 1.0
1987 826.5 6.39 0.8
1988 1,027.9 7.07 0.7
1989 1,116.8 9.44 0.8
1990 1,154.4 9.52 0.8
1991 1,357.0 13.49 1.0
Source: (Gilimseung Pyunlam, 1994: 84).
Table 5-16. Foreign Direct Investments in Jilin Province (Actual Amount, Accumulated
up to September 1998)
Total HK USA ROK Germany Taiwan Japan France Canada
Amount 2,350 - - - - - - - -
% 100 36 13 13 7 7 5 3 3
Source: (Wang, Zhile, 1999: III-2-6).
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1.3 Development strategy
Jilin Province has encouraged all the cities and counties located on the border to adapt 
themselves to the new international environment, speed up economic cooperation with 
bordering countries, widen the opening to the outside world, and gear up the development
1 Rand construction of the Tumen River area (Wang, Shengjin, 1992; Zhang, Hongyan, 1996).
In order to attract FDI, development zones should become the cornerstone of constructing 
Jilin Province into a developed near-sea boundary province and the new growth point for the 
economy of the whole province. For planning purposes Jilin could be divided into the three 
regions.
The riverine area has one prefecture (Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture), two cities 
(Hunjiang and Tunhua) and fifteen counties with 42.9% of the area and 21.1% of population 
The centre has four cities (Changchun, Liaoyuan, Siping, Jilin) and seventeen counties with 
33.8% and 63.9%. Lastly, the west includes one city (Baicheng) and six counties with 23.3% 
and 15%, respectively. The pace of development in the three areas is not same, because of 
different structural characteristics. But the provincial government thinks that it should 
concentrate its limited resources on the eastern part, where it is close to the East Sea, and 
only develop the underdeveloped western part later (Chen & Yuan, 1996: 31-42).
According to the ‘Profile of Recommended Economic and Technological Projects of the 
Development Zones of Jilin Province for Cooperation with Foreign Countries’ published by 
the People’s Government of Jilin Province, 1997, there are now 16 development zones in 
total. While the total planned area of the 16 development zones is 153.89 km2, the 
preliminary construction area is 26.09 km2. Of these, four national level development zones 
include the ‘Changchun New and High-tech Industries Development Zone’, ‘Changchun 
Economic and Technical Development Zone’, ‘Jilin City New and high-tech Industries 
Development Zone’, and ‘Hunchun Border Economic Cooperation Zone’. 12 provincial level 
economic development zones include ‘Changchun Jingyuetan Tourist Economic 
Development Zone’, ‘Antu Changbai Mountain Economic Development Zone’ and the 
economic development zones of Songyuan, Jian, Yanji, Dunhua, Tumen, Gongzhuling, Da- 
an, Dehui, Changbai and Linjiang.
18 However we should bear in mind that the only countries bordering Jilin are Russia and North Korea -  hardly 
ideal places for providing openings to the outside world.
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Figure 5-2. Jilin Province Developm ent Zone D istribution Chart
Source: (Jilin Government, 1997)
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2. Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture
2.1 Background
The Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture forms the 42,700 sq. km eastern part of Jilin 
province which borders the Russian Far East to the north and the DPRK to the south. The 
length of the entire prefecture reaches 755.2 km, including 522.5 km for Sino-North Korean 
border, and 232.7 km for the Sino-Russian one. The Prefecture is about the same size as 
Taiwan, with an area of 42,700 sq. km. Jilin is rich in natural resources with grain, forests, 
and minerals. Wollastonite, diatomite, bentonite, oil, gas, coal, iron mine, and nickel are the 
main mineral resources. The Prefecture has a high urbanisation rate (61%) by Chinese 
standards, reflecting the area’s relatively high level of industrialisation (UNIDO, 1995a: 2).
The Prefecture’s name, Yanbian (Borderline in English), reflects the 860,000 ethnic Koreans 
living there making up 40% of its population. The name of this prefecture comes from the 
fact that there is a large Korean minority. The Han Chinese makes up a 57.4% majority of the 
people. Other minorities include the Manchu (1.8%) and Moslem Hui Chinese (0.2%). 
Yanbian has five cities (Yanji, Dunhua, Hunchun, Longjing, Tumen) and three counties 
(Antu, Wangqing, Hualong) and seven border crossings; one with Russia at Changlingzi and 
six with the DPRK at Nanping, Sanhe, Kaishantun, Tumen, Shatuozi and Guchengli 
(UNIDO, 1996: 2).
2.2 Economy
Before the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1949-85), the total growth of industrial and agricultural 
product in Yanbian remained at just 6.8%, which was not only lower than that of the country 
(12.7%) but also that of the province (8.9%), as well as other minority regions (7.4%) 
(Guojia Kewei, 1995: 4). The Yanbian economy generated a GDP of RMB11.2 billion yuan 
(US$1.35 billion) in 1997, or US$619 per capita, a little less than that of Jilin Province. 
Economic growth since 1995 has maintained a rate of 5.7%, less than the national average 
(China’s Tumen River Area - Investment Guide, 1998: 3-4). The percentage of international 
trade in Yanbian’s GDP was just 6.4% against a national average of 16.8% (Ibid.: 8).
Total FDI in Yanbian during 1986-91 remained at 2.5%, compared to 10.8% at the national 
level (Ibid.). But there have been improvements in the economic situation since the open- 
door policy towards South Korea was adopted, and Yanbian has received relatively more FDI
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than other regions of the province (Yanbian Ribao, 16 May 1997). By the end of 1997, there 
were 682 registered foreign investment enterprises and US$411 million came in actually 
foreign investment, US$ 228 million, or 55%, of which had been absorbed in 1996-97. 
Foreign investment from the ROK, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Japan, accounts for 87% of 
total FDI to Yanbian. The ROK was the major investor, accounting for 53%, followed by 
Hong Kong with 14%, Japan with 11% and Malaysia with 9%. There were 393 ROK 
supported enterprises driven primarily by Korean ethnic, language and market considerations 
in all sectors of the economy. Other investment comes from Taiwan (78 enterprises), USA 
(39), DPRK (37) and Russia (6) (China’s Tumen River Area - Investment Guide, 1998: 7).
The Yanbian Prefecture now has relatively strong manufacturing industries, especially in 
food processing, textiles and timber processing. These accounted for 34.6% of GDP in the 
Prefecture in 1997. As a result these sectors are attractive to foreign, export-oriented 
investment (ERINA & FIAS, 2000: 7). Secondary industries account for 44.1% of GDP and 
tertiary for 42.8%. The primary sector has a 13.1% share - relatively low for the Northeast 
region. State-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective enterprises, private enterprises and 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) are the four main types of enterprise in Yanbian. The SOE 
sector had the highest industrial output at 65.8%. However, more than 40% of these made 
losses in 1997. In contrast, FIEs and private enterprises contributed 22.2% of output in 1997, 
up from 3.8% in 1993. These are expected to provide the highest industrial growth in 
Yanbian (Ibid.: 40-1).
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Figure 5-3. Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture
Source: (UNIDO, 1995a)
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Table 5-17. GDP for Yanbian Prefecture (1998)
Total Primary
Industry
Secondary Industry Tertiary
Industry
GDP 11,470 1,510 4,400 660 4,900
Proportion 100.00 13.1 38.4 5.8 42.8
(Unit: RMB million,%)
Source: Statistic Bureau o f Yanbian Prefecture, Statistics o f  Economic and Social Development in Yanbian 
Prefecture, March 1999, (ERINA & FIAS, 2000: 40).
Table 5-18. Industrial Structure of Yanbian Prefecture (1997)
Category %  o f  Gross Output
Total
industries
industry
Industries Total 100.00
Primary
industry
Agriculture and forestry 11.7
Secondary
industry
Industry Total 46.5 100.00
Mining & 
lumbering
Sub-total 9.6 24.8
Mining 5.3
Lumbering 19.5
Manufacturing Sub-total 34,6 69.7
Food
processing
12.4
Textiles & 
apparel
9.9
Timber
processing
14.1
Chemicals 9.2
Pharmaceuticals 8.7
Non-metal
mineral
products
4.5
Metal products 4.5
Machinery 3.0
Electrical & 
electronics
0.6
Other products 2.8
Electricity, gas & water 2.2 5.6
Construction 7.6
Tertiary
industry
Total 34.1
Transportation 7.6
Commerce and restaurants 11.4
Other services 15.1
(Unit:%)
Note: ‘Industry’ in China includes ‘Mining and Lumbering’, ‘Manufacturing’ and ‘Electricity, Gas and Water’ 
sectors.
Source: (ERINA & FIAS, 2000: 40).
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The following table summarises the strengths and weaknesses of Yanbian Prefecture 
affecting the investment environment.
Table 5-19. Yanbian: Strengths, weaknesses, and potential sectors for investment
Strengths Weaknesses
1. Geographical proximity to DPRK, Russia and 
the sea: distances to DPRK, Russia, ROK, and 
Japan are shorter from Yanbian than elsewhere in 
China
1. Geographical distance from major domestic 
markets and ports o f the three Northeast 
provinces: Changchun, Shenyang, and Dalian
2. The Korean ethnic community (39% o f the 
1997 population): trade and investment relations 
between Yanbian and ROK have grown rapidly 
over the last decade, and Yanbian has good 
communications with DPRK
2. Land-locked location and lack o f efficient 
access to east coast ports, due to hard and soft 
infrastructure constraints, and o f  regular services 
from those ports
3. A  low-cost, skilled and disciplined labour 
force: FDI using new technologies, combined 
with monthly wages o f US$ 70-80, produce levels 
o f productivity similar to southern China
3. Lack o f supporting industries, including parts 
manufacturing. The domestic banking system is 
also weak.
4. Natural and tourism resources 4. Inadequate infrastructure and underdeveloped 
international access routes to Yanbian.
Source: (ERINA & FIAS, 2000: 41-2)
2.3 Development strategy19
Yanbian sees the Prefecture as a very unique place, where all the 4-Yan development 
strategies, Yanhai (along coast), Yanbian (along border), Yanjiang (along river), and Yanxian 
(railway), meet together. The prefecture is located in the Tumen River Economic 
Development Area (TREDA) along the Tumen River {Yanjiang). It borders on other 
neighbouring countries {Yanbian) and is close to the East Sea {Yanhai). Also it connects the 
Tumen River and Europe by the trans-continental railway {Yanxian). With Hunchun as its 
head and Yanji as its body of the strategy, Yanbian fits the all-out open policy of ‘nanlian 
beituo, dongchu xijin, mianxiang dongbeiya\ namely, to unite with the south (North and 
South Koreas), open the north (Russia), reach to the east (Japan), launch to the west (Eastern 
Europe and Mongolia), and to face Northeast Asia.
In order to pursue the above-mentioned objectives, during the Eighth FYP (1991-95) and 
Ninth FYP period (1996-2000), the prefecture announced five general principles below (Wei 
& Xu, 1994: 68-9; Guojia Kewei, 1995: 353-4):
19 This is a plan that expresses Jilin Province’s aspirations rather than properly evaluate projects based on proper 
costs and feasibility statistics. Much o f this describes a potential rather than an actual situation.
1. The importance of the right of navigation in the Tumen River is the key 
point.20
2. The priority given to the Hunchun project. The TRADP on the Chinese side 
includes the large triangle area (Hunchun, Tumen, Yanji, Longjing), but the core 
area is Hunchun-Changlingzi-Jingxin-Fangchuan. The central and provincial 
governments need to ensure prefecture support for Hunchun.
3. Hunchun is at the heart of ‘engine growth’ of the prefecture and its 
development should lead to the development of the whole prefecture and should 
be backed by other development zones such as Tumen and Yanji.
4. In order to attract foreign investment, infrastructure such as ‘wutong iping’ 
(five-running and one-arrangement: air, water, energy, telecommunications, roads 
and land use) must be provided. Further, preferential policies must ultimately 
encourage investment by foreign companies.
5. Hunchun must take an active role in co-operating with the UNDP.
In August 1992 Jilin Province, working at provincial level, established the four economic 
zones in Tumen, Yanji, Antu and Dunhua. The description of the four zones in the UNIDO 
document is summarised below (UNIDO, 1995b: 8-18).
Yanji Economic Development Zone
Yanji City, the capital of Yanbian Prefecture, is the centre of politics, economy and culture of 
the prefecture. It is an open city having the features of being close to the East Sea and to the 
land border. Being situated along the Tumen River, it is one of the three supporting cities 
(Yanji, Chungjin and Vladivostok) of the medium-sized TREDA. The city covers an area of 
1,350 sq. km and has a population of 343,000, of which ethnic Koreans constitute 59.5%. The 
Yanji Economic Development Zone is located in the eastern part of the city, on both banks of 
the Burhatong River. The total area of the zone will be 5.33 sq. km, but initial development 
will be on the northern part of the river (1.14 sq. km). The annual industrial output value in 
1994 was RMB300 million yuan. The development plan of the Yanji Zone is divided into 3 
stages: the starting stage (1995-2000); the growing stage (2001-2005); and the high 
developing stage (2006-2010).
Dunhua Economic Development Zone
This is situated in the eastern part of the province, with a total area of 14.09 sq. km. The zone 
is a varied one with industry, commerce as well as trade and tourism. Along the Changchun- 
Tumen railway, the city has an important geographical position and serves as a junction
20 Jilin’s border on the Tumen stops well short o f its exit to the East Sea. The strip along Russia to the sea is also 
too shallow.
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station and collection and distribution centre for the Tumen River development area and 
various inland markets.
Tumen Economic Development Zone
Tumen City borders the DPRK across the Tumen River. The city is 160 km from Rajin- 
Sonbong Free Trade Zone of North Korea, 138 km from the Zharubino Port of Russia, and 
150 km from the East Sea. Tumen City has a population of 140.000, of which 59.8% is 
Korean. The total area of the zone is 3.02 sq. km and the starting zone is 1.36 sq. km. The 
leading industry of the zone is food processing, light and textile industries, plastics and 
construction material.
Antu Changbai Mountain Economic Development Zone
This is situated on the northern slopes of the Changbai Mountain, a well known international 
tourist spot, and in the Erdao Town of Antu County. The development of the zone is divided 
into three stages. 1995-2000 was the basic construction stage, 2000-2005 the development 
stage and 2006-2010 the stage of improvement and enhancement.
Yanbian needs to secure direct access to the East Sea. It is heavily reliant on Dalian Port, 
1,296 km from Hunchun. Access to the sea is needed to attract FDI and stimulate economic 
growth. Alternatives to Dalian include new routes via the DPRK and Russia. These should 
help to divert some business from the Dalian route since distances are much shorter -  79 km 
to Zarubino Port and 116 km to Rajin Port from Hunchun.21 Rajin Port was chosen since it 
had easier operating conditions and cross-border arrangements. In 1995 the Yanbian shipping 
company began a container service three times a month to the South Korean port of Pusan. 
Since then transit trade business through the DPRK Rajin-Sonbong Zone has developed 
{China’s Tumen River - Investment Guide, 1998: 23).
Yanbian has provided tax and other incentives to investors. The main characteristics of the 
tax incentive regime are as follows:
21 However, these routes are not competitive enough to replace the Dalian Route, due to poor infrastructure 
conditions, non-physical impediments, limited regular vessel services, and so on. In this regard high 
transportation costs and excessive overall transit times are the major complaints o f foreign investors in Yanbian. 
These transit routes are thus currently only used for about 20% o f the import/export cargo o f Hunchun according 
to official city figures (ERINA & FIAS, 2000: 13).
181
- In Yanbian, as in other parts of China, all foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) are 
exempt from income tax for the first two profit-making years. In addition, most 
foreign manufacturing enterprises in Yanbian pay corporate income tax at a rate 
of 12-15%, which is either equal to or below that paid by foreign investors in 
China's major open areas. For example, the rate is 15% in the Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs: Shenzhen and four other regions) as well as the Shanghai Pudong 
Zone, and 24% in the Economically Opened Coastal Areas. Furthermore, the 
Yanbian government also refunds paid income tax for one, two or three years 
from the sixth profit-making year depending upon the size of the investment. 
Agriculture and infrastructure projects are exempt from income tax for the first 
ten profit-making years.
- Regarding customs duties and value-added tax (13-17%), the Yanbian 
authorities... exempt foreign investors from these charges for imports of capital 
equipment, raw materials, parts and packing materials. In the Yanji Economic 
Development Zone, especially, the local portion of value-added tax (Yanji City - 
10%) is refunded for the first three operational years. These exemptions 
notwithstanding, many foreign enterprises currently operating in Yanbian have 
not benefited from these reductions due to the complicated VAT system, and the 
fact that many transactions with domestic enterprises are made without receipts.
- Yanbian also offers land-related incentives... Foreign investors can rent 
manufacturing-use land... for US$17-20/m2 for a 50-year lease. Furthermore, for 
lump sum lease payments by foreign investors, Yanbian authorities refund 20- 
70% of the lease amount. Yanbian authorities also reduce the annual land use tax 
of RMBl/m2 by 50% for the first three operating years (ERINA & FIAS, 2000:
33-4).
3. Hunchun City: City level
3.1 Background
Hunchun, the second largest city in Yanbian after Yanji, is also centrally located in the 
Tumen area. In March 1992 it was designated an Open Border City, and the Hunchun Border 
Economic Cooperation Zone (HBECZ) was inaugurated. This zone covers 88 sq. km, and 
development work was started immediately in a 5 sq. km area. It is well-placed, being only 
14 km from the Sino-Russian border, 42 km the Russian port of Posyet, 71 km from the 
Russian port of Zarubino, and 93 km from the North Korean port of Rajin. It is 750 km to 
Pusan in South Korea and 800 km to the west coast of Japan. The HBECZ has a 372.2 km 
long border, of which 139.5 km is shared with Hamkyung Province of North Korea and 232.7 
km with Russia. The 198,000 population is made up of 11 nationalities, of which 44.3% are 
Korean, 45.6% Han Chinese, and 9.7% are Manchurian. The HBECZ breaks down into four
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sub-development zones: these are ‘Hunchun export-processing zone’, ‘Fangchuan free trade 
zone’, ‘Border trade zone with North Korea and Russia’, and ‘Agriculture zone’.
3.2 Economy
The main focus of the HBECZ is export-processing and high-tech industry. There is a full 
range of facilities and services: industrial production, finance, bonded warehouses, 
commercial services, public utilities, accommodation and leisure facilities (UNIDO, 1995b: 
1; Liu, Zhuangfei et al., 1990). In 1996 Hunchun turned US$30.43 million in trade, US$13.91 
million in imports, and US$16.52 million in exports. In 1996, total industrial product reached 
RMB130 million, and total infrastructure investment RMB493 million yuan (Zhang Shihe, 
1997: 51-3). Hunchun City quickly became the main destination for foreign capital in 
Yanbian’s manufacturing sector, attracting more than 25% of foreign investment (US$98 
million), 80% of this came from the ROK, and most (85%) was channelled into the HBECZ 
to be applied in export-oriented advanced manufacturing (China's Tumen River Area - 
Investment Guide, 1998: 7).
During the Ninth FYP there was an annual contribution of RMB10 million yuan from the 
central government, and local revenues have also been used. Responsibility for administering 
the central government funds was given to the Administration Committee under the authority 
of the Hunchun municipal government. The central government provided annual grants and 
loans to Hunchun City for urban, public and housing infrastructure construction in the city. 
Total funds received from all sources reached RMB4.79 billion yuan (US$580 million) and 
during the period 1992-98 these were spent on capital projects. RMB1.32 billion yuan of this 
was spent on state infrastructure projects. Domestic enterprises spent a further RMB3.5 
billion yuan (US$425 million) on the development of local commercial, mining and industrial 
businesses (China s Tumen River Area - Investment Guide, 1998: 24).
Hunchun approved 102 foreign investment projects during 1992 and 1995. The foreign 
participants included 29 companies from Hong Kong, 25 from South Korea, 9 from Japan, 8 
from Russia, and 7 from Taiwan. Projected investment by foreign and joint venture 
companies was US$160 million, of which US$40 million was invested in late 1994 (Ibid.). 
57% was in manufacturing and food processing, 30% in real estate, hotels and tourism, 9% in 
commerce and services and 4% in agricultural activities (UNIDO, 1995a: 3).
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3.3 Development strategy
The approach taken by the Chinese government in the TRADP is a typical ‘bottom-up’ 
participatory development approach (Kim, Haksoo, 1993: 21). This means there are three 
phases. The first phase (1992-97) was preparatory. Basic institutions, infrastructure, energy 
supply and urban planning, were to be strengthened, and management systems improved. The 
second phase (1997-2002) harnesses local resources to encourage export production, and 
focuses on attracting foreign investment. In this phase tourism and agriculture would also be 
encouraged as well as economic cross-border cooperation.22 The final phase (2002-2007) will 
see the introduction of an open-style economic system with an aim to develop high-tech industry 
(Ibid.: 36).
According to the ‘Hunchun & Fangchuan Development Plan’, Yanbian foresees that 
Hunchun should use economic complimentarities of neighbouring countries, combining its 
cheap labour and resources with foreign finance and technology. The HBECZ has to be 
developed, with the aim of balancing regional development policy by the central government 
so as to promote horizontal inter-regional economic cooperation. The Hunchun Project 
should be developed along the entire development project, in cooperation with Yanbian and 
Jilin {Gilimseung Pyunlam, 1994: 224-6; Kim, Haksoo, 1993: 36; Jin, Tie, 1993: 12-8; Wang, 
Shengjin, 1997).
Population in Hunchun is projected to go up to 600,000 (2010) from 250,000 (1998). The 
growth in population is seen as part and parcel of an expansion in the industrial, mining and 
energy base and output of Hunchun, which is expected to be five to ten times its current level 
by the year 2010. Such growth should build an industrial, tourist and transit trade foundation 
which is needed to consolidate Hunchun’s position as the leading growth pole in the Tumen 
River Area. Such growth would place Hunchun in a similar position to Vladivostok in size 
and economic capacity (China’s Tumen River Area - Investment Guide, 1998: 25).
Currently, Hunchun has been pursuing four major plans: ‘The General Principles on Hunchun 
Development’, agreed by the State Planning Committee, ‘Hunchun City Border Economic 
Cooperation Zone Plan’ by Jilin Province, ‘Hunchun’s Municipality Development Plan’ and
22 The central government thinks that Hunchun can not follow other coastal free economic zones (FEZs) such as 
Shenzhen, because it is a geologically land-locked area. So Beijing sees the economic success o f this region as 
connecting traditional border trade and export processing.
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‘Hunchun City’s Land Use Plan’ by Hunchun City. The zone is supported by extensive
O'Xpreferential policies from the three administrative levels.
In Hunchun, there are income tax exemptions for the first three profitable years for all types 
of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) with ten-year contracts. In addition if FIEs reinvest 
profits for a period of five years they qualify for a complete income tax refund. In other areas 
of Yanbian the benefit is only a 50% refund. Hunchun City has a degree of autonomy in 
making economic decisions, including the approval of imports and exports; the approval of 
new foreign investment projects of up to US$10 million in value and construction and 
technical upgrading projects of up to US$30 million in value; and the granting of planning 
permission for land use (UNIDO, 1996: 4).
4. The role of Beijing, Jilin and Yanbian in TRADP policy-making24
In October 1992, recognising the Tumen River area to be the proposed centre for regional 
international trade and industrialisation, the UNDP suggested that TRADP should raise 
US$30 billion in 20-30 years. However, the idea of the TRADP was not developed by the 
UNDP overnight. Long before the commencement of TRADP by the UNDP, China had 
started to develop Hunchun as the core of the Tumen River area development. The centre and 
the province had discussed the development within Hunchun. Since the open door policy in 
1979 when the four special economic zones and the 14 open coastal cities were set up, Jilin 
Province had felt itself to be trailing the other regions. The wish to ride the tide of economic 
development led the local government and scholars in Jilin Province to express a strong 
interest in regional development. In response to the province’s enthusiasm, the central 
government instructed Jilin Province to develop regional development scheme and supported 
this scheme as part of consensus-building with Jilin.
23 The State Council’s 8 preferential articles, Jilin Province’s 20 preferential articles and 10 provincial level’s 
management rights, and Hunchun City Government’s 12 preferential articles and 3 special treatments for border 
economic cooperation zone (Jin, Tie, 1994: 263). For the brief contents o f the preferential articles, see (Ren 
Shufu et al., 1994: 347-8); And also for the State Council’s 8 preferential articles and the Jilin Province’s 20 
preferential articles, see (Wei & Xu, 1994: 69-74).
4 Lack o f research materials and information has hampered investigation into the central-provincial linkages 
that this section is devoted to examining. It is not clear who proposed first and how the negotiation went. 
Limited Chinese materials only provided chronologies o f the project. As a result, it should be recognised that the 
detail o f this section remains largely the author’s personal feelings and related speculations, and the content of 
this section is heavily based on the chronology o f one local material. See (Chiao, 1994).
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In December 1985 Jilin Province’s first move proposing access took place. The ‘Study Group 
on Jilin Province's Trade with the Soviet Union’ submitted a report on the possibilities for the 
province's trade. The report suggested the need for trade with the Soviet Union, and included 
two scenarios: the development of Hunchun and Changlingzi, and the use of North Korea’s 
railway and the port of Rajin. Jilin should among other things focus on its relationship with 
Northeast Asia; properly use its riverine border area with the Soviet Union; rebuild Da-an 
Port; open Changlingzi; and develop Fangchuan (Chiao, 1994: 635).
In response to the provincial government’s request, in June 1986, the central government 
permitted Hunchun to carry out border trade with North Korea. The Border Management 
Group of the State Council sent officials to examine the situation in July. In December, the 
‘Study Group on Jilin Province’s Trade With the Soviet Union’ and the Geography 
Department of Northeast Normal University worked together and submitted the ‘Report on 
the Use of Tumen River and the Development of Jilin Province’s Coastal Area to the 
Outside’ (Ibid.: 636).
On 10 January, 1987, Gao Dezhan, the then governor of Jilin Province, and Chui Lin and 
Chen Hua-guan, the then Vice-chairmen of the Province's Nation People’s Congress (NPC), 
requested further research. In April the Jilin Provincial Government sent an official letter 
entitled, ‘Request to solve the right of the Province to exit the Tumen River’, and further 
recommended the State Council to place it high on the agenda in the Sino-Soviet border talks 
(Ibid.: 637). On 6 June, Yu Ke, the head of the provincial committee of the NPC sent a letter 
to Wan Li, the head of the NPC, asking whether the NPC could support Jilin’s Tumen River 
navigation plan at the national level (Ibid.: 639).
The central government’s response became more positive and concrete. When Chen Cai, 
Jilin’s representative as well as a professor from Northeast Normal University went to meet 
Qian Qichen, the then foreign minister, on 21 July, 1987, Qian responded that the Ministry 
was very concerned about the issue of right of exit to the Tumen River and would discuss it 
in the Sino-Soviet talks (Ibid.: 640). The central government then set up some policy 
arrangements which saw fruit in 1988. The State Council permitted Hunchun to trade with 
Khasan of the Soviet Union (16 April); opened up Changlingzi (10 May); and further agreed 
that the areas surrounding Hunchun be upgraded from county to city status (25 May) (Ibid.: 
640-1).
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Receiving warm support from the Beijing government, the then province governor Wang 
Zhongyu expressed hope on 6 June of that year that Hunchun would be a ‘window’ of 
Northeast Asian economic cooperation, and on 14 June announced plans that Yanbian 
Prefecture should lead the Hunchun development. On 26 November, the Yanbian 
Autonomous Government sent a report, ‘On Building Hunchun Development’, to the Jilin 
Provincial Government, suggesting the importance of the project and the immediate 
resolution of remaining obstacles to starting work on the project. As a result of that research, 
on 13 December, the provincial leadership decided to establish the ‘Hunchun Economic 
Development Zone’ (Ibid.: 642). The provincial government’s argument for the introduction 
of a special economic zone in the area around Hunchun had paid off.
Jilin Province became more active and made an effort to communicate the province’s 
enthusiasm. On 14 February 1989, Jilin Province sent a letter to Deng Xiaoping requesting 
that in his meetings with Gorbachev later that year whether he could ask the Soviet Union to 
let the Chinese use the Tumen River on the Soviet side. Only two months after the 
Tiananmen Crisis, on 23 August, Chui Lin, the vice-director of the provincial standing 
committee of the NPC, wrote a letter to ask Li Peng, the then Premier, about the 
establishment of a Hunchun Economic Special Zone to enjoy the same status as one of the 
fourteen main Chinese coastal cities (Ibid.: 641-5).
On 16 February 1990, the Special Zones Office of the State Council sent a report to Li Peng 
proposing that the plan for building a special zone in Yanbian Prefecture should focus on 
self-reliant resource development through border trade first before finally moving into export 
processing industry. On 31 March, Li Pengming, vice-director of the provincial Science and 
Technology Committee, and three other representatives of Jilin province attended the meeting 
on Tumen River navigation in Beijing. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs negotiated with the 
Soviet diplomats on 22 May, and with North Korean diplomats during 22 to 24 of May 
regarding the navigation issue (Ibid.: 645-8). This diplomatic support from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs secured the two countries’ compromise. For the first time since 1938 when 
China was blocked access, Jilin could navigate through the Tumen River. The first navigation 
took place in May 1990, and the second in May 1991 (For a more detailed discussion of the 
navigation attempts, see also Part II of Chapter Six).
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Apart from the province’s effort, development in the Tumen area had received stimulus from 
the international academic circle as well as international organizations. In July 16-18 1990, 
‘the first International Symposium on Economic and Technological Development in 
Northeast Asia’, co-sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Institute of China, the East-West Centre in 
Hawaii and the UNDP, was held in Changchun (Chiao, 1994: 645-652). The conference 
reviewed new possibilities for regional and cross-border development. This led to a meeting 
sponsored by the UNDP in July 1991 at Ulaanbaatar where delegates from China, Mongolia, 
North Korea, and South Korea affirmed the need for a TRADP programme. The Commission 
of Science and the UNDP discussed the Tumen River Area Development in May. From 6 to 7 
July, the UNDO supported the TRADP as part of the Northeast Asia Technological 
Cooperation Conference 1992-96 in Ulaanbaatar (Ibid.: 654).
The appearance of central government political heavyweights was a great boost. The 
president and General Secretary Jiang Zemin visited Jilin Province in 8 January 1991 and 
stated: ‘If we add this kind of [TRADP] to the outside world, it will be of great significance 
to Jilin, Northeast China, and indeed the whole of China’. The visits from high officials to 
Hunchun continued during the second half of the year including those by the then vice­
premier Zhu Rongji on 15 June, another vice-premier Tian Jiyun on 20 June, Premier Li Peng 
on 7 August and Zou Jiahua, then another vice-premier, on 18 August (Ibid.: 654-8).
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Encouraged by the attention from the central leadership, Minister of Science and Technology 
Committee Song Jian briefed Professor Ding Shicheng, a member of the Jilin Province 
Science and Technology Committee, about economic cooperation and presented him with a 
draft for the region. At the second ‘International Symposium on Economic and Technological 
Development in Northeast Asia’ (29-31 August, 1991), Ding presented results of a study into 
the complementarities of Northeast Asian economies compared to economic cooperation 
elsewhere, which had been commissioned by the provincial governor Wang Zhongyu. Ding 
argued that the Tumen River in its lower reaches could become the ‘golden delta’ (jin 
sanjiao) of the region. The first initial proposal identified two regional ‘triangles’. The 
smaller of these did not at the time include Hunchun, but only the territory at the Tumen 
River mouth. Ding’s idea was that China should build a seaport at Fangchuan (See Figure 6- 
2), which is the mouth of the East Sea (Cotton, 1996: 1094-5).25
On 15 January 1992, Northeast Normal University chaired a seminar on ‘Current Situation of 
the Korean Peninsula and Policy Directions’, in which representatives from eight provincial 
organisations participated. The Jilin provincial government called a meeting on Tumen Area 
development, including more than 30 experts from Jilin Province’s Academy of Social 
Science, Northeast Normal University, Jilin University, Jilin Province’s Economic 
Management Cadre College and other relevant organisations. The then vice leader of the 
Leading Group as well as Director of the TRADP Office of Jilin Province, Ding Shicheng 
gave an important speech on the future and implementation of the project detailing: i) the 
need to recognise its crucial importance to the province; ii) the importance of expanding 
border trade and building infrastructure; iii) the goal of gaining access to Japanese and 
Korean capitals by establishing designated economic zones for the two countries 
respectively; iv) the desirability of obtaining the navigation rights from the Soviet Union and 
North Korea; and v) the establishment of a Tumen area development committee (Chiao, 
1994: 665-6).
25 However, in 1992 the plans for Fangchuan were shelved on the grounds that they were too ambitious and 
expensive with smaller returns than would be achieved through developing port facilities in North Korea and 
links from these to China (Rajin-Sonbong). Instead, an inland railway and warehouse hub located in Hunchun 
was put forward as an alternative project (Cotton, 1996: 1094-5).
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On 9 March 1992, Hunchun was finally designated an open city at national level while other 
economic development zones in Yanji, Dunhua, Antu and Tumen were established at the 
provincial level. On 16 March, Vice Premier Tian Jiyun met the Yanbian Governor Jin 
Zhezhu and emphasised that the timing was right to expand full trade relations with Russia, 
North and South Koreas. On 3 April, 1992, the State Council sent Jilin Province an official 
letter (1992-30) ‘About the development of the Tumen River Area’, which included five 
points: i) how to join the UNDP-led TRADP; ii) how to open up Hunchun; iii) how to 
develop the mouth of the Tumen River; iv) how to manage navigation on the Tumen River, 
and v) how to put the development of the region into national policies. On 13 April in a letter 
(1992-32) ‘Joining the UNDP Preliminary TRADP Study’, the State Council recommended 
that the development should be led by the minister of the State Science and Technology 
Committee with the minister of the State Planning Commission as a vice-leader. In addition, 
the State Council officially allowed the province to join the UNDP-led TRADP (Ibid.: 667- 
8). On 21 October the State Council designated Hunchun as a border economic cooperation 
zone (Ibid.: 675).
Under the guideline of the State Council, on 12 February 1993, Liu Xilin, the then provincial 
vice- governor, called a TRADP leading group meeting. In this meeting Zhang Dehong, Vice 
Secretary of Yanbian Prefecture, made a speech ‘On the Current Situation of Hunchun and 
Tumen River Development in 1992 and Key Points for 1993’. The meeting noted with 
approval that: i) the State Council had given Hunchun the status o f an open city; ii) the 
province gave Hunchun special legal treatment; iii) the province made three missions to 
Hong Kong, Beijing, and Seoul; iv) the State Council approved the Tumen project; v) the 
Council also approved the ‘Hunchun Border Economic Cooperation Plan’; vi) the province 
actively joined international conferences in and out of China; vii) the central government 
made some agreements with Russia to support the province; and vii) the investment 
environment had improved (Ibid.: 684).
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Later on, central leaders gave the provincial leaders great encouragement. In March in the 
eighth NPC period, Qian Qichen and Song Jian met the representatives from the State 
Science and Technology Committee and Jilin Province, and told them not to lose this 
opportunity despite obstacles. In April Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Zhou Jiahua, Qian Qichen, Li 
Lanqing and Song Jian approved the report ‘The Current Situation of the UNDP-led TRADP’ 
provided by the State Planning Committee and the State Science and Technology Committee 
(Ibid.: 686). On 12 November Jilin’s Technology Committee showed its strong willingness 
on the TRADP issue, submitting a report on ‘The Current Situation of Jilin’s Relations with 
North Korea and Russia’. The report gave six recommendations: i) standing firmly on 
navigation issues; ii) firmly keeping to policy principles; iii) building infrastructure and 
borrowing ports; iv) coordinating the development and trade policies; v) attracting foreign 
direct investment; and vi) obtaining support from the central government (Ibid.: 693).
5. Institutional arrangements
Various institutions to coordinate and manage the TRADP have been developed by the 
central government, Jilin provincial authorities, Yanbian prefecture government and Hunchun 
city. The ‘Hunchun Border Economic Cooperation Zone Administration Committee’ came 
into being in May 1993. This was followed in April 1994 by the ‘Tumen River Area 
Development Administration’, set up by provincial government to coordinate Tumen Policy. 
At the highest level under the State Council and the State Science and Technology 
Committee is the ‘Tumen River Area Leading Group’ which includes representatives from 
other state ministries as well as provincial representation. It meets once or twice a year to 
look at overall Tumen project policy (Cotton, 1996: 1096).
There are different procedures for approving foreign investment in Yanbian, and the relevant 
decision making body varies according to the scale of the investment and where it is targeted. 
Hunchun has some autonomous decision making power. In China as a whole the foreign 
trade and Economic Bureau system is part of the Ministry o f Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (FTEC). The Yanbian Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau 
(Foreign Investment Approval Department) is empowered to approve all foreign investment 
projects with a value of less than US$10 million in Yanbian. In Jilin the equivalent body has 
authority for investments between US$10 and US$30 million. In Hunchun, however, there 
are special foreign trade and foreign investment approval rights. Its Open Border City status
191
(gained in 1992) gave it rights to approve foreign investment of any type up to the value of 
US$30 million, the same power as vested in Jilin Province {China's Tumen River Area - 
Investment Guide, 1998: 9-10).
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Figure 5-4. Tumen River Area Development (TRAD) Administration
Source: Jilin Sheng Kaifaqu j i  Tumenjiang Diqu Duiwai Jingji Hezhuo Xiangmu Jianjie (Profile of Recommended 
Economic and Technological Projects of the Development Zones of Jilin Province for Cooperation with Foreign Countries),
Jilin Government, China, 1997; Personal interviews, August 1997.
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Conclusion
As China has widened its opening to the outside world, Jilin Province has aspired to function 
as a ‘window’ to that world, and economic growth of the development zone should become 
the gateway and cornerstone of the policy to reconstruct the whole province into a developed 
near-sea boundary province. It is clear that a number of interests has intersected in the 
development of the Tumen River region. Centre, province and locality have all had a stake. 
This project not only has served the government’s present economic objectives, but also 
allowed Jilin Province and the Yanbian Prefecture to overcome their land-locked and 
backward economic status. Having made a step forward, Jilin Province continued to ask for 
permission to build a special economic zone in the province. In 1992 Beijing made 
development of the zone one of ten national projects. However, in addition to the stated 
economic objectives, non-economic considerations were embedded in the creation of the 
Tumen project. The following chapter will unfold the major theme of this thesis as it analyses 
Beijing’s political and security perspectives in implementing the Tumen project.
26 Of course, this would require agreement o f Russia and North Korea.
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Chapter Six. The Perspective of Beijing
Introduction
In October 1992 the UNDP inaugurated the TRADP based on the claims of the Tumen River 
area to be a centre of international trade and industrialisation. However the idea of the Tumen 
River Area development was not developed by the UNDP overnight. In fact long before the 
commencement of the TRADP by the UNDP, as seen in the previous chapter, the centre, 
provinces and localities in China had all discussed internally the development in Hunchun 
and had actively developed the Hunchun Project, not only as a core development project for 
the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, but also for Jilin Province as well as Northeast 
China. What were the reasons that prompted the Chinese to develop the area independently, 
separately from the UNDP-led TRADP?
Jilin Province’s hopes of turning the province around were centred on benefiting the whole 
Jilin Province through development of the Tumen region. However, the central government’s 
calculations were more complicated. Beijing had to appease the province, whose 
development had been left behind by the coastal areas. At the same time, the TRADP was 
devised with China’s security and foreign policy interests in mind as well. This chapter will 
attempt to investigate what kinds of interests drove the Beijing government to approve the 
development in the region, and if these undermine China’s long-standing assertion that the 
formation of the TRADP would be for the mutual benefit of neighbouring countries. This 
chapter begins with four specific questions with regard to China’s political interests in the 
TRADP: Why was the special economic zone (SEZ), one of the ten national development 
projects, given to the Korean Autonomous Prefecture in particular? Why did China insist on 
the right to have access to the East Sea through the Tumen River? Why did China make an 
effort to keep North Korea involved in the project? Lastly, how did the project fit into 
China’s regional strategy?
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I. The Korean minority policy
Despite many other international cooperation projects such as the Greater South China 
Economic Zone (GSCEZ), the Pudong Area Circle and the Bohai Rim Circle, all of which 
appeared to give more competitive advantages than the TRADP, the Tumen project was 
upgraded to one of ten national development projects in 1992. Why was it so? Was the 
establishment of the SEZ in the Tumen River region linked to relations with the Korean 
minority within the region? What role does the Tumen project play in the central 
government’s regional development plans? Part I will explain why the Korean minority is 
important to China. It will first be necessary to provide a brief overview of China’s 
nationality policy so as to place the Chinese management of the Korean minority in context 
and to show why the TRADP is important for China’s Korean policy.
1. China’s minority policy
1.1 Background1
According to 1990 statistics, the Han nationality is in the vast majority. With 936 million 
members, it constitutes nearly 92% of China's population of more than 1.3 billion people. 
Fifty-five other nationalities2 make up the remaining 8%. The Zhuang are the largest minority 
with over ten million members. Then there are fourteen other groups with populations up to 
10 million, including the Koreans and Hui. Thirteen minority groups, including Kazak and 
Dai, number between 100,000 and one million. The Daur and Jinpo have populations of 
10,000-100,000 along with 16 other national groups, and there are nine very small minorities, 
including Russians and Tatars who number less than 10,000. The smallest population is the 
Hezhen, with only 1,400 people (He, 1990: 1).
1 For the chronological evolution o f the Chinese responses towards minorities, see (Liu, Ziwen, 1994).
2 The government undertook lengthy examination o f the applications, recognising 54 nationalities by 1957, 
adding one (the Jinuo) in 1979.
Since the establishment of the PRC, autonomy (zizhi) defined by a combination of territory 
and nationality, has been granted to minority areas.3 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
has decided that the structure of national autonomous regions are the best way to handle the 
diversity of minority groups within China (Jin, Shangzhen, 1990: 31). The institutional unit 
could be an autonomous region, prefecture, county, or township and bodies for self­
administration were established. In 1989 there were 141 areas that were granted regional 
national autonomy (5 autonomous regions at the provincial level: Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang 
of the Yugur, Guangxi of the Zhuang, Tibet, and Ningxia of the Hui; 31 autonomous 
prefectures and 105 autonomous counties and nearly 3,000 minority townships. These 
regions (in 1987) covered an area of 6.1 million sq. km (64% of the country) and contained 
142.5 million people, of which more than 62.5 million were from national minorities 
(Heberer, 1989: 40-1).
3 Heberer explains autonomy ‘does not mean that these regions have the right to secede from the sovereign 
territory o f the PRC, but it does mean that, under the “direction o f higher authorities”, they enjoy certain special 
rights over other administrative units. In these regions, the language(s) and writing(s) o f the region’s 
autonomous nationality (or nationalities) should be used; administration must (or should) be in the hands o f  
functionaries from the minority population; the regions can promulgate their own laws and regulations, draw up 
their own production plans (within the bounds o f the central state plan), and choose their own path o f  economic 
and cultural development (within the lines o f  the constitution). Furthermore, the autonomous regions can 
administer local finances themselves (within the framework o f financial planning for the state as a whole), and 
can have their own local security forces’ (Heberer, 1989: 40-1). However, this changed in the 1990s as a result 
of the spread o f more market conditions and increased Han migration to minority areas.
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Figure 6-1. C hina’s M inority Nationalities
Source: (Heberer, 1989: xiv)
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1.2 Characteristics of minorities
Compared to other multi-ethnic countries, China has a small portion of minority populations. 
However, the significance of the minority for China cannot be ignored for three basic 
reasons. First, some of these areas are rich in natural resources, which are as yet under­
exploited. If living standards are to be raised and economic development to be progressed, 
these resources need to be exploited efficiently (Dreyer, 1983: 359; He, 1990: 1-2).
Second, the border regions where the minorities are mainly located are of strategic 
importance (Dreyer, 1983: 358). The size of the non-Han minority groups is small in relations 
to the total population, but they are settled mainly in the west, north and northeast that most 
of the non-Han areas lie. Up to 70% live in these areas (Olivier, 1993: 1-2). Thus the 
minorities are of importance to China’s defence strategy. In the case of war a change of 
allegiance by minorities could significantly impair China’s defence capability (Ibid.: 16). 
Apart from this, immediate relations with neighbouring countries have potential to influence 
social stability even in times of peace.
Finally, there is the propaganda factor. The CCP held out its own brand of socialism as a 
model for other areas of the developing world. Clearly, discontented ethnic populations 
would undermine this claim (Dreyer, 1993: 359). Specifically, a successful minority policy 
might help to persuade Taiwan that absorption into the PRC would not destroy the Taiwanese 
sense of nationhood (Ibid.: 377).4
1.3 Evolution of China’s minorities policy
The PRC has tried to keep national unity as a fundamental, and this can be seen in the 
policies and actions proposed since 1949. The policy on minorities in general has four 
dedicated goals: equality among the nationalities, autonomy in nationality areas, joint 
development, and joint prosperity and unity among the nationalities (He, 1990: 3). In the 
early 1950s the approach of the CCP towards minorities was ‘gradualist’. The focus was on 
‘integration’ (ronghe) rather than ‘assimilation’ (tonghua) (Brugger & Reglar, 1994: 313-9). 
In the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) and especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966-
4 For the importance o f the Taiwan problem to the legitimacy o f  the Chinese nation-state itself, see Chapter 1 of 
(Hughes, 1997: 1-20).
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76), however, the earlier official minority policy was revised.5 Pressure was exerted to 
assimilate the ethnic minorities, and in cases force was used.6
In the Third Plenum of 1978, a wholesale reassessment of the minorities policy which had 
been applied during the Cultural Revolution was taken. Errors were recognised (Ibid.: 332) 
and the 1982 constitution set out a relatively improved new status for minorities. This was 
followed by the autonomy law of 1984, which, in granting special rights in the areas of 
regional planning, economic development and administration of resources, foreign trade, the 
financial and tax sectors and education, took the process even further (Heberer, 1989: 43). 
Lower administrative levels (provinces and prefectures) were given broader decision-making 
powers with the aim of benefiting the local populations (Ibid.: 46).7
1.4 Limits of China’s minority policy
However, there remain limits to this newer approach from a legal point of view, as well as in 
practice. On the face of it, more freedoms and rights were allowed under the 1984 law. But 
upon closer look, it transpires that in order for the law to be effective substantial legislation 
from central government is required. However, the CCP was granted supreme power by the 
constitution and therefore the autonomous regions were necessarily subordinate to the 
organisation that was dominated by the Han (Ibid.: 42-3). Sceptics further point out that the 
commitment to improving minority well-being is apparent only in rhetoric and declaratory 
statements, and not in practice. Actual policy involves Han supremacy and assimilation 
through the denial of self-rule coupled with the encouragement of Han migration into 
minority areas. In Inner Mongolia the Han outnumber the Mongolians by more than 5:1. In 
Xinjiang the Han proportion has grown to 45% making it the largest ethnic group when in
Q
1949 it accounted for only 7% of the total. More importantly, the gap between minority and 
Han regions has been growing. If the state cannot guarantee a broad margin of substantive 
self-determination to minority areas, especially in economic matters, it will lead to increased 
tension between minorities and Han. The minority regions are among the poorest and least-
5 In the 1950s the CCP followed Stalin’s policy which at least enabled minorities a degree o f separation. This 
was abolished briefly from 1958 to 1961 and again in 1966 to 1976.
6 ‘They were divested o f  all special rights, their languages and modes o f writing were forbidden, and their 
manners and customs suppressed. Although all the Chinese (including Han) suffered during the Cultural 
Revolution, the minorities experienced the particular indignity o f being coerced to renounce most o f  their 
national identities’ (Heberer, 1989: 17).
7 It is important to note that the leadership and real decision-making was in the hands o f the Han.
8 Dissatisfaction with the Han grew. But the Han are the dominant majority now everywhere except for Xinjiang 
and the Tibet.
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developed regions in China, and there are real fears that they will see the erosion of national 
and cultural symbols and cohesion with natural resources being exploited but not for the good 
of the region (Ibid.: 45). Such ill-feeling towards the centre would have strategic 
disadvantages for China, as minorities would be more open to subversive influences from 
foreign powers (Dreyer, 1993: 358-9). Thus the CCP needs to keep control over minority 
regions, since these are important for defence and economic growth. At the same time it has 
to tread carefully to keep the loyalty of the minorities (Ibid.: 360).
2. China’s Korean minority policy
This section explains why the Korean minority is important to China. To understand this, this 
section firstly provides a brief overview of China’s nationality policy, and with regard to 
Koreans examines how China has managed the Korean minority policy.
2.1 Background
As a Chinese area of the Tumen River Economic Development Area (TREDA), the Yanbian 
Korean Autonomous Prefecture forms the 42,700 sq. km of Jilin province which lies in the 
extreme Northeast of Jilin, bordering the Russian Far East to the north and the east and the 
DPRK to the south. The length of the entire prefecture reaches 755.2 km, including 522.5 km 
for the Sino-North Korean border, and 232.7 km for Sino-Russian one. The area has five 
main urban centres (Yanji, Dunhua, Hunchun, Longjing, Tumen), three counties (Antu, 
Wangqing, Halong) and has seven border crossings; one with Russia at Changlingzi and six 
with the DPRK at Nanping, Sanhe, Kaishantun, Tumen, Shatuozi and Guchengli (UNIDO, 
1995a: 2).
The prefecture’s name reflects the 855,000 Koreans living there - 40.6% of the 1995 total 
population of 2,150,000. However the Han Chinese make up a 57.4% majority of the people. 
Other minorities include the Manchu (1.8%) and Moslem Hui Chinese (0.2%) (Ibid.). As 
previously mentioned there are 55 minorities in China. Koreans represent the thirteenth 
largest non-Han nationality. They are a significant minority group as they outperform other 
minorities in various socio-economic areas, and are considered to be a success story in 
China’s minority policy.9 The Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture was established in
9 Koreans in China have the highest percentages o f young people in further education in relation to other
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Jilin on September 3, 1952. In December 1955, the Yanbian Korean autonomous qu was 
changed into the Yanbian Korean autonomous zhou. 10 In 1958 a second important 
autonomous Korean area, the Changbai Korean autonomous county, was created on the 
Chinese side of the Yalu river. Six other Korean autonomous townships in Jilin province and 
one mixed Manchu and Korean autonomous township were later established (Olivier, 1993: 
74-5).
2.2 History of Korean migration
The Chinese of the Northeast and Koreans have a long shared history. Forefathers of the 
Koreans, the Yemaek, were settled in Northeast China, and founded the Chosun and Koguryo 
states. After the Korean Peninsula was brought together over 1000 years ago the Northeast 
Chinese regions were abandoned to China (Ibid.: 11). Those Koreans that remained gradually 
blended with other native peoples of the region. In fact the present Korean minority traces its 
roots back not to those early Koreans, but the migrations in the seventeenth and nineteenth 
century from south of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers (Piao, 1990: 44-5).
The Qing dynasty sought to create protective buffer zones around its Manchu homeland. The 
region between Korea and China in the area of Yalu and Tumen Rivers was targeted, and in 
the so-called ‘Willow Palisades’ of 1677 Han people were forbidden to move to the area 
north of Mount. Changbai (Ibid.: 48). Some migration to the Northeast still took place. From 
1845 the restrictions were slowly lifted until after losing territory to Russia in 1860, and full 
freedom to migrate was re-established. Indeed there was a reversal in that Korean settlement 
in Yanbian to the north of the Tumen River, in present-day Yanbian, was encouraged 
(Olivier, 1993: 17-9).11
After Japan controlled Korea and annexed it in 1910 following its victory over China in the 
1894-5 war, many Koreans fled to Northeast China. In fact migration had begun to grow 
from the middle of the nineteenth century and it continued until the end of World War II in
minorities, and the highest literacy rates. Only 11.4% of the population (over 6 years o f age) remains illiterate. 
In other minorities this is 33%. Life expectancy through birth is high among Koreans, and Koreans have the 
highest and lowest percentages o f people employed in the professions and agriculture respectively (Park, Kyung 
Ae, 1991: 209).
10 ‘An autonomous qu was, equivalent to a province, but when it was part o f a province it had to be called an 
autonomous zhou, or ‘prefecture” (Olivier, 1993: 72).
11 The occupation by Russia and later Japan coupled with the impact o f the flooding o f  the Yellow River as it 
changed course in the 1850s caused the Qing to encourage Han people from Shandong to move in the Northeast.
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1945. In 1860, the Korean population of Yanbian stood at 100,000 people or 77% of the 
population. By the end of the Qing dynasty it was 200,000. In the 1920s, it grew to 500,000; 
and it reached a million in the late 1930s. By 1944, the total population of the area had 
increased to 1,002,650 - 63.5% of the population (Ibid.: 26). The 1985 census showed 
1,765,200 Koreans in China, located in the three provinces of Manchuria. Jilin had 1,104,074 
Koreans -  61% of the Koreans living in China, Heilongjiang had 431,644 or 24%, and 
Liaoning, with 198,752 Koreans, or 11% of the total Korean population. In addition Koreans 
lived in other parts of China, for example, 17,680 reside in Inner Mongolia (Jin, Shangzhen, 
1990: 32).
2.3 Changes to China’s Korean minority policy
However, the authorities and elites did not wish to acknowledge Koreans as an internal 
‘minority nationality’, and took action to suppress Korean identity and to encourage 
assimilation (Piao, 1990: 70). This was true from the Qing, who sought to make the Koreans 
Manchurians, through to the Kuomintang (KMT), who saw the Koreans as an element of 
local nationalism which prevented China’s effective unification (Brugger & Reglar, 1994: 
307),12 and who were used by the Japanese.13
Unlike the Qing and the KMT, the CCP had a closer relationship with the Koreans. Drawing 
on their common opposition to Japan it managed to muster significant Korean support, whilst 
other minorities were better disposed towards Japan or even supported the KMT. Korean 
communists both took part in the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army to fight Japan, which 
had made much of the theme of ‘national independence’ in its intention to wrest territory 
away from China, and supported the revolution in China. They had full encouragement from 
the Chinese communists, who realised the potential of the Korean populace in the ‘old 
liberated areas’ of Yanbian of the Northeast. By 1930 the CCP had recognised the Koreans in 
China as a minority nationality (Piao, 1990: 71), even though they were relative newcomers 
to the region.
12 The KMT hardly ruled here -  the warlord Zhang Zuolin did so until he was killed by the Japanese, who ruled 
from 1931 to 1945. Then came the Russians.
13 ‘Japan used the Koreans o f Yanbian as a convenient excuse for advancing its interests in Northeast China, 
declaring, in 1905, that they would protect the Koreans of Yanbian. Japan appeared to be helping the non-Han to 
rid themselves o f Han domination while it was simply using them. It suited Japan to “protect” the Manchus, 
Koreans, and Mongols because o f their numerical significance and potential political leverage’ (Olivier, 1993: 
42).
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This historical relationship between the CCP and the Korean minority in Manchuria, and also 
the Korean War, can explain the party’s positive stance towards the Koreans of Northeast 
China in the early 1950s. Granting them autonomy within China rather than repatriation was 
a natural outcome after Japan’s defeat and the establishment of an independent Korea. 
Koreans became well represented in all autonomous organs, and the two main Korean 
territorial autonomous areas were established (Oliver, 1993: 48-55).
2.4 Korean minority problem in the 1990s
Nevertheless, in the 1990s the implementation of the CCP’s minority policy underwent 
changes, which threatened to destroy such earlier achievements for the Koreans. The post- 
Mao era of the late 1970s and early 1980s and its new economic policies overwhelmingly 
benefited the Han. Emphasis on technological development and economic performance in 
areas other than the Northeast meant that Koreans began to fall behind from an original 
position of relative socio-economic advantage (Ibid.: 2).
The Chinese government began to be especially worried about internal political stability and 
security. The 1989 Tiananmen crisis followed by the collapse of communist regimes in 
Europe and the Soviet Union made China’s leaders feel insecure about the political cohesion 
of the country. Domestic unrest is especially dangerous for China when the unstable elements 
have links outside the country, giving rise to a serious external security threat. Minority 
populations are central to Beijing’s perception of security. For the Chinese leadership 
minorities such as Xinjiang and Tibet can become a threat at any time (Hu, Weixing, 1995a: 
127-8).
China’s sensitivities to Yanbian where the Korean minority lives have been apparent in this 
dimension. For example, China was said to have been hesitant to permit South Korea to set 
up the Korean Consulate General in Shenyang, because the government was concerned that 
this would result in encouraging nationalist aspirations among the Korean minority in 
Yanbian. Thus China only agreed to allow the South to open a representative office and not a 
consulate there (Chosun Ilbo, 28 January 1999). China also protested at the South Korean 
government’s attempt to introduce a ‘Special Law for Overseas Koreans’, which was based 
on jus sanguinis, contending that the law might give an impetus to Korean nationalism in 
Yanbian (Ibid., 11 October 1998).
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Perhaps, Beijing’s sensitivity to Yanbian, which Koreans claim, holds potential for territorial 
conflict. The first concern comes from the different interpretations over whether Yanbian was 
really inside or outside the traditional area of Chinese control. Historically, Koreans have not 
viewed Yanbian as a ‘real’ part of China but as an integral part of Korea. Oliver gives several 
arguments between the two sides. Yanbian was in fact referred to as Jiandao in Mandarin and 
Kando in Korean. There are several ways of reading Jiandao. The character jian means 
‘between’, which posits that the Yanbian area was seen as an ‘in-between’ island (dao), 
surrounded by rivers. Alternatively, Jiandao could be taken to mean a neutral island, between 
China and Korea (originally constructed by Manchu isolationism). A third theory argues that 
Jiandao is a mispronunciation for Handong, ‘east of Korea’, or Jiangdong, Kangdong in 
Korean, ‘east of the Tumen river’. Another explanation is that the so-called ‘in-between’ 
island would have been, at the beginning, a real island. It is said that about two hundred years 
ago, the Tumen River basin was flooded, that an island of river sands of about 300 hectares 
appeared, and that Koreans occupied it and brought it under cultivation. These river sands 
were called Jiajiang ‘false river’ or ‘double-river’ in Chinese, but Kendao ‘reclaimed island’, 
or Jiandao ‘in-between island’, in Korean. Both Jiandao and Kendao are pronounced Kando 
in Korean. This island was located in Longjing County (Oliver, 1993: 25-6, 29-30).
In addition, it is always possible that a reunified Korea might open up territorial claims in 
border areas with China, especially where Koreans consider to be the birth-place of the 
Korean nation. Claims of this sort have been voiced both by Kim II Sung and by South 
Koreans (Lee, Chae-Jin, 1996: 173; Garret & Glaser, 1995: 541). Some Koreans still argue 
that in 1909 Japan transferred this territory to China, ignoring Korea’s sovereignty. In 
September 1909, Tokyo signed an agreement with Qing government by which Japan 
recognised that the border between China and Korea was the Tumen River. The Japanese 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Korea investigated the Baikdu (Changbai) stone monument, which 
was built in the three kingdom period in Korea in 1907 and confirmed that Gando was the 
territory as an eastern part of a line from the Tumen River through the Songhua River and 
Heilong River to the Sea of Okhotsk. But the Japanese reduced the scope of Gando’s territory 
to the current Yanbian area, otherwise Korea’s territory would have been extended to even 
the Maritime provinces of Siberia. It is told that Japan at that time was concerned that it 
would be harmful to its future interest, if the grand territory had been ceded to Korea, and 
Korea with a huge territory would be a strong competitor if  one day it were liberated. Thus 
Japan gave up the Gando area for further interests in Manchuria (Lee, Ilgul, 1995: 198-9).
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Some would further propose that negotiation between China and Korea on the Gando should 
be reopened. For example, in 1995 Kim Won-woong, MP, argued in the Korean Parliament 
‘Gando is a Korean territory’. This was followed in 1983 by Kim Young-kwang and other 54 
MPs of South Korea, who submitted a resolution of Baikdu Mt. Dominium (Lee, Ilgul, 1995: 
197). In the case of the dispute between China and a reunified Korea, the loyalty of the 
Korean minority in Yanbian will be an important factor.
2.5 Policy measures
The PRC has approached this sensitive situation with both hard and soft tactics. The 
government has pursued ‘soft’ measures such as promising and helping in the economic 
development of the region, while it pursues a ‘hard line’ by encouraging Han migration to the 
region and appointing Han people to highly responsible positions in the regional political 
organisations.
Hard line measures
This Han migration can be seen simply as a solution to overcrowding in the main Han 
population centres, and as a way of bringing in the necessary manpower to better exploit 
Yanbian’s natural resources. The result, however, is of course an erosion of the minority 
population’s autonomy and cultural independence (Heberer, 1989: 97-8). Strategically, 
increasing Han presence in the region may strengthen the centre’s influence over a border 
region which is important from a defence point of view, and it may also help to dilute any 
calls for nationalist moves towards a reunified Korea. According to Lee Hongwoo, President 
of Yanbian Prefecture Political Science Association and Professor of politics in Yanbian 
University, the proportion of Korean population in Yanbian has decreased from 60.1% in 
1953, 45.3% in 1982, to 39.5% in 1990, and is estimated to fall to less than 20% in 2110, 
when 2 million Han population will have migrated there (Heilongjiang Ribao, 28 October 
1995, in Lee, Ilgul, 1995: 196).
In a change to the initial policy many Han have now been appointed in high level official 
positions. The majority of cadre level positions had earlier been given to Koreans (78% in 
1952) as a means of achieving local cooperation in the new order. However, by 1971 only 7 
(27%) of 26 core positions (party secretaries and deputy secretaries of 8 cities and counties in 
Yanbian) were filled by Koreans. Since then the percentage o f Korean cadres at all ends has
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stabilised at 54.3% in 1982 and 51.0% in 1992 (Kim & Kim, 1994: 40-1). By putting Han 
cadres at the highest levels of both the local party and government organs, the CCP is 
attempting to prevent power slipping from the centralised control of the party.
Soft measures
The Chinese leadership has also been encouraging economic development in Yanbian in 
order to soothe the Koreans’ resentment in the so-called ‘Lao-Shao-Bian-Cong’ - Old 
revolutionary base, Minority, Border, Poor region. Beijing realises that local economic and 
political circumstances need to be taken more seriously if they are to put forward policies that 
stand any chance of successful implementation in these areas. Encouraging economic 
development of the non-Han will help to diffuse ethnic tensions (Olivier, 1993: 261). This fits 
in with the leaders’ view that prosperity will quiet discontent.
Economic development was given maximum priority, markets were liberalised, and export of 
local crafts were encouraged. These were strategies seen to have worked in the modernisation 
of Han regions (Dreyer, 1993: 378-9). Yanbian is more easily accessible to foreign countries 
than to major cities in China like Beijing and Shanghai, and cross-border trade was often both 
easier and more convenient in terms of procuring certain goods. Chinese Koreans have also 
been encouraged to seek foreign sources of investment. As Chinese provinces pursue local 
economic growth, Yanbian has sought to develop trade and attract investment from foreign 
countries, leading to increasing interdependence between Yanbian and its neighbouring 
countries. Different regions are thus being pulled in different directions by their foreign 
partners. The TRADP was chosen as a state level development project in the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan (1991-95), in view of its potential for increased border trade with neighbouring 
countries.
3. Concluding remarks
China hopes to keep domestic political stability in the region with the above measures. The 
Chinese leadership authorised the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Yanbian. Jilin Province 
officials believe that development will greatly benefit the region, and has been very active in 
opening up its borders. However, from the viewpoint of the central government, the creation 
of a SEZ in Yanbian was motivated by political as much as economic considerations. It has 
been argued that ethnic Koreans’ loyalty to Beijing will be weakened, if economic benefits
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fail to materalise (Olivier, 1993: 261). The Chinese government was forced to seek a more 
balanced regional development within China, and, as a result, created the SEZ in the Tumen 
River in Jilin Province, to pacify local resentment against the centre.
II. Navigation to the East Sea through the Tumen River
Both Beijing and Jilin Province have attempted to overcome the latter’s land-locked status, 
but their objectives are not the same. While Jilin Province hoped that the access to the East 
Sea would permit the province to gain a trade route with neighbouring countries, Beijing’s 
effort was made to restore the country’s previous navigation rights. As seen in the significant 
role played by Beijing in the TRADP policy process in Chapter Five, the central government 
was cmcial in restoring navigation right. Evidence is lacking, and limited sources providing 
only a chronology of the project have hindered this research. However, we might expect that 
such a diplomatically and militarily sensitive issue as China’s navigation rights to the East 
Sea, which had been blocked since 1938 by the Soviet Union and North Korea so that China 
needed the two countries’ agreements, cannot be considered only at a provincial or economic 
level. The outcome might have been manipulated at Beijing government level. Therefore, the 
provincial activities would only have been possible with Beijing’s tacit agreement or 
direction. Therefore, Part II will describe how China attempted to realise its long-standing 
desire to gain access to the East Sea. It will first discuss China’s legal and historical claims 
before assessing the economic aspects and security implications of navigation to the East Sea.
1. History of navigation attempts
Olson and Morgan summarise the navigation history of the region. In 1860 Russia in the 
Treaty of Peking won from Qing China an area of land measuring 400,000 sq. km. This area 
included the final stretch of the Tumen River into the East Sea, blocking previously held 
Chinese access. In 1886 the Treaty of Hunchun restored some Chinese navigation rights and 
use was made of the river to connect Hunchun to coastal cities as far away as Shanghai. 
Trade increased so that by 1929 there were 1500 boats in Hunchun country. These boats 
could handle up to 25,000 tons between them, and Hunchun port was considered in studies 
done in the 1920s and 1930s to have an annual capacity of 500,000 to 800,000 tons. In 1938
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this trade was brought to a half by the presence of the naval build up in the East Sea, and with 
Japan’s defeat at Zhang Gufeng this part of the river was closed completely. Further conflicts, 
first between KMT, then the Korean War, and finally the dispute between China and the 
Soviet Union meant that the potential of the river as part of the transport infrastructure 
remained untapped (Olson & Morgan, 1992: 69-71). With the outward-looking open door 
policy of China, the need for access to the East Sea has put the issue of navigation on the 
Tumen River back on the table.
China’s renewed attempts to gain access to the East Sea started at the provincial level in the 
mid 1980s. In December 1986, the ‘Study Group on Jilin Province's Trade With the Soviet 
Union’ and the Geography Department of Northeast Normal University worked together and 
submitted to the Jilin provincial government the ‘Report on the Use of Tumen River and the 
Development of Jilin Province’s Coastal Area to Outside’. In the same month, the Hunchun 
People's Government published a report, concluding that ‘Fangchuan near the Tumen is the 
best place in Jilin Province to open to Northeast Asia’, referring to the exit to the East Sea. 
The Chinese Institute for Social Science of Jilin Province also suggested opening Tumen City 
to the outside. On 10 January of the following year, the then Jilin Province Governor Gao 
Dezhan encouraged a new speedy study (Chiao, 1994: 636-7).
In response to Jilin Province’s active reports and suggestions, Beijing started to think 
seriously about the idea. Between 12 and 19 March 1987, Song Jian, the minister of the State 
Science and Technology Committee, sent the State Ocean Bureau examiners to the Province 
to investigate the possibility of exit to the Tumen River. The State Ocean Bureau proposed 
that a port should be built in Fangchuan. In April Gao Ditong, the then Provincial Secretary 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) stated that the area must be developed in the national 
interest. The Jilin Provincial Government officially sent the letter, ‘With Request to solve the 
right of the Province to exit to Tumen River’, and further urged the State Council to place it 
high on all of the agendas in the Sino-Soviet border talks. On 21 July, Qian Qichen, the then 
foreign minister, told to the provincial representatives that the Ministry was very interested in 
the issue of exit to the Tumen River and would discuss it in the Sino-Soviet talks (Ibid.: 637- 
40). On 5 October 1988 Song Jian sent a letter to Chin Hongmu, the head of the State Ocean 
Bureau:
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As you have also been informed of this project, I suggest your Ocean Bureau 
examine it in full and report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as soon as possible.
We should not lose this golden opportunity, which comes rarely once in a 
hundred years, so that future generations can inherit national glory (Ibid.: 642).
Chin Hongmu reported to Song Jian that the bureau would set up the plan of the exit to the 
Tumen River and study Chinese interest in the exit to the East Sea on 19 December 1988. 
Four months later Song Jian transferred a report on 3 April 1989, ‘From the Viewpoint of 
International Law in regard to Our Navigation Right to Tumen River’, to Li Peng, the then 
premier, suggesting that the navigation issue should be placed on the diplomatic agenda with 
the Soviet Union. On 18 July the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the report, ‘Current 
Situation on the restoration of Our Right to Navigation through Tumen River and Resolution 
of the Surrounding Difficulties’ to the State Council. The report emphasised that ‘We will 
continue our efforts and prove it is naturally our right’. On 26-29 July, some researchers from 
the Ministry of Transportation investigated the Tumen area, and later sent a report, ‘Current 
Situation of the Tumen Navigation Route’. On 1 December some provincial middle ranking 
officials and scholars requested that a ‘Leading Group of Tumen River Navigation’ be 
established, and with plans to establish the ‘Hunchun Economic Special Zone’ in due course. 
They also suggested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discuss with the Soviet Union and North 
Korea plans for coordinating Tumen River navigation (Ibid.: 642-5).
On February 18 1990, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested permission from the Soviet 
Union for China to undertake a scientific investigation of the Tumen area. During 18-20 
March, the Beijing Bureau of Jilin Province People’s Government convened the meeting on 
the navigation of the Tumen River, involving relevant organisations such as the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, General Staff Office, National Commission of Science, Ministry of 
Transport, State Ocean Bureau, Institute for Ocean Development Strategy, Yanbian Korean 
Autonomous Prefecture, and Hunchun city and so on. On March 28, the Soviet Union 
Embassy to Beijing agreed to a Chinese ship’s inspection tour of the Tumen River. On March 
29 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also made the same request to North Korea for the same 
mission. The North Korea’s Embassy to Beijing also agreed to this on April 7, and expressed 
on 22 May that there are ‘no agreements impossible’ between China and North Korea and 
that Chinese navigation would provide interest to the North as well. Having gained the 
permission of both countries, China’s first navigation took place on 28 May. For the first time
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since 1938, officials and scholars from Jilin Province and the State Ocean Bureau travelled to 
the mouth of the Tumen River (Ibid.: 645-648).
On 20 August 1990, Jilin Province established the Ocean Management Office under the 
provincial government. On 11 January 1992, the then Jilin Province Governor Wang Zongwu 
said that the province would concentrate on resolving the navigation issue in 1992. On 
February 9 the Ocean Development Office of Jilin Province produced a report, ‘On 
Developing the Lower Stream of Tumen River’, and explained what the project had achieved 
in 1991: i) enforced the capacity of the Ocean Development Office of Jilin Province; ii) 
gained the recognition of navigation rights by two neighbouring countries; iii) investigated 
the Tumen River successfully; iv) successfully hosted the Second Changchun international 
conferences on the project; v) produced two important reports, ‘Report of the Lower Stream 
Tumen River Development’ and ‘Report of the Tumen Development and Our Policies’; vi) 
completed the report, ‘The Tumen Area Development Plan’; vii) invested in the Hunchun 
area; 8) upgraded Hunchun into one of the national level open cities; 9) improvement in basic 
infrastructure in Hunchun; and x) took the Tumen project into a new stage (Ibid. 663-4). The 
second navigation activities took place between 20 May and 29 June 1992. This time the trip 
took much longer than the first navigation which lasted only one day. Officials from the 
province and the State Ocean Bureau pursued the inspection tour through the Tumen River 
and even to the East Sea. The tour even extended to Vladivostok, Niigata (Ibid.: 657). 
However, since then no reports of Chinese navigation on the river have been made.
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Figure 6-2. Tumen River
Source: (Cho & Valencia, 1992: 5)
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2. China’s position on the legal and historical claims of navigation
The three bordering countries of the Tumen River had concluded bilateral treaties amongst 
themselves in the nineteenth century. Olson and Morgan summarise the treaties which have
tVibeen since the 19 century. In 1860 ‘the Peking Additional Treaty of Commerce, Navigation 
and Limits’ between China and Russia, which was signed on 3 November 1860 in Peking and 
later ratified on 20 December 1860 in St. Petersburg, agreed that the Manchu-Russian border 
at its southern point was 13.2 miles from the Tumen mouth, with territory further east taken 
to be the Russian-Korean border. In 1886 the Treaty of Hunchun made modifications and this 
point between Russia and China was moved 3 miles east. Navigation of the Tumen River 
from there on to the mouth was regulated by the 1888 (Olson & Morgan, 1992: 69-70). 
Treaty of ‘Regulations between Russia and Korea, respecting the Frontier Trade on the River 
Tumen’, which stated that ‘Russian and Korean coastal-vessels shall be free to navigate the 
River Tumen. For the control of intercourse between the two shores and of shipping on the 
river, the competent authorities of the two countries shall hereafter draw up special 
regulations for navigation’. 14 In the twentieth century a border agreement was reached 
between Moscow and Pyongyang in 1985.15 This clarified the boundary between the two 
countries as the Tumen River, and their respective territorial waters and continental shelf 
were further defined in a 1986 treaty (Ibid.: 71). The upshot of all these bilateral agreements 
was that China had no direct access to the East Sea.
China is not a land-locked country, but the Chinese government thinks that Jilin Province 
should enjoy the privilege of land-locked countries or regions. The rights of land-locked 
states are dealt with Article 124 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.16 This article in fact probably does not apply at all to China, as it is plainly open to the 
Yellow, East China, and South China Seas, since it can by no means be considered to be 
‘land-locked’, and lack of access to the sea at one point may not be such as to seriously
14 (The Korea-USSR Boundary, The Geographer, US Department o f State, Washington, DC, 1965, cited in 
Olson & Morgan, 1992: 69-70).
15 The agreement o f 1985 consists o f two parts: The Treaty between the Union o f  Soviet Socialists Republics 
and the DPRK on the Demarcation o f the Soviet-Korean National Border, and Description o f the Demarcation 
Line o f the National Border between the USSR and the DPRK (Park, Choon-ho, 1993: 74-6).
16 According to Olson and Morgan’s interpretations: ‘Part X, articles 124-132, o f the 1982 Convention establish 
that land-locked states have right o f access to and from the sea and shall enjoy freedom o f transit through the 
territory o f other states by all means o f transport. The means for exercising this freedom o f transit are to be the 
subject o f bilateral, sub-regional or regional agreements’ (Olson & Morgan, 1992: 71).
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disadvantage China. In all likelihood, China has no rights under international law to access 
the Tumen River (Ibid.).
However, apart from the relatively new UN convention, customary international law and 
diplomatic practice have seen cases of countries which have long coastlines being granted 
rights of access via rivers.17 In the case of the Tumen, the Chinese had indeed made use of it 
until 1938. Under the Russian-Qing boundary agreements in 1860 Russia took over Siberia, 
but China reserved access to the East Sea via the Tumen River. Thus access rights have been 
seen as important even where they are not a vital necessity, as in the case of a completely 
land-locked state. A foreign vessel enjoys a right of innocent passage through the territorial 
sea of the coastal state, as long as the passage is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or 
security of the coastal state (Paik, Jin-hyun, 1995: 32). Some international law experts have 
accepted that extrapolating from a foreign vessel’s rights of peaceful passage implies that an 
upstream state may use a river to access the sea for the purposes of trade and commerce 
(Pounds, 1959, in Olson & Morgan, 1992: 72). If a state is land-locked, then such rights are 
all the stronger, but even where a state does have other sea access, rights by an upstream state 
to navigate an international river may be part of international law (Ibid.). China has therefore 
argued that coastal states have the general duty not to hamper the innocent passage of foreign 
ships except in accordance with the Convention. Russia and North Korea should permit use 
of the river for Northeast China to which the Tumen River is the obvious solution to the East 
Sea (Li, Dehu, 1993).18
3. Implications
What benefits might China derive, if  China navigates? Achieving navigation rights would 
provide the Chinese with a symbolic turning point in its quest to restore previous practice. In 
addition China would enjoy the additional benefits of securing the use of the Raj in port.
17 There are some notable examples: in 1920 Finland was permitted to retain the boundaries Russia possessed in 
the Treaty of Dorpat; In 1854 the Reciprocity Treaty between the Britain and the US guaranteed to American 
citizens ‘the right to navigate the River Saint Lawrence’ (Olson & Morgan, 1992: 72).
18 After China is able to access the East Sea, with its own inland port, it can become a full member of the region 
and can make its own contribution to the region, says Li Dehu of China’s State Ocean Bureau’s Ocean 
Development Strategy Institute (Li, Dehu, 1993: 24).
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3.1 International maritime aspect
The East Sea is a kind of multiple junction for both regional and global trade. Vessels on their 
way from North America to ports on the Sea normally pass through the Tsugaru Strait, or 
sometimes through the Soya Strait. Vessels from North America to the west coast of Korea 
and northern China use the Korea Strait (Olsen & Morgan, 1992: 60). All goods shipped to 
and from these countries may use the East Sea. For China the Sea, accessed via the Tumen 
River, would provide shorter trade routes to the three main trading partners there (Ibid.: 69).
3.2 Domestic economic aspect
For geographical reasons, there are not many north-south navigable rivers in China. The 
railroads and the road network are not sufficient (Song, Yann-huei, 1990: 56). A north-south 
shipping route would thus be extremely welcome. This would provide a channel, not only for 
international but also for domestic trade with the main commercial centres on the south and 
east coasts. The Tumen-Rajin route, if  developed, would have the potential to relieve pressure 
on Dalian which is China’s busiest port on the Yellow Sea. Rajin would also be particularly 
useful as a stopover port for international trade (Olson & Morgan, 1992: 69).
3.3 Possible maritime claims
Rights of navigation would not entail rights to sovereign territory or maritime exclusive 
zones. However, China’s possible position on the sovereign and maritime claims of 
navigation is influenced more by its concern to expand its geopolitical sphere of influence 
than by international trade considerations. The East Sea has important sea resources. The 
exploitation of sea resources, especially oil and gas, depends on the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries. It would be able to use fisheries and sea lanes and carry out scientific research in 
the East Sea. This might force the coastal states ‘to review the pending maritime boundary 
issues with reference to the 1982 Convention’ (Park, Choon-Ho, 1993: 70).
3.4 Military value
The importance of the Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone is rooted in Rajin port. The blockage 
of Chinese access to the East Sea not only contributes to the security of the Sea Lanes of 
Communication (SLOC) in the Northwest Pacific but also exerts a great effect on strategic 
positions in Northeast Asia. The three Northeastern Chinese provinces were a key part of 
Japan’s Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere in the 1930s and 1940s. In the 1930s Japan 
expanded Rajin port since it was of strategic importance for its expansion into Manchuria
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(Kim, Yongsam, 1998: 167). Following the visit of Kim II Sung to Moscow in 1984, the 
Soviet Union was permitted by North Korea to use its naval bases of Rajin with Chungjin and 
Wonsan on the east coast, and Nampo on the west coast, as well as to have legal and free use 
of North Korean home waters. This was the Soviet Union’s way around its own strategic 
blockade of the Korea-Tsushima Straits which enabled it to gain access to the major sea-lanes 
in Northeast Asia (Lee, Kitaek, 1987: 50-2). By preventing Chinese access to the Tumen 
River, the Soviet Union was able to put a stop to China’s ambitions in the East Sea and, by 
denying China further access into the Pacific Ocean, thwart its military strategic purposes. In 
this, the gaining of access to the Sea via the Tumen River would help to conduct military 
surveillance operations, according to an interim document, dated May 1987, in the 
‘Restoration of the Access to Tumen River Right Problem’, provided by a ‘Studying Group 
of Restoration of the Access Right to the Tumen River and Open-up to Outside under Jilin 
Province’ (Chen & Yuan, 1996: 128).
3.5 Policy alternative
The paper ‘On Navigation to the Tumen River and Jilin Province’s Open-up to Outside’ by a 
study group dated February 1989 put forward ‘Advance to the Pacific Ocean’ as an important 
goal for Jilin. Access to the East Sea is an important step in this greater goal. In this China 
should build a port at Fangchuan (Ibid.: 134-7). However, in 1992 Jilin recognised that 
building a port at Fangchuan was too expensive and would not be economical given the 
parallel development of port facilities in North Korea (Rajin-Sonbong). For China, 
nevertheless, Fangchuan is still a long-term option, in place of other foreign ports such as 
Zarubino, or Rajin. Alternatively, if  China does gain access to the Tumen River, it may 
construct its own port (Chen & Yuan, 1996: 132-3).
4. Concluding rem arks
One way China has attempted to regain and to reassert its historical claims of navigation to 
the East Sea through the Tumen River is by instituting the TRADP. Regaining navigation 
rights would not only be a psychological victory in the face of the historical loss of this area, 
but also would secure maritime and aid other various national interests.
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III. Stability in the Korean Peninsula
Instability in the Korean Peninsula would necessarily involve Northeast China in political 
confusion, and would damage Chinese prospects of continuing to enjoy peace and 
development. Stability there is thus vital. Part m  will argue that the TRADP is an important 
component of China’s policy towards the Korean Peninsula, as it requires the development of 
the economy of the North. That in turn necessitates the promotion of a peaceful environment 
in Northeast Asia. This part will review briefly China’s relations with the two Koreas, and 
identify China’s various interests in the Peninsula. Lastly, it will investigate how China has 
adopted the TRADP as a part of a new strategy towards North Korea.
1. Evolution of China’s Korea Peninsula policy
China and Korea are neighbouring countries, sharing close cultural ties and a long history. As 
an empire, China required ‘vassals’ that would pay homage to it as the centre of the universe. 
For many centuries a hierarchical system of tributes operated between them. The Koreans, 
drawing upon Confucian ideas, accepted China’s dominant position and were dependent on 
China’s protection. The Chosun Dynasty was recognised by China and this assured dynastic 
stability for five centuries. Yet the influence of the overlord was resented in Korea (Lee, 
Chae-Jin, 1996: 1-2).
Chinese influence waned and was replaced by the Japanese in the late 19th century. From the 
1870s, imperial Japan was already eyeing Korea, and between 1884 and 1895 China and 
Japan engaged in a power struggle over the Korean Peninsula (Cotton, 1995: 204-5). In the 
1920s the Peninsula was a launch-pad for Japanese expansion into Manchuria and for 
outright war with China. After World War II, spheres of influence developed. The US backed 
the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and China (alongside the Soviet Union) sponsored the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). However, the communist victory in 
China’s civil war in 1949 helped to bolster the Kim II Sung regime and, finally, the Korean 
War gave opportunity for China to regain direct influence on the Korean Peninsula (Lee, 
Chae-Jin, 1996: 3-4).
217
During the period of the Cold War and particularly after the Korean War China and North 
Korea enjoyed a working relationship, with China providing diplomatic, military, and 
economic support to North Korea. In 1961 the Treaty of Defence and Mutual Assistance was 
agreed upon with North Korea. During this time, generous grants and loans were given and 
there was some moderate trade conducted between the two countries (Ibid.: 133). China also 
backed North Korea’s position on unification. On the other hand, the relations between China 
and South Korea were tense before and after their confrontation during the Korean War. 
China did not consider South Korea as a legitimate state and relations with it were 
subordinated to its overall policy towards North Korea.
From the end of the 1970s, however, relations with South Korea thawed somewhat and those 
with North Korea also changed. China was being forced to adopt more pragmatic approaches 
in the face of global realities. The Maoist economic model was superseded and economic 
achievements such as those in South Korea became less threatening (Ibid.). 1979 saw indirect 
trading with South Korea taking place. This process continued through the 1980s, and 
diplomatic relations were normalised in 1992. When Gorbachev’s policy became more 
inclined towards the South, the PRC became only backer of North Korea. As a result of its 
dependence on China, North Korea was not going to turn against China to protest against this 
new openness to South Korea. China was in a good position to cultivate South Korea without 
losing North Korea (Ibid.: 134).
Establishing a formal relationship with South Korea also gave China a stronger position vis- 
a-vis the US, Russia, and Japan in the management of Korean Peninsula affairs (Ibid.: 5; 
Kim, Taeho, 1998: 36). Indeed, there seemed to be a great shift o f interest towards the South 
and certainly in trade terms. This jumped from zero to US$20 billion worth in the decade up 
to 1996. South Korean business investment in China has increased enormously, to more than 
US$4 billion in 1996. On the other hand, China soon stopped seeing its involvement in North 
Korea in economic terms, due to the weakness of the North Korean economy. It should be 
noted that in the 1960s and early 1970s the economy of the North was in better shape than the 
South, and North Korea has benefited from the partnership. Trade with China comprised 
about 20% of North Korea’s total foreign trade throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This was a 
large figure for North Korea, but made up a small and decreasing fraction of China’s foreign 
trade, falling from 2.5% in 1970 and 1.7% in 1980s to 0.8% in 1985 and 0.6% in 1989 (Lee, 
Chae-Jin, 1996: 134). From 1990 to 1996, North Korea experienced negative growth rates of
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about minus 4.4% annually, and its total trade volume went down (US$4.7 billion in 1990, 
US$2.6 billion in 1993, and US$2 billion in 1996). Trade volume with China reached a peak 
in 1993, with US$900 million, but this began to decline from 1994 - US$570 million in 1996, 
and US$660 million in 1997 (Kim, Taeho, 1998:40-1).19
Table 6-1. North Korea’s trade with China (1990-1997) Unit: US$ million
Year Imports Exports Total Deficit
1990 358.16 124.57 482.73 233.59
1991 524.78 85.67 610.45 466.11
1992 541.11 155.46 696.57 385.65
1993 602.35 297.29 899.64 305.06
1994 424.52 199.22 623.74 225.30
1995 486.04 63.61 549.65 422.43
1996 497.03 68.64 565.67 428.39
1997 534.68 121.61 656.29 413.07
Source: (China Statistical Yearbook 1997, p. 594, in Kim, Taeho, 1998: 41).
Therefore, although both countries still share many interests, since the 1990s there has been a 
gradual parting of ways in basic policy objectives. North Korea has stubbornly remained in 
its ideological backwater, while China has pragmatically shifted to become more in line with 
changing international economic realities (Lee, Chae-Jin, 1998: 194). National interest has 
proved stronger than the revolutionary solidarity in setting the path of Sino-North Korean 
relations. Indeed it seems that China would like relations with North Korea to become more 
‘normal’, that is, less fraternal and more economically based (Garret & Glaser, 1995: 543). 
1990 saw the abolition of a longstanding friendship price system between the countries, and 
this was replaced by normal international pricing systems. Since the death of Kim II Sung in 
July 1994, relatively low level representatives have visited Pyongyang (Ding Guangen, 
Politburo member, and Luo Gan, Secretary General of the State Council). In contrast the likes 
of General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and Qiao Shi (Chariman of the NPC) 
have visited Seoul (Kim, Taeho, 1998: 47).
19 Although the total amount decreased, the North’s dependence actually increased greatly. See this Chapter, 
pp. 232-5.
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2. China’s interests in the Korean Peninsula
Although the importance of North Korea in China’s foreign relations has been reduced, it 
does not mean that China is about to abandon North Korea. Apart from the fact that there are 
still shared interests derived from the Cold War era, China also sees the medium term 
maintenance of the Korean Peninsula status quo to be of economic, political and strategic 
benefits.
2.1 Geostrategic importance
Shared borders bring China and North Korea together geostrategically. North Korea is the 
closest foreign country to Beijing, as well as to the important heavy industries of the 
Northeast and the strong lower-Yangtze economic region. North Korea has been described as 
the ‘lips and teeth’ of China, that is, the Chinese see North Korea as a useful buffer zone 
(Cotton, 1995: 204-5). China intervened in the Korean War to stop American forces reaching 
the Chinese border and it opposes their presence in a projected united Korea. From a longer 
historical point of view, it is an important buffer against Japan. This is despite the fact that 
China regards the main immediate strategic threat to be from the south or southwest of China 
(Hu, Weixing, 1995b: 53).
2.2 Against ‘peaceful evolution’
Both countries remain committed to their one party political system. Post-1989, when East 
European socialism was toppled from within each state, it is increasingly difficult for China 
to maintain its system unchanged. The paradox is that while China would like to see reforms 
in North Korea, such reforms might lead to an ultimate collapse of its system. Another 
communist collapse so close to home would have severely demoralising consequences and 
increase the likelihood of radical change in China (Lee, Chae-Jin, 1998: 172).
2.3 Stability in Northeast China
Instability in any part of the Korean Peninsula, especially in the North, carries the real threat 
of spill-over effects into China’s Yanbian area (Hu, Weixing, 1995b: 54). As North Korea 
has become relatively poorer compared to the South, to the point of destitution, the threat 
becomes even more real. At a very basic level, there is the danger of tens of thousands of 
North Korean refugees crossing the border to find food. This could have knock on effects for 
the economy of the whole region.
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2.4 The North Korea card
Of all the major powers in the region China still carries the most influence in North Korea 
through existing political and military ties. Russia’s relations with North Korea have been 
strained throughout the 1990s. This has provided China with its ‘North Korean card’ which it 
has skilfully played, sometimes against the South (against the North, China now also has a 
South Korean card), or against the US and the wider international community. Here China’s 
supposed influence over North Korea’s nuclear politics is an extremely strong bargaining 
tool, although this must be balanced against the adverse implications to China of American 
and Japanese counter measures, including ballistic missile defence systems. Therefore, China 
will not give up this card lightly and thus it will continue to cultivate its relationship with 
North Korea.
2.5 Uncertainties in the wake of Korean unification
The reunification of Korea is now admitted by some Chinese affairs analysts to be a distinct 
though distant probability. With the seemingly irreversible decline of the North, it can be 
considered inevitable with South Korea emerging at some point as the unifying force 
(Manning & Przystup, 1998: 6-8). This is of great concern to the Chinese, who realise it 
would destabilise the regional balance of power. Not only that, but a unified Korea, in 
contrast to the reunification of Germany which integrated the German Democratic Republic 
into the EU and NATO, could become an independent free-standing entity, not necessarily 
friendly towards China. The US might win security arrangements with a unified Korea, thus 
destroying the wish of China to keep the Peninsula as a buffer in favour of its strategic 
interests (Lee, Chae-Jin, 1996: 173-4). The case of Vietnam is a good basis for such 
concerns. China found itself in 1979 facing armed hostility with a reunified Vietnam after 
having previously maintained close relations of comradeship. Thus a unified Korea is an 
unknown quantity and China’s unwillingness to see a change in the status quo reflects this 
(Ibid.: 173), even though the Chinese anticipate enjoying closer relations with a unified 
Korea than Japan would.
2.6 ‘Two-Koreas’ as a reflection of China’s core interests
China thus maintains a two-Koreas policy, cultivating relationships with both Koreas, while 
at the same time working towards economic cooperation in the region which would promote 
political stability. This is in its security as well as its economic interests (Hu, Weixing,
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1995b: 64). As Li Peng himself stressed, ‘[P]eace and stability in the Korean Peninsula serves 
the interests of China, which is in the midst of a massive economic modernisation 
programme’. China cannot afford any negative economic impact, let alone the costs of direct 
conflict, or indeed the consequences of relatively peaceful reunification (Kim, Ilpyung, 1998: 
109).
In sum, China’s Korean Peninsula policy is to establish what Ferdinand calls the ZOPPFAN 
(ZOPFAN in the ASEAN context), that is, a region of ‘Zone of Peace, Prosperity, Freedom 
and Neutrality’ (Fredinand, 2000), at a time when China is concentrating on its domestic 
development.
3. Policy measures
Being less inhibited by an ideological straightjacket, China’s main worry in relation to a 
unified Korea is the stance that such a state might take towards China rather than the political 
system it might espouse. The support provided to the North is a strategically calculated move 
to keep in the good books of a united Korea in the light of the scenarios China foresees 
developing.
3.1 Political and security support
Political and security support for the North continues. Indeed, since the demise of the Soviet 
Union, China is now North Korea’s only real sponsor. After Kim II Sung’s meeting with 
Deng Xiaoping in October 1991, a package of military aid was offered to North Korea, with 
the aim of maintaining at least a semblance of military balance on the Peninsula (Lee, Chae- 
Jin, 1998: 200). China has sought recognition of North Korea by the US and Japan, and the 
normalisation of relations. It achieved this through persuading the US and Japan, and giving 
advice and policy support to North Korea. In a wider arena, China has supported North 
Korea’s actions in the UN (Ibid.: 170). Even on the North Korean nuclear issue, China has 
been supportive of North Korean military and diplomatic positions as demonstrated by their 
stance in the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), although China had 
supported the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, signed in 
December 1991 and the implementation of the US-North Korean Geneva agreement 
concluded in October 1994. The Chinese have certain security guarantees towards North
222
Korea in place and, as a matter of strategic policy, they will continue to honour these (Ibid.: 
171).
3.2 Economic support
The economic chaos in North Korea is a major concern to China. Although North Korea has 
had very little buying power, its dependence on China has remained relatively high. This is 
due to the fact that much of the trade is in the form of barter along border areas, and oil and 
grain provided by China was more or less given as aid.20 More than 70% of North Korea’s 
trade in 1993 was conducted with China, Russia, Japan, and Hong Kong, and 40% of the total 
trade volume was with China and Hong Kong, its largest trading partner (Kim, Taeho, 1998: 
45). In May 1996, a ‘Sino-DPRK Economic and Technological Exchange Agreement’ was 
signed. Under this China agreed to provide 0.5 million tonnes of grain, 1.2 million tonnes of 
crude oil, and 1.5 million of coal for 5 consecutive years. Half of this was aid and half sold at 
a friendship price. China also revived the friendly price which it had abolished earlier in 
1993. It can be said that since 1996 China’s North Korea policy has moved to a policy of 
considering long-term interests (Song, Munhong, 1997: 236-8). In addition some of North 
Korea’s unpaid debts were rescheduled or cancelled (Lee, Chae-Jin, 1996: 140), despite the 
fact that many Chinese companies have suffered or gone bankrupt as a result of North 
Korea’s mounting debt.
4. The TRADP: China’s best means to lead the reform of North Korean system
In the short to medium term Beijing will continue to offer economic support to North Korea 
as a means of extending the present political status quo. But the Chinese supportive trade may 
not last long,21 because China wants to reduce its economic burden vis-a-vis North Korea. 
China is seeking ways to minimise its costs and has already reduced financial support for the 
three Northeastern provinces which engage in below-cost trade with North Korea (Kim, 
Taeho, 1998: 52). As the Korean proverb goes, China wants to teach North Korea ‘how to 
fish’ rather than simply knowing ‘how to eat fish’, by providing North Korea with a model
20 Over 40% o f Sino-North Korean trade passes through the border between China’s Jilin province and North 
Korea’s Tumen River area (Kim, Samuel, 1994b: 19).
21 The border trade volume between North Korea and China accounted for 21.1% (US$129 million) o f the total 
trade volume in 1996, and 32.2% (US$218 million) in 1997 (9fn, Kim, Tae Ho, 1998: 42).
22 But the costs o f the Chinese Northeast provinces’ collapse might be much more greater. As a result, it is its 
economic weakness that enables the North to exercise some influence over China.
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for economic modernisation and encouragement.23 Building on pre-existing border trade, the 
TRADP is not only an urgent measure that may help to keep North Korea afloat, but may 
even prove to be quite profitable while at the same time introducing concepts of market 
reform (Cotton, 1995: 206-7). 24 This would be an improvement over China’s past short-term 
approach of economic rescue. China has encouraged the North to reform and it is also 
looking to the TRADP to function as a catalyst, in order to reduce the burden of supporting 
the North and to increase its prospects for survival.
4.1 The process of political and economic reform
The only way to stabilise the Korean Peninsula might be to encourage economic development 
that would underpin political stability in the North. China has been encouraging North Korea 
to become more independent economically through growth and opening itself to the outside 
world (Lee, Hong Yung, 1994: 107). The South, increasingly strong, is now a major 
challenge to the North, militarily as well as economically. North Korea must follow the route 
of ‘hard state and soft economy’ as trod by China's reformers in its own way. In the past 
North Korea adopted aspects of the Chinese model such as the Great Leap Forward, in its 
ch ’ollima (flying horse) movement and Mao’s philosophy of self-reliance in its juche 
ideology. If North Korea continues and succeeds in this, the outcome will be significant. 
Reduced social, economic, and political differences between the two Koreas may help a 
transition to a more peaceful reunification that is not wholly driven by the South (Ibid.: 108-
9).
Since the early 1980s China has been prevailing on North Korea to follow its steps in opening 
up cautiously to the outside world. In 1983 Kim Jong II visited China between 2 and 12 June, 
1981, and was encouraged to consider Chinese economic and political policies as a 
potentially beneficial model for North Korea. An editorial in Nodong Shinmun on 2 June 
1984, one year after the visit, went into details of the trip and looked at how it affected North 
Korea’s foreign policy. The Chinese model meant adopting new laws on joint ventures, 
opening free economic and trade zones, and inviting foreign investment through tax breaks. 
A more recent North Korea newspaper report dealt with the use of foreign capital for 
economic modernisation in North Korea (Kim, Ilpyong, 1998: 104-5). In November 1990, 
there were meetings with North Korean Premier, Yon Hyong Muk in China. The Deputy
23 For the Chinese perspective o f North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong FEZ, see (Wu, Delie, 1996).
24 Who will provide the massive infrastructure investment and technology remains unanswered.
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Premier, Kim Tal Hyon, and the Chinese Vice Premier Wu Xueqian, signed an agreement on 
economic assistance to North Korea. Premier Yon went with Jiang Zemin to the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to see the Chinese model of economic modernisation in 
operation, and this SEZ was used as a model in North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade 
Zone. Jiang Zemin impressed on Yon that Shenzhen proved that an open-door economic 
policy was possible within a socialist system. He also made the point that socialist ideology 
led to economic reform and that socialism need not result in economic difficulties (Ibid.: 
107).
4.2 Preserving an economic buffer in a reunited Korea
The Korean Peninsula is central to future regional schemes of a political or economic nature, 
and this explains China’s strong interest to be at the heart of the TRADP (Cotton, 1995: 206- 
7). The TRADP is an important strategic block in China’s North Korea policy. China’s long­
term plan for Northeast Asian multilateral cooperation is based on the division of labour and 
mutual competitiveness within a free trade area. This kind of a relationship requires present 
good relations and strong economic cooperation with North Korea in advance of 
reunification. Any further opening of North Korea to regional trade will undoubtedly be in 
China’s interests. The DPRK provides China with a useful economic buffer zone, which 
would disappear if the regime there were to fall apart. China may be able to limit the negative 
impact in strategic terms of a collapse of the North by investing now in the North, and 
building better trading relationships with the South (Snyder, 1996: 10).
Current tendencies suggest that Beijing favours economic development in the North. Chinese 
capital flow into North Korea is an important phenomenon. A major newspaper in South 
Korea ran the headline ‘The Winds of Change in North Korea’ and reported that up to 5,000 
overseas Chinese were carrying out business there, with the accompanying capital investment 
that entailed (Joongang Ilbo, 29 July 1997, in Kim, Ilpyong, 1998: 109).25 China itself has a 
50 year concession to operate trains from Raj in and the three northeastern Chinese provinces. 
The Tyson Group from Hong Kong has invested in a motorway from Raj in to Wonjong, in 
the Rajin International Hotel, and in taxi services (Lee, Hgul, 1995: 173-4). The Hong Kong- 
based Emperor Group had plans to build a casino and hotel complex in the zone. According 
to the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA), of the 56 foreign companies in Rajin-
25 For the report on commercial interest o f overseas Chinese capital in Rajin-Sonbong FEZ, see (Ahn, Sangho, 
1996: 52).
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Sonbong in June 1996, 70% of them were from China and Hong Kong. One North Korean 
source says although it is small in scale, 100% of foreign capital in the Rajin-Sonbong free 
market is Chinese (Song, Munhong, 1997: 236-8). After the Rajin-Sonbong Investment 
Forum held in September 1996, US$265 million of investment was pledged by five 
companies. Most investments have direct or indirect Chinese connections, that the Chinese 
government is supportive of the economic development that North Korea is tentatively taking 
(Snyder, 1996: 4).26
5. Concluding remarks
Beijing has sought a pragmatic and balanced two Koreas policy in the interest of maintaining 
stability and the status quo. Within this approach, continued support to North Korea is a key 
component, with near term objectives being stability within North itself. Thus while building 
better official relations with South Korea, China is providing bilateral help as well as 
informal support through cross-border trade and barter to the North in order to prevent, for as 
long as possible, collapse of the North (Ibid.: 1-2). By doing so China is also positioning 
itself to be ready for reunification. Fostering relations with the South has long term payoffs in 
that the South is likely to be the leading player in the future reunification process.
IV. Taking the initiative in regional distribution of power
East Asia is where China’s vital interests remain. What kind of meaning and function does 
the TRADP have in Beijing’s regional economic development and in the regional distribution 
of power? Part IV initially assesses the backdrop to the major changes in China’s foreign 
policy in the 1990s. It then moves on to discuss how regionalism has developed as a pivot of 
China’s omni-directional foreign policy and especially its good neighbourly diplomacy.
26 However, given the importance o f these objectives, Beijing has not put more resource into the TRADP.
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1. Asia-Pacific focused Omni-directional foreign policy
In the post-Cold War world order, China has become less of a large strategic player in the 
global balance of power and Beijing has had to rethink China’s role in global affairs and to 
determine afresh what are its vital interest are. The result was a refocusing on the Asia- 
Pacific region. China has adopted an omni-dimensional policy which aims at capitalising on 
the adjacent centres of external Chinese communities, described by the Hong Kong Scholar 
Huang Zhilian as being a ‘Greater South China Circle’ centring on Hong Kong and Taiwan, a 
‘Yangtze Circle’ around on Shanghai, a ‘Bohai Circle’ taking in Tianjin and Dalian to South 
Korea,27 and a ‘Southwest China Circle’ connecting Sichuan and Yunnan to Southeast Asia 
(Huang, 1988, pp. 14-5, cited in Harding, 1995: 19).
Some scholars have discussed these new dimensions in Chinese foreign policy in the 1990s. 
Hsiung has defined it as ‘rational pragmatism’ or ‘omni-directional diplomacy’, or 
‘globalised zhoubian diplomacy’ (Hsiung, 1995). The globalised good-neighbour policy 
campaign can be summed up in a few steps: i) strengthening existing ties in the Asia-Pacific; 
ii) mending fences in South Asia and West Asia; iii) exploring new frontiers in Central Asia; 
iv) cultivating closer ties with Europe; v) venturing into Latin America in search of new 
friends and better relations with existing ones; and vi) wooing the support of ‘Business 
America’. Zhoubian diplomacy in the 1990s has been called ‘a highly active and visible 
diplomatic offensive to recover China's international standing’ (Ibid.: 573).
Liu and others (1996: 173-5) have stressed the importance of the Asia-Pacific in Chinese 
foreign policy with the three circles-pattem open model: The first circle (or inner circle) 
consists of China’s closest neighbours. Apart from Japan, most of these are the Asian NIEs. 
They border directly or indirectly with Chinese border provinces. The second circle includes 
North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand and the South Pacific region. These 
countries are economically developed states. South America and Africa make up the third 
circle of mainly developing countries, which are remote from China by distance, and thus 
connections with these have been minimal. The most important foundation for Chinese 
geopolitical strategy is to strengthen cooperation in all fields with states and territories in the 
Asia-Pacific in general and East Asia in particular.
27 ‘The Bohai Circle’ does not involve external Chinese communities.
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China’s circle-pattem directional diplomacy can be summarised by Huang’s notion of 
‘triangular relationships’. In his view China faces a new configuration of three ‘triangular 
relationships’ - small, medium, and large in the Asia-Pacific region. These are the small 
triangle (mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong), the medium triangle (China, four NIEs, 
ASEAN), and the large triangle (China, Japan, the US). These three triangles are the main 
framework for China’s economic strategy in the region. In the Asia-Pacific economy, 
therefore China’s optimum strategy would be to base its strength on the ‘small triangle’, to 
reinforce the ‘medium triangle’, and from there to tackle the ‘large triangle’. That is, it should 
develop the economic and trade relationship and cooperation between the mainland, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan as its main source of trading. It should reinforce bilateral or multilateral 
sub-regional cooperation with ASEAN and South Korea, and promote mutually 
complementary relations with them. The resulting production for export can be targeted at 
overseas markets (Latin America, Australia, and Europe). Finally, China should deal in 
whatever way is appropriate with such developed countries as the US, Japan, Canada, and 
Australia in order to manipulate factors in the external environment to bring about economic 
prosperity in China (Huang, Fanzhang, 1994: 12-5).
2. Sub-regionalism as a pivot of Omni-directional foreign policy
There are advantages to this strategy. A European model of a large single market would be 
difficult to follow due to major differences in the political and social systems in East Asia and 
Asia Pacific. However, sub-regional economic zones (SREZs) of a partial nature are feasible 
in that such SREZs between China’s border provinces and the neighbouring regions will help 
economic development in China's northeast and southwest regions (Ibid.: 15-6).
China has taken some steps to organise and establish such SREZs to create an international 
division of labour (Goodman, 1994: 2-3). Without going back to a planned economy, Chinese 
economic policy-makers have allowed markets to allocate economic tasks to more ‘smaller, 
geographically delimited, regional entities’ (Simon & Lee, 1995: xii). The use of SREZs, 
from Beijing’s point of view, is a ‘manageable vehicle’ (Segal, 1994b: 38). Beijing has been 
able to decentralise decision-making on some issues, especially economic ones. This has 
happened on a piecemeal basis resulting in the creation of different types of SREZs. 
Similarly, Beijing has been happy to see the development of SEZs (Ibid.: 55).
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That sub-regionalism was an element of China’s foreign policy was suggested by some 
Chinese scholars and institutes. Although these accounts do not necessarily represent official 
policy, we may get a hint of things to come from the Chinese ideas. An ‘Internal Manuscript 
of Asia-Pacific 1993’, for government consumption only and published by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science (CASS), proposed a ‘Segmental Omni-dimensional strategy’, 
with three sub-dimensions. In the first dimension (A1-B1-C1-D1), the ‘Northeast Asia 
Economic Circle’, the aim was to bring together Japanese and South Korean technology with 
the cheaper labour of Northeast China, the Russian Far East, North Korea and Mongolia. The 
second (A2-B2-C2-D2) focuses on eastern China. The ‘Yangzi River Circle’ could be used to 
create a link with South Korea, through the western part of Japan (Kyushu, Guansai) to the 
rest of Japan and Taiwan, and finally NAFTA. The third ‘South China Economic Circle’ (A3- 
B3-C3-D3) proposes to make an economic link from the Southeast of China, Hong Kong, and 
Macao to Australia, New Zealand, and even the South Pacific Ocean (See Figure 6-3) (Lee, 
Hee Ok, 1994).
Similar ideas were supported in ‘China’s Regional Co-operative Development Plan’, by the 
Chinese State Council in 1993. In this three economic circles are seen as having real 
potential: the ‘Northeast Asia Economic Circle’, ‘South China Economic Circle’, and 
‘Central Asia Economic Circle’ (Bae, 1995: 18; Chen, Jiaqin, 1995). In this proposal the 
government planned the Yangzi River Area Circle with ‘Central Asia Economic Circle’ 
which covers the Chinese Northwest (Xinjiang, Yugur), five former Soviet countries in 
central Asia, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. China believes that it can move out from a strong 
triangular relationship between the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. There can then be better 
multilateral cooperation with ASEAN, South Korea, and Singapore, and finally the US, 
Japan, Canada, and Australia could be challenged (Huang, Fanzhang, 1994: 19).
2.1 South China Economic Circle (SCEC)
The ‘South China Economic Circle’ (SCEC), whose objective is to bring together 
comparative production advantages in a market economy, covers China, Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan, and even reaches out to Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific. It is 
conceived as part of China's open-door policy and has brought some wealth to each region. 
Within the whole there are two smaller spheres (Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao economic 
sphere and the Fujian-Taiwan economic sphere) (Ji, Congwei, 1995: 28).
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2.2 Central Asia Economic Circle (CAEC)
The ‘Central Asia Economic Circle’ (CAEC) includes the Chinese Northwest (Xinjiang, 
Yugur), the five former Soviet countries in central Asia, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. There is 
some local border trade and other economic and technological cooperation between Xinjiang 
Yugur Autonomous Region and the former Soviet Union and Pakistan. Economic relations 
and trade exist between Tibet, India, and Nepal; between Yunnan and countries like 
Myanmar; and between Yunnan-Guagxi and Vietnam-Laos (Friske, 1994: 120; See also 
Beijing Review, 1996; Zhang Xiaodong, 1992: 12-3; Wu, Youde, 1995; Xu, Chunxiu, 1995).
2.3 Northeast Economic Circle (NEEC)
The ‘Northeast Asia Economic Circle’ (NEEC) involves Japan and South Korean the one 
hand as wealthy centres of finance and know-how, with Northeast China, Russia, North 
Korea and Mongolia where natural resources are plentiful and labour cheap. In addition to the 
TRADP, this circle has four economic proposals, which use similar economic ideas but 
different names. Yet they are being discussed only among scholars, except for the Bohai Sea 
Rim area.
The Yellow Sea Economic Zone
As its name suggests, this zone stretches along the northern coast of China from Liaoning 
down to Shanghai. It includes Korea’s west coast and Kyushu in Japan. This region is one of 
the most heavily populated areas in Asia. Because of the size of the population and the 
already established markets in Japan and South Korea, there is a great potential for the goods 
and services markets, perhaps more so for non-tradable goods and services in the immediate 
future (Kim, Won Bae, 1990; Hwang, In-Joung, 1992).
The Sea o f  Japan Rim sphere
This economic sphere is still in the early states of planning. It has support from the western 
prefectures of Japan which need to look west access to the East Sea for new relations. The 
sphere includes the eastern coast of the areas and the Siberian coastline up to Taiwan (Ji, 
Chongwei, 1995: 28-29).
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The Bohai Sea Rim area
The area covered by the Bohai Sea Rim in central to growth in the whole of Northeast Asia. 
Centred on Beijing and the sea port of Tianjin, there are well-established industries, both 
heavy and light and it has natural mineral and plentiful human resources. The area reaches 
out over Hebei, Liaoning and Shandong, and into north, central and western China. The East 
Sea gives access to the Korean Peninsula, and there are connections to the Russian Far East 
(Ibid.: 29).
The Heilongjiang economic sphere
This is a smaller scale sphere between Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Russia and Mongolia. It 
aims to develop border trade, labour cooperation and joint investment (Friske, 1994: 120).
These new conceptions differ from earlier discussions of ‘Greater China* in several ways. 
First, there are several economic centres, not only Hong Kong. Whether or not this makes 
economic sense, the SREZs are politically attractive, particularly since most of these smaller 
economic circles are not solely Chinese. For example, the NEEC foresees interaction with 
economies where ethnic Chinese are not the economic leaders (Harding, 1995: 19). In 
contrast to the early ideas for a Greater China, Russia and the NIEs, for example, are 
centrally involved.
Another difference is that these economic circles are fairly informally based, with little 
institutional structure or cross-over with existing institutional or state structure. This helps in 
reaching some kind of international cooperation, and avoids limits on sovereignty through 
multilateral agreements. Finally, a number of economic circles give China the flexibility to 
apply different policies for development to regions with different economic and resource 
conditions as appropriate (Christoffersen, 1996a: 1070).
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Figure 6-3. China’s Segmental Omni-dimensional Cooperative Strategy
Zhang Hai-ming, Yatai Ziliao (Neibu Ganwu), 1993-3, 18 January 1993, Yazhou 
Taipingyang Yanjiusuo, The Chinese Institute o f Social Science, Beijing, China, in 
Heeok, 1994).
A1 (Three Northeastern Chinese provinces, Beijing, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong) 
B1 (Korean Peninsula) C l (Japan) D1 (Liaodong, Mongolia, Russian Far East)
A2 (Changjiang Sanjiaozhou) B2 (South Korea, Western part of Japan)
C2 (Entire Japan, Taiwan) D2 (The United States, Canada)
A3 (Hainan, Guangsi, Guangdong, Fujian) B3 (Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan) 
C3 (ASEAN) D3 (Australia, New Zeland)
D (Asia-Pacific region)
2.4 Strategic objectives of China’s sub-regionalism policy
The international situation has developed and is constantly changing, and China’s global and 
regional diplomacy has become more active than ever. China has gradually moved from 
seeking unilateral advantage from what was offered by international institutions to 
participating in multilateral international bodies to promote its own ideas for international 
norms and regimes. It has pursued its policies at two levels. One is to actively participate in 
the international organizations, such as APEC, at a macro level. The other is to take part in 
sub-regional economic cooperation, such as SREZs, at a micro level.
In 1991 China joined the APEC forum and two years later in 1993 it became a founder 
member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).28 One Chinese scholar explains how China 
sees APEC. He argues that the building of APEC institutions will go ahead and in general 
China goes along with this. APEC offers China a forum where it can participate in the 
international scene, but which will not bind it to agreements that are not in its interests 
(Zhang, Yunling, 1998: 221-3). However, there are strong checking powers, such as the US 
and Japan, within APEC.
China remains concerned that APEC will be dominated by the US (Ibid.: 220-1). There is a 
feeling that if APEC become more institutionalised this would allow the US to exert more 
influence on it for its own purposes (Nesadurai, 1996). The Pacific community idea relates to 
a US desire to see a multilateral security framework institutionalised in the region. Such a 
framework would work alongside Washington’s bilateral security arrangements (Yamakage, 
1997: 293-4). Japan, a potential partner, is also a rival. Throughout the 1980s and in the first 
half of the 1990s China became increasingly wary of Japan’s growing status as an economic 
superpower and as leader in the East Asian regional economy (Mochizuki, 1995, also in 
Blachard, 2000: 281). The view of Chinese analysts remains that Japan sees a Pacific 
community as a place for a Japan-dominated economic sphere of influence (Deng, Yong,
9 01997: 375-6). The Chinese think that the US and Japan have attempted to resist the rise of 
China, so that these countries can maintain their influence in the region.
28 Indeed China has become an important player in the ASEAN-led search for the right level o f regionalism, a 
process which also involves political dialogue (Hu, Weixing, 1996b: 59).
9 Concerns about Japan’s objectives in regional cooperation were expressed by Huan Xiang, leading scholar- 
advisor o f Chinese foreign policy: ‘Japan is now gung-ho about extending its force in the Asia-Pacific region 
through investments and trade. It is an attempt to form a so-called East Asia economic ring led by Japan. The 
circle is supposed to encompass Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and the members o f the 
Association o f Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).... Japan aims to gradually set up and lead an East Asian
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The strategy of China has been to divide the wider region into units that could be more easily 
influenced by China that is not strong enough to be considered the dominant regional power 
(Christoffersen, 1996a: 1081). China has thus made an effort to pursue its good-neighbourly 
policy through a number of sub-regional economic cooperation projects such as the TRADP 
and the Greater Mekong Sub-regional Development Project. There are some strategic 
motivations.
Basically, SREZs such as the TRADP would allow China to acquire foreign technology and 
capital in the face of existing Western restrictions on technology transfer to China. This 
would reduce its dependence on Japan (Blanchard, 2000: 282, 284). Then, a sub-regional 
economic grouping such as the TRADP serves China as a counter-balance, against Western 
protectionism and regional bloc formation in Western Europe and North America, although 
such groupings are not meant to replicate the functions of the EU or NAFTA. Some Chinese 
researchers have argued that ‘the external pressure of competition implies all the countries in 
Northeast Asia to inevitably choose the path of jointly developing the international economic 
cooperation in this region’ (Peng & Yang, 1995, p. 2, in Blanchard, 2000: 283).
Third, China sought to counteract the Japanese influence which they felt permeated the whole 
region. Blanchard argues that in the early 1990s when the project was actively discussed 
Japan was the ‘lead goose’ under the flying geese model of economic development. China 
did not want to be a follower and thus proposed the Tumen project. Beijing did not plan on 
excluding Japan from such projects, because Japan was a vital source of significant capital 
and technology and was the key to making the projects feasible. The framework of the 
TRADP, however, would allow China to take the lead from Japan in shaping economic 
cooperation in Northeast Asia. China could more effectively influence the Japanese, since it 
was an organisation initiated by the Chinese (Ibid.: 282).
Lastly, it advanced China’s efforts to avoid international isolation and to maintain diplomatic 
clout. Previously, in the wake of the Tiananmen crisis, China had turned to Asia and regional 
cooperation initiatives in order to obtain allies that could help it withstand Western 
diplomatic and economic pressures (Ibid.: 284). Such sub-regional groupings in East Asia
economic circle in preparation for further conquests in Australia, New Zealand and Latin America’, (Huan 
Xiang, 1989, pp. 17-18, quoted in Deng, Yong, 1997: 377).
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could also create a political front that would make it difficult for the US to deal with states in 
the region through bilateral arrangements. Although China has not committed to the 
geographical scope of APEC and despite its corresponding commitment to the open policy, 
such sub-regional groupings could be more ‘advantageous’ for China. The SREZs could 
provide a means whereby Russia, the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), and the 
ASEAN countries could join China against ‘meiri kongzhi he liyong ' [US-Japan dominance 
and exploitation], also called the Nichibei hegemon, in the region (Jia Bei, 1989, pp. 46-52, 
cited in 17fii, Christoffersen, 1996a: 1073). China saw that the TRADP could bring the NIEs 
and Russia into a part of China’s Northeast Economic Circle strategy. It sought to cultivate 
regional relationships to defend itself against American and Japanese strategies (Ibid.: 1079).
Conclusion
Our starting point was that all economic activities have political motivations. Political 
purposes are an important factor in the case of the TRADP. This chapter was directed 
primarily towards investigating those political objectives at which China has aimed. There 
are four motivations for the project: i) to diffuse the resentment of the Korean minority being 
felt amid coastal development; ii) to access the East Sea through the Tumen River; iii) to add 
leverage to China’s North Korea policy; and iv) to build a platform from which to compete 
with other major powers. China hoped that the Tumen project could help achieve its strategic 
objectives, in the words of one Korean proverb, ‘killing many birds with one stone’. 
However, the Tumen project did not go in the direction China has planned. Problems at 
various levels both outside and inside China worked against the plan. The next two chapters 
will look at what kinds of obstacles lie ahead for the Chinese plans for the TRADP.
30 An interview in 1992 at the Asia-Pacific Studies Institute with Deputy Director Shi Min, cited in 
(Christoffersen, 1996a: 1079).
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Chapter Seven. Economic and Institutional Constraints on the 
TRADP
Introduction
At the beginning of 1990s, the TRADP was seen as a great opportunity for promoting the 
regional economic development of the neighbouring countries. In theory, as shown in 
Chapter Three, the project was a great idea, with vision and goals. It promised to bring 
together a synergies and logical combination of advantages of member countries. It might 
have been a success, but now less than ten years later there is little hope of reviving 
enthusiasm for this project as each nation has begun to realise that its expectations will not be 
met. What were the chief obstacles that obstructed China’s TRADP policy? As remarked 
earlier in Chapter Two, the deciding factors for the success or failure of such multinational 
economic projects are firstly sufficient economic incentives to the private sector, and more 
crucially, political commitment by the relevant governments. Chapters Seven and Eight 
intend to explain why China’s TRADP policies have not been successful.
While Chapter Eight will comment on the political and security challenges that faced China 
at the domestic and international levels with regard to the project, Chapter Seven will analyse 
it on two different levels: a) The diverging national interests of the participants; and b) The 
economic and institutional constraints. Divided into three parts, Part I will summarise the 
evolution of the project at inter-governmental level, and review the progress that has been made 
since 1990. This will enable an understanding of the project from the time of inception and its 
subsequent development over the last decade (1990-2000), highlighting the complicated 
relationships between major players (governments, private sector, and international 
organisations). Based on the description of the zigzag evolution of the project, Part II will 
first evaluate the challenges to the project from the varying commitments of the five other 
TRADP countries (Russia, Mongolia, the two Koreas, and Japan), and Part m  will then look 
at the formidable economic problems inherent in the project itself.
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I. Evolution of the TRADP: An overview1
Since the initial discussions began at the July 1990 Changchun First International Symposium 
on Economic and Technological Development in Northeast Asia, the TRADP was adopted at 
inter-governmental level. Despite some achievements, however, the development of the project 
has been limited, because the member countries have been cautious about taking risks. The 
project has gone through various phases. This section describes the last ten years in three 
different phases: desire (1990-94), practice (1995-97), and stagnation (1998-2000). These 
illustrate the difficulties as they emerged within the chronological evolution of the project.
1. Time o f ‘desire’ (1990-94)
From 1990 to 1994 there was a period of developing the goodwill for some form of 
cooperation. However, there were unresolved problems. The complex nature of the project 
was underestimated, a suitable model for cooperation was not agreed upon, and the role of 
the UNDP in dispute, in addition to the question of defining precise objectives.
Initially, the TRADP concept was first developed at the Northeast Asia Economic and 
Technology Cooperation Conference in Changchun, Jilin Province, China, sponsored by the 
East-West Centre, Hawaii, and the UNDP on 16-18 July 1990. At the conference, the Chinese 
representatives promoted the ‘golden triangle* concept (contiguous areas known as the TREZ). 
The UNDP expressed its great interest in the concept. From July 6-7 1991 the UNDP called a 
Northeast Asia Sub-regional Programme meeting in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, with China, 
Mongolia and North and South Korea. The outcome was the UNDP’s offer of funding for the 
TRADP for the initial period 1992-1996, and indeed the TRADP developed to be the 
UNDP’s largest project. The UNDP found its role as a co-ordinator or facilitator between the 
four participating states, and was also requested to approach Russia and Japan to secure their 
investment. It also put together a team of expert advisors to develop feasibility studies, which 
produced the so-called ‘Mission Report’. This report gave a strategic and conceptual basis to 
the discussions until then, and came up with the fundamental guidelines. It addressed the
1 Unless given a citation, this description is based on Annex I: Timeline for the Evolution o f  Regional 
Cooperation in the Tumen River Area and Northeast Asia Pertaining to UNDP, UN Agency, and other Donor 
and Private Sector Involvement and Support, 1990-1999, provided by ERINA, Japan; See also ‘Tumen 
Programme Outline’, Tumen River Area Development Programme, which is available at 
http://tradp.org/textonly/history.htm.
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issues of what regional development should mean as a concept, how nations might perceive 
the process, what international agreements might be necessary, the infrastructure 
developments needed, human resources, industry, commerce and tourism development. A 
Tumen River development study was also proposed (Choi, Hoil, 1995: 278-9).
On 16-18 October 1991, at the Tumen Project Conference in Pyongyang, the UNDP established 
that the project would require a probable investment budget of US$30 billion for the project. Six 
countries (the two Koreas, Mongolia and China and observers from the Soviet Union and Japan) 
decided to establish a Programme Management Committee (PMC) to consist of three 
representatives from each country and to be responsible for managing the TRADP activities. 
The UNDP would also be represented in the PMC, and would organise and chair its meetings 
(Ibid.: 279). As part of a preparatory assistance project the UNDP agreed to a budget of US$3.5 
million for 3 years 1992-1994 to finance a Programme Management Office (PMO) in New 
York. It was also decided that National Teams and Working Groups would be set up to support 
the activities of the PMC. In November 12 the Soviet Union and Japan were invited to become 
full members of the TRADP. While the Soviet Union accepted membership, Japan declined and 
remained an observer. Also at the end of November, the UNDP published the TRADP 
feasibility study (the ‘Mission Report’). Under the auspices and co-ordination of the UNDP, a 
series of conferences were held to discuss issues such as patterns of development, industrial 
structure, infrastructure constructions, communication and transportation systems, laws, and 
environment (Kim, Icksoo, 1994a: 27-30; See also Yuan, Shuren et al., 1995).
From the start of 1992, all TRADP participants were encouraged by the positive preliminary 
reports from the UNDP and their mutual understanding. Throughout the PMC discussions, a 
series of showcase or mega-projects were proposed. In February 1992, the first Tumen PMC 
meeting was held in Seoul, while the first TRADP Legal and Financial Workshop was in New 
York. The full members from China, Mongolia, and the two Koreas, as well as observers from 
Russia, Japan and the ADB attended the PMC. The members agreed that the TRADP should 
proceed step-by-step and adopt three different concepts of the development area: the TREZ, the 
TREDA, and the NEARDA. In April the first Director of the PMO in New York was appointed, 
and the TRADP Secretariat Office was established in New York in August. In October the 
second Tumen PMC meeting was held in Beijing. Priority objectives of the meeting were the
2 A total o f five Working Groups (WG) are, namely Telecommunications WG, Infrastructure WG, Environment 
WG, Investment WG, and Co-ordination, Harmonisation & Promotion WG.
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establishment of sector-specific workshops and discussion of the legal and institutional 
framework for regional cooperation. At the second PMC meeting, Russia officially joined as the 
fifth full member. Japan, Finland, the World Bank, and the ADB sent observers.3 The five full 
members and the UNDP signed the Programme Document, approving the eighteen-month pre­
investment phase of the TRADP and providing US$4.5 million from the UNDP resources.4 This 
fund was earmarked for work on the initial pre-feasibility studies on legal/institutional/financial 
issues, infrastructure, and foreign trade. All members agreed on the four basic principles 
resulting from the two Working Group meetings, which were held in April and July/August 
1992: i) retention of sovereignty over all land leased to the TRADP;5 ii) land leases to be 
negotiated according to the sovereign investment laws of individual countries; iii) international 
management; and iv) maximum attractiveness to international investment. Other important 
issues they settled on were the functions and composition of an inter-governmental body and 
international cooperation. Given the broad range of issues encompassing NEARDA, it was 
agreed that there should be an inter-governmental co-ordinating commission, similar to the 
existing PMC, including all members. There would also be a consulting committee consisting of 
the three riparian countries (North Korea, China and Russia) and other shareholders.
The discussions of such proposals were extended to the third TRADP PMC meeting, which 
was held in Pyongyang in May 9-11, 1993. Here legal and institutional issues for future 
regional cooperation were discussed, and concepts of integrated development explored, 
including the idea of a UN ‘core city*. There were of course unresolved issues, but member 
countries agreed to explore the feasibility of a Tumen River Area Development Company 
(TRADCO),6 which could be responsible for leasing land in the ‘TREZ’ (Yanji/Hunchun/ 
Rajin/Khasan/Vladivostok triangle). Japan and Finland again sent observers (FEER, 27 May 
1993: 71). Members agreed to set up two inter-governmental bodies: a committee to co-ordinate 
the activities of the riparian countries in the TREZ; and a commission which the participating
3 The ADB had approved major assistance to develop railroads in Northeast China. All members agreed that the 
Programme Manager consult regularly with the World Bank and ADB to review the TRADP master plan and 
financing strategies (Choi, Hoil, 1995: 283).
4 The UNDP provided US$3.5 million for the pre-investment phase o f the TRADP. In November o f 1992, soon 
after PMC II, Finland granted US$1 million to the TRADP specifically for forestry research and studying a land 
bridge concept from Northeast Asia to Europe by trans-continental rail {BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, 19 
October 1992).
5 Land leases can be negotiated for periods o f 40 to 70 years. China, Russia, and North Korea also agreed that 
land leasing did not mean a loss o f sovereignty or ownership o f land leased.
6 According to the Tumen River Development Corporation Ltd., TRADCO ‘enters into any arrangements with 
any government or authority or person and to obtain from any such government or authority or person any 
legislation, orders, rights, privileges, franchise and concessions and to carry out, exercise and comply with the 
sam e...’ (Nimetz, 1993: 9).
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governments could consult and which would coordinate development in Northeast Asia {Beijing 
Review, 1993). The chairman, Mr. Singh of the UNDP called it ‘a most significant step* (Choi, 
Hoil, 1995: 283). The third meeting was given to legal and institutional matters coming out of 
the third Working Group. It was further agreed that the inter-governmental group of the three 
riparian governments should be established as soon as possible to consult and oversee socio­
political matters and other common interests in the TREZ; that inter-governmental co-ordination 
and consultations should be held periodically for matters of common concern; and the ‘Tumen 
Bank’ would also be established (Ibid.: 286; Chosun Ubo, 14 May 1993). In October the Tumen 
Project Industry Workshop met in Seoul to review the position of industry and investment 
promotion, and recommended coordination of economic, trade and construction plans. The 
UNIDO gave an assessment of industry in TREDA. Several consultancy reports were presented 
on telecommunications, transport infrastructure, resources, land use, energy supplies, water 
resources, river management, urban/region planning, etc.
However, such showcases of mega-projects started to face serious blows when member 
countries questioned the economic rationalities of the project. At an informal meeting in New 
York in February 1994, member countries evaluated the UNDP’s mid-term plans and agreed 
that those ideas were unrealistic, as declared by China and Russia (Ibid.: 286-7). Russia’s 
main concerns were the potential erosion of sovereignty, the amount of capital expected from 
participating countries and the proposed system of land-leasing. Although there were benefits 
on offer in terms of capital flows, Russia opposed TRADCO (Davies, 2000: 11). The two 
other partners also began to consider the project to be of limited value. In their view 
concentrating only on TREZ might mean that the potential of the subreigon would be missed. 
A more results focused and economically sound proposal was sought that would encourage 
foreign investment and deal better with infrastructure development and tourism. It was 
argued that the geographical scope should be widened to the TREDA area. The geography of 
the project was discussed in Moscow on 15 July 1994, at a meeting where DPRK could not 
be represented due to the death of President Kim II Sung. An area including China’s Yanbian 
Korean Autonomous Prefecture, the south part of Primorsky in Russia and Rajin-Sonbong in 
DPRK was proposed with further strategic development, but due to the absence of the DPRK, 
no agreement could be reached (Ibid.: 12).
The fact that each member had different political and economic interests was proving a 
barrier to finding a real consensus. To address their divergence of opinions on the legal and
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institutional framework and to avoid their unnecessary conflict of political issues, the UNDP 
adopted a ‘progressive harmonisation’ approach. Development needed to go at a speed 
agreed by all the governments. Harmonisation in the case of TRADP meant providing each 
member with an assurance that a balance of interests was being sought and that the 
development of the whole region would proceed with a view to national and local objectives. 
Harmonisation was thought to be progressive in that it did not set fixed master plan priorities 
for projects, but aimed to do what could be done in a non-contentious way to remove trade 
and investment barriers (Kim, Icksoo, 1995a: 81). It did not set priorities, which could prove 
to be stumbling blocks, but concentrated on resolving the more straightforward issues first. In 
a compromise the UNDP agreed to extend the formal coverage in Russia of TREDA from 
Vladivostok to Vostochini and Nakhodka; and to shelve for the time being the establishment 
of TRADCO (Kim, Icksoo, 1995c: 218-9). The UNDP core city notion was finally 
abandoned, since it overlapped with the existing function of towns within TREZ and was 
found to be impractical. Eventually more realistic approaches were adopted. The UNDP 
realised that grandiose ideas for regionalism would not work, given the limited responses that 
member countries were able to make (Davies, 2000: 11-2).7
2. Time of ‘practice’ (1995-97)
There was a significant change after 1995 following the Tumen inter-governmental 
agreements on the relationship between UN specialised agencies and the project. This time 
can be seen as ‘practice’. The basic text for this period is the Regional Development Strategy 
(RDS), produced by a joint team of nationals and accepted as a framework for action at the 
Moscow meeting in July 1995. As the report pointed out, ‘development of the region requires 
both the commitment of governments to an agreed, realistic cooperative development strategy 
and the support of outside agencies and investors’. The strategy agreed between the member 
countries contained four key elements, which had already been started and which would 
continue to be developed in parallel: the creation of an ‘enabling’ environment, improvement 
in services, facilitation of trade expansion, and attraction of investment (Underdown, 1995: 
73).
7 In November, the Tumen PMO was transferred from New York to Bejing, where it commenced operations 
under the auspices o f the UNDP Beijing Office.
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At the Fifth PMC meeting in Beijing on 28-30 May 1995, the five members agreed to set up 
bodies: the ‘Consultative Commission for the Tumen River Economic Development Area and 
Northeast Asia’ (China, DPRK, Mongolia, ROK, and Russia), and the ‘Tumen River Area 
Development Coordination Committee’ (China, DPRK and Russia). They also agreed to provide 
a memorandum of environmental development and preservation. According to the agreement 
paper, the Commission was to focus on assistance arrangement and investment promotion, and 
the Committee was to focus on mediating mutual interests and sovereignty problems among the 
riparian countries. Furthermore, Michael Underdown, Director of the Interim Tumen Secretariat, 
described the role of the Committee as ‘promoting’, and the Commission as ‘consultative, co­
ordinating and advisory’ (Underdown, 1996: 76-9).
The project which had been discussed since 1990 finally materialised after the member 
countries reached a consensus. At the Sixth PMC Meeting in New York on 4-6 December 
1995, member countries signed up to the establishment of the Consultative Commission and 
Coordination Committee, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Environmental 
Principles. They also upgraded the Tumen PMO to the Tumen Secretariat. The member 
countries decided that the meetings should consist of a vice-ministerial representative from each 
country;8 that the Tumen Secretariat would be based in the Beijing UNDP office; that a general 
secretary should be elected at the next meeting; and that a TRADP master-plan and scheme of 
financial support would be drafted. The UNDP confirmed continued funding for the project and 
invited member states to take a part in decision making through their newly established 
intergovernmental bodies. All member countries made investment promotion and removal of 
barriers to cross-border trade high priorities (Beijing Review, 1995). Long Yongtu, assistant 
minister in China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, described the 
agreements as forming the ‘legal basis’ for the further practical development of the area (Ding, 
Dou, 1996: 9-10).
Under the positive mood substantial efforts were made during this period in the areas of foreign 
investment and infrastructure. The UNIDO-sponsored International Investment forum for 
Yanbian was held in Yanji on 10-15 October 1996. The first ever cross-border foreign business 
missions were conducted from Yanbian (China) to Zarubino Port (Russia) and Rajin-Sonbong
8 According to Chosun Hbo (7 January 1996), the South Korean government had already decided to send Lee 
Hwankyun, the vice-minister o f Finance and Economics, as their representative. South Korean newspapers saw 
the setting up o f the Council as the important point in accelerating full-scale development o f the TRADP.
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(DPRK). On 13-15 September, the Rajin-Sonbong Zone International Investment and Business 
Forum was held following UNIDO/UNDP sponsored Investment promotion missions to Japan, 
Hong Kong, Southeast Asia and Australia in the previous three month. Various activities took 
place during December. The Tumen Coordination Committee Meeting was held in Pyongyang 
followed by the Consultative Commission Meeting in Hunchun. Border crossing issues, 
harmonisation of customs procedures, and facilitation of border/transit trade were discussed. The 
countries also made an effort to learn from the successful cases of special economic zones 
abroad. China’s State Planning Commission (SPC) sent Chinese officials from Jilin Province 
and the Beijing central government to Singapore to study the operation of the Singapore 
Development Corporation, the planning of Singapore industrial estates and the triangular 
economic relationship between Malaysia’s Johore Export Processing Zone (EPZ), Singapore, 
and the Batam Island EPZ in Indonesia. Japan’s Keidaren and Economic Research Institute for 
Northeast Asia (ERINA) embarked on a technical feasibility study into the major three-stage 
expansion plan for Russia’s Zarubino Port associated with proposed loans of US$212 million 
from the Export-Import Bank of Japan for the first stage of the project (1997-2010).
In June 20-25, 1997, the TRADP Tourism Industry/Services Workshop was held. The main 
focus was tourism accessibility e.g. the opening of new air routes to Yanji, and development of 
transit tourism and cargo services (Sokcho of ROK-Rajin of DPRK-Hunchun of China). Funded 
by the UNDP, during 17-28 July, the DPRK Rajin-Sonbong City Government leadership 
inspected EPZs, industrial estates and economic development institutions in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Singapore and Malaysia. In August, China’s TRADP Team visited the US, Canada and Mexico 
in order to study the NAFTA, legislative support, free trade procedures for export processing 
business, customs arrangements, cargo and passenger border crossing procedures. The Tumen 
Secretariat and China’s SPC funded the mission. In September and October, the self-funded Jilin 
Provincial Government investigated port, rail and road transport to Primorsky Territory 
(Khansan, Valadivostok, Nakhodka) and North Korea (Rajin-Sonbong, Chongjin, Namyang, 
Hoeryong). From October to November, the United Nations Office for Project Services 
(UNOPS) Swedish Trust Fund financed a pre-feasibility study into route options for a Sino- 
Eastem Mongolian Railway link between Choibalsan and Aixan/Ulanhot/Chanchun with the 
Tumen Port. Rajin-Sonbong Zone Investment Promotion was held in Italy and Finland during 1- 
10 November.
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1996 to 1998 saw a period of increasing funding to over US$10 million. UN agencies, 
multilateral and bilateral sources were tapped. Technical support was offered by other UN 
bodies such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social affairs (UN/DESA), the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), the World Tourism Organisation (WTO) and the UNOPS 
Nordic Funds and especially UNIDO, which worked closely with the governments and the 
secretariat, providing US$2.44 million worth of support from 1996 to 1998, working 
especially to promote investment and build capacity. This compares with the US$2.4 million 
provided by the UNDP for the TRADP from 1997 to 1999 (Davies, 2000: 26-7).
3. Time o f ‘stagnation’ (1998-2000)
The years 1998 and 1999 saw some achievements. From January to 6 March 1998, Customs, 
Border Guards, and Public Security/Immigration officials from China, DPRK, Russia and 
Mongolia met on border crossing procedures. The first Primorsky International Investment and 
Business Forum, sponsored by UNIDO and funded by the UNDP, was held in Vladvostok, on 
27-30 May. In June the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JCIA) study on the transport 
corridor between Changchun and Tumen ports was completed. This was part of the Japanese 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (JOECF) process of extending low interest loans for 
highway development in the eastern Jilin Province. The Mongolia Investment Conference on 
foreign investment was held in Ulaanbaatar from 24-26 June. From 25 July to 11 August, the 
UNIDO-sponsored Yanbian/Hunchun Investment and Forum Promotion Missions to Japan, 
Norway and Finland were conducted. The China Tumen River Area International Investment 
and Business Forum was held in Hunchun on 21-23 September. 1,600 people, including 500 
foreigners, attended the forum. 87 contracts (in total worth US$420 million, but only in 
contractual terms) were signed. The UNIDO-implemented Rajin Business Institute opened 
officially with financial assistance from the UNDP on 24 September. The following year, 
Tumen programme intergovernmental meetings were held in Ulaanbaatar on 10-11 June. The 
meeting discussed the 1999 Work Plan and again the concept of the Tumen Investment 
Corporation. There was an ADB/ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific) seminar on measures to facilitate land transport held in Beijing from Jilin, Heilongjiang 
and Inner Mongolia on 19-21 July. From 29 August to 9 September, there was a 
FIAS/ERINA/UNOPS (Foreign Investment Advisory Service/Economic Research Institute 
for Northeast Asia/United Nations Office for Project Services) mission to Yanbian, Rajin-
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Sonbong and Primorsky Territory for the purpose of diagnostic studies on the investment 
environment in the region.
Despite progress, the results were not satisfactory to all. Foreign direct investment (FDI) had 
to be the driving force for the project, but investment was limited. The Secretariat and 
member states tried their best but made little progress: FDI in the Tumen area was still small 
compared to other SEZs in various parts of China. From 1990 to 1995, the total amount of 
foreign investment in the region only added up to US$230 million, within which was not 
even 0.5% of the total foreign investment that China took in 1999 (Blanchard, 2000: 272). 
Wheels turned slowly and problems of bureaucracy, national interest conflicts, lack of 
political will, political sensitivities, funding delays and limits, all created obstacles to steady 
progress (Davies, 2000: 20-1).
Some efforts had been made to revive the TRADP by the UNDP and member countries. 
Leadership in both the UNDP and the Tumen Secretariat were replaced, and the Tumen 
Secretariat proposed a few regional initiatives from mid-1998 onwards. The new leadership 
put forward the idea that the TRADP should ‘broaden its agenda’ and ‘widen its vision’; look 
at issues from a higher and wider regional dimension; and ‘re-focus’ attention on ‘regional 
economic cooperation initiatives and activities’ rather than ‘local development activities’. 
The new regional efforts were, a council of ‘Eminent Persons’ which is similar to that of 
APEC, and the ‘Northeast Asia/Tumen Investment Corporation’ (NEATIC), similar in 
concept to the Northeast Asia Development Bank. However, it was initiated by the UNDP 
and did not have the commitment of the member states neither at high, nor low level, nor 
with private interested parties. The Secretariat alienated member states from the policy 
process of the project (Ibid.: 39-42). Ultimately, the Secretariat management was losing 
support and the value of the programme undermined (Ibid.: 44-5).
4. Conclusing remarks
All in all, the cooperation plans failed. The project was seen as unrealistic and lacking in 
substance, and unattractive to investors and donors. There was a tangible lack of interest in a 
stagnating programme that was not showing benefits. Not only did the UNDP state 
misleading directions, but also member countries were not prepared to put up finance and 
infrastructure for a commercial project that was not well defined, and had development goals
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that were unlikely to be met. As a result, international organisations ceased funding to all 
local area plans in the riparian’ territories in mid 1998 (Ibid.: 39). In Davies’s term, ‘No... 
project proposals had gone beyond the conceptual stage’ (Ibid.: 40).
II. The TRADP and the five countries concerned
Having shown how the conflicts of interest between the major players affected the uncertain 
development of the project, it is time to look more closely at the positions of the five 
countries other than China.
1. North Korea
Prior to the 1970s North Korea’s economic performance was better than that of South Korea. 
The North in fact achieved respectable annual growth figures (ERINA, 1996: 41). In 1990 
GNP stood at US$ 23.1 billion (US$ 1,064) (Ibid.: 42). However, following that were seven 
consecutive years of negative growth, which brought the country to the point of collapse. 
There were food shortages from 1995 to 1997, compounded by floods and drought. The 
collapse of the former Soviet Union and termination of support from the Russian Federation 
added to the severe economic decline. And given the refusal of its leaders to follow the 
Chinese or Vietnamese route to market socialism, opportunities to escape the situation 
through trade were limited (ERINA, 1996: 45-6).
Yet, North Korea has made attempts to revitalise its dying economy and in that respect foreign 
capital and technology have been seen as vital. Plans were made to establish a free economic 
and trade zone in the Sonbong area (on the northeastern coast of North Korea). This was 
announced at the first Northeast Asia Sub-regional Programme Meeting of the UNDP held in 
July 1991 in Ulaanbatar, Mongolia. On 28 December of the same year, the Free Economic and 
Trade Zone (FETZ) in Rajin-Sonbong area (621 sq. km) was established as part of the TRADP 
(Decision No. 74 of the DPRK Administration Council).
The Rajin-Sonbong Zone borders Hunchun in China, and Khasan in Russia, and faces Japan 
across the East Sea. It is only 130 km by land and 485 miles by sea from Hunchun to Niigata
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through the port of Raj in. The Hunchun-Rajin/Sonbong route offers Hunchun more rapid 
access to a port as compared with Dalian which was 1,300 km away (Kim, Munsong, 1996: 
71; Li, Giman, 1997: 71). Rajin was given city status under the central government, and the 
total area of the FETZ was increased to 746 sq. km through annexing Undok County to 
Sonbong County by the decree of the DPRK Central People’s Committee issued on 
September 24, 1993 (Investment Climate, 1995: 11).
Under the ‘Master Plan of the Committee for the Promotion of External Cooperation of DPRK’, 
the Rajin-Sonbong area is to be developed as a centre for international cargo transit, finance, 
tourism, and manufacturing focusing on export processing. Manufacturing would draw on the 
natural and geographical advantages of the area. Development was planned in two phases: 
During Phase I (up to 2000), existing infrastructure would be utilised to the maximum and ports, 
railways, roads and telecommunications improved and upgraded to enhance the role of the zone 
as an international cargo transit centre. At the same time, efforts would be made to create and 
improve the investment climate. During Phase II (2001-2010), efforts would focus on continued 
improvement of the infrastructure network and manufacturing development as well as on the 
creation of a financial centre and an international tourist resort. The ultimate goal for the zone is 
to make it a first class international centre of economic exchanges and trade for the 21st century 
(Kim, Munsong, 1996: 72).
North Korea has identified advantages for Rajin-Sonbong over other free economic zones. First, 
the Russian ports are frozen for four months in the winter, which obviously limits their capacity. 
Second, the Sonbong route is short and economical for China’s northern part (Imai, 1993: 16). 
The ports of Sonbong, Rajin and Chungjin (all within 90 km radius) are important for 
Chinese and Russian cargo, and the improvement of the existing facilities would increase the 
annual cargo handling capacity significantly (Kim, Soo Jin, 1993: 74). North Korea 
participated in the TRADP because of the benefits the project could offer.9 It proffers the 
prospect of foreign capital and technology to help deal with its economic difficulties and a 
means of cooperation with China and the Western countries (Takata, 1999: 13). The interest 
generated by the TRADP in the UNDP, the ESCAP, and the ADB may also have contributed
9 The idea of the Rajin-Sonbong project was also driven by the need to respond to the Chinese Hunchun Project 
(Kim, Icksoo, 1994c: 19). There was a danger of North Korea falling behind. It might lose existing advantages 
and the TRADP might merely help China to gain access to the East Sea.
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to the North’s decision (Portiakov, 1998: 56). In addition the zone was seen as an opportunity 
for a controlled experiment with market economics.
Nevertheless, North Korea has met great problems in taking advantage of this opportunity. 
Very low credit ratings as well as unfavourable legal and institutional investment conditions 
have made the country an unattractive option. The main problem remains that of attracting 
finance, especially from South Korea and Japan. In addition to these financial problems, 
North Korea has been very cautious in promoting the TRADP since the potential for a radical 
effect on it as a closed country is greater than for the other players (Yang, Un-chul, 1998: 8). 
One of the reasons for establishing the economic zone in Rajin-Sonbong area, which is 
geographically located to the far north of Pyongyang, was to keep any political and 
ideological influence from the outside to a minimum.10
2. Russia
Primorsky Krai is located in the southern part of the Russian Far East (RFE), bordered by the 
East Sea, China, and the DPRK. The area is the RFE’s11 largest economy with 40% of total 
RFE GDP. A strong military presence had encouraged relatively technologically advanced 
businesses to develop. More than half of Primorsky’s output is created within the Tumen 
River Economic Development Area (TREDA), which is plentiful in natural resources, and 
processed for its income. There used to be large central government subsidies, but these dried 
up, leading to a 52% decline in industrial production between 1990 and 1997 (Wright, 2000: 
7). Additionally, the RFE has yet to complete successfully the transition from being a 
privileged outpost of the Soviet Union to a region that must look outward to East Asia for 
more trade and investment opportunities.
In his Vladivostok speech of 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev recognised the potential for a more 
open environment. He announced regional development and investment programmes for the 
area which would help it to integrate its economy with the Asia-Pacific region. Also in 1986, 
the West Ryborg area near Moscow, and the Nakhodka area in the RFE were declared FEZs. 
Later 11 other areas became free zones. Four of these were in the RFE: i) Chita (a border area
10 For more details about the significance of the project in North Korea in terms of the Korean Peninsula 
political and security context, see Part II of Chapter Eight.
For the chronology of development strategies for the region, see (Chen, Rishan, 1993: 1-5).
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between East Siberia and Mongolia); ii) Birobaizhan, the Jewish Autonomous Region (near 
the border with China); iii) Sakhalin (nearest to Japan); and iv) the Primorsky area (adjacent 
to China, North Korea, Japan and South Korea) (Kim, Soo Jin, 1993: 72).
In 1992, with the advent of the TRADP, Russia initiated the Greater Vladivostok Free Economic 
Zone (GVFEZ) programme.12 This zone makes up part of the northern section of Russia’s 
portion of TREDA. It has within it three distinct economic zones, with the port of Vladivostok 
at the centre, Nakhodka and Vostochny 80 km to the east, and Posyet/Troiza 100 km to the 
south (Kouriatchev, 1993: 21). The aim of the GVFEZ is to promote trade through the opening 
of an Asia-Pacific gateway. Promotional efforts highlighted its potential as a transport hub, and 
the availability of local resources. In keeping with other regional special economic zones, the 
GVFEZ aims to be an export-oriented processing trade zone, based on a free trade port. The 
Vladivostok region was planned to be the centre for administration, finance, and banking 
services of the GVFEZ. Nakhodka has potential for a land-intensive industry or commerce 
centre and Khasan should concentrate on light-industry, fishery, agriculture and food- 
processing, with neighbouring Chinese and North Korean labour. Development was envisaged 
to take place in three stages. The first was the preparatory period, building up infrastructure, 
focusing on intensive export-processing industry; the second stage (1996-2000) was to increase 
the import substitution industry, and the third (2001-2010) would nurture technology-intensive 
industry (Kim, Icksoo, 1994a: 95-6; Marton et al., 1994).
The reasons for Russia’s participation in the project may be explained as follows. Exploitation 
of Primorsky region’s raw materials and labour force would bring initial and easy gains. This 
exploitation could also extend to Siberian natural resources (Cho & Valencia, 1992: 13). 
Russia believes that the TRADP would be expected to provide Russia with an opportunity to 
develop the Primorsky Krai, contributing to the economic development of Vladivostok and the 
southern district of Khasan which extends from near Vladivostok to the Tumen River (PDP 
Australia, 1994). There are potential gains from a revitalisation of the Trans-Siberian Railway 
(TSR). It is the shortest route from East Asia to Europe and used to be a major route for
1 3Japanese transit cargo. The TSR connects with the ports of Zarubino and Posyet in Russia
12 Initially, the GVFEZ plan was formulated in December 1991 by the Engineering Consulting Firms Association of 
Japan (ECFA) under the auspices of the UNIDO (Kobayashi, 1992: 126).
13 At its height in 1983, the TSR handled 110,683 TEU from Japan. However, tariffs, and handling and security 
problems have reduced this traffic to 7,453 TEU in 1998 (Wright, 2000: 8).
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and with China at Hunchun and Suifenhe (Whalen, 1995: 103). The TRADP also has the 
potential to attract foreign capital investments.
Russia would like to strengthen its position in the Northeast Asian economic cooperation 
(Minakir, 1998: 194), which would increase domestic stability and enable Russia to 
participate for the first time in the economic dynamism of East Asia. Increased economic 
cooperation and trade with the countries of Northeast Asia would also help maintain a better 
geopolitical balance in Russia’s foreign policy (Toloraya, 1999: 53-4). Importantly, the 
TRADP is also seen as a way to increase involvement in the Asia-Pacific region’s 
mainstream economic processes, including the APEC organisation to which it was admitted 
in November 1997. If Russia were to withdraw from the TRADP, it would jeopardise its 
position in the region and its chances for foreign investment in the RFE (Portiakov, 1998: 58- 
9).
In December 1992, Russian President Yeltsin and Chinese Premier Li Peng discussed 
Russia’s active state-level participation in the TRADP as part of a strategy of improving 
economic relations between the two countries. On July 17, 1995 an official resolution on 
Russia’s participation in the TRADP entitled ‘Development Programme for the Tumenjiang 
Basin’ was passed (Ibid.). Recently, at the Tumen Consultative Commission Meeting of June 
1999, Vladimir Karasin, Deputy Minister of Trade, expressed a hope to meet with other 
member countries to discuss the planning and implementation of concrete projects (Tumen 
Consultative Commission Meeting, June 1999).
However, serious hurdles to progress in Russia’s cooperation in the region remain. These 
include lack of infrastructure, unresolved questions of dispute settlement and earnings 
repatriation, and market uncertainties (Lee, Jae-You, 1992: 210-3). There was the impact of the 
Asian crisis, on top of the Russian defence cutbacks and the disappointing results for the TSR. In 
addition there are energy and administrative problems. Internal political problems have also 
been present, including different views of the project in Moscow and Primorsky and disputes 
centring on the role of the regional leader. Initially between 1990 to 1992, Primorsky’s 
administration was decentralised, but this move was shortly after reversed due to subsequent 
opposition to the GVFEZ. Similarly, special treatment given to the Nakhodka Free Economic 
Zone in 1991 was removed in 1993, and then partly reawarded in May 1999 (Davies, 2000: 
38). Locally there is real concern about an increasing and potentially disturbing Chinese
250
presence in the RFE.14 The TRADP, with its focus on Zarubino, may detract from other 
territories. Furthermore, the downside of cooperation lies in ceding competitive advantage to 
rivals. In this case the North Korean ports may be developed and linked through China to the 
TSR while leaving out Primorsky, with a negative impact on the Russian ports of 
Vladivostok and Nakhodka (Cho & Valencia, 1992: 13).15 Finally, security concerns have 
dominated Russian policy in the region, making cooperation a sensitive issue. From a 
geopolitical point of view, the dispute between Russia and Japan over the Northern 
Territories has remained unresolved.
3. South Korea
At the initial stages, South Korea was greatly interested in the TRADP. Many South Korean 
commentators argued enthusiastically for participation in the Northeast Asian regional 
cooperation schemes (Shin, 1996). The project could open access to cheap labour and natural 
resources, and would provide new and diversified export markets. These would provide a 
testing ground for new technology in a controlled environment leading to increased 
competitiveness. One scholar argued that by playing an active role in building the Northeast 
Asian economic circle, South Korea would gain significant competitive advantages 
(Valencia, 1991: 267). As a newly industrialised economy, South Korea could play a very 
important role in this project.
The Tumen project, too, was attractive from a political viewpoint. Increased inter-Korean 
cooperation would be of benefit to strengthen its position on reunification (Kim, Soo Jin, 
1993: 86; Zhu, Yuchao, 1996: 109). Change in North Korea is a delicate issue, and a focus on 
economic cooperation could indirectly induce adjustment, making the process of unification 
less costly (Kim, Icksoo, 1994b: 20). The project would also provide links with ethnic Koreans 
in the former Soviet Union and China (Kim, Kookjin, 1994: 10).
14 It was reported in the Chinese press that there would be difficulties in reading targets for population growth in 
Greater Vladivostok (up to 2.2 or 2.3 million people from 1.2 million over twenty years) if  there were no 
migration from China. At the extreme, the population o f the district o f Khasan has recently been just 44,000 
(1994) (Portiakov, 1998: 57).
15 The TRADP was seen in the ‘1996-2005 Federal Target Programme for Economic and Social Development in 
the Far East and Transbaikalia’ (which was adopted in April 1996) as a factor that might detract from the 
development o f good traffic on the TSR (Portiakov, 1998: 59-60).
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Officially, the South Korean government has taken a positive stance towards the project. At a 
Tumen Consultative Commission Meeting in June 1999, Uhm Rak-Yong, Vice Minister of 
Finance and Economy, noted that South Korea supported such efforts to enhance regional peace 
and stability. He urged participating countries to focus on attaining international standards in 
investment and production, suggesting that member countries should share technical skills 
within the region and strengthen regional institutions. Financial support for the Tumen Region 
Investor Services (TRIS) Network project has been provided by South Korea and an injection of 
US$1 million was given to the ROK Tumen Trust Fund (‘Tumen Consultative Commission 
Meeting, June 1999’).
Nevertheless, South Korea was hit hard by the Asian financial crisis. The chaebols in particular 
were no longer in a position to make foreign investments and this was a real setback for the 
TRADP, especially as trade, investment and tourism in the Tumen region was being fuelled 
mainly from South Korea. At the same time, the South Korean government has had less risky 
and more profitable opportunities to invest overseas, such as in China (the Yellow Sea coast) 
and in Russia (the Khabarovsk Territory and Sakhalin). Moreover, a new prospect has 
emerged in Seoul concerning the development of another economic zone nearer its border 
with North Korea.
4. Mongolia
As a land-locked country, Mongolia needs as many points of access to the sea as possible and 
support for the economic cooperation in the Tumen region is a means of achieving this 
(Husband, 1998: 167). Tianjin is one of the main ports to which it has access at the moment. 
The Ulaanbatar-Tianjin route (1,700 km) is shorter, but more congested and expensive than 
the Ulaanbatar-Vladivostok route (3,200 km) (Wright, 2000: 7). A new route to the sea via 
Tumen would thus be welcome. Mongolia is particularly interested in the potential of a ‘land 
bridge’ which would pass through Mongolia to connect the Tumen River and Europe (Imai, 
1993: 17; Olzvoy, 1996: 45-9; Li, Haibo, 1992: 6). Such a project would enhance Mongolia’s 
transport infrastructure.
Mongolia’s policy is to ‘Look to the Northeast’ (Olzvoy, 1996: 48). It is keen to participate in 
such multilateral efforts as the TRADP in order to integrate its economy into the regional 
economy. It is seeking ways to maximize use of internal resources and develop its roads and
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transport systems. The cultivation of better bilateral relations with Japan, South Korea, and 
the ADB is important in terms of attracting investments from them to carry out development. 
It is therefore participating actively in ongoing negotiations related to the TRADP, and it is 
willing to supply all information to the Consultative Commission on the TRADP (Demberel, 
1995: 83-4), and join and promote multilateral organizations such as Northeast Asia 
Economic Forum (NEAEF). Above all Mongolia seeks more international links so as to avoid 
being contained by its two gigantic neighbours.
Mongolia will benefit most from the project by exploiting the mineral resources in the east of 
the country. It can afford to be enthusiastic about the project, and to hope for an enlargement 
of the TRADP to reach into its geographically remote territories. However, Mongolia is not a 
main strategic player in the region, and is less concerned about the particular version of the 
project selected. It is not a strong power politically and economically and thus its leverage to 
influence the TRADP is minimal.
5. Japan
Like the other participants, Japan is also mindful of changing global economic trends. The 
complementarities of the region have been identified as being of possible benefit to Japan. Its 
capital and expertise can be combined with Russian and Mongolian natural resources, using 
cheap Russian, Chinese, and North Korean labour and energy. For Japan, the area could also 
become a new sea and land bridge to Asia. The trans-Siberian route is an alternative route to 
Europe (Chosun Ilbo, 12 August 1995). In one way Japan is the most important participant in 
the TRADP because of its financial power and technological capacity. However, it currently 
only has observer status.
Japan has not been an active participant and there are reasons for this. One problem is a 
difference in enthusiasm between the central and local governments in Japan (Takata, 1999: 15). 
One goal of the Sea of Japan Rim Circle is to narrow the economic differences between omote 
nihon (Pacific coast) and the relatively underdeveloped ura nihon (Japan sea coast) (Touma, 
1992: 295). Local governments and communities in the East Sea Rim area feel that the TRADP 
could help the West of Japan, and have become very active in seeking development 
opportunities. Up to 15 research institutes have been investigating the East Sea region, including 
the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA), the think-tank of the Niigata
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Prefectural government, which has been doing research and consulting work on the region since 
1993, and is the central presence of the Zarubino harbour development plan. The Tottori 
Prefectrual Government also participates in the TRADP and is exchanging researchers with Jilin 
Province. This region participated in forums held in the UN and Rajin-Sonbong Zone in 1995 
and 1996 (Takata, 1999:15).
In contrast, the attitude of the central government is more ambiguous. It seems more 
interested in cooperating with a large economic community such as APEC, rather than the 
relatively small, Northeast Asia Economic Circle (NEAEC) preferred by prefectural 
governments. Tokyo seems hesitant about joining in the project for various reasons: the 
unpromising economic situation remains bleak, and basic infrastructure underdeveloped. 
North Korea remains politically unstable, and competing views on development approaches 
to the project make progress complicated. In addition to this, there are other competitive 
projects such as Mekong area development, which might provide a better investment 
opportunity. Japan still has ongoing territorial disputes with Russia and indeed its historical 
involvement in the area as occupier has made its relationships with both the Koreas and 
China particularly sensitive.
Japan has thus argued that the improvement of political relations is vital for future 
cooperation in the region (Zhu, Yunchao, 1996: 110). In sum, Japan does not see the TRADP 
as something it can join in the short-term, but it envisages that economic and political benefits 
can accrue in the longer-term. Thus Japan has been involved only hesitantly and selectively, 
carefully weighing up what would be in its interests. For the time being Japan cultivates bilateral 
relationships rather than multilateral ones through direct investment or economic assistance.
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Table 7-1. Foreign direct investment in the Tumen region
To 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Yanbian 42 61 78 134 95 47 457
RSFEZ 1 1 4 31 26 25 88
Primorsky 205 2 53 93 95 56 504
Mongolia 10 29 46 53 31 39 208
Total 258 93 181 311 247 167 1,257
(US$ million)
Source: (ERINA & FIAS, 2000: Statistical Annex, p. 1)
Table 7-2. Trend of foreign investment in Yanbian
Until 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Jan-Sep
1999
Total
Contract
basis
125.4 167.1 110.3 87.3 64.1 60.0 580
Arrival
basis
103.8 78.3 133.9 94.5 46.3 25.0 480
(US$ million)
Source: (ERINA & FIAS, 2000: Statistical Annex, p. 2)
Table 7-3. Source of foreign investment in Primorsky territory
Until 1997 1998 Total sum until 1998 Proportion
USA 113.74 3.44 117.18 26.6
ROK 87.98 23.27 111.25 25.3
Japan 69.30 13.19 82.49 18.7
Singapore 35.25 6.99 42.24 9.6
Switzland 20.39 0.03 20.42 4.6
Australia 18.66 - 18.66 4.2
UK 8.02 1.18 9.20 2.1
China 6.63 0.08 6.81 1.5
Norway 3.17 - 3.17 0.7
Canada 3.98 0.004 3.98 0.9
Total 383.86 56.34 440.20 100.00
(US$ million)
Source: (ERINA & FIAS, 2000: Statistical Annex, p. 3)
Table 7-4. Foreign investment in Rajin-Sonbong zone until 1997
Contract Actual investment
China 28,160 1,328
Japan 7,822 539
Hong Kong 31,854 1,845
UK 2,000 34
Netherlands 1,536 786
Thailand 2,800 1,000
Singapore 127 76
Vietnam 46 3
Australia 120 0
Koreans in the US 500 61
Russia 120 120
Total 75,085 5,792
(US$ million)
Source: (ERINA & FIAS, 2000: Statistical Annex, p. 3)
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III. Constraints in and/or around the project itself
Part III examines the particular kinds of economic issues and problems that developed 
between the participating governments and the UNDP (as the major force of the project) that 
have made it difficult to move the TRADP forward. The views of the private sector as the 
investment source will be also examined.
1. Limits of the role of the UNDP
1.1 Unrealistic plans
As shown in Part I, the time of ‘desire’ (1990-94) worked on the basis that it was possible to 
prescribe the best form of government for the region and that sufficient funds and investment 
would become available when needed. However, the project in the ‘time of desire’ was too 
large-scale and idealistic. According to Davies, there were a number of sub-projects proposed 
under the TRADP such as a Eurasian land/sea bridge, the establishment of a new ‘United 
Nations Core City’, and the establishment of a ‘Tumen River Area Development 
Corporation’ (TRADCO). These received extensive publicity among the relevant research 
and business communities worldwide, and especially in Northeast Asia. They were the 
UNDP-generated projects and, from 1992, a lot of time and energy was put into them by the 
UNDP and TRADP states. However, by the end of 1994 most of the projects had been 
dropped, as the enthusiasm of the participating countries did not match the scale of the 
proposals, which were either unrealistic or simply lacked support (Davies, 2000: 10-12). 
Nevertheless, the UNDP still failed to draw appropriate lessons from this, and it proposed 
other ambitious projects. It tried to set up a Tumen Region Development Finance Facility in 
1997, which was similar to TRADCO. The Finance Facility in mid-1999 switched to a 
proposal for ‘Northeast Asia/Tumen Investment Corporation’ (NEATIC), not dissimilar to 
the 1990 proposal for a Northeast Asia Development Bank (NEADB) (Ibid.: 41). Unrealistic 
plans were once again attempted, even though plans of such kinds had previously proved 
unsuccessful.
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1.2 Neutrality doubt
Additional problems emerged. The relevant countries suspected that the UNDP was acting on 
behalf of China’s interest rather than as an impartial entity. Indeed, the UNDP’s TRADP 
feasibility study was based on the Chinese concept and it favoured the important concepts of 
the TREZ, TREDA, NEARDA, with the idea of leased lands and so on (Imai, 1991: 20; 
Marton et al., 1995: 30). As a result some member states lost confidence in the UNDP’s 
ability to remain neutral.
1.3 Member countries’ disappointment at UNDP inefficiency
Due to the lack of obvious beneficial outcomes of the various participating countries, belief 
in the value of the TRADP began to wane, and opinion of the Tumen Secretariat fell. No 
agreement was reached on the best model of cooperation to be used. South Korea began to 
back off somewhat. The project faced communication problems, and lack of preparation of 
schedules and budgets lead to a lack of progress and disenchantment. North Korea found 
sector workshops to be ineffective, and was disappointed by the lack of response to its 
requests for funding. North Korea did not attend the inter-governmental meetings during 
1998 and 1999, and in March 2000 threatened to pull out completely if technical help for its 
own projects was not forthcoming. Russia too was not satisfied. It felt that the TRADP would 
not offer sufficient benefits to its Far Eastern region, which had a lot more capacity to offer. 
Even China, in the latter part of 1999, agreed that stagnation had set in, and discussed calling 
a half to the whole project if there were no changes in the direction that the Secretariat was 
moving in (Davies, 2000: 44-5).
1.4 Oversized bureaucracy
The Tumen Secretariat became less and less active in the project mainly through stoppage of 
technical assistance. Its activities and business declined by two-thirds in 1999 as compared 
with 1997. However, staff numbers increased, which was a drain on the TRADP budget. 
With a staff of 14 in 1999 (up 100% on 1997), salaries, administration and support costs 
consumed 85% of the UNDP TRADP budget (Ibid.: 44).16
16 Accordingly, staff reductions at the Secretariat were initiated in the first quarter o f 2000, partly as there was a 
lack o f  activities, and partly in readiness for changes to the programme. A new director was sought (Davies, 
2000: 45).
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1.5 Funding limits
The growing disenchantment with the UNDP may be seen from the fall-off in investments. 
Yet, from 1998 to 2000 less than US$100,000 in funds were committed to the project by the 
UNDP, even though the TRADP envisaged large scale resource mobilisation. In 1996 to 
1998 the equivalent resources reached over US$10 million. US$5.25 million of this was 
Tumen Global Environment Facility (GEF) related, US$2.44 million was from or through the 
UNIDO, and over US$3.3 million came from the UNDP trust funds, the Nordic Fund or other 
UNDP funds (mainly through UNDP Seoul and Pyongyang). In 1999 to 2000 there were no 
positive results from funding missions to Europe, Japan and South Korea (Ibid.). 
Consequently, the TRADP is facing its biggest ever challenge as its long term survival is now 
in doubt.
2. The view of the private sector
2.1 Geological and natural constraints of the project
Although the location of the Hunchun area and its flat topography are suitable for a special 
economic zone, there are some geographical problems. First, the corridor of the Tumen River 
downstream, where the three riparian countries meet, is very narrow and difficult to develop. 
Unlike the Yangtze, the 324 mile-long Tumen River can only be navigated far about 30 miles 
from its north. Second, the area is sandy, so the possibility of flooding is high, since sand 
moves with the wind from the river and sea and there is instability. Floodgates and 
stabilisation mean additional cost. Third, the area experiences a severe winter with 
temperatures falling below -20C for a four month period, making the manufacturing of 
machines that could withstand the temperature costly. On top of that the river freezes during 
this period, halting marine transport. Alternative transport such as railways or roadways 
would have to be constructed. Thus, it can be said that the natural environment is not as 
advantageous for an economic zone as it should be (Li, Kiseok et al., 1994: 2, 56).
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2.2 Exaggerated value of the project
As Davies has pointed out, the scale and value of the TRADP has been overblown. The 
project started in 1992 with huge expectations generated by preliminary reports drawn up by 
the UNDP consultants. These suggested that opening up the Tumen area and providing a 
transport network from eastern Mongolia and northeast China to the East Sea would require 
financing to the tune of US$30 billion. In fact these figures were inflated and the conclusion 
o f the report had not taken account of the riparian countries’ existing capacities and 
development plans, nor of the real trade potential of the project. Instead it focused on large- 
scale infrastructure projects, including risky plans for significant state investment in airports 
at an early stage (Davies, 2000: 9). Therefore, the little that has been accomplished to date 
seems disappointingly insignificant, and saps remaining enthusiasm in the project.
2.3 Poor infrastructure
There are differences between the TRADP and similar sub-regional economic zones. One of 
these is that the focus is on infrastructure projects rather than on production and trade 
(Chung, Jinyoung, 1995: 95-6). This is because a good infrastructure is a prerequisite to 
further economic development and from there to international trade and further foreign 
investment. As Campbell explains, the need for low cost telecommunications and an 
accessible and modem international airport is clear if the Tumen River area is to be made 
attractive to outside investors. There must be adequate rail and highway transport and 
container handling sea ports for moving goods to the rest of Northeast Asia Regional 
Development Area (NEARDA) and beyond (Campbell, 1995b: 199-200).
2.4 Insufficient co-ordination among countries
According to Kim, much of the infrastructural work is directed towards new constructions 
rather than for the improvement or modernisation of existing facilities. For such work to be 
feasible, it is vital to have accurate notions of projected growth of cargo volume, costs, and 
profitability. Uncoordinated expansion by competitive riparian countries would have caused 
waste or misallocation of scarce capital through overlapping projects, For example, the 
DPRK is trying to build Sonbong Airport, while China and Russia are holding out for their 
own international airports, in Jingxin and Khraskino. Such infrastructure-focused work would 
need to be carefully considered as a whole, along rational and cooperative lines, the growth 
of the regional economy, intra-regional and border trade, as well as changes in industrial
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sltructure. Otherwise it would end up jeopardising the prospects for future financing and 
ewentual profits (Kim, Icksoo, 1995a: 91-2).
2!.5 The legacy of the socialist economic system
Amongst other obstacles to the development of a stronger trading ties is the lingering 
imfluence of socialism. The ideology of centralised control and a poor legal system have 
imade it difficult for foreign investors and traders to know where they stand (Campbell, 
1.995a: 22-3). Where liberalisation has taken place, the outcome has often been tainted by 
local officials exercising their positions to their own advantage. The North Korean command 
©conomy is completely unable to deal with economic cooperation. Mongolia and Russia have 
introduced reforms towards a freer market but still lag far behind in their understanding of 
market mechanisms (Kim Icksoo, 1995a: 77). There have been major reforms in China too, 
moving towards establishing the basic requirements and freedoms for a market system and 
for engagement in the global economy. However, there are regional variations, and Northeast 
China lags behind the rest of the country. There is no unity of policy and rules regarding 
economic matters, pricing, availability of goods and services between the various countries. 
Clearly, too, the view of and response to the opportunities presented by a regional free trade 
zone may also prove to lack common ground (Campbell, 1995a: 31).
2.6 Irrational price and incentive structures
The disadvantage of international trade is the pressure domestic prices face in responding to 
cheaper imports. For example, although port fees are kept low as an incentive, railway freight 
price is still high. The China Northeast Asia Railway & Ports Group Co. set US$5 per ton as 
a realistic price, but this is already higher than the US$3 charged on the state railway. This 
has left potential investors unable to predict with sufficient clarity their return on investment, 
making it difficult to assess the break even levels (Kim, Icksoo, 1995a: 92).
2.7 Bureaucratic structures
Bureaucratic problems had a real impact on the TRADP, as a result o f poor communication 
and cooperation between relevant ministries and with local authorities. Inter-departmental 
rivalry was evident, and lack of coordination meant that the Tumen project was less discussed 
at national level in bilateral talks than it should have been (Davies, 2000: 34). For example, 
the Chinese national team from 1992 to 1998 was made up entirely of middle level officials 
from the planning and science and technology commissions and from Jilin province. Local
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authorities in Yanbian were rarely consulted because they were at the bottom of the 
hierarchical ladder (Ibid.: 36).
2.8 Different administrative levels: unclear players in the project
Until now, the Tumen project has been promoted by inter-governmental organisations, 
namely the Tumen Secretariat. In order to be a free trade zone, legislation regarding tax, 
customs, entrance and exit management, and capital transit needs to be passed by authorities 
at the state level. For the two Koreas and Mongolia, this presents no problem since they 
joined the project in the name of central government. However, because the TRADP is 
pursued at provincial level for China and Russia, this creates tensions (KDI, 1997: 139). This 
is because issues that arise between them may lead to situations that need diplomatic 
resolutions. In this case there is no role for local government or the private sector (Yang & 
Lew, 1994: 8-9). Things are made even more difficult by the fact that the World Bank and 
ADB as well as other international financial institutions normally get involved at state level 
for state-wide projects rather than sub-regional or trans-border projects.
2.9 Weak trade mechanism
Trade and investment in the region has in fact grown, but this is more as a result of growth by 
the East Asian economies as a whole rather than due to significant local change (Akaha, 
1993: 28). The six countries that make up Northeast Asia have around 15% of world exports 
and 13% of imports and this has remained fairly steady. In terms of trade among the six 
countries of the region, Japan has the largest share with 62% of exports and 53% of imports 
and South Korea is the second strongest with 14% and 18% respectively (ERINA, 1996: 29- 
31). 11.0% of total Japan’s exports and 17.4% of imports go to or come from Russia, China 
and the Koreas. 51.2% of exports to Russia from Japan come from prefectures on the East 
Sea. Only small amounts (6%) of trade from these prefectures go to China and the Koreas. 
Imports to Japan show the same trend. Only 6% of imports from China come via the East Sea 
prefectures, compared to 20% of imports from Russia and the Koreas (Yoshida, 1993: 141-3).
2.10 Financial supply constraints
Another concern is the shortage of financial resources within the region. Several of the most 
promising sectors such as liquid natural gas, coal, and non-ferrous metal extraction and 
infrastructure require huge amounts of capital. How to raise the estimated US$30 billion 
proposed by the UNDP remains a big question. It is hoped that cash will come from
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multilateral bodies (such as the ADB), corporate sources and from Japanese and South 
Korean banks. However, not surprisingly, Japanese and South Korean responses have been 
cautious. Moreover, the Asian financial crisis has had a negative impact and Japan is 
constrained by the need to restructure its bubble economy. The South Korea’s financial crisis 
has also put any major South Korean business investment backing on hold for several years.
2.11 Limited support from the public sector
The Korea Development Institute (KDI) reports on the difficulties of attracting foreign direct 
investment. Initially, the TRADP has looked to various sources for funding. The first sources 
are the international development banks such as the World Bank, ADB, and European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). However these banks are already committed 
variously in the region with Russia benefiting from support from the World Bank and the 
EBRD, and China and Mongolia benefiting from World Bank and ADB funds. Further 
funding to these countries will therefore be limited. North Korea would be a possible target 
for ADB funds if  it were a member, but it is not one yet. The US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), and South Korea's Economic Development 
Cooperation Fund (EDCF) are possible sources from among national development funds. 
However, the budgets of such funds are being squeezed as governments are forced to control 
public spending. The USAID is already committed in the former Soviet Union and East 
European countries and so can provide only limited help to Northeast Asia. The JICA was cut 
by 35% from US$9.6 billion in 1995, and belts are being tightened as a result o f the domestic 
banking crisis (KDI, 1997: 152-159). Therefore, public sector funding is in fact limited. In 
view of these limitations in public sector funding, private sector FDI becomes the key to 
further investment.
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2.12 Skepticism of the private sector
The region is not yet an attractive target for the private sector, especially if compared with the 
economic hotspots of Southeast Asia and South China (Kobayashi, 1995: 113). What is 
needed to attract private sector investment is a favourable tax regime and secure commercial 
and economic conditions (KDI, 1997: 152-159). All private investment in such sub-regional 
projects, particularly in infrastructure-related investment where returns may be longer-term, 
involves high risk. Although some degree of risk is unavoidable, the risk here is compounded 
by lack of information and lack of control regarding the project environment, which is in the 
hands of governmental authorities. Risk management decision-making means that an investor 
may not invest if  the most likely outcomes are too costly and outweigh potential benefits 
(Abonyi, 1996: 18-9). Credit ratings of the riparian countries are very low, so they cannot 
expect easy financial supply from the international capital market. In 1995, the total amount 
of private sector investment in developing countries was US$100 billion globally, one third 
of total private investment. Of this, US$64 billion went to Asian developing countries. Only 
US$27 billion flowed into the rest of Asia. China remained the main investment area with 
US$38 billion. Private investment in social infrastructure in Northeast Asia was just US$500 
million (0.5%) (KDI, 1997: 152-159).
Japan and South Korea are seen as the leaders in private investment for the region. However, 
South Korea has been less well positioned to be a major capital exporter, leaving Japan to 
shoulder the larger part of the burden. But Japan has shown little interest. By 1993 Japan had 
invested almost US$60 billion across Asia as a whole, still only a third of the total Japanese 
investment in the US (US$170 billion). Only one sixth of this total was in Northeast Asia, 
that is, South Korea (US$4.6 billion) and China (US$4.5 billion). Southeast Asia attracted the 
bulk o f investment, especially Indonesia (US$14.4 billion), Hong Kong (US$11.5 billion), 
Singapore (US$7.8 billion), and Thailand (US$5.9 billion) (Calder, 1995: 80-1). In China, 
Japanese enterprises have so far preferred to develop the eastern and southeastern coastal 
provinces, rather than Northeast China (KOTRA, 1996: 195).
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According to a 1994 Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) survey on the Pan Japan 
Sea Economic Cooperation (PJSEC), which was conducted with 23 companies and 
prefectural governments, the Japanese private sector’s view of the Tumen area was not 
positive. 16 companies thought some progress might take place in the near future. The 
medium to long term prospects (10 years) of the PJSEC would be slightly better, but the 
focus will be on China, not Russia. 10 companies predicted that Northeast China has some 
positive prospect of development, but the future for the Russian Far East remains pessimistic. 
Geographical closeness alone cannot promise a rosy future for regional cooperation. The 
general mood was dominated by more passive and negative predictions. While 6 companies 
said that the PJSEC would not progress or would stand still, only one took the future of the 
project seriously. 12 felt that the PJSEC as an integrated regional economy may not be 
possible and were concerned by the large differences in the interests among the participating 
countries (Kobayashi, 1995: 107-8). Business confidence in any kind of progress for the 
PJSEC seemed to be draining away.
The US commercial interest in the region lies mainly in the communication sector. AT&T, 
MCI, and Columbia Communication are making contacts in the Rajin-Sonbong area. Another 
possible investment area would be North Korea’s untapped gold, iron, manganese, zinc, lead, 
and other mineral resources, and here investment could consist of technological payment in 
kind. Consulting, energy and banking sectors might also be interested in the area (Lee, 
Chando, 1996: 49).17 However, it is not likely that the US will develop a sudden interest in 
the TRADP. There are many other alternative investment regions which can offer the benefit 
of cheap labour and land, which means that the TRADP has global competitors. So a US dash 
to the TRADP is still a distant possibility.
17 American companies’ move to enter North Korea as a base for assembling products for export elsewhere is 
being led by the American Chamber o f Commerce (AMCHAM) in Korea. In his interview with Chosun Ilbo on 
December 8, 1999, AMCHAM President Jeffrey D. Jones mentioned the plan to send an investment mission 
consisting o f 12 companies, including Motorola (Communications), Ralston Purina (pet products), P&G 
(consumer goods), Allied Signal, Goldman Sachs, GE Capital, Siemens Westinghouse Power Corp., BBMS 
(textile exporter), and four other companies, in January 2000 (2fh, Bae, Chong-Ryel, 2000: 33).
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Conclusion
Underlying the various visions for the TRADP of the member countries were and continue to 
be differing perceptions of the new regional cooperation. North Korea, for example, sees such 
project as a force that could potentially undermine its political system, and as a weapon that 
could be used against it by capitalist countries. South Korea sees the project as a way to 
engage the North and to work towards unification. Russia is beset by internal political 
problems which have meant differences between central and local government resulting in 
contradictory approaches to the TRADP. Japan can afford to keep a low profile for the time 
being, but like South Korea, sees the TRADP as a means of engagement in the region, 
particularly with Russia, with which it has territorial disputes.
Some progress has been made until very recently, but a lot of plans have not reached their 
targets or lived up to expectations, mainly due to national level hesitancy revolving around 
concerns about national interests and political sensitivity, but also the problems of complex 
and slow-moving bureaucracy. The political will necessary for effective regional cooperation 
was not really in place. In addition funding limitations and delays were hindrances. 
Coordination over legal, financing and transport infrastructure still falls woefully short of 
what is necessary. Thus the project is up against adverse conditions.
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Chapter Eight. Political and Strategic Constraints on China’s 
TRADP Policy
Introduction
Following on from Chapter Seven, which focused on the economic issues around the project 
itself and many diverging economic issues between the membership counties, Chapter Eight 
will explain why Beijing’s TRADP polices have been adversely affected by considerations of 
international political and security. At the domestic level, the TRADP has nevertheless had 
low priority in China's national development plan, as this project was devised to placate an 
inland minority region without due consideration being given to the economic viability of the 
project. Beijing paid lip service to the inland provinces in order to win them over. The project 
became the pawn in the game of inter-provincial rivalry and the centre’s juggling with the 
interests of the provinces. At the international level, Beijing’s relations with other countries 
can be depicted as one of ‘having different dreams while sleeping in the same bed’. As a 
result, these countries could not have behaved in a way that China would have wanted. 
Reading the Chinese mind, other countries had been joining and withdrawing at various 
stages of the relative advantage of cooperating with the Chinese according to their own 
assessments. Accordingly, the TRADP has become hijacked by an inter-state political game.
I. Inter-provincial rivalry and centre’s response: Domestic level
This part argues that the TRADP arose out of play-offs in China between both the centre and the 
provinces and also between the provinces themselves, rather than out of real economic 
considerations. Thus the priority of the TRADP in Beijing’s national development order is not 
high in terms of economic efficiency, even though it is still listed one of the top ten national- 
level development projects.
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1. The compromise between the three northeast provinces
Because the three Northeast provinces (Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Jilin) had been centres of 
heavy industry, certain privileges were extended to them during the Maoist period. For 
example, Liaoning Province became a centre of the PRC industrial policy and accordingly 
benefited from state support subsidies (Postel-Vinay, 1996: 497). But with the launch of 
economic reforms in the late 1970s the provinces soon came to see that as the suppliers of 
government-priced cheap supplies of vital materials they were in effect subsidising the 
economic development of the southeastern coastal regions. In the mid 1990s resentment grew 
among the three provinces that they were receiving only weak support from the central 
government (Rozman, 1998a: 11-2). The provinces felt that the region was being sacrificed 
for the benefit of other provinces. They demanded and later obtained similar treatment for 
their cities and river ports as was given to the Southeast coastal provinces (Yahuda, 1994: 
259). Various types of horizontal economic organisation and regional economic relations 
were encouraged by the central government hoping to win over local feeling (Zheng, 1994: 
313). However, due to the fact that the three provinces and Beijing had rather different 
interests, it was difficult to find agreement about goals and suitable policies for the region.
The differing positions of the three provinces are well researched by Christofferson’s articles. 
The initial idea that emanated from Beijing for Northeast Asian economic cooperation was to 
place Jilin at the centre of China’s activity in the Tumen project. The TRADP started as a 
Chinese-Korean strategy which sought to maximise the potential of Jilin’s large community 
of ethnic Koreans to promote trade between Koreans in China, North Korea, and South Korea 
(Christoffersen, 1996b: 270). This strategy was welcomed by the Jilin provincial officials who 
were already strong supporters of efforts to create a regional development zone based on the 
Tumen River area, as it coincided with their own economic reform efforts.
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However, other models were considered that focused on Heilongjiang or Liaoning rather than 
Jiilin. For Liaoning, its relationship with the two provinces (Heilongjiang and Jilin) is a 
ciomplex mixture of divergence and interdependence that has led to different relations with 
Beijing (Imai, 1991: 19-20). Liaoning Province preferred the Yellow Bohai Sea Rim project 
(YBSR) to the TRADP. This included all the same countries as the TRADP apart from 
Mongolia, but put the focus on Bohai and not the Tumen area, which then appeared to give 
advantages to Liaoning Province and not Jilin. As a result Liaoning had promoted the YBSR 
ais the best gateway to Northeast China, hoping for an increased use of its own industrial base, 
technological strengths, and ports in Northeast Asian economic development and 
regionalisation. The province reorganised its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into improving 
its global competitiveness. There was significant Japanese investment in the YBSR -  71% of 
total Japanese investment in China in 1987 and 44% in 1991. This economic cooperation 
with Japan strengthened the argument that Liaoning should be singled out as leading in 
Northeast Asian regionalism (Christoffersen, 2001: 9-10). Liaoning supporters also pointed 
out its greater economic complementarity with the Russian Far East, which challenged 
Heilongjiang’s first position in Sino-Russian trade. The advantages Liaoning offered for 
Russian trade were better-quality consumer goods and a more advanced scientific and 
technological base (Christoffersen, 1996b: 274). They further argued that a wider Northeast 
economic sphere should include both the East Sea Rim and the Yellow Sea Rim spheres 
(Imai, 1991: 19-20).
Heilongjiang Province had different priorities. It sought a three-way trading partnership 
between China, the Soviet Union/Russia, and Japan. The link to the East Sea would have to 
be either by rail through Tumen to Chongjin in North Korea, or by the Hechuan River and by 
the Amur river in Russia and then the East Sea (Ibid.). Thus Heilongjiang raised objections to 
the privileged position accorded to Jilin in the Tumen project by Beijing. The Heilongjiang 
Academy of Social Sciences held a conference in Harbin in parallel to the Northeast Asia 
Economic Forum’s (NEAEF) first meeting in Changchun, and argued that Heilongjiang 
should be a ‘northern gateway’ to the world economy along the ‘golden border’ area, and 
Harbin the ‘Paris of the East’ (Christoffersen, 1996b: 273). It was envisaged that there would 
be so-called ‘growth points’ (zengchang dian) along the Heilongjiang border and further 
through the province. The idea of these would be to harness regional strengths in a kind of 
horizontal division of labour to replace an over-structured vertical division. Heilongjiang 
wanted to expand the number of special economic zones and border openings from four to
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twenty-one to create a fairer and wider distribution of trade benefits (Ibid.: 274-5). While 
both South and North Korea were happy to give some backing to Jilin, and Japan to Liaoning 
with regard to the Sea of Japan Rim Project, however, Heilongjiang did not manage to attract 
as positive a response from Russia as it had hoped for in its policy of creating an economic 
strip along the Sino-Russian border. Low quality products and the fear of illicit Chinese 
migration were disincentives that made Russia reluctant to cooperate in envisaged 
transnational alliance of Heilongjiang with the Russian Far East (Ibid.: 267). The province 
was not able to achieve its aims in Beijing without securing support from Russia. 
Heilongjiang’s short-term trade gains policy may have led to some hostility at regional level. 
It would also have had to some negative impact on Beijing’s good neighbour policy toward 
Moscow (Christoffersen, 2001: 21-22). The development of the TRADP was affected by the 
stance taken by Heilongjiang. China had to satisfy the resentment of the Russian side, and the 
Russian response to Heilongjiang ultimately took on the form of the wider Tumen River 
Economic Development Area (TREDA) (not the small sized TREZ) (Ibid.).
The notion of more widely dispersed benefits was accepted within the Tumen project, and in 
this one can see that the regional competition of the three provinces affected the nature of the 
TRADP and the character of Chinese participation in it (Ibid.: 265-6). Christoffersen describes 
how the Tumen project became a springboard for economic cooperation of the three 
provinces. The vision was to develop ‘growth points’ in the zone. When enough of these 
points were established they would become ‘growth lines’ which would reach across 
provincial and also national borders. Railways, roads and gas pipelines would also provide 
lines on which to base development projects. The central growth line or ‘growth axis’ would 
be the ‘Harbin-Dalian axis’. The final aim was to see a whole network of these lines across 
Northeast Asia, centring on Northeast China. The aim of Beijing was changed to promote 
development of the regional economy as a whole from not just the three provincial economies 
separately. For infrastructure projects especially, this approach was much more logical, and it 
would also help to avoid inter-provincial competition and dispersed benefits throughout 
Northeast China (Christoffersen, 2001: 11). In considering all three Northeast provinces’ 
interests, the Tumen project Took[ed] like a compromise between the three provinces’, and 
Beijing had designated the Hunchun project as the centre of Northeast China’s participation 
(Christoffersen, 1996b: 290).
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2. Beijing’s response
The work towards economic growth also produced political change. This came about as a 
result of the decentralisation of political power and the development of a new strategy for the 
regions, providing, from 1978, new relationships between the centre and provinces and 
between provinces. Poorer provinces had sought to gain economic and political advantages 
from the central government, and negotiated hard, both on their own or collectively in order 
to increase bargaining power. As a result of their lobbying, various regional projects were 
granted.
Nevertheless, most have been unsuccessful. Guangdong was the exception which became the 
leading spot of development in Southeast China, but other provinces failed to realise their 
ambitions. These other provinces had large geographical scope, a strong dependence on 
primary industries, and few local enterprises. Yunnan province hoped to benefit from access 
to seaports in neighbouring countries and to establish new export centres of regional trade in 
Kunming. But trade declined amidst suspicions of dumping of low quality products and fears 
of criminal activity along the border (Rozman, 1998a: 5). Xinjiang too had opportunities for 
trade with the Soviet Union/Russia. Prospective energy pipelines were mentioned but resulted 
in no concrete projects. One reason was that uncontrolled movement across the borders did 
not help relations between the regions. Further, there is a danger of tension in Central Asia 
which does not bode well for development in Xinjiang (Ibid.: 6; See also Ferdinand, 1994).
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With such considerations in mind, it has been argued that Northeast China has some 
potential. As Rozman explains: First, Northeast China has the greatest military-industrial and 
political strength of the inland regions because it was the industrial heartland of China from 
the 1950s until the 1980s. Second, its geographical position in relation to the powerhouses of 
South Korea and Japan and its traditional and ethnic linkages to them should allow some of 
the dynamism of East Asia to rub off on it. Third, the area has all the advantages that come 
with being a coastal region. Although it is not actually part of the three Northeast provinces, 
the Liaoning Peninsula of the Yellow and Bohai Sea sub-region, is often grouped with them. 
Jilin and Heilongjiang are separated from the ports on the horizon only by a narrow strip of 
land, and there is a good network of railroads and rivers. It seems to have potential as a 
gateway to the outside. Finally, the overlapping dreams of Northeast Asian regionalism and 
Sino-Russian strategic partnership have served to lift the prospects of Northeast China. 
Geopolitical reasons are important here. After the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 and the resulting 
sanctions, Beijing needed to work on relations with South Korea. Beijing hoped that 
attracting South Korean investment into projects involving native Koreans in the Northeast 
would help building better diplomatic links with South Korea. China was also keen to 
develop cross-border trade with Russia to give Russia a reason to stop looking westward. 
Sub-regionalism was thus a tool to achieve geopolitical advantages (Rozman, 1997b: 32-3).
Despite the very real economic potential of Northeast China, however, it was not at the top of 
Beijing’s list in its approach to China’s development. In Rozman’s view, the top priority in 
Beijing’s development plan was the Southeast coast of China in the 1980s; Shanghai and the 
Yangtze delta triangle as the core with the Yellow Sea and the Bohai rim reaching into 
southern Liaoning province in the early 1990s. The rest was not of significance (Rozman, 
1997b: 31).
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The development of Shangai and the Yangze delta hinterland received top priority. The 
decision was taken in 1990 to build Pudong into a significant new international central 
business district and develop Shanghai into an international economic, financial and trade 
centre as soon as possible, stimulating economic development of the Yangtze Delta Area 
(Ibid.). The Yangtze Delta Area is situated on the middle of China’s eastern coastline, 
including 100,000 sq. km and contains approximately 71 million inhabitants. It consists of 14 
cities (Shanghai, Nanjing, Zhejiang, Yangzhou, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou and Nantong in 
Jiangsu Province, and Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Ningbo, Shaoxing and Zhoushan in 
Zhejiang Province) and 74 counties. In 1996 GDP in Pudong reached RMB51 billion yuan 
with 4,260 foreign-invested enterprises located there (China s Ten Economic Hot Spots).
Second in the central government’s list of priorities is the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea rim, 
aiming to develop the Shandong Peninsula and the port of Dalian, and even reach to Tianjin 
and Beijing itself. This area may be regarded as part of a broader Northeast China region, but 
it has been treated differently. Although Dalian and the Liaodong Peninsula are part of 
Liaoning Province in Northeast China, in fact they have been treated as part of seacoast 
(yanhai) China, rather than as border area {yanbian) China like the rest of Northeast China 
(Rozman, 1998b: 12-3). The Bohai Bay Area originally included the Beijing and Tianjin 
centrally administrated municipalities, and the Liaoning, Hebei and Shandong Provinces. In 
1994 the Chinese government reformulated the ‘Programme for Economic Development of 
the Bohai Bay Area’, extending the area to Shanxi Province and the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region. In total this covers an area of 1.86 million sq. km (19.4% of the 
nation’s total area) and, a population of 270 million (22% of the nation’s total). The area is 
the centre of the Northeast Asian economic sphere, and the convergence of the three regions 
of Northeast China, North China and Northwest China {China’s Ten Economic Hot Spots).
The third priority for central government in terms of development is the Sanxia (Three 
Gorges) mega-project (Rozman, 1998b: 12-3). This is a massive hydroelectric power plant, 
which also has as its aims to control river flooding and to improve navigation. US$740 
million of foreign investment will be put in to provide 14 energy generating sets (Li, Yongan, 
1996; Beijing Review, 1999). This middle and upper Yangtze are regarded as the ‘preferred 
route inland’. It seems that the Northeast ranks behind all these projects in terms of the 
importance attached to it by the central government (Rozman, 1998b: 12-3).
272
This relegation of Northeast China results not only from inability at local level to take 
advantage of opportunities, but also from the failure of Beijing to use multilateral regionalism 
to address the cross-trade hangovers from socialism. There is still a lack of business 
experience and entrepreneurial skills and ingrained corruption at official levels, which means 
that local areas have failed to take hold of opportunities presented to them. In the discussions 
on how to promote regionalism, these two weak points in Northeast China are often 
overlooked (Rozman, 1998a: 5-6). In 1994 Beijing agreed to lower trade barriers of its 
domestic market in order to obtain most-favoured-nation trading status in the US and 
admission to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This hit border areas the most, since the 
recently given benefits had not yet yielded enough investment or technology to be self- 
sustaining. When Beijing finally allowed some privileges to border areas, they were short­
lived (Ibid.: 11). Thus Northeast China has not taken the opportunity to embrace 
decentralisation and openness, and this has slowed the process of regionalism and of finding 
new models of cooperation (Ibid.: 5-6).
In addition, the difficulties faced by the TRADP were representative of fundamental 
structural problems within Beijing’s policy-making process. Ian Davies, former investment 
advisor of Tumen Secretariat who had been closely working with the Chinese counterparts 
says: The Chinese team was led by a vice-minister from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). He could only give two or three days a year to the 
TRADP, as most of his time was taken up by far more important international issues such as 
China’s entry into WTO, APEC, and foreign and UN aid to China. Communication with the 
Tumen Secretariat was delegated to the sub-ministerial MOFTEC agency responsible for the 
UNDP technical assistance to China, but it lacked footing with other ministries and 
government bodies such as the State Planning Commission. Furthermore, while some 
political leaders had visited the Tumen area in the early 1990s, there was now no Chinese 
State Council member who was actively interested in the TRADP (Davies, 2000: 36).
Another problem was that the Chinese national team from 1992 to 1998 consisted of a narrow 
group of individuals -  middle ranking officials from the planning and science and technology 
commissions, and Jilin Province. The local authorities in the Tumen River area (Yanbian), 
which had a real interest in the project’s success, were rarely consulted. It also meant that the 
interests of other government agencies did not factor strongly in the national consideration, 
apart from the planning and science technology commissions. In 1998-1999 there was a
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reshuffle in government, and in May 1999 a new China Tumen River Area Ministerial Group 
was set up. This body of 14 different ministerial-level organisations plus Jilin Province and 
coordinated by the SPC, was designed to resolve the previous failure. However, since its first 
meeting in June 1999, there have been no further meetings (Ibid.).
3. Concluding remarks
The provinces did not help themselves or their cause by having very high expectations and 
approaching the matter without careful planning and organisation (Rozman, 1998a: 10-11). 
At the same time the central government focused too much on national interests, and did not 
provide the area opportunities such as full legal authorisation for genuine free economic 
zones (Ibid.: 11). In fact Beijing made some efforts, in that they replaced some obstructive 
local leaders, tried to move the project away from state-sector dominance, and tackled a 
pricing system that was unfair to local producers and local products, but not nearly enough 
was done (Zheng, 1994: 313). Beijing did not allow enough capital accumulation, and it also 
failed to encourage investment in new technology. China is apparently not yet willing to 
undertake the full extent of commitment necessary to such a big project.
n. The TRADP as one issue in North Korea problem: The Korean 
Peninsula level
Just as the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone (the North Korean part of the 
TRADP) can be seen as an economic breakthrough and a necessary component of a plan for 
the long-term survival of North Korea, the TRADP was seen by the other countries not only 
as a multilateral economic project, but also as an element in their policies of dealing with 
North Korea. This part looks at how the major powers were trying to assert what power and 
influence they could muster in the Korean Peninsula and how the TRADP was reduced to a 
political pawn between them.
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1. Importance of North Korea in the international strategic balance
1991 signaled the end of Cold War polarity, an overriding political balance that brought all 
international politics within its scope. This end allowed regional tensions to take on their own 
meanings, including the Korean conflict. But the Korean Peninsula has remained on the 
international agenda for three reasons.
First, efforts at arms reduction in the 1990s did not succeed and the existence of nuclear 
capabilities has been a destabilising factor for the whole Pacific region (Zarubin, 2000: 210). 
The tensions have been exacerbated by the prospect of the development of nuclear weapons 
in North Korea. The major powers’ involvement shows that it is a conflict of not only local 
significance (Yahuda, 1996: 256).
Second, the Koreas are important in geopolitical terms mainly because they are located 
between Russia, China and Japan, and hence are of significance to the US. Any changes in 
the Korean Peninsula could produce a new balance of power in East Asia. Thus great powers 
continue to see North Korea as a pivotal nation and realise that they cannot play an important 
role in any new security establishment without proper relations with North Korea.
Third, the geo-economic importance of the Korean Peninsula is significant. Industrial 
development in Manchuria before 1939 resulted in the North being the more industrialised 
part of Korea. Communications lines opened it to Manchuria and the Russian Far East (RFE). 
By 1957 the border between North Korea and Manchuria had the highest number of railway 
lines in relation to area in all of East Asia. With the closure of North Korea, many routes to 
the Far East were blocked, and this had a negative impact on regional development. In this, 
the potential remains and a foothold in North Korea is an attractive goal (Maxwell, 1996).
Given the presence of two separate states in an area of geopolitical, geo-economic and geo­
security significance to four of the world’s greatest powers (the US, China, Japan, Russia), it 
is hardly surprising that there is unresolved debate on the shifting international alliances and 
alignments.
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2. North Korea’s survival game
The end of the Cold War did not cause North Korea to change its military priorities, but made 
it recognise the need to develop its economy. It became isolated from the economic support 
of its previous allies (Garrett & Glaser, 1995: 535), and the precariousness of its economy 
became apparent due to a number of factors: low levels of energy resources, fuel, and raw 
materials; an abrupt decline in the volume of trade with foreign countries; excessive military 
spending; and an inefficient utilisation of whatever resulting financial and material resources 
were available (Andrianov, 2000: 42). The country suffered six years of negative growth,1 
resulting in food shortages2 exacerbated by floods and drought from 1995 to 1997. Economic 
concerns rose in the agenda of leadership, since not only was South Korea becoming an 
economic threat, but its property also threatened to undermine North Korean ideology 
(Garrett & Glaser, 1995: 535-6). Ultimately, this has even led to questions about the state’s 
political legitimacy.3
In order to survive, even long before the end of the Cold War, North Korea introduced a law 
on joint ventures in September 1984 as part of its attempt to open itself to the outside world. 
It also tried to attract foreign capital and technology, although this was a gesture, or at best an 
experiment. Few joint ventures were established even after seven years, and over 80% of 
them were by ethnic Koreans from Japan. Being such, they were limited in scope and capital 
(Miyatsuka, 1992: 15). The establishment of a special economic zone (SEZ) in Rajin- 
Sonbong designed to generate foreign investment. However, as we can see the location of the 
SEZ, which is in the far northeast of the country, represents the regime’s cautious response. It 
was in no way a capitulation to a reformed system. Rather it was emerging first aid to keep 
the economy alive for the moment (Bazhanova, 2000a: 73-4).
On the other hand, North Korea attempted a rapprochement with Japan to strengthen its 
diplomatic relations with Japan for the purpose of bolstering its international status and 
position vis-a-vis South Korea. More importantly, this new approach was clearly related to
1 The DPRK economy underwent the deepest economic crisis in its history. Beginning in the late 1980s, North 
Korea’s GDP began to fall, by -3.0% in 1991, -7.6 in 1992, -5.4 in 1993, -1.7 in 1994, -2.0 in 1995, -2.1 in 
1996, and -6.8 in 1997 (Andrianov, 2000: 41-2).
2 North Korea has suffered annual grain shortages in the region o f two million tonnes since 1992 and produced 
only 60-70% o f total demand even before the great flood o f 1995 and 1996 (Kim, Philo, 1999: 210).
3 China and Vietnam managed, despite Marxist ideologies, to come up with a rationale for market-oriented 
reforms. However, such a side step will be less easy in North Korea (Noland, 1997: 112).
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the hope of gaining economic assistance from Japan in the face of a widening gap between 
North and South Korea. In return for some normalisation of relations between the two 
countries, North Korea hoped for a payback of Japanese capital and technological inflows 
(Kim, Hong Nack, 1998:134).4
However, North Korea failed in its intentions. It became clear that the US was insisting on 
nuclear inspection access and that normalisation talks with Japan were not going to make 
headway (Ibid.: 121). The US was seen by the North Korean leadership as leading a US- 
ROK-Japanese conspiracy against them, particularly on the nuclear issue (Manning, 1998: 
146). North Korea had always regarded the US as an enemy, but after the end of the Cold 
War relations became more complex. Apart from being a threat, it came to feature more and 
more in North Korea strategic geopolitical thinking, as it took over the role previously played 
by the Soviet Union and China of providing economic support and security guarantee. The 
US was seen as the key to enhancing regime legitimacy, to gaining economic aid, trade and 
investment, as well as a means of political leverage in the stand-off with South Korea (Ibid.: 
140-1).
North Korea sought both to hold back US interference and to achieve economic advantages 
by using military blackmail with its missile and nuclear potential as a lever. North Korea 
succeeded in manufacturing ballistic missiles. The Nodong-1 was first tested over the East 
Sea on May 29 and 30, 1993. In August 1998 North Korea shocked the world by reneging on 
the test moratorium in place since 1993. It shot a three-stage Taepodong-l missile across the 
East Sea and over the Japanese main island of Honshu (Bazhanov, 2000a: 102-5). In the 
summer of 1999, Pyongyang threatened to test fire a more advanced ballistic missile, 
Taepodong-2, with the range o f4,000 km to 6,500 km.
The nuclear weapons was its trump card in negotiations with Washington. In March 1993, 
Pyongyang withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons after the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was refused access to inspect Yongbyon. Then 
having won some concessions from the US, the DPRK signed the Agreed Framework with 
the US in October 1994. Manning describes the scope and content of the 1994 Framework:
4 In 1965, as part o f the normalisation process with South Korea, Japan made a reparations payment o f US$800 
million. The 1994 equivalent would have been US$3.76 billion. North Korea, however, argued for a much larger 
sum o f US$5 billion to US$10 billion to be made (Harrison, 1998: 66).
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This was seen by North Korea as a way of establishing more beneficial relations with the US. 
A commitment was made to freeze further nuclear development. In return the US promised to 
make efforts to secure two light-water reactors (LWRs) with about 2000 MW power- 
generating capacity by 2003 and to provide 500,000 tons of heavy oil per year. The US also 
gave security assurances, and promised to begin moves to normalise political and economic 
relations. Section III of the Agreement also committed North Korea and the US to ‘work 
together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’. The US agreed to give 
North Korea formal assurances that it would not use or threaten use of nuclear weapons 
against it. The agreement also made commitments to removing trade barriers, particularly the 
trade embargo against North Korea. The accord explicitly committed both sides to reducing 
trade barriers, which to Pyongyang meant ending the trade embargo (Manning, 1998: 155-6).
In addition, North Korea has attempted to increase foreign aid. Since the US-DPRK Geneva 
Agreed Framework in October 1994, US aid has grown and this has alleviated the domestic 
situation somewhat. There have also been efforts to cultivate South Korean businesses. One 
project was the Mt. Kumgang tour project, which was set up with the Hyundai group in 
November 1998. Hyundai agreed to pay monthly installments of US$8 million for 78 months 
to a sum total of US$942 million and in return were given the right to bring tour groups to 
Mt. Kumgang. Other collaborations were in offshore oil exploration, a project for a 100,000 
KW thermal power plant in Pyongyang, and a major industrial complex on North Korea’s 
west coast near Haeju (Kim, Hong Nack, 1999: 532). In 1998 there was talk that a bonded 
processing area would be set up in Nampo and Wonsan, possibly including the Sinuiju and 
Mt. Kumgang sites. The widening of such designated processing areas would be one way in 
which the North could attract more foreign capital, and such multilateral economic 
cooperation is expected to be important in the future (Jo, Eun-ho, 1999: 104-5).
In sum, North Korea has used brinkmanship diplomacy to apply pressure in order to maintain 
its regime. It aims to squeeze economic gains from the West. Thus North Korea has achieved 
political recognition by the US through the Agreed Framework, KEDO, and Four-Party 
Talks. To address its food crisis and economic recovery, it has pressured the US into lifting 
economic sanctions and giving more economic aid. It has also looked to economic 
cooperation on the Korean Peninsula itself. However, North Korea still maintains still 
suspicions against the US, and military blackmail was used again, heightening tensions in the 
late 1990s. The 1999 Berlin Accord between the US and North Korea finally looked towards
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a full scale removal of economic sanctions. In light of these events the importance of the 
Rajin-Sonbong area as the only special economic zone has been lost among the many Korean 
issues.5
3. South Korea’s North Korea policy
The 1980s saw some major international and domestic changes in the South Korean 
environment and its foreign policy evolved accordingly. South Korea’s ‘nordpolitik’, by 
which the country put new emphasis on better relations with the Soviet Union and China, its 
northern neighbours, was cultivated in conditions of new found economic and political 
confidence. The result was that China and the Soviet Union, both long time associates of 
North Korea, formally recognised South Korea by the early 1990s. During the Roh Tae Woo 
period, South Korea began to contemplate a co-existence of two different political systems 
within some kind of federal framework (Harrison, 1998: 77). In mid-December 1991, North 
and South Korea signed an ‘Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchange 
and cooperation’, followed by ‘a joint denuclearisation declaration’ on 31 December. 
However, things changed again under President Kim Young Sam, who seemed to move back 
to a position where political and economic liberalisation would have to be put and parcel of 
any moves toward reconciliation. This position, which was seen by North Korea as 
unmasking South Korea’s plans to absorb North Korea, may have been influenced by the 
US’s emphasis, under President Clinton, on encouraging market democracy and human right 
(Ibid.).
The new President Kim Dae-jung, in contrast to his predecessors, made it clear that his 
government would renounce unification as a key policy, but would seek to develop peaceful 
coexistence. He accepted the prospect of Pyongyang normalising relations with Washington 
and Tokyo and the political recognition this would bring. It was clear that unification would 
be hugely costly especially after the 1997 financial crisis. President Kim embarked on a 
rapprochement with North Korea, calling for direct talks, an exchange of special envoys, and 
the easing of restrictions on business and other private contacts -  the so-called ‘sunshine 
policy’. Under the principle of separating economics from politics, the government used both
5 North Korean sources say that there are 111 projects in the Rajin-Sonbong zone, having an estimated value o f  
US$750 million. Actual investments, however, have been made in only 77 o f these projects and total investment 
capital has reached just US$57.92 million (Andrianov, 2000: 46).
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formal and informal channels to explore and foster the possibility of promoting economic 
cooperation (Kim, Hong Nack, 1999: 531). This was designed to encourage North Korea to 
adopt reformist and more open policies. There were times of tension, including the incursion 
of a North Korean submarine into South Korean waters, the test-launch of missiles, and the 
naval confrontation between the two Koreas in the West Sea. However, by late 1998, Kim 
developed a ‘package deal’, working closely with William Perry, the Clinton administration’s 
North Korea policy co-ordinator. By spring 1999, even the US and Japan as well as China 
and Russia were persuaded to adopt a policy of engagement towards North Korea (Ibid.: 536- 
8).
The TRADP was one of the limited official inter-Korean dialogue corridors in the early 
1990s. South Korea took the view that economic cooperation would lead to improved 
political relations with North Korea. Such a multilateral forum could be used for freer 
discussions and for encouraging a gradual opening of its closed economy (Kim, Icksoo, 
1995a: 90). However, the importance of the TRADP in this regard has been reduced 
following the opening of other avenues by the two Koreas such as the KEDO, Four-Party 
Talks, and the Mt. Kumgang project, as well as the possible opening of other special 
economic zones in Sinuiju and Nampo. ROK officials have been involved in all KEDO 
meetings with the DPRK. The result of the LWRs is that a large number of South Koreans 
will have the opportunity for the first time to visit the North and have contact with the 
thousands of North Korean workers in the construction activity (Cossa, 1999: 52-3).
Furthermore, the position of the TRADP in inter-Korean relations may have serious flaws 
when looked at from the context of a unified Korea. As Olsen points out, the reunification of 
Korea is estimated variously to cost somewhere in the range of US$200-500 billion, and 
possibly even higher still if the North Korean economy deteriorated further prior to 
unification. That would be a huge amount of money for South Korea to bear. It must be asked 
whether a unified Korea will be able to sustain the Tumen Project (Olsen, 1995: 64-5). This is 
one real problem. The other is that a united Korea might have new priorities and would 
question the strategic value of supporting a special economic zone which will mainly benefit 
its dominant neighbours, China and Russia (Ibid.). Therefore, the TRADP has become one 
piece among many in the possible outcomes of the jigsaw puzzle of inter-Korean dialogues.
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4. Russia’s North Korea policy
After World War II Moscow supported North Korea, and signed a Treaty of Mutual 
Friendship and Support with Pyongyang in 1961, steadfastly refusing to recognise the South. 
Its links with the North consisted mainly of providing subsidised oil and goods on 
concessionary terms, together with military equipment and training. North Korea was a key 
ally in Northeast Asia during tense Sino-Soviet relations in the Breznev era. Under 
Gorbachev (1985-91), Moscow gradually shifted away from unconditional support and began 
to question the domestic and foreign policies of the North Korean leadership. By 1988, trade 
links with South Korea had begun and 30 September 1990 saw the establishment of 
diplomatic relations in the face of protests by the North Koreans (Ziegler, 1996: 4-6). After 
1991 this approach was continued by Yeltsin. Russia’s stance on the nuclear question, which 
was the main problem in North Korean foreign relations from 1991 to 1994, adversely 
affected Russian-North Korean relations (Bazhanov, 2000b: 219-220). The North felt a sense 
of betrayal.
However, Russia’s foreign policy strategy began to change since 1994. Russia was noticeable 
by its absence at the multilateral meetings set up on the subject of North Korean nuclear 
development and changes to the existing peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. This 
accentuated Russia’s feeling of isolation and led to a renewal of relations with North Korea 
after the summer of 1994. Moscow has since sought to cultivate a more balanced policy 
towards North and South on the Peninsula.
Economic considerations too have prompted Moscow to improve relations with the North. 
Some large-scale economic projects, such as the construction of a gas pipeline from Yakutiya 
to the southern part of the Korean Peninsula are dependent on North Korea’s cooperation. 
The development of North Korean nuclear industry within the KEDO framework is also of 
interest to Russia (Ibid.: 220-1). Nevertheless, political considerations are more important. 
Alexander Torkunov, president of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
(MGIMO), has said Moscow needs to keep exercising some kind of influence on both Korean 
states in order to ‘remain in the game’ and retain a solid position with a future reunified 
Korea. Tense relations with the DPRK would not help Russia to influence future 
developments (Ibid.).
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Thus North Korea is still a central part of Russia’s East Asia foreign policy. In the past, the 
Soviet Union made its presence felt in the region as a military power (Meyer, 1994-1995: 
511). Since its withdrawal from Vietnam and Mongolia, this influence remains only in 
Northeast Asia. However, despite improved Russo-Chinese relations, tensions may arise 
again if China develops its military capacity there. North Korea remains the most obvious 
way for Russia to continue to build a stronger role in Northeast Asia.
Moscow can exert an influence on the Korean Peninsula, but only through a renewal of its 
ties with North Korea. The TRADP has provided at least one of these ties, keeping alive 
relations with North Korea and making up for an obvious weakening of Russia’s position on 
the Korean Peninsula (Portiakov, 1998: 61). For Russia, the TRADP will be an important part 
of future Northeast Asian Economic Circle framework. It also lays foundations for new 
strategic alignments in the event of Korean reunification.
5. Japan’s North Korea policy
Until 1990, Japan recognised the ROK as the only legitimate government of Korea. This 
position had been strengthened by the 1965 treaty that normalised relations between Japan 
and South Korea. However, following the thawing of relations between the US and China in 
the early 1970s, the informal contacts between Japan and North Korea increased. 
Furthermore, the fall of South Vietnam, the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan, and 
several North Korea terrorist attacks on South Koreans soon put an end to any new hopes 
especially since North Korea defaulted on its international debts in the mid-1980s. In 
addition, Pyongyang still owes Japan around US$700 million (Halloran, 1998: 215-6).
Nevertheless, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo’s ‘nordpolitik’ foreign policy provided a 
new impetus for Japan to improve relations with North Korea (Kim, Hong Nack, 1994: 113). 
From 1990 North Korea and Japan have held talks to discuss normalising diplomatic relations. 
Despite initial progress, these were suspended in November 1992. Pyongyang had turned 
down requests for international inspection of its nuclear facilities and no agreement could be 
reached regarding Japanese compensation to North Korea. Since Kim II Sung’s death in 1994, 
North Korea has shown itself more willing to reopen dialogue (Ibid.: 116). Talks resumed in 
August 1997 after a five year gap, but again there were setbacks caused notably by the launch 
of a Taepodong missile over Japan's main island on August 31,1998.
282
Despite many blows to their troubled relationship, why has Japan still made an effort to 
rebuild its relations with the North? One argument suggests that it is a question of 
establishing a role in the reconstruction of a new international order in East Asia (Ibid.: 125). 
Normalisation of relations would yield political gains for Japan and it would provide a 
stronger Japanese influence upon the Korean Peninsula. Historically, Japan has had to 
compete with the US, China and Russia for influence on the Peninsula, and has generally 
been the weaker player (Lee, Won-deog, 1999: 30). Japan still remembers the ‘Nixon Shock* 
which occurred when it was left behind in the wake of US-China normalisation in the 1970s.
Accordingly, Japan is anxious to establish a foothold in North Korea. Japan’s participation in 
the KEDO and its humanitarian aid can be understood in this context.6 Subject to the North 
refraining from provocative actions, Japan wants to make as many links with the North as 
possible. This will help Japan maintain its influence in the region. Japan may not be 
interested in the TRADP at this stage because the future of the project is still uncertain, and 
participation means a heavy financial burden. However, Japan regards the TRADP as one of 
many links with North Korea.
6. The United States’ North Korea policy
After World War II the US replaced Japan as the decisive power in the region. For the US, 
the Pacific War and the Cold War that followed conferred an importance on the Korean 
Peninsula that it had previously lacked (Patterson & Conry, 1999: 6-9). North Korea 
remained unrecognised by the US until 1994 when moves towards normalisation of relations 
were initiated.
6 No summit-level talks were held during that period, but moves to restart negotiations were conducted at other 
levels. In March 1995, a delegation o f  the ruling three-party coalition o f  Japan visited Pyongyang to adopt an 
agreement on the resumption o f negotiations on the normalisation o f relations. In that year, Japan sent 600,000 
tonnes o f grains to North Korea (Lee, Won-deog, 1999: 28).
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The US’s North Korea policy can be said to have two objectives. Its first objective is to 
prevent North Korea from using actual aggression, to halt the proliferation of nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and generally to reduce tensions in the region 
(Manning & Przystup, 1998: 2). The nuclear threat by the North has made the issue global 
rather than regional, since it had implications for other states that were pushing to develop 
nuclear capabilities (Yahuda, 1996: 150). The second objective of the US is to encourage the 
North to engage in a process of reconciliation and reunification with the South (Manning & 
Przystup, 1998: 2). A challenge to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula would 
undermine the status quo in the region. A collapse of the North Korean regime might lead to 
intervention by China, fearing the negative fallout on its own regime. The US, Japan and 
South Korea would see China’s engagement as expansionism. Japan would be pressed to 
strengthen its military. Such outcomes would certainly be unfavourable to the national 
interest of the US with its historical involvement there and its growing economic interests in 
East Asia (Yun, Dukmin, 1999: 5).
The approach known as the Agreed Framework signalled a US change in policy from 
containment to engagement. It sought to keep dialogue open on the question of nuclear 
weapons and to prepare North Korea for a soft landing into the international community, 
should that ever be possible (Ibid.: 4). In the framework North Korea was to halt its nuclear 
and missile development programmes, a new peace treaty replacing the 1953 armistice 
agreement was to be agreed upon, and reconciliation with South Korea to be sought. In 
return, the US promised to work towards normalisation of diplomatic relations with itself and 
Japan, as well as to provide economic assistance (Kim, Hong Nack, 1999: 537). On 
September 17, 1999, a number of restrictions on trade, travel and banking were lifted by the 
US as a result of ‘the Berlin Accord’. The real aim was to lay the groundwork for a 
fundamental change in North Korea’s external relations (Ibid.: 539).
For the US, the questions surrounding political and practical TRADP have not been a matter 
of urgency, since regional security is the priority. US policy is focused on stopping the 
development and sale of missiles and the WMD.7 The US is keener to provide broader 
economic aid to North Korea, rather than uncertain investment in a single economic project
7 Unlike the Clinton approach, the Bush Administration takes a different view. The US current position may be 
seen as based on a dilemma between accepting or rejecting ‘blackmail diplomacy’.
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in a special economic zone.8 In this regard, the TRADP is seen by the US as one of the few 
and small opportunities to involve North Korea in the system of international agreements and 
accords, which may lead to greater openness (Portiakov, 1998: 54). Taking into account these 
considerations, the US will find it difficult to stay out of such regional development, even 
though the project itself is seen as fairly insignificant in economic terms.
HI. A conflict between major powers’ strategies towards the regional 
distribution of power: The Northeast Asia level
East Asia has been given geo-political and geo-economic shape by the tension of interests 
between America, Russia, Japan and China. These countries have continually had to readjust 
their foreign and security policies towards the region to keep up with changes in global 
international relations.
1. Russia
Russia thinks that its involvement in any regional groupings should serve strategic as well as 
economic ends. Moscow tends to view the region in broader terms as encompassing the Asia- 
Pacific, rather than just looking at a geographically limited economic zone. It hopes that by 
being involved, it would be recognised as a major regional power. It does not want to be left 
out of any consolidation process and the project is seen as a main way for Russia to be 
economically integrated in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus any form of regional development 
needs to be considered in light of the wider moves to cooperation within APEC (Toloraya, 
1996: 1-2, also cited in Christoffersen, 1996b: 292).
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia has not had a strong presence globally as well 
as in this particular region. Suspicious of Japanese economic power and Chinese political 
manoeuvring, Russia has played a cautious game. Proposals by Japan for the Greater 
Vladivostok Free Economic Zone Project were not warmly embraced, and the Russians have 
always seen Japanese claims to the Kurile Islands as provocative and a hindrance to
8 There are several options open to it. The first is to aid the North through international organisations such as the 
World Bank, and the IMF. The second is to create a more stable environment in North Korea as a whole so as to 
make it more attractive to foreign investment, by reducing or removing economic sanctions.
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cooperation. Altogether, the previous close cooperation with China has also come to an end. 
Russia had never really taken great economic advantages from the relationship, and China 
was considered to be pushing over Russia for geopolitical gains (Rozman, 1997a: 562-3). 
Some Russian writers such as Alexander Nemets have claimed that China intends to integrate 
the Russian Far East into Northeast China’s economic system and recreate the geopolitical 
structure around a Chinese ‘heartland’ surrounded by a hinterland (Nemets, 1996, pp. 43, 49, 
64, 78, 98, in Ibid.).
Perhaps, Russia is not ready support to such a multinational regional cooperation as the 
TRADP, because it is not clear where it would fit into a regional division of labour, apart 
from being a source of raw materials (Toloraya, 1996: 27, 31). Furthermore, Russia does not 
yet have a concrete agenda of regional cooperation. Thus, Russia has co-operated with each 
side on a case-by-case basis and is keen to be involved in the regional projects on a wait-and- 
see basis.
2. Japan
Japan has publicly stated that it identifies itself with the rest of East Asia. However, when it 
comes to developing institutions to reflect any feelings of common identity, Japan has been 
slow off the mark. It had long relied on the American market as a destination for its 
manufactured exports, consequently, its regional trade interdependence remained low until 
the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, Japan was active in creating regional groupings, although it 
preferred engagement on a more discursive private and scholarly level to officially 
institionalising them. Japan’s initial interest in Asia-Pacific cooperation began as early as the 
1960s. A Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA), the Pacific Trade and Development Conference 
(P AFT AD) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) were proposed. In 1980 Japan 
attempted to form the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and APEC in 1988/89 
(Deng, Yong, 1997: 373-4; Wang, Shaoqin, 1994; Jin, Weixing, 1994; Tan, Chunlan, 1993). 
In 1994 a Japanese political and security initiative became the ARF, the first multilateral 
meeting to discuss security in the Asia-Pacific region.
In contrast to Japan’s active participation at the macro level such as APEC and the ARF, 
Tokyo seemed unenthusiastic about smaller regional groupings such as SREZs. Ever since
286
the concept of regional cooperation first came to the fore in Japan in 1988,9 Tokyo’s interest 
in the Sea of Japan economic rim10 has been rather cool (Rozman, 1997b: 38). Japanese 
usually play the TRADP as one element within a framework of economic cooperation in the 
Sea of Japan rim (KanNihonkaikeri). This is rather a narrow view of regionalism within a 
context in which Japanese private sector is moving across borders to stimulate trade and new 
economic divisions of labour (Ibid.: 30). For Japan, the TRADP is only one piece of a larger 
jigsaw. The pattern of Japan’s strategic and cooperative action seems to be one that moves 
from small steps to wider geographic involvement, from bilateral to multilateral arrangements, 
and from a focus on parts of a geographical area, to a focus on the whole of a regional 
cooperation zone.
In this, the aspect of Japan’s regionalism policy objectives can be explained with two reasons. 
First, it recognised that China was a challenger in regional dominance (Maswood, 2001: 17). 
The rise of Chinese economic power mainly combined with mainland China, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan, in the 1990s has caused the fear that the Greater China will dominate the region 
(Deng, Yong, 1997: 389). Thus Japan actively participated in the development of macro level 
regional groupings such as APEC and the ARF in the hope that these new frameworks would 
be able to work to restrain China (Hook, 1996: 193).
Second, institionalised regionalism does not serve Japanese foreign policy objectives. The 
relations with the US has been the core of Japanese policy objectives of East Asian 
regionalism. In accordance to Washington, the Japanese are to refrain from initiating policies 
that might result in a tightly organised regional structure or an economic alliance, without 
consultation with the US (Maswood, 2001: 7). The US-Japan relationship continues to be 
been the most important influence in Japan’s foreign policy in the post-war period, as 
underpinned by the US-Japan Security Treaty and by their economic linkages. If Japan wants 
to be a player in Northeast Asia, it will have to do so in partnership with the US (Rozman, 
1997b: 38).
9 Hisao Kanamori chose to construe it narrowly as ‘an economic sphere around the rim o f the Sea o f Japan’ (Jean 
Nihonkai keizai ken), p. 1, cited in (Rozman, 2000: 11-2).
10 For the Chinese perspectives on concepts the Sea o f Japan Rim in chronological order and Japan’s national 
interest, see (Lin, Shaoguang, 1993).
287
3. The United States
Even during the Cold War when the US was primarily concerned with containing the Soviet 
Union and establishing a geostrategic presence in the region, the economic significance of 
Northeast Asia did not go unnoticed.11 In April 1978 Senator John Glenn, Chairman of the 
Sub-committee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations of the US 
Senate, proposed a feasibility study for regional economic development. The resulting report 
‘Evaluation of a Proposed Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Organisation’ in May 1979, 
considered gains to US interests from joining the OPTAD, which was later given serious 
consideration at the US policy level (Soesastro, 1994: 82-3). In the early 1980s Michael 
Mansfield, the former US ambassador to Japan, highlighted the significance of trade across 
the Pacific compared with trade across the Atlantic. In 1984 President Reagan stated that ‘the 
Pacific is where the future of the world lies’ (Both are cited in Berger, 1999: 1015).
Since the end of the Cold War, the US began to consider what would be the regional 
consequences of a change in US strategy. The US turned its attention to the Asia-Pacific 
region after it had constructed the basic framework for post-Cold War Europe (Chen, Jun, 
1995). The US strategy can be looked at as a ‘fan-shaped structure’ with the US as the axis, 
joined by a series of agreements to China, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, and Australia 
(Christoffersen, 1996a: 1069-70) and, at the same time, it began to play an active role in 
APEC. APEC was established in 1989, and in 1993 President Clinton emphasised that US 
policy in the Asia-Pacific was in accordance with APEC principles, an extension of PECC to 
ministerial level, and talked about a ‘new Pacific community’. Clinton’s ‘New Asia-Pacific 
Community’ can be illustrated as a means to marketisation and democratisation in the region 
through APEC (Ibid.: 1081), as a forum where US power can be maintained. It may also 
hinder the creation of a regional identity with East Asian capitalist values - i.e. East Asia 
Economic Caucus (EAEC). The US further hoped that APEC would be replaced by more 
formal and binding commitments with scheduled liberal, multilateral international economic 
order, including eventually China. It has been boosted by American led attempts since 1993 
to enlarge its scope to promote an Asia-Pacific community committed to a free trade area 
(Yamakage, 1997: 293-4).
11 For the Chinese perspectives on the security importance o f  Northeast Asia in the U S’s Asia-Pacific strategies 
and its policies towards the region, see (Chang, Xin, 1994; Xu & Xiao, 1995: 15-17).
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Despite the US’s obvious interests at the macro level, at present the US’s position in the 
kinds of sub-regionalism is not apparent. Nevertheless, one can safely assume that if  the 
development of sub-regionalism should lead to the diminution of the role of the US, the latter 
may have no option other than to insist on new forms of regionalism (Portiakov, 1998: 54). 
The US never neglected to pay attention to such activities, as we can see the US’s federal 
institute’s active role in shaping the TRADP. The idea of the TRADP was conceived in a 
discussion by Lee-Jay Cho, director of the East-West Centre in Honolulu, with Chairman 
Song Jian of China’s State Science and Technology Commission (lfn, Choi, Hoil, 1995: 
271). In addition, the US’ strategic interests should be clear. First, there is their direct 
involvement in the North Korean problem, second, it is their concern on the military 
manufacturing capabilities of the Russian Far East (Campbell, 1995b: 214). Third, there is the 
rise of China and the challenge to Japan’s regional economic and political influence in the 
region.
4. China
While the major countries (China, Russia, Japan and, to some extent, the US) continued to 
pay lip service to regionalism in the 1990s, economic ties across the region’s borders were 
not a high priority. Efforts to create regionalism were politically motivated and came through 
central directives from the major countries (Rozman, 2000: 19). China’s complex relations 
with the other three powers has led to conflict in their perceptions and rejoinder strategies 
towards the regionalism and regional international politics of Northeast Asia.
China has constantly sought to undermine Russo-American, Russo-Japanese, and Japanese- 
American relations and turn them to its advantage (Rozman, 1997c: 159-60). China aimed to 
alienate Russia from the West and Japan. In building their new strategic partnership, Beijing 
urged Moscow to raise trade levels sharply while gaining its cooperation in achieving China’s 
political priorities and providing China with military technology. However, the Russian Far 
East continued to be suspicious of China, which led to a severe downturn in trade and border 
crossings in 1994 (Rozman, 1997b: 34-5). Russia’s distrust of China’s long-term intentions 
for the region meant regionalism was much harder to achieve.
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In addition, Japan would not accept any regionalism dominated by China in Northeast Asia. 
Beijing has identified three reasons why Japan was reluctant to participate in the TRADP. 
First, Japan’s strategy was to be a regional leader and would only support regionalism as 
such. Second, fearing that it might stimulate the rise of China, Japanese support is limited to 
promoting stability and steady growth. Third, under Washington’s guidance, Tokyo is 
withholding technology and other benefits in order to undermine the communist party 
leadership (Blanchard, 2000: 284; See also Rozman, 1998a: 10). The Chinese noticed that 
Japan’s regional-based economic groupings such as the ‘Sea of Japan Rim Economic Circle’ 
were an important component in Japan’s overall national security strategy which would 
balance China (Gao, Yu, 1985: 8-14; Xu, Yong, 1988: 6-11; Song, Shaoying, 1990: 5-9; Gao, 
Zhonglu, 1990: 18-24; Xu & Wang, 1997).
For China, the key issue is its relationship with the US, the only global economic and military 
power that China ‘respects’ (Bracken, 1998: 420). Despite their great commitment in trade 
and investment, their relations have been volatile. Shambaugh calls them ‘strategic 
competitors’ and there is between them ‘an ambiguous relationship with elements of conflict,
1 7coexistence and cooperation’, although of very unequal strengths. This ambiguity runs deep 
and reflects the contrast between the deeper historical and cultural forces that have shaped the 
two states. This is despite the fact that the presidents of the two countries in 1998 publicly 
stated an aim to ‘build towards a constructive, strategic partnership for the 21st century’. The 
Chinese think that the US has attempted to resist the rise of China, so that Washington can 
maintain its initiative in the region (Lin, Hongyu, 1997).
Thus, the four major powers are all repositioning and adopting new policies to accord with 
new developments. The essential nature of their geo-strategic relationship means that 
economic initiatives are subordinated to political considerations. The strategic objectives of 
the three major powers (Japan, Russia, the US), whether considered independently or in 
alliance, have been effectively blocked the success of China’s regionalism strategy.
12 At the same time, Shambaugh also recognises that ‘strategic competitors’ are not the same as, and need not 
become, ‘strategic adversaries’ (Shambaugh, 2000: 99).
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Conclusion
The TRADP suffered not only from the economic problems of lack of private sector 
enthusiasm and investment. It was also weakened by the Chinese government’s essential 
view of it as a pawn in the game between the centre and the provinces and between provinces 
themselves. However, the most significant obstacle to the further TRADP development was 
the fact the Chinese and other major powers have regarded it as a strategic-political vehicle 
rather than an economic one. The major powers have not been interested in uncertain 
investment in a single economic project, but have treated it as one of many political and 
economic links to remain engaged in North Korean issues, fearing that any changes in North 
Korea would threaten the current alignment of power. Furthermore the project has been 
functioning as a constituent in the strategic mapping of each country of Northeast Asia. The 
political game-nisation of the TRADP has been the major obstacle to a pure multinational 
regional economic development project.
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Chapter Nine. Conclusion
This thesis has analysed the TRADP with emphasis on the theory of ‘relative gains’, while 
the concept of absolute gains has been found to be of little use. A crucial consideration was 
the comparative impact of relative versus absolute gains in deciding a state’s preference for 
cooperation. Liberals’ proposition is that states cooperate so as to achieve absolute gains. 
Through further cooperation and agreement, states can make up for any relative 
disadvantages by other means, and then cooperate to get the benefits, the absolute gains 
(APSR, 1993: 730-1). However, as this thesis examined, cooperation is much more difficult 
even when all sides can reap absolute gains, because states are not willing to realise fewer 
absolute gains than others. In a game where friends can become enemies, concern about 
relative gains will be always a fact (Grieco, 1988, p. 499, cited in Matthews, 1996: 119). The 
power struggle nature of the anarchic system encourages relative gains. Where relative shifts 
in gains are a central concern, states must be prepared to take into account the choices of 
other states. This concern for relative gains turns cooperation into a zero-sum game, thereby 
squandering cooperation opportunities between members.
Along with the study of relative gains, this thesis illustrated how relative gains influenced 
cooperation between neighbouring countries, using the example of the sub-regional economic 
zones (SREZs). Beyond the economic aspects of cooperation between the countries, SREZ 
was a useful tool for international relations and foreign policy fields. How national state 
actors have been involved in making them and have used them for their national interest has 
already had enough political implications (Weatherbee, 1995). Therefore, by focusing on the 
processes and roles of SREZs as an instrument of a state’s foreign policy, this thesis has 
explored the value of SREZs in a state’s foreign policy. The value of SREZs depends on ‘the 
congruence of foreign policy with domestic interests and policies’ that ‘will be pursued as 
long as it does not conflict with or undermine other policies deemed more effective or 
threaten interests viewed as more vital’ (Ibid.: 425).
Bearing these two important assumptions in mind, this final chapter of the thesis seems 
sensible to conclude with a discussion of the Chinese approach first, as China has been the 
principal initiator and driver of the TRADP and related measures. The first section
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summarises China’s TRADP policy objectives and the reasons for policy failures within the 
context of relative gains between China and its neighouring countries. The second section 
looks again at the TRADP within the context of regionalism. The main implication shows the 
reasons for its failure to achieve workable regionalism drawing from the lessons of other 
cases of regionalism in the world.
1. China’s TRADP policy dilemma
Each state has a number of national objectives in pursuing its foreign policy. Major changes 
in both its domestic and international environments made China rethink where its national 
interest lay. Faced with these new circumstances, China focused the direction of its foreign 
policy on the Asia-Pacific region as well as on the pursuit of the status of a global power. 
Since the Asia-Pacific has become central to Chinese security concerns and to its economic 
development, China’s leaders believe that the Asia-Pacific in general, and East Asia in 
particular was becoming a more critical arena within which to find supporters with sufficient 
influence to enable it to achieve independence in the post-Cold War era. It is with this in 
mind that regional cooperation with bordering countries has been advocated in the guise of 
China’s ‘good neighbourly diplomacy’. Regional cooperation with adjacent neighbouring 
countries has had a significant impact on every aspect of omni-directional foreign policy in 
the 1990s.
However, there is much concern about the real intentions behind China’s more cooperative 
foreign policy, as the end of the Cold War has also created a sense of insecurity and 
uncertainty in Asia. Both schools of ‘engagement’ and ‘containment’ have differing views of 
Chinese cooperative behaviour that are pertinent to the analysis of the nature of the Chinese 
foreign policy problem. In one view, its active participation in sub-regional economic 
cooperation can be understood as ‘strategic’ interdependence, which has an effect on China’s 
tactical thinking about how to achieve long-term goals. In order to achieve national goals 
(great power status and regime stability), China has had to develop a flexible and cautious 
strategy, despite the ruling party’s generally negative views on interdependence derived from 
its interpretation of recent history. Its broader strategy has been pursued in a form so as not to 
give rise to suspicions and misconceptions by stronger powers and neighbours. It is also 
essential for China to satisfy two short-term goals (domestic economic development and a 
peaceful security environment). Sub-regional economic cooperation in the various parts of
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China has been thus seen as a means of realising its goals. Careful and flexible management 
o f  foreign economic relations should therefore have promoted China’s foreign policy goals.
1.1 China’s TRADP policy objectives
In the TRADP, China’s self-interest maximum approach was developed with several national 
considerations in mind. As reviewed in Chapters Five and Six, China was concerned with the 
Korean minority living in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, which borders North 
Korea. The authorities thought that the provision of opportunities for economic development 
would placate widespread complaints and discontent from Yanbian, related to the growing 
economic disparities between the coastal and interior regions since the inception of the open- 
door policy in 1978. In particular, the 1989 Tiananmen crisis followed by the collapse of 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union made China’s leaders feel 
insecure about the political cohesion of the country. Traditionally, domestic unrest has been 
seen as especially dangerous for China when unstable elements with links outside the 
country, give rise to a serious external security threat (neiluan waihuan) (Hu, Weixing, 
1995a: 127-8). The Chinese government was forced to seek a more balanced regional 
development within China and, as a result, created the special economic zone in the Tumen 
River area in Jilin Province.
However, China’s self-interested approach was of more international politico-strategic 
importance. Once China has access to the East Sea via the Tumen River as part of the 
TRADP, China might reassert its legal claims to rights of navigation to the East Sea through 
the Tumen River. Customary international law and diplomatic practice have seen cases of 
countries which have long coastlines being granted rights of access via rivers. China has 
therefore argued that coastal states have the general duty not to hamper the innocent passage 
of foreign ships in accordance with the Convention. In this Russia and North Korea should 
permit use of the river (Li, Dehu, 1993). Moreover, regaining navigation rights would be 
confer a psychological victory in the face of the historical loss of this area. China had ceded a 
400,000 sq. km. territory to Russia under the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking. Access to the East 
Sea through the Tumen River would also provide maritime and military outlet to the Sea that 
was hitherto dominated by Russia and Japan. China did not want to lose this opportunity, 
which resulted from rapid changes in the Northeast Asian political atmosphere in the post-Cold 
War era.
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Another important strategic aim was to maintain stability in the Korean Peninsula. This 
serves the interests of China, in the midst of its own economic modernisation. Beijing would 
like to provide North Korea with a model for economic modernisation and with political 
encouragement. Building on existing border trade, the TRADP is not only an urgent measure 
that may help to keep the North Korea afloat, it may even prove quite profitable, while at the 
same time introducing concepts of market reform (Cotton, 1995: 206-7). Furthermore, the 
TRADP is an important strategic block in China’s long term Korean policy. The Korean 
Peninsula is central to future regional schemes of a political or economic nature, and this 
explains China’s strong interest to be at the heart of the TRADP (Ibid.).
Finally, in the Chinese view, the US and Japan have attempted to resist the rise of China, so 
that the countries can maintain their influence in the region through their manipulation of 
macro regional level entities such as APEC. The strategy of China has been to divide the 
wider region into units that could be more easily influenced by China that is not strong 
enough to be considered the dominant regional power (Christoffersen, 1996a: 1081). Such 
sub-regional groupings in East Asia could also create a political front that would make it 
difficult for Japan and the US to deal with states in the region through bilateral arrangements. 
Although China is committed to the geographical scope of APEC and despite its 
corresponding commitment to the open policy, such sub-regional groupings were more 
‘advantageous’ for China (Ibid.: 1079). China saw that the TRADP could bring the NIEs and 
Russia into a part of China’s Northeast Economic Circle strategy. It sought to cultivate 
regional relationships to defend itself against American and Japanese strategies (Ibid.).
1.2 China’s TRADP policy failures
China hoped that the TRADP could help achieve its strategic objectives, in the words of one 
Chinese proverb, ‘killing many birds with one stone’. However, the project has not reached 
targets or lived up to expectations, although some progress has been made. China’s TRADP 
policies have encountered various challenges, as assessed in Chapters Seven and Eight. In 
addition to the institutional and economic problems in and around the project, the political 
gamQ-nisation of the TRADP has become the most crucial obstacle for the TRADP 
development.
Domestically, the project was the product of conflicts of interest between both the centre and 
provinces and between provinces themselves, based on domestic political considerations
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without regard for economic realities. The project became a springboard for economic 
cooperation of the three provinces of the regional economy as a whole and not just the three 
provincial economies separately (Christoffersen, 2001: 9-11). Liaoning Province preferred 
the Yellow Bohai Sea Rim project (YBSR) to the TRADP. Heilongjiang also wanted to 
expand the number of economic zones and border openings from four to twenty-one to create 
trade benefits. In Rozman’s view, the top priority in Beijing’s development plan was the 
Southeast coast of China in the 1980s; Shanghai and the Yangtze delta triangle as the core 
with the Yellow Sea and the Bohai rim reaching into southern Liaoning province in the early 
1990s. The rest was not of significance (Rozman, 1997b: 31). The project was a large-scale 
one needing more resources and commitment than China was now able to supply. China was 
not willing to pay the price to develop the project, to make the necessary political 
commitments, or to put in place much needed economic incentives. China has regarded the 
TRADP as a jile  (this is a Chinese phrase meaning a chicken’s rib -  a part that is difficult to 
eat, but which we do not want to throw away) rather than a vitally important economic 
project for the region. The Chinese attitude could be described as ‘a fox waiting for a grape to 
fall’.
Internationally, such cooperation as a transnational phenomenon gives rise to political and 
security problems of various kinds. As China has managed the project for its own national 
interest, the other major powers have also treated it in broader terms as encompassing their 
regional strategies, rather than just looking at a geographically limited economic zone. 
China’s initiative in Northeast Asian economic cooperation has taken place in a context where 
the major powers differ over the appropriate regional distribution of power as well as about the 
desirable form of regional economic development. Different forms of regional development 
affected relations between the major powers differently and that constrained cooperation as 
each side sought to guard its own interests. The other powers saw the rise of China as 
threatening their national interests, and they wanted a model of economic cooperation that 
would secure their interests better. It was the concern of other countries in the region to check 
China’s political and economic ambitions and ease Chinese pressure in the region. Thus China- 
centred regional cooperation that seemed to diminish their influence in the region necessarily 
entails resistance. In this, the Korean Peninsula, which is located at the centre of the TRADP, 
had become a battlefield for great power competition in Northeast Asia. Any changes in the 
Korean Peninsula could produce a new balance of power in the region. The TRADP as the only
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transnational economic zone in North Korea, provided a link with which to engage North Korea, 
and was therefore regarded as a political ploy.
In sum, China is the key player (jujiao), at the Asia-Pacific level, and in particular in 
Northeast Asia (Ferdinand, 2000). Given China’s size, economic dynamics, cultural 
influence, and political power as well as military potential, we cannot understand East Asian 
affairs without understanding the role of China. China’s strategy toward the region aspires to 
leadership in determining the future of the region. Since China opened the door to the outside 
world in 1978, its foreign policy has gradually become more very open, cooperative and 
interdependent. However, there has been a dispute in analysing the nature of Chinese foreign 
policy after the Tiananmen crisis. The core of the dispute is the argument that China is not 
constrained by concerns that it might damage its economic interdependence. This thesis has 
not sought to examine the dispute, but it has instead examined the nature of the new 
economic interdependence, which has become the kernel of China’s external relations since 
then. One of the things this thesis set out to do was to describe how China managed its 
regional economic cooperation with neighbours and how China has used economic 
cooperation as an instrument in pursuing its broader foreign policy concerns. The TRADP 
could be seen as one test of China’s foreign policy of interdependence with neighbours. The 
thesis explored why China had embarked on the project, showing that China wanted to 
maximise economic and non-economic interests, using the opportunity to develop the TRADP, 
not only for domestic, but also for international reasons in and outside China. We have seen 
how the ambiguity and fragility of the interdependent relations with China of those countries 
was shaped by having uncomfortable political and historical memories and how China’s 
TRADP policy was affected by the response and reaction of its neighbouring countries.
2. The TRADP at the crossroads of East Asian regionalism
Another significant dimension of the TRADP may be seen in the context of regionalism. This 
is relevant not just to regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, but also more widely as one of many 
examples of regionalism worldwide. The study of the TRADP as regionalism is significant to 
test the four IR questions that were stated in Chapter One: a) illumination of the pattern of 
development of regionalism in East Asia; b) assessment of the likely success of institutional 
regionalism in East Asia; c) the implications of this case study for the future of North-South 
cooperation; and d) assessment of the relative significance of market and state in creating
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regionalism. Answering these four questions can cast light on the preconditions necessary for 
the success of regionalism. A leading country (or countries) within a region should provide 
public goods, and/or less powerful states should accept the leader(s). Furthermore, rival 
powers should accommodate each other. In this case China was too self-interested to allow 
for the concerns of others and thus provided insufficient leadership. Moreover regional 
rivalries were not accommodated.
2.1 Regionalism under the comparative perspective
The economic, political, and security significance of regionalism has largely been based on 
consideration of the formation of particular sets of institutions including the EU, NAFTA, 
APEC, and ARF (Payne & Gamble, 1996: 1, 17).1 With the end of the Cold War, such regional 
arrangements can be seen as leading to increasing regional economic and political integration. 
Kenichi Ohmae, in his book Borderless World (1990), went so far as to suggest that 
governments ‘become invisible’ in the era of globalisation (p. 183). ‘Today’s global 
corporations are nationality-less, because consumers have become less nationalistic’ (p. 195). 
This trend thus ‘made traditional national borders almost disappear’ (p. xi).
Among examples of regionalism, the most successful cases are the EU and NAFTA. In 
particular, these two successful regionalisms present a working model of rule-making that is 
highly institutionalized. They are based on formal consensus, with economic integration led 
by strong institutional traditions. Their national borders are blurring in the process of 
regionalisation. The source of their success can be drawn from Coleman and Underhill’s 
perspective. European countries had shared a common history, and economic and security 
interests, along with the consensus on the US as the security guarantor against the Soviet 
threat. More importantly, power struggles among Germany, France and Great Britain had 
been accommodated. In North America the US and Canada and the US and Mexico also 
shared economic interests, and above all, neither Canada nor Mexico had objections to US 
leadership (Coleman & Underhill, 1998: 1-2).
1 For more regionalism movements in various parts o f the world, see the special issue o f {Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 5, 1999).
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In contrast to the two successful regionalisms, many in the Third World have not been so 
successful. Regional organisations such as Mercosur and SICA in South and Central America 
are highly institutionalised which can be compared with one of the EU and NAFTA, but their 
economic and trade liberalisation remain weak, due to institutional inefficiency, economic 
competition and political distrust. From their experience, we can see economic cooperation 
does not depend on the degree of institutionalization only. Central American states sought 
unilateral actions to maximise their national interests, and sacrificed mutual trust; the rivalry 
between Argentina and Brazil has not waned. Other parts of the world are not exempt from 
such problems. More importantly, history does not stand by regionalism. In South Asia, India 
does not feel the need to make a regional grouping, and prefers bilateral deals with small 
states such as Nepal or Sri Lanka. India is aware of its clout in dealing with smaller partners. 
Why should it give up this easy way of control? The rivalry and hatred between India and 
Pakistan is another strong concern. In the cases of North Africa and Middle East political and 
historical rivalry were so crucial. Violence and conflict had halted all talk of regional 
cooperation.
Keeping in mind the worldwide patterns of regionalism, we can carefully evaluate the 
TRADP in the context of characteristics and patterns of regionalism that may be seen in the 
Asia-Pacific. Regionalism in Northeast Asia is more or less unique. There are two streams of 
regionalism there. APEC and ARF cooperation are at the macro level. However, wide range 
of geographical distance and differences in political systems and levels of economic 
development mean that they are not same as EU and NAFTA-style regional integration. 
ASEAN has been regarded as most advanced version of regionalism in East Asia, but the 
substance of cooperation is still open to many questions. Although they have dynamic trade 
and economic relationships, regional organisations have remained minimally institutionalised. 
The preferred approach of Asian governments has been more in tune with non-binding 
agreements and informal consensus. The regional cooperation process of the region has to 
date proceeded in a loose and pragmatic way. By virtue of that approach, or perhaps despite it, 
major issues of ‘bargaining and reciprocity’ have not been placed in the countries’ policy 
making-process. The regional countries mainly see such regionalisms as simply an economic 
mechanism, and desire a process of consensual dialogue and socialisation (Harris, 1994: 267- 
8).
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Apart from the examples of the loose forms of cooperation at the macro-level provided by 
APEC, ARF and ASEAN, the more dynamic economic interaction across ideological and 
political boundaries in East Asia have been promoted by sub-regional economic zones 
(SREZs), involving links between segments of neighbouring states, at the micro level. The 
SREZs, which do not necessarily involve whole states, emerged as a regional cooperation 
model in contrast to the Western approach. However, although SREZs were seen as a great 
opportunity for promoting mutual regional economic development and seemed to suit the 
Asian way of thinking and approaches avoiding maximal institutionalisation, most projects 
have failed to perform. Only two SREZs (SIJORI and GSCEZ) can be considered successful 
in the region, even these two SREZs developed without close relations to the end of the Cold 
War and the continuing trend towards globalisation.
The answer as to why SREZs on the whole have been unsuccessful can be found in the 
significant role of the state in creating regionalism in East Asia. Perhaps, we are not really 
living in a borderless world, as Ohmae claimed. People, as he represents them, ‘are global 
[only] when [acting] as consumers’ (my emphasis) (Ibid.: xiii). They may not be ‘less 
nationalistic’, when they are not consumers, at least in East Asia. Economic realities are not 
only created by and for consumers, but more importantly, they are also influenced by the 
state’s political and security interests. Cross-border economic interactions still raise questions 
of jurisdiction and challenges sovereignty. Although the Cold War was over, regional 
cooperation that included the socialist and capitalist countries crossing over different 
ideologies and political systems has not been easy. Thus it can be said that the significance of 
the state has not necessarily declined, even though its role is evolving.2
Such a state-centric approach may come from the regional countries’ historical experience. In 
addition to their experience of colonialism, there remain several issues such as North-South 
issues, suspicion of the West, sovereignty concern, and the fears of hegemonic influence, etc. 
still dominate in the region (Harris, 1994: 260). As a result, there was little mutual 
understanding among them, and the possibility of mutual and international cooperation was 
limited. Of many reasons that can be blamed, conflict between the two potential leaders of 
the region, Japan and China, is the most important factor. As well as the other two greater 
powers in the region, the US and Russia, are crucial. At the time when Russia is suffering the
2 For a discussion on the role o f the state, see (Clark, 1998; Yoshimatsu, 2000).
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setback from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan is struggling with economic re- 
constructuring, and the US is showing more isolation tendencies, a more serious issue to 
debate is the security dilemma that China poses. The economic development of China is 
mostly seen as good news in the region, in part because it is believed to lead China to 
concentrate on domestic development, so that it makes an effort to cultivate better foreign 
relationships with its neighbours. However, in the long term, a dilemma arises because 
economic growth can increase the Chinese military capabilities, so that China will 
increasingly aspire to the position of regional leadership, which can threaten the current 
regional status quo. Therefore, both weaker neighbours and stronger powers are suspicious of 
China’s moves to interdependence. In this regard, bringing together the regional countries 
into one economic equation is a very difficult matter, with serious implication for the future 
political and economic landscape of Northeast Asia (Rozman, 1998b: 1-2).
2.2 The ways to revive the TRADP
When considering economics, the region is not yet an attractive target for the private sector. 
The project is constrained by many intractable problems in or around the project itself: the 
geological and natural environmental problem, the lack of infrastructure, the aftermath of 
centralised command economy, and a poor legal system, etc. Furthermore, capital is vital 
especially for an infrastructure development project such as the TRADP. This foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is needed to release the region’s potential. Key considerations for potential 
investors include excellent location in terms of access to markets, low property and labour 
costs, and the supply of skilled workers for any particular industry. Rules and legal 
procedures affecting FDI need to be created and applied and they must be readily 
understandable and transparent (Campbell, 1995a: 32). If these major obstacles are not 
addressed, the TRADP will remain a half-completed exercise in multilateral cooperation.
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In addition to the above theoretical and principal suggestions, some practical lessons can be 
learned from the Singapore-Johore-Riau Growth Triangle (SUORI). Recently, it has been 
expanded, adding Johere, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka and Pahang in Malaysia in 1996; and 
West Sumatra, Jambi, Bengkulu, Lampung and South Sumatra in Indonesia in 1997. In fact, 
the success of SUORI is such that it has developed into the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore 
Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) (Thambipillai, 1998: 254). Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that SUORI countries were not eager to move to over-institutionalise the successful close 
economic ties between them. The trilateral government agreement that was initially expected 
never in fact materialised (Vatikiotis, 1993b). The most that was achieved was a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on economic cooperation within the triangle signed 
by representatives of the three countries in Johore as late as December 1994, even though it 
started from the early 1980s. Moreover, there is still an understanding between the three 
countries that any two of them may take joint action without approval from the third 
(Thambipillai, 1998: 255). More crucially, the rivalry between them has been muted or has 
not been regarded seriously as a threat. Indonesia is a important power, but not a dominant 
power. As is Malaysia. Singapore is the driving force of the SREZ, but is not in position as a 
threat.
Another good example is the Greater South China Economic Zone (GSCEZ). Sub-regional 
economic zone does not always follow institutionalised regionalism. The existence of 
geographic and cultural proximity and economic interdependence does not guarantee 
institutionalised regionalism, especially when sovereignty and national security are at stake 
(Zhao, Suisheng, 1998: 115). In sovereignty disputes with Taiwan, Beijing was not keen on 
any formal institutional arrangement in the GSCEZ. It is unlikely that formal structures will 
be introduced as long as neither China nor Taiwan recognise each other on the diplomatic 
level. But the sub-regionalism approach has allowed Beijing to take advantage of economic 
interdependence with Taiwan without addressing the issue of sovereignty (Ibid.: 120). 
Taiwan has also benefited via trade and economic interest from the sub-regional economic 
cooperation approach which can avoid political conflict.
Lessons from the two cases can be applied to the TRADP. The conditions around the TRADP 
were not ready for the many attempts at institutionalisation, but the countries institutionalised 
first before creating a conducive climate for cooperation. The degree of mutual trust is key. 
However, these regional countries do not have a sense of community, and the issue of
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distribution of power has not been settled. As Chapters One and Two of this thesis argued out 
of the key factors that could make regionalism in East Asia work, the political commitment of 
governments is the more crucial facilitating factor for regionalism, by which to induce the 
private sector. In order to revive the opportunity of the TRADP’s future development, 
political commitment of the TRADP membership countries is needed to identify the common 
interest of the countries involved to enhance mutual benefits. Successful sub-regional 
cooperation needs more flexible planning by all the interested parties to balance their national 
interests. Such a capacity to adapt according to partners’ national interests with equality and 
mutual benefit in mind is an important condition for successful cooperation to create a 
suitable circumstance. In order to avoid the politically sensitive issues between members 
which impede cooperation, the TRADP would do better to move together after developing its 
own area first (Aldrich, 1997: 326), even though the time and cost would be higher than in a 
cooperative and coordinative project. Such an approach is necessary for the time being.
If this project has had a measure of success, it will probably have stimulated other 
regionalisms struggling for survival. Since the Second World War the gap between North and 
South has widened with the aftermath of colonialisation. The issue became more problematic 
when it combined with the hostility of East-West confrontation (Adams, 1993: 215-7, 239). 
Historical economic underdevelopment reflected the inability of the South to catch the 
mainstream of the world’s economic development. For the continuing economic stagnation in 
the South and the widening gap with the North, the South needed an opportunity to cooperate 
with the North, which could provide technology and capital. In the process of post-Cold War 
economic order, international political economic environment was improving. Many 
countries in the South adopted a new, open economic policy, which aimed to open their 
strictly controlled borders to their rivals regardless of their differences.
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However, in spite of their efforts to create economic opportunities, most regionalisms have 
failed and disparity in incomes between the rich and poor countries are rapidly growing. At 
the time when regionalism has a great difficulty to stand as a test case of narrowing gaps in 
North-South divide, the success or failure of the unique cooperative model presented by the 
TRADP will challenge the uncertainty of future North-South cooperation. If South Korea’s 
and Japan’s financial and economic support to these socialist economies should prove 
positive, the ‘trickle-down effect’ could bring hope to a new model of division of labour. It 
might also contribute to overcoming political and ideological differences and historical 
tensions between the North and the South. It could bring hope for those who are interested in 
curing the aftermath of East-West confrontation and in reducing the gap of the North-South 
divide to have a belief that it will be possible to improve North-South relations in a way that 
would foster peace and prosperity to the region.
3. Concluding remarks
The TRADP was regarded as an experiment in regional cooperation that would benefit 
member countries, Northeast Asia, and beyond that the wider world. A regionalism which 
combines local needs with national interests and global forces is one of the best possibilities 
to achieve positive development (Rozman, 1998b: 4). However, the consensus among the 
commentators is that the TRADP’s current status is not good and that there are many 
challenges that need to be faced. There have been many plans and few achievements, and the 
realities do not correspond to the ideal. Each country in the region has a different design for 
the TRADP. Member countries see the potential benefits very differently. Some have looked 
to immediate economic benefit, whilst others have looked for long-term strategic benefit. 
Levels of enthusiasm and involvement vary greatly and this is reflected in the uneven process 
of institutional building for the TRADP. Perhaps, as may be seen from an article in The Asian 
Wall Street Journal (March 29, 2001) entitled: ‘The UN is extending the life of a highly 
publicised but disappointing project to create a special economic zone’, the TRADP ‘is too 
high-profile for the UNDP to let it die’. However, as even a former UNDP TRADP officer 
takes the pessimistic view, the TRADP might not survive into 21st century (Davies, 2000: 
46). The project may be close to dying.
To repeat the argument which runs throughout this thesis, economic incentives and free 
market forces may be important in the formation of successful regional cross border
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initiatives in East Asia, but the commitment of governments is the precondition necessary to 
induce the private sector. Among many factors, we have seen the key rests with China. 
Relating to the theme of this thesis, China, as the principal initiator of the Tumen project, has 
sought to use the TRADP for its own purposes. China intended to manipulate 
interdependence for its own strategic purposes, but its intentions may not have been as 
successful as wished. As Keohane points out, cooperation at governmental level occurs only 
when players adapt ‘their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through 
a process of policy coordination’ (Keohane, 1984: 51). China has hoped that other countries 
would adapt their behaviour to its own preferences, but they did not behave that way. When 
the others anticipated China meeting their standards, the Chinese did not respond the way. 
China has retained a mindset that is rather focused on a narrow definition of self interest. 
Therefore, both weaker neighbours and stronger powers are suspicious of China’s moves to 
interdependence. The former are vulnerable, the latter sensitive to growing interdependence. 
Tensions still remain and there has been no real change in the substance of their 
interdependence.
Northeast Asia is a difficult area for trans-national cooperation or developing common 
economic interests and opportunities. At present we cannot tell if  any of the players will 
actually ‘pull the plug’, but the survival of the TRADP will now depend on the way the 
political and economic geography of Northeast Asia will change in the future. At the time of 
writing in 2002, the Chinese government can either wait until its growing economic and 
political power is sufficient for them to get their way on the TRADP or it can seek to build 
trust and confidence with the other TRADP countries. This raises broader issues about 
Chinese foreign policy and the rise of China in world affairs. The TRADP problem may 
either help push China into exploring new ways of consensus-building, or raise the ‘China 
threat’ theory to prominence again. Without China’s efforts to resolve other countries’ 
suspicions of China’s intentions and to provide incentives to erase the relative gains concerns 
of neighbouring countries, the future prospects of the TRADP will continue to be bleak. The 
realisation of the goal of maintaining and strengthening stability in Northeast Asia is still in 
the distant future.
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